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ABSTRACT 
Despite the endeavours of Kings Tupou I and II to maintain 
Tonga's independence, Britain established a Protectorate over the 
Kingdom in May 1900. By this action the British Government hoped to 
exclude other powers from Tonga, whilst keeping its own commitment to 
a m1n1mum. Tonga aroused little interest in British eyes apart from 
its potential as a base for rival Pacific powers. 
Although it was not intended that the British Agent and Consul 
·appointed to Tonga should intervene in the Kingdom's internal affairs 
other than by giving advice when asked, a succession of British 
officials were not content with the role of observer, and sought 
Colonial Office backing to force the recalcitrant Tupou II to heed 
their advice. In 1~05 the King was obliged, on threat of deportation, 
to accept the intervention of the High Commissioner for the Western 
Pacific and to agree to take the Consul's advice on internal as well 
as external affairs. For the next six years the Consul, supported by 
a Cabinet of British nominees, vied with the King for control of the 
Government. 
In 1911, after the Consul had insisted once too often that his 
advice be taken in opposition to the decision of the Tongan Privy 
Council, Tupou II launched an effective protest against British 
intervention. The Colonial Office, which had never intended the 
authority of the Tongans to be removed under the Protectorate, did not 
support the actions of ~ts Consul and restored to the King much of the 
autonomy that had been taken away in 1905. 
Throughout the rest of the reign of Tupou II and during the reign 
of his daughter, Queen Salote, the British Consul continued to advise 
the Government by mutual agreement rather than by force. The Conaul 
came to be a source of support to the Government and the monar~hy, 
rather than a thre .. t, and for at least three decades his advice was an 
important facet of the administration. 
After the Second World War, and particularly with the rise to 
prominence of the Queen's son and heir, Tungi (later King Taufa'ahau 
Tupou IV), the British Consul moved further and further from the 
centre of power. The changes in his relationship with the Tongan 
Government were embodied in a revision of the Treaty of Friendship in 
1958 and again in 1968. 
With an exchange of notes in 1970, Tonga regained control of its 
external affairs and 're-entered the comity of nations'. 
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PREFACE 
The claim is sometimes made that the Kingdom of Tonga has a 
unique importance in the study of colonial history because it is the 
one Polynesian society that has maintained its political independence 
unbroken in the face of the overwhelming might of the colonial pm..rers. 
Th~ credit for this unusual achievement is often given almost entirely 
to King George Tupou I and his adviser and Premier, the Reverend 
Shirley Baker. This thesis sets out to examine these claims and .o 
analyse the relationship between Tonga and Great Britain which 
operated for the first 70 years of the twentieth century. 
Tonga became a British Protectorate in May 1900 not b~cause of 
the situation in Tonga itself but because of broad~r imperial 
concerns. The Treaty of Friendship which defined the protectorate 
relationship was drawn up in the British Colonial Office and designed 
to meet Britain's requirements in Tonga with the least possible 
interference in Tonga's internal affairs. Great Britain's main 
concern in Tonga was to exclude the warships of foreign nations, for 
Tonga offered practically nothing worth exploiting from a nineteenth 
century European viewpoint, apart from its safe harbour at Vava'u. 
The lines of a poem, penned by Hamilton Huntc:r, the British Agent and 
Consul to Tonga from 1901-1909, might well serve as a key-note for 
Britain's attitude towards the island kingdom: 
••• By reason of its great, 
Its regal unimportance, it rests a native state. 
viii 
Admittedly, had there been no recognised central Government 
capable of ruling both Tongans and the few Europeans within the grouo, 
Tonga's history would have been very different. But Tonga did have a 
unified and effective Government which would never willingly submit t•) 
external domination. For this reason, Britain's minimGl interest in 
Tonga was adequately served by the signing of the Treaty o:t Friendship 
and the proclamation of a protectorate involving control of the 
Kingdom's foreign relations and defence, and jurisdiction over 
non-Tongan subjects who committed serious offences. Although Britain 
subsequently increased its influence in Tonga through the Consul's 
role as adviser, it learnt that there was nothing to be gained, and 
even much to be lost, by adopting a coercive attitude towards the 
Tongan Government. 
The use of the term 'protectorate' in this study requires some 
~xplanatiou. In 1900~~sed by the Colonial Office in a general 
!;ense to denote a 1/. formal commitment to a colonial territory than 
was implied by the term annexatio, As Deryck Scarr has shown in 
Fragments ~Empire, Britain was reluctant to extend direct control, 
accompanied by inevitable administrative expenses, over islands in the 
Pacific. Britain established Protectorates over the Solomon, Gilbert 
and Ellice Island groups and over Tonga, all of which involved a 
different degree of involvement. In the Solomons and in the Gilbert 
and Ellice Island Protectorates, where no central Gov~~.·n:n~nt existed, 
the rol ~ of the Resident Commissioner wus naturally very different tc• 
that of the Agent and Consul in Tonga; the kind of relationship 
depended almost entirely on the circ~stances of the island 
government. 
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Although Tonga was regarded as u protectorate in the early part 
of the twentieth century, the Colonial Office later adopted the term 
Protected State to describe those of its territories which were 
self-governing and subject only to certain defined limitations on 
their sovereignty. In 1929 the ForL:ign Office examinL•J Tonga's 
precise legal position and concluded that it was an independent 
kingdom under the protection of Great Britain. 
This thesis is not an attempt to write a general history of Tonga 
between 1900 and 1970, but to examine thL' British-Tonga relationship 
which spanned that period. For this reason, the temptation to beeome 
side-trac~ed into a discussion of developments that are not relevant 
to the central theme has been avoided. The concentration of seven of 
the chapters on the reign of Tupou II between 1900 and 1918 is a 
natural consequence of the extent of conflict and change that occurred 
in the relationship throughout this early period. 
One criticism that has been levelled a~ writers of Tongan history 
is that they tend to write 'great person' history and to deal almost 
exclusively with the thoughts and actions of those at the apex of 
power. Such a ph.:nomenon can hardly be avoided, however, in writing 
about a hit. :archical society such as Tonga, whl•re the voices of the 
common people have little influence on government policies. The 
existence of public opinion as a force to be reckoned with is the 
product of an individualism which was not the social norm in Tonga 
throughout the period unde..:- discussion. However, 'public opinion' was 
nevertheless a force that could be mobilisc>d in Tonga's interests by 
its political leaders. Given the socio-political struc tun~ of Tonga, 
it would be unusu::1l, for the period under review, for thE..~ common 
pc.wpl e of Tonea. to hold or much lesG express views contrary to those 
.. 
.. 
of their chiefs on national political issues. Most Tongans were in 
the main concerned with the intricacies of church and villare level 
politics. 
Tonga 1 s treaty relationship with Britain was important in 
consolidating the position of the Tupou dynasty 1 in promoting Tlmgan 
nationalis•n and in helping to clef ine the way in tvhich Tongans see 
themselves ana the rest of the world. Honwver 1 as tvell as its 
intrinsic intt!rest, the relationship was unique in Oceania and had 
only limited parallels elsewhllre in the British Empire. At a time 
when 1 imperial history' has lost its popularity 1 this t1wsis is 
'imperial' in so far as it examines Tong.:1's diplomatic, and sometimes 
'colonidl', relationship with Great Britain. But, in terms of the 
definitions of the ~ate Professor J.W. Davidson in the course of his 
Inaugural Lecture on the study of Paci fie History 1 it is also 
'island-oriented' in that its main concern is with Tongan initiatives 
in manipulating and modifying the treaty relationship. 
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NOTE m; ORTHOGRAPHY 
A rwte is perhaps nel.!essary to ~~~•plain the form of iipl'lling 
in the tlwsis. In 19L<3 the Tongan Govermnt.>nt st.mJardi~.wd its 
alphabet by omitting the letters 'b' 'd' and 'g'. Except in the 
Treaties in Appendix I, ~1ich are copies or the original dnrum~nts, 
UJl spelling has been modernised. 
A.N.U. 
AT/TA 
BCT 
c.o. 
F.O. 
.JPH 
'Pitto' 
PO 
PO/KNF 
NZNA 
S.P.O. 
HPHC 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Australian National University 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Tongan Archives 
British Consul Tonga 
Colonial Office 
Foreign Office 
Journal of Pacific History 
The Pitcairn and Tonga Office, Suva 
Palace Office, Tonga 
Pala~e Office, Koe Ngahi Fefaitohi'aki 
New Zealand National Archives 
South Pacific Office, Suva 
Hestern Pacific High Commission 
:d ii. 
CHAPTER 1 
An Independent Kingdom 
'For remember that till your flag goes up or your 
Protectorate is declared, that ~t is still open to any 
nation to take Tonga' 
[Private communication from C~ptain Mandt, commanding His Imperial 
German Majesty's Ship 'Bussard' to Ernest G.B. Maxse, Her Britannic 
Majesty's Consul and Deputy Commissiol.~er at Samoa. (Maxse to 
Co~mander Sturdee, 18 October 1898, FOCP 7278, encl. in no. 58.)] 
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On 18 May 1900, Tonga was forced to accept British protection 
through the determined efforts of a Special British Commissioner, 
Basil Thomson. The Treaty of Friendship whi('.h set up the new 
relationship was neither songht nor desired by the Tongan King, George 
Tupou II. Its origins lay solely with the British Colonial Office, in 
whose eyes Ton6a had temporarily acquired an importanc~ out of all 
proportion t0 its size or resources. 
~) 
For Britain, the Treaty.~s the 
culmination of more than two decades of intermittent anxiety over the 
future of the Tongan group, provoked primarily by concern for British 
interests in nearby Fiji. By claiming a protectorate over Tonga, 
Britain hoped to exclude other foreign powers from the group while 
keeping its official commitment to a minimum. For the King of Tonga, 
however, the Treaty represented defeat. His predecessor, 'rut !U I, had 
sought international recognition for Tonga in order to secure its 
independence; Tupou II continued to struggle against any curtailment 
of Tonga's sovereignty. But despite his determination, Tupou II was 
powerless to alter the course of Great Power politics. The prized 
Tongan independence was compromised and it seemed only a matter of 
time before Tonga suffered the political fate of its neighbours 
annexation. 
Tupou II had inherited from his great-grandfather, Tupou I, a 
kingdom united under his supreme will. Out of the constant struggle 
for power and the civil wars of the first half of the nineteenth 
century, Tupou \ had emerged as hau (temporal ruler) over all Tonga. 
With a basis of legitimacy provided by his high birth, Taufa'ahau (as 
he was then known) had used his energetic and commanding leadership, 
his military prowe~s aDd his new-found allegiance to Christianity, to 
win him paramountcy. In a series of battl~;;s he defeated those whose 
power rivalled his own, including the heir to the once omnipotent but 
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now largely ceremonial title of Tu'i Tonga, and also the recalcitrant 
Ha'a Havea chiefs on Tongatapu. In 1845 Taufa'ahau was recognised as 
the undisputed successor to the Tu'i Kanokupolu title and in 1852 he 
survived the last military challenge agains~ him, at the forts of Pea 
and Houma.[1] 
But the spirit of challenge was not dead, merely buried. Tupou I 
had won his supremacy over powerful rivals who kept the Kingdom's 
unity under constant threat. He therefore set about reinforcing his 
own position with measures designed to change the basis of legitimacy 
and prevent his rivals from following his own example. In this 
respect the role of Christianity was significant. As early as 1831 
Tupou I had formally renounced his traditional gods in favour of the 
new religion which the Wesleyan r.~issionaries had brought to Tonga. 
Although some of his opponents held out against Christianity for a 
time and others adopted the teachings of the Roman Catholic 
missionaries in defiance of Tupou I's Wesleyan affiliation, the new 
King was nevertheless successful in seeing Christianity accepted 
throughout his Kingdom by the 1850s. This provided an important 
unifying force and gave Tupou I a new legitimacy from which to 
challenge the old order. 
In his search for internal stability, Tupou I turned to European 
forms of government to replace Tonga's traditional war-like 
factionalism and to provide a stable framework for the exercise of his 
power. Wi'h the help of a series of advisers, of whom the most 
1. An uccount of the rise of Tupou I and his unification of the 
Kingdom is contained in Sione Latukefu, Church and State in 
Tonga, Canberra, 1974. See also A.H. ~-lood, History and Geography 
of -Tonga, Nuku' alofa, 1932 and NoL!l Rutherford (e'd:),Frfendl'Y 
Islands:- A History of Tonga, Melbclrne, 1977. 
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notable was the Reverend Shirley Baker, Tupou I created a centralised 
government which shared some of the principles and many of the 
trappings of European-style constitutional monarchies. [2] The 
Constitution, proclaimed by Tupou I in 1875, was the culmination of 
this policy. Amongst other things, it established a Privy Council, a 
Cabinet of Ministers, a Legislative Assembly with control over 
finance, and a judicial system vested in the courts. Perhaps more 
importantly, the Constitution underlined the power of the King over 
the whole system. Under clause 55, for example, it was the King's 
prerogative to appoint Ministers to hold office during his pleasure. 
The King's role in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly was 
also crucial; although he was not a member he could prorogue or 
dissolve it at his pleasure and he also had final control over the 
passage of legislation by means of the power of veto. If he refused 
to sign legislation not only did it not become law, but it could not 
be discussed again during that session.[3] 
Other significant changes introduced by the Constitution 
concerned the system of land ownership and the creation of a landed 
nobility. In part these measures were aimed at limiting the powers of 
the chiefs while giving them a clearly defined place in the 
Government. Although all land belonged to the Crown, certain estates 
known as tofi'a were granted to nobles appointed by the King; the 
nobles in turn were to parcel out their land amongst their people. 
2. For a full account see Noel Rutherford, Shirley Baker and the 
King of Tonga, Melbourne, 1971. 
3. Constitution of Tonga, 1875, clauses 55, 80, 60, 71. Clause 55 
was later amended to allow the king to appoint such persons as he 
saw fit to Cabinet. A readily accE~ssible copy of the 
Constitution is in Sione Latukefu, The Tongan Cot~stitution, 
Nuku'alofa, 1975, Appendix A. 
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This system was later refined so that each male over the age of 16 
years had the right to an hereditary 'api' uta of 8 -} acres and a 
smaller town allotment, in return for which he paid a poll tax to the 
Government. [ 4] Although these arrangements were slow to take hold, 
they ensured the people a degree of independence from the chiefs to 
whom they otherwise owed their allegiance and their labour. 
The 1875 Constitution made provision for twenty hereditary noble 
titles chosen from amongst Tonga's chiefly lines; in 1880 a further 
10 were added together with six land-holding matapule (or chief's 
attendant) titles, and a further three noble titles were added 
later.[5] Selection was based not necessarily on rank or on loyalty 
to Tupou I, but on the extent of influence which particular chiefs 
wielded over territory and subjects.f6] Undoubtedly the creation of 
the nobles was Tupou I's means of accommodating the most powerful 
chiefs and ensuring their support for his reforms. Moreover, the 
legal recognition of some chiefs gradually tended to weaken the power 
of the others. The nobles (as distinct from the matapule) were all 
accorded a place in the Legislative Assembly and this, together with 
their hereditary land rights, gave them an important stake in 
government. 
4. These changes were contained in the 1880 amendments to the 
Constitution, and in the Hereditary Lands Act, 1882. 
5. Las ike was added in 1.897, Veikune in 1903 and Tupouto' a in 1921. 
6. Tupou I's Closing Announcement to the Inaugural Parliament 1875. 
Reprinted in D.B. Hunter, Tongan i· i1 .:eports, Vol. II: Reports 
of Land Court Cases, 1923-196:;. ,- -Privy--Council Decisions 
1924-1961, Nuku'alofa, 1962, pp.3-~. 
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Tupou I was not completely successful in overcoming his opponents 
and ensuring the stability of his Kingdom. During the 1880s under the 
premiership of Baker, his Government faced mounting opposition 
particularly from those who had not benefited by the reforms and 
resented the entrenched position of Baker. In 1881-2 a group of minor 
title-holders and traditional rivals of Tupou I petitioned the King 
for Baker's removal in what became known as the 'Mu'a Parliament' 
affair, but they could not overcome the King's authority. In 1885 
however, when Tupou I and Baker seceded from the Australian Wesleyan 
organisation and created the Free Church of Tonga, the scene was set 
for long-term confrontation. While the majority of Tongans supported 
Tupou I and his Premier, others chose to declare their opposition by 
refusing to leave the Wesleyan Church and its local leader, the 
Reverend J.E. Moulton.[7] The King's a~thority and the unity of the 
Kingdom were clearly under threat. 
Despite these troubles, the Kingdom which Tupou I had created 
held together. The degree to which his innovations had gained 
acceptance was indicated most clearly at his death in 1893 when, 
contrary to the expectations of many European observers, he was 
succeeded according to the Constitution by his great-grandson, Taufa 
'ahau. [8] The laws of succession dictated by the Constitution were 
not sanctioned by tradition, nor was the young Taufa'ahau particularly 
well qualified other than by birth to become Tu'i Kanokupolu and King. 
Nevertheless he was proclaimed George Tupou II in February 1893 by 
Tuku'aho, heir to the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua title, who had been made 
Premier after Baker was removed in 1890. Tupou II thus inherited a 
7. For a fu: 1 acc<,tmt of these events see Rutherford, Shirley Baker 
and U.G. Cummins, ~Missionary Chieftain: James Egan Houlton and 
Tongan Society 18('1-1909', Ph.D. thesis, ANU, 1980. 
8. See, for example, 'Hemorandum on Tonga', 30 November 1887, FOCP 
5570, encl. in no. 374. 
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kingdom united in form but riddled by factions and potential 
divisions. 
The reforms which Tupou I introduced into his Kingdom were not 
only aimed at suppressing his traditional enemies. By the time of his 
rise to power the interest of colonial powers in the Pacific as a new 
field for expansion had been clearly demonstrated and it became one of 
Tupou I's central obje~tives to safeguard his Kingdom from European 
intervention. The movement into new territories which took place in 
the late nineteenth century had its roots in conditions in Europe; 
industrial growth had prompted the search for raw materials and new 
markets which led in turn to the development of trans-Pacific shipping 
and the influx of foreigners looking for land, for trade, and for 
souls. Behind them were the metropolitan governments whose imperial 
policies were shaped not only by international rivalries and by 
defence and economic considerations, but also by the overseas 
activities of their nationals. Where the perceived national interest 
required it, or where European settlemeat was accompanied by problems 
of disorder, then annexation or perhaps the establishment of some less 
overt form of control was inevitable. 
Tonga had little to offer Europeans by way of resources and was 
therefore not a prime target for colonial expansion. Its land area 
was small -- only 269 square miles spread over 140,000 square miles of 
ocean and the limited availability of land for settlers was 
reinforced by Tupou I who acted quickly to forbid the sale of land to 
foreigners.[9] Although leases were available, subject to the 
approval of Cabinet, there was little potential for large-scale 
9. Tupou I's refusal to allow the sale of land was first codified in 
Clause XXIX of the 1850 Code of Laws. See Latukefu, Church ano 
State, p.172. 
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plantation development. As a result, European economic interests were 
restricted to trading. The trade in coconut oil, which was replaced 
by copra from the late 1860s, attracted both German and British 
traders especially aft~r the mid-1850s, but not in great numbers. 
From a strategic point of view, the most important asset Tonga 
possessed was the harbour of Neiafu in the northern Vava'u group. 
Although not on any direct trade routes, the harbour was, as the 
British Admiralty admitted in 1899, 'an almost perfect war 
harbour'. [10] In the later nineteenth century both Germany and the 
United States acquired rights to establish a naval station at Vava'u, 
but although the German Government leased a site in 1880, neither 
power ever made use of its rights. Britain also showed interest in 
' the harbour and ensured its own position there vis ~ vis the other two 
powers by means of a 'most favoured nation' clause in its 1879 Treaty 
with Tonga. [111 Although Britain acquired naval facilities in Fiji, 
it was nevertheless concerned to keep the other powers out of Vava'u 
and its policy towards Tonga did not fail to take account of this 
consideration. 
Perhaps the greates: interest which Tonga aroused amongst 
Europeans came as a result of the on-going search for souls, to which 
the various missions were devoted. In 1797 ten missionarie~ from the 
London Missionary Society made an unsuccessful attempt to evangelise 
the Tongans, and in 1822 the Reverend Walter Lawry initiated Wesleyan 
efforts to spread Christianity in Tonga. Once Tupou I took up the 
10. Admiralty to F.O., secret, 31 January 1899, and encl., FO 
83/1674. 
11. Article II of Treaty of Friendship Between Great Britain and 
Tonga, 29 November 1879; sf.'e Appendix I(i). Gt_•rmany and the 
United States acquired their rights in their respective Treaties 
with Ton[ia. For the German leaae see Leefe to O'Brien, 7 
February 1899, FOCP 7358, encl. 2 in no. 55. 
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Wesleyan cause Tonga rapidly became a Wesleyan domain, and the 
influence of the Wesleyan missionaries was imprinted on T(onga's eocial 
and political life. 
From 1837 French Roman Catholic mis~ionaries also sough!:. to gain 
a foothold in Tonga, and they made no secret of the close backing they 
received from the French Government. Although the We.,l.:yan-influenced 
Tupou I resisted the intrusion of the French priests, they found 
adherents amongst those who opposed his desire for supremacy. 
Subsequently, Tupou I was forced to accept the presence of the priests 
as a result of French pressure. In 1855 the French Gove1nor of Tahiti 
gave the King little option bat t:.> sign a treaty guaranteeing 
protection for Roman Catholics, and promoting the int ··rests of French 
citizens and shipping. Over the next few years French warships 
continued to press the demands of the Catholic missicmaries for equal 
privileges with the Wesleyans, and in March 1860 Command 4 De Cintre 
of the Corvette La Chise demanded that discrimination against 
Catholics in appointments to government positions should cease.[12] 
1upou I's encounters with French warships strengthened his 
resolve to try to safeguard his Kingdom against foreign tnterference. 
On the advice of Baker and others he sought intPrnational recognition 
for his Govern.ment as a means of ensuring its continued ind€!p:mdence. 
To achieve this, it was necessary to convince the color,.!..:ll pm-1ers of 
Tonga's ability to govern itself, in a seemingly European fabhion, and 
to control the growing number of Europeans visiting or residing in the 
Kingdom. Many of the changes Tupou I introduced to the Kingdom were 
thus aimed as much at international Ncogniticn for Tonga's 
12. 'Supplementary Statement of 1860', Nuk~'alofn, 19 March 1860, 
CO 22')/63(2). See also Uur,h LarG.cy, 'The C:J.tholie Hi so ion', 
Fr.icl!_c!_ly !_nl'!_ndf!, p.l16-153. 
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sovereignty and independence as at reinforcing his own supremacy. The 
Constitution, completf· with Declaration of Rights, not only defined 
Tonga's form of government but was in itself a useful form likely to 
impress European observers. Similarly, the provision of such pomp as 
a crown, flag, coat of arms, national anthem and even a small army 
were as much for external as internal effect. 
The Constitution achieved its desired end in relation to external 
threats t·rhen, in the next fetv years, three European po~vera signed 
treaties which formally recognised Tonga's independent status. 
Treaties of Friendship were signed with Germany in 1876, with Great 
Britain in 1879 and with the United States in 1886. Moreover the 
Anglo-German Commission, s<·' up in 1885 to delineate the respective 
spheres of influence of Britain and Germany, concluded that no 
interference with Tonga's administration was required because the 
Government of Tonga itself could guarantee peace and order and protect 
the commercial interests of foreign residents.[l3] 
The effectiveness of Tupou I's Government in maintaining order 
amongst both Tongans and Et•.ropeans, coupled with Tonga's lack of 
resources, lessened ~he opportunities for any of the Great Powers to 
intervene. Nevertheless it was unlikely, in the context of nineteenth 
century imperialism, that Tonga could escape some form of European 
supervision or control. The pattern of events in Piji, Tahiti and 
Hawaii demonstrated beyond doubt that neither the consolidation of a 
kingdom, nor Christianization and missionary advice, nor even 
international recognition was in fact a complete insurance against 
Great Power intervention. Should events in Tonga indicate that the 
Government could no longer keep control over the population or if, for 
13. On this point see F.o. minute to Lord Salisbury, 13 J..1nuary 
1899, FO 53/321. 
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its own reasons, some imperial power became bent on taking Tonga, 
there was little that Tongan leaders could do about it. 
Britain's decision to establish a protectorate over Tonga was 
taken entirely in the context of European r~valries. Although 
Britain's faith in the Tongan Government had been \\'eakened by the 
debacle of Baker and by reports of corruption and miqgovernment under 
Tupou II, the 1900 Treaty did not seek in any way to interfere with 
Tonga's internal administration. On the contrary, the instructions 
given to the Special Commissionet' charged with negotiating the Treaty 
made clear that the Colonial Office did not intend 
for the present at all events tu advise Her Majesty to 
assume the sovereignty of the Friendly Islands, nor to 
interfere with the internal autonomy or administration of 
the group.[l4] 
Britain's intentions were limited to a desire to circumscribe German 
activities in the group. In bilateral negotiations between Britain 
and Germany, the respf'.ctive roles of the two powers in Tonga and 
elsewhere were discussed and settled without any reference to the 
leaders of the countries concerned. 
THAT it would be British interests to which Tonr.a would 
evcmtually rmecumb, had been foreshadowed since the late 187tlc. t:nt:a 
then Dritain had nhown particular reluctance to bt:comt' involved in 
Tonr.an affairn, aG in tht.• Pacific Is lands in generlll. Ttw rcaaon w.:u:; 
14. c.o. to Thomswn, 20 January 1900, FOCi' 738G, end. 1 in n~c1. 10. 
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not to be found in any lack of excuse. Since 1844 BritaLn had ignored 
petitions from British subjec~s and even some Tongans praying for 
British protection or annexation and had paid no heed to voices in the 
Australasian colonies that had been constantly urging Britain to take 
a more positive stance in the area. The costs and problems of 
administering remote Pacific territories continued to outweigh any 
benefits which may have been gained. [15] 
By the mid 1870s however, Britain's relucttmct! to become involved 
was overshadowed by practical considerations. In 1874 Britain annexed 
Fiji, and as a result its attitude towards the rest of the Pacific 
underwent some chat.ge. The fJOlitical status of Tonga wan now S(~en in 
a new light: Tonga was close to Fiji and joined to it by social, 
cultural and trading links. If a foreign power controlled To~ga, and 
especially the Vava'u harbour, it could conceivably exert an indirect 
influence on Fiji · r at l~ast make Britain's regulation of Fij~an 
affairs much more difficul~. Any unrest in Tonga could hdve ser1ous 
repercussions on Fiji, which was to become a major centre of British 
influence, providing facilities for the Royal Navy, a base from ~h1ch 
to control the labour traffic and a ,•;eat fc r the Western Pacific Ilish 
Commission. The concern for Fij ·, tl •• 1er with the growing demJ.nds 
f0 intervention from the Australasian colonies, finally convinced 
Britain that Tonga should not come under the influence of any other 
foreiGn power. As Sir Arthur Gcrdon, the firBt Hie;h Commissioner for 
the ~{estern Pacific urged the Colon.i..al Office in 1879, the Germans 
should be warned that it would be 'impoosible for uo ••• to ae:quicoce in 
15. A discussion of Britain'n 
role can be found in 
R_i.c:tnry f!i tiw jyer.t~·rl_! 
Canberra, 1976. 
• .. eluctant. aC'ceptance' ot a Pad.fic 
Deryck Scarr, Frar.r.wnto of Empire. A 
r>~iC'ifi<~ l[Li;lt ~'1'lf0~n~-= Jl:lz?[q_}_f;" 
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the assumption in that group of a prepon~~rating influence by any 
other power 1 .[16] 
Although Tonga's importance was thus acknowledged, Britain 
remained reluctant to increase its official involvement. Britain was 
quite content for Tonga to maintair. its political independence, 
provided always that its own interests remained ahead of those of any 
other foreign power. Independence was the solution which best suited 
the Colonial Office as it involved the least commitment, but it left 
the possibility that some other power would overtake the hesitant 
Britain and claim Tonga. Some insurance against this eventuality was 
contained in t'••:. Treaties recognising Tonga's sovereignty and 
territoriality, and in the reluctance of the powers to disturb 
existing relations between themselves, especially as this might affect 
the rivalries o'er Samoa. To.1.ga' s independent status was reinforced 
by the 1886 Anglo-Germa~ convention which listed the respective 
spheres ot influence of the two powers in New Guinea and the rest of 
the Pacific and declared Tonga, along with Samoa and Niue, to be a 
neutral region. 
Nevertheless the insecurity remained, and the growth of British 
official involvement in Tonga became a history of response to Germau 
initiatives. The 1879 Treaty of Friendship by whi~h Britain secured 
'most favoured nation' status in Tonga was iP itself more a reaction 
to Germ<.'ny's Treaty in 1876 than the outcome of any genuine desir~ to 
recognise the independent Tongan Government. In August 1876, some 
three months prior to the signing of the Germao-Tongan Treaty the 
CC''llm:mder-in-Chief of the Royal Navy's Australirm Statio•t had viGited 
16. Gordon to c.o., June 1879, cited in W.P. 
tac :f..U_c: ~Gl.:lttd.S!,J O?.ford, 1960, p. 322. 
1,,' Bd tain in the 
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Tonga and recommended that its goY-?:Cnment should be accorded official 
recognition. But, on the basis r>f its information as to the condition 
of affairs in Tonga and the power of the King to maintain order and 
good government under the present a.dministration, the Colonial Office 
was not convinced that such a step was justified. Further, officials 
believed that as the High Commissioner was about to be given 
jurisdiction over British nationals in Tonga, official recognition was 
even less fitting.[17] By 1879, however, increased German activities 
fostered by Baker had convinced Britain that a treaty was required, 
and the extensive powers over British subjects granted to the Tongan 
Courts at this time reflt'cted a s ignifi~ant change of heart. 
Despite their 1886 Convent:i.un, Britain and Germany continued to 
vie for dominance in Tonga. In late 1887 the British Government was 
again spurred into action by German initiatives. Following the 
failure of the Hashing ton Conference to achieve a settlement of the 
rivalries over Samoa, the German Government ~esorted to direct actio~ 
and declared war on Samoa in Augubt 1887. The British Government, 
fearing similar German action in Tonga, acted quickly 
British ia•.&rests in Tonga. The High Commissioner, 
to protect 
Sir Charles 
Mitchell, received telegraphic instructions to declare a protectorate 
over Tonga on ~he first indication of German interference there. At 
the same time HHS Opal was hurriedly despatched to Tonga, where it lay 
in Nuku' alofa harbour for some five months to prevent German 
intervention and reinforce Britain's claiill to regulate Tcngan affairs. 
The arrival of a German warship, the Adler, shortly ai'ter tr.-1S Ooal 
strengtheneJ British fears that Germany planned to nune1: Ton~:~a. [18] 
17. c.o. to Under-St:cretary of StatQ, I•'.O., August 187o, HPHC 21/6. 
18. Se~ Rutherford, Shir~~~ !~,::!_~c:~, pp.l55-6, 
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In tht: wake of these events, the British Gr)vernment sought to 
convince Germany that Britain's claims to influr:nce in Tonga surpassed 
those of Germany. A Foreign Office MemoJ:andum to the German 
Government in November 1887 declared that British influence in Tonga 
was suppotted by 'interests and ties based upon the past and present 
close connection between the people of Fiji and Tonga, and [by] every 
argument founded upon propinquity'.[l9] The question as to whose 
trade influences predominated was argued at length by the two 
GovE>rnments,[20] but it was clear that from the 1880s British trade 
in Tonga was on the increase, while German trade was declining, 
especial": after the failure of the German firm, J.C. Godeffroy and 
Son. By 1900, even the Germans admitted that their share of the 
Tongan trade had declined to one-third of that of the British.[21] 
At this time the British Government was prepared to sacrifice its 
position in Samoa to ensure its dominance in Tonga. In a proposal 
that foreshadowed the final solution of international rivalries over 
Samoa and Tonga in November 1899, the Foreign Office suggested that by 
.~ 
a 'corresponding arrangement' to that desired by Germany in Samoa, 
Britain 'should direct the policy of the native Government of 
Tonga'. (22] The Foreign Office sought an assurance that if for any 
19. Memorandum on Tonga, 30 November 1887, FOCP 5570, encl. in 
no. 374. 
20. See 'Memorandum respecting British and German Proposals regarding 
the Political Control over Samoa and Tonga' F.O., 9 September 
1898, FOCP 7045. 
21. ";ited in Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Islands, p.328. In 1887 
the Germans held 76% oy- Tonga's export trade and 41% of the 
imports but ten years later, in 1897, the figures were 25% and 
32% respe-:tively. (Stewart Firth, 1 German Firms in The Hestern 
Pacific Islands, 1857-1914', JPH, vol. 8, 1973, p.l7.) 
22. Memorandum on Tonga, 30 NovL~ber 1887, FOCP 5570, encl. in 
no. 374. 
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reason the British Government deemed it necessary to intervene in 
Tongan affairs, it would be able to count on the full 'moral support' 
of the German Government for its actions as the mandatary of the 
'civilised powers' interested in Tonga. A similar proposal had been 
rejected by the German Government on the eve of the Washington 
Conference on the grounds that 'the Tonga Islands were most important 
to Germany'. [23] With this second attempt however, the British 
Government gained a measure of success. In return for support for its 
position in Samoa, Germany was appare~tly prepared to respect 
Britian's position in Tonga. An informal assurance was given that 
there would be no German ships of war sent to Tonga.[24] 
The new tripartite system of government in Samoa (set up by the 
Berlin Conference of 1889), solved for a while the Samoan troubles 
without reference t~ Tonga and, through the 1890s, Britain grew 
reluctant to renoun~e any of its rights in Samoa.t25] Nevertheless, 
Britain continued to claim a preponderating influence in Tonga and, 
through the Western Pacific High Commission, intervened increasingly 
in Tonga's internal affairs. The Western Pacific High Commission had 
been established in Suva in 1877 primarily to control British subjects 
in the Western Pacific. It was hoped that by giving advice and 
support to the various island governments, any further formal 
23. Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet, 7 February 1887, encl. in 
'Memorandum ••• ', 9 September 1898, FOCP 7045. 
24. This assurance 
Ambassador in 
ibid.) 
was given 
the course 
to 
of 
Lord Salisbury by the German 
conversation. ('Memorandum ••• ', 
25. On this aspect see P.M. Kennedy, 'Anglo-German Relations in the 
Pacific and the Partition of Samoa, 1885-1899', Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. XVII, no. 1, April 1971, 
pp.56-72-. -
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commitments could be avoided. From June 1878 the High Commissioner 
was represented in Tonga by a Vice-Consul who was also a Deputy 
Commissioner. Under the 1879 Treaty he presided over the High 
Commissioner's Court which heard all civil actions involving British 
subjects and, following an amendment to the Treaty in 1891, all 
criminal offences cognisable under British law apart from breaches of 
local laws relating to customs, taxation, public health and 
police. [ 26] 
Both the High Commissioner and the Vice-Consul took considerable 
interest in Tongan affairs, hoping to assume the role of European 
intermediary and adviser to the Tongan Government. But successive 
British officials competed unsuccessfully with Baker f0r the ear of 
the King. The result was frequent conflict with Baker and a history 
of what the Acting High Commis~ioner, Sir William MacGregor, called 
'meddling interference with Tongan politics' on the part of certain 
Vice-Consuls.[27] Tupou I's Government, led along by Baker, began to 
fear that British annexation was imminent. On a number of occasions 
the High Commissioner used gunboats to reinforce his position in Tonga 
-- in 1884, for exar1ple, HMS Espiegle visited Tonga to urge the 
release of the men convicted for treason over the 'Mu'a Parliament' 
affair and to settle certain other matters in dispute between the two 
Governments. The most notable intervention was Sir John Thurston's 
deportation of the Tongan Premier, Baker, in July 1890. Thurston's 
action, together wi~h the secondment of Basil Thomson to Tonga for a 
year as Deputy Premier, stamped British influence indelibly on the 
26. Agreement between Great Britain and Tonga, 2 June 1891; see 
Appendix I(ii). 
27. MacGregor to c.o., 10 June 1885, cited in Scarr, Fragments, 
p.l02. 
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Tongan Government and fostered the impression that Tonga was virtually 
a British Protectorate. 
But the de facto control which Britain exerted uver Tongan 
affairs was not enough to provide security against the threat of 
German intervention. In 1898, rumours of German designs on To~6a 
again grew so extensive that the Colonial Office could not ignore 
them. ~n July 1898 Commander F.C.D. Sturdee of HMS Porpoise visited 
Tonga and reported that the Government had recently borrowed £500 
from a German firm and was making 'strenuous efforts' to borrow a 
further £2,000-3,000 to tide it over the effects of a bad drought. 
Further, he commented on local speculation that the King intended to 
marry Jane von Treskow, the half-caste daughter of the German 
Vice-Consul. At about the same time, the Colonial Office received 
reports that German naval officers were showing considerable interest 
in Tonga and that some German newspapers were urging their government 
to seize Tonga to offset the American acquisition of Hawaii.[28] 
Even more disturbing were the -umours surrounding the activities 
of the Ge~man Vi~e-Consul at Samoa, Grunno, who visited Tonga in 
December 1898 in connection with the settlement of private debts owed 
by ~ongans to German firms. Under Tongan la-v;, foreigners were 
prohibited from suing Tongans for any debt contra~ ted .::>.iter :890. The 
German Government apparently saw this as an infractiun of its treaty 
rights and it seems that Grunno hoped to persuade the Tongan 
28. Commander F.C.D. Sturdee to Rear-Admiral Pearson, 25 July 1898, 
FOCP 72 78, encl. 2 in no. 24; Consul Maxse to Commander Sturdee, 
18 October 1898, ibid., encl. in no. 58; Dr Edward Van Dyke 
Robinson to Mr Chamberlain, 24 August 1898, ibid., encl. in 
no. 22. 
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Government to open its courts to the recovery of these debts. When he 
was unsuccessful, rumour abounded that Grunno had notified the King 
that unless the Tongan Government paid the amount of the debts, the 
V0va'u group would be seized in the name of Germany.[29] Although 
there was probably very little substance to these various German 
threats the evidence of German interest in the group was sufficient to 
impress upon the Colonial Office the need for preventative action. 
Britain decided that further art, ..• ment with Germany was useless. 
A number of British officials took seriously the warning of a German 
naval officer in October 1898 that 'till your flag goes up or your 
Protectorate is declared ••• it is still open to any nation to take 
Tonga', and advised the immediate establishment of a protectorate, or 
its equivalent, over Tonga.[30] Instead, the British Government 
chose to strengthen Tongan independence and allay the German threat by 
extracting a pledge of neutrality from the King of Tonga. In early 
1899, a British warship was sent to Tonga to extract from the King a 
carefully worded undertaking by which he agreed to 
pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, never to 
cede or transfer any of his rights of sovereignty, nor, 
except insofar as he may be expressly bound by existing 
arrangements, to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for 
occupation any part of his territory to any foreign 
power.[31] 
The Colonial Office believed they could at any time release the King 
of Tonga from his pledge as far as a cession to Britain was concerned; 
29. Leefe to O'Brien, 14 December 1898 and 26 December 1898, FOCP 
7358, encl. 2 and 4 in no. 42. 
30. Consul Maxse to Commander Sturdee, 18 October 1898, FOCF, 7278, 
encl. in no. 58. 
31. F.O. to c.o., 20 January 1899, FOCP 7358, no. 10; c.o. to F.O., 
27 January 1899, ibid., no. 16. The wording was int~nded not to 
interfere with the existing rights of Germany and the United 
States to coaling stations under their respective Treaties. 
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since no other power would be involved there could be no 
objections.[32] This was the last possible means, short of making an 
official claim, by which Britain could try to ensure that Germany 
would not seize Tonga. 
The British Government made it clear that its intentions in 
regard to Tonga went no further than this. It gave no support to the 
suggestion, put forward by Commander Sturdee, that Britain should 
establish a general control over Tongan finance in order to counter 
German dealings. Further, the Commanding Officer of the waLship was 
instructed to explain, in case the King should raise the question, 
'that His Majesty's Government have no intention of establishing a 
Protectorate over the group, and that they cannot entertain any 
proposal of that nature'.[33] When Captain Leslie Stuart of HHS 
Tauranga arrived in Tonga on 8 March 1899, he was thus able to assure 
a 'nervous and suspicious' King, attired in full military dress, that 
Britain's sole objective was 'to secure the independence of Tonga for 
ever, and to maintain the friendly relations which have hitherto 
existed between them and the Sovereign and peoples of the 
islands'.[34] Such an objective could hardly have been closer to the 
King's own wishes. Accordingly Tupou II signed the Agreement on the 
14 March 1899, without Stuart needing to make any mention of a loan 
which he had been authorized to hold out as inducement if 
necessary. [35] 
32. C.Q, to F.O., 6 May 1899, FOCP 7358, no. 62. 
33. F.O. to c.o., 20 January 1899, FOCP 7358, no. 10; F.O. to c.o., 
9 February 1899, ibid., no. 24. 
34. Captain Stuart to Tupou II, 11 March 1899, ibid., encl. 2 in 
no. 69. 
35. Captain Stuart to Rear-Admiral Pearson, 20 March 1899, ibid., 
encl. 1 in no. 69. 
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With the signing of this Agreement it seemed that Tonga's 
independence was further strengthened and that Britain had again 
managed to secure her interests in Tonga with a minimum of effort and 
expense. But within a few months the settlement of British, German 
and American rivalries over Samoa altered the situation drastically. 
The Anglo-German Treaty of 14 Noveillber 1899 was based on the idea of a 
Samoa-Tonga division of interczts which had been foreshadowed 13 years 
earlier. Under the Treaty Britain agreed to surrender her rights in 
Samoa in return for a similar withdrawal of Ge~an interests from the 
Tonga group, together with territorial concessions in tne Solomons and 
West Africa. [36] 
In view of the Australasian lobby for Samoa, some commentators 
have found Britain's decision to abandon Samoa in favour of Tonga 
surprising, and have attempted to explain it as the outcome of 
weakness, or of a last-minute revelation of the strategic importance 
of the harbour at Vava'u in the Tongan group.[37] However, Britain's 
decision to take Tonga is best seen as the culmination of 20 years of 
concern over the strategic importance of the group in relation to 
other British possessions. Britain's primary motive over this period 
had been to keep out the warships of foreign nations,[38] and its 
36. 'Convention between Great Britain and Germany for the Settlement 
of the Samoan and other Questions', London, 14 November 1899, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1900, vol. CV, cd 38. The United States 
joined in a simpler treaty on 2 December 1899, ibid., cd 39. 
37. See P.H. Kennedy, 'Britain and the Tongan Harbours, 1898-1914', 
Historical Studies, vol. 15, no. 58, April 1972, pp.251-267. 
38. cf 'The primary motive for them (the 
preserve the Kingdom's autonomy, not to 
foreign nations', Kennedy, ibid., p.257. 
British) had been to 
keep out the warships of 
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objective in obtaining a surrender of German treaty rights in 
Tonga in 1899 was the same: 
to remove as far as possible the competition of any foreign 
influence, and to prevent the establishment in those islands 
of a strategic position from which the security of the 
Australian colonies and ~ew Zealand, or their trade, might 
easily be threatened.[39] 
Besides, the practical good sense of gaining exclusive rights in Tonga 
as against uncertain and probabiy unobtainable rights in Samoa 
naturally appealed to British negotiators. As Lord Salisbury had 
minuted more than 10 years earlier: 'It is in Tonga that we must 
look for compensation for the superior position which their more 
active trade has given to the Germans in Samoa.'[40] 
Thus with the Samoan settlement of November 1899 Anglo-German 
rivalry over Tonga, which had helped maintain the islands' 
independence, was eliminated. Britain had accepted Tonga in part 
compensation for Samoa» and it therefore became necessary for the 
Colonial Office to establish some positive claim over Tonga and 
prevent the possibility of fresh rights being created in the group. 
Officials also felt that possession of Tonga might help to appease New 
Zealand's anger over the loss of Samoa, and the Colonial Office 
intimated that responsibility for Tonga might shortly be handed over 
to New Zealand.[41] The 1886 Anglo-German declaration of Tonga's 
neutrality and the explicit guarantee of Tongan independence contained 
in the undertaking obtained from the Ki~g exactly eight months 
39. c.o. to F.o., 16 December 1899, FOCP 7358, no. 110. 
40. Minute on Commander-in-Chief Australian Station to Admiralty, 27 
November 1887, FO 58/232. 
41. c.o. to Governor of New Zealand, 2 November 1899, See 
Proposed Annexation of Tonga to New Zealand', 
Australian no. 200, 14 October 1911. 
'Note on 
co 881/12. 
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earlier, had all been superseded. Tongan independence was no lcnger a 
possibility. 
CHAPTER 2 
Reluctant Protectorate 
The King of Tonga to Mr Basil Thomson. King's Palace, Nuku'alofa, 7 
May 1900. 
I DESIRE to know how treaties are made by the great 
Governments of the world, especially England, and the reason 
for my question is that I am certain that you know the right 
way in which Treaties are made, and that you are familiar 
with all Government matters. 
First. Are Treaties made when two Governments are of the 
same mind, or only when it is the mind of the stronger of 
the two? 
Second. If a great and powerful State wishes to make a 
Treaty with a small and weak State, is it right that the 
small and weak State should be punished by the strong State 
because it does not wish to make the Treaty? 
Third. Does a great and powerful State seek occasion to 
quarrel with a weak State for seeing that a portion of its 
powers will be taken away from it by a Treaty? 
Fourth. Will England punish poor Tonga for wishing to keep 
the existing Treaty of Friendship she made with England? 
I send my love. 
Your affectionate friend, 
~signed) TUBOU II 
[Encl. 5 in no. 6, FOCP, 7504.] 
" ••• for our land could not be justly sei:!ed for having 
wronged any State, or for having broken any Treaty, but only 
for having wished to keep our~elves independent". 
[The King of Tonga to Hr Basil Thomson, private, (translation), 19 H..ty 
1900, encl. 8 in no. 6, FOCP, 7504.] 
Page 25 
The form of control which the British Government decided to 
assert over Tonga in the wake of the Samoan Convention represented no 
great departure from its previous policy. While it was considered 
essential to the interests of the Empire that Britain 'should be 
placed in a position to prevent any foreign Power acquiring any 
influence or authority in those island!:. or interfering in any \-lay in 
their affairs';(l] this was to be achieved with a minimum of 
commitment. Britain's requirements wou1 d be met by extracting three 
privileges from the King of Tonga under a nev: treaty. The most 
important requirement was control over Tonga's foreign relations. 
Article II of the draft Treaty sought the King's aggreement that 'all 
his relations of any sort whatever with foreign Powers, shall be 
conducted under the sole advice and through the channel of Her 
Hajesty' s Goverrunent'. [2] Secondly, to avoid complications with 
foreign powers, it was necessary to persuade the King to transfer full 
jurisidiction over Europeans to a British court; this would ensure 
that when the consular jurisdiction of other powers was abolished, 
they would have no cause to complain of the weakness or partiality of 
the Tongan Courts. Thirdly, Britain sought the sole right to 
establish coaling stations in the harbours of Vava'u and Tongatapu, 
and ~he right to erect and garrison fortifications should this become 
necessary. [3] 
Britain intended to assume these rights under a protectorate. By 
Article I of the draft Treaty the King of Tonga "ms to agree 'to place 
freely and unreservedly himself, his subjects, an~ his dominions' 
1. c.o. to Thomson, 20 January 1900, FOCP 7388, encl. in oLh 10. 
2. Draft Treaty of Friends1tip, FOCP 7388, encl. 3 in no. 4; net' 
Appendix I(iii}. 
3. Article VI and III, .!]Li_'!,• 
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under the protection of Great Britain. In return, Britain would 
undertake 'to protect the Government and territory of Tonga from any 
external hostile attacks',[4] as well as conducting Tonga's foreign 
relations and exercising jurisdiction over foreigners. Although the 
word 'protectorate' was used, it implied a totally different 
relationship from that involved, for example, in the protectorate 
established over the Solomons in 1893. The word 'protectorat·a' was in 
fact used for a variety of governmental forms, and the extent of 
influence exerted under it •·•as determined far more by practice than by 
any set policy. The establishment of a protectorate rather than 
annexation, was in the first place 'a matter of convenience', for it 
implied limited financial and administrative commitments.[S] In the 
case of Tonga, protectorate status was simply a convenient framework 
within which to claim international responsibility for Tonga. Tongan 
sovereienty was to be retained, and British sovereignty would not 
extend to the Tongans. Britatn would have no responsibilities in 
internal affairs, except that the advice of a resident Agent and 
Consul or the High Commissioner would be available to the King, should 
he wish to seek it.[6] 
Although protectorate status would meet immediate needs, the 
Colonial Office was nevertheless careful not to preclude the 
possibility of ann£.~xation should it become necessary. Its major 
concern was the po£wibili ty of an unfriendly move by another power, 
4. Article II, .:!!?.!.!• 
5. For a diocuosion of the concept of Protectorates nee Scarr, 
Fragmcnt.G, pp. 2 '>2-256 and Colin Newbury, '"Tr(•:.lt y, Grant, t:ua,~c 
ui1<r~Tferancc": The Orit;ins of British Colonial Prt>tector,ltPo', 
in s.A. Wood and r>.s. O'Connor (edn.), W.P. Horrell: A Tribut(>, 
Dunedin, 1973. ~- =-~~~--a ~ ~~=~~-
6. Dnft Treaty, Article IV. 
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particularly tre United States, which had not fcrmally rerounced its 
treaty rights, including the right to esta'r lish a naval station at 
Vava'u.[7] Similarly, if a deterioration in the state of Tonga's 
intern~l affairs warranted annexation, then the questlon would be 
reconsidered. Accordingly the Colonial Office stressed that while 
there was no immediate intention or desire to assume sovereignty, it 
was necess&ry 'to abstain from giving any formal pledge or assurance 
that Her Majesty will not under any circumstances annex the 
gr'>up'. [8] At the same time the Special Commissioner to Tonga, Basil 
Thomson, was asked to assess as discreetly as possible, how the King 
and people w.)uld react to annexation and especially whether there was 
any posGibility of active resistance. [9] 
The draft Treaty did not seek an e~.tensive surrender of the 
King's powers, but the Colonial off ~e was nevertheless aware that the 
task of extracting even these meagre concessions from him might not be 
an easy one: 
As the people of Tonga are naturally ;,uspicious and jealous 
of outside interference, it is desirable that the person to 
be entrusted with the proposed Mission should be not only 
possessed of tact and discretion, but also known to and 
trusted by them.[lO] 
Accordingly they chose as their negotiator a man considered to have 
successfully gained 'the entire confidence of the king and people' --
7. In the meantime, however, a confidential assurance had been given 
by the American Secretary of State, Hay, that the Unit<>d States 
did not intend to take advantage of its treaty right to establish 
a naval station. (Memorandum by Oakes, F.O., 21 December 1899, 
F0CP 7~18, no. 110,; minute by Villiers, F.O., 23 December 1899, 
.!.t~i5!.·) 
8. c.o. to Tt'.orwon, Secret, 20 January 1900, FOCP 7388, cnC'l. 2 in 
no. 4. 
9. !hid. 
10. c.o. to F.o., 16 Deeember 1899, FOCP 7358, no. 110. 
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At the outset of his mission, Thomson was hopeful that he might 
win at least a nominal cession of sovereignty, 'with the full 
agreement of the Chiefs and people'.[14] His pro-annexationis~ view, 
privately expressed to the Colonial Office, contrasted markedly with 
his public expressions that Britain 'was bound in honour not to take' 
the Tongan harbour, and that annexation was a 'ridiculous idea' .[15] 
To the Colonial Office he justified his support for annexation in 
terms of his fear of the United States 'expansion party' which might 
not be daunted by a mere protector~te. As he pointed out, annexation 
would 'put the matter of the coaling station at rest for ever' .[16] 
The Colonial Office went along in part with Thomson's reasoning-- he 
was ;iven full power to accept a cession of sovereignty if it were 
freely offered, but he was not to be the first to mention it. 
Moreover, if sovereig,tty was taken it would be only on condition that 
existing arrangements were to stand until Britain provided 
otherwise.[17] 
Thomson's o,,timism was misplaced. Far from eliciting an offer of 
cession, he was to have considerable trouble in extracting from Tupou 
II ~ven the few concessions contained in the draft Treaty. By the 
time of Thomson's visit the 26 year-old King had been on the throne 
for seven years. In keepin3 with his position as Tongan chief and 
King he was of massive proportions and had surrounded himself with the 
finest trappings of European-style royalty. His claim to the throne 
was through l1is mother, Fusipala, who was the daughter of Tupou I's 
14. Memorandum by Villers, F.O., 17 January 1900, FOCP 7388, no. 6. 
15. Basil Thomson, 'The Samoa Agteement in Plain English', B1ackwoods 
Magazine, vol. 166, December 1899, pp.849-51; Thomson, ~Scene 
Chan~es, p.l97. See also Thomson, Savage Island, pp.216-7. 
16. Hemorandum by Villiers, F.O., 17 January 1900, T!OCP 7388, no. 6. 
17. Ibid. 
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son, Tevita 'Unga, and he was also descended from Tupou I through his 
father, Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, who was the son of Tupou I's daughter, 
Salote Pilolevu. At birth the young Taufa'ahau had been only fifth in 
line to the throne; it was not until 1889 with the death of Tevita 
'Unga's son, Prince Ngu, that he became Crown PriLlce. Taufa'ahau was 
educated at the Government College in Nuku'alofa, and, although as 
King he invariably used an interpreter, he had a reasonable command of 
English. [18] For a few months in 1889-90 he visited Auckland where, 
under the guidance of a ~rivate tutor, he continued his education. 
His first and only government position prior to the Kingship was as 
'Town Officer' of the village of Holopeka, in Ha'apai. The village 
contained about five or six families and Taufa'ahau was sent there at 
the age of 18 to see how he managed to conduct the fono, or meetings. 
The death of Tupou I within a year caused his rapid promotion from 
Town Officer to Sovereign.[l9] 
Tupou II's contact with the encroaching European world was 
minimal and the problems of internal dissension which he inherited 
increased the difficulties of his reign. Tupou II ruled, not as the 
constitutional monarch European observers expected, but as Tu'i 
Kanokupolu: Tongan chief and holder of supreme power. He was 
strong-willed, autocratic and sensitive· to any challenge to his 
authority. Not surprisingly, he made no secret of his dislike for the 
idea of a protectorate and his conviction that Tonga should preserve 
its independence. An independent kingdom was his proud heritage and 
any compromise would damage his prestige: a letter he had received 
18. At the Government College Taufa'ahau studied under 'Professor' 
J .H. Roberts. See S.C. Roberts, Tarnai; The Life Story~ John 
Hartley Roberts of Tonga, Sydney, 1924, pp.110-112. 
---.::... -------
19. Information given to the British Commissioner 
Goode, by Her Hajesty Queen Salote. Goode to 
1963, con£., BCT 3/Pol 2, vol. 2. 
~nd Consul, J.c. 
Haddocks, 14 L\l.!~·ust 
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from the ex-Quzen of Hawaii addressed to 'the last independent 
Sovereign in the Pacific', consoling him on the loss of his 
independence under the Samoa Convention, had apparently stren~thened 
his resolve never to surrender willingly any of his rights.[20] 
As soon as he read the draft Treaty, Tupou II rejected its 
implications. In a brief letter to Thomson written on 10 April, the 
day after the latter's arrival, Tupou II bemoaned the fact that the 
country was lost, and signed himself dramatically 'Your true friend, 
whom you have slain'.[21] In discussions between the t\110 men over 
the next few days no agreement was reached and Thomson decider tt he 
should lose no time in securing the coaling and repair stations 'lest 
the King should afterwards make them a condition for concessions in 
other parts of the Treaty'.[22] Accompanied by the Minister of Lands 
who had been authorised by the King to conclude a perpetual lease of 
the land required, Thomson selected two sites: one at Vava'u and one 
at Nuku' alofa. He also took the opportunity to sail on to the 
neighbouring island of Niue, w!1ere the King and Chiefs accepted a 
protectorate without demur. After an absence of 10 days Thomson 
returned to Nuku'alofa on the 25th April. He then proceeded, as he 
later put it, to show his claws to a recalcitrant King.[23] 
After his return from Niue, Thomson was invited to attend three 
Privy Council meetings at which the draft Treaty was discussed. To 
counter the King's objections Thomson argued that far from taking away 
20. Thomson to c.o., 28 May 1900, CO 225/60. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Thomson, 'I Show My Claws to a Recalcitrant King', Chap.XX., The 
Scene Changes. 
-----
Page 32 
Tonga's sovereignty, the Treaty would strengthen it by removing the 
danger of foreign aggression. He stressed the possibility of the 
French or even Italian flag being hoisted and claimed that if Tonga 
rejected the draft Treaty Britain would regard the King as 'hostile to 
her interests' and take 'stronger action'. If, however, the Treaty 
was signed, Thomson assured the King that Britain would recognise his 
sovereignty in the event of any civil disturbance within Tonga, 
although, as he noted later, he gave no promise to keep Tupou II op 
the throne. Further to allay fears regarding independence Thomson 
agreed to add to the first. Article which placed Tonga under British 
protection the words, 'without prejudice to the sovereignty of the 
King of Tonga'. But as Thomson no doubt realised, the addition 
neither altered the substance of the Treaty, nor guaranteed continuing 
sovereignty for the King.[24] 
During the discussions on the Treaty, Tupou II was undoubtedly 
receiving European advice, although the exact source is uncertain. 
The Reverend J.B. Watkin, a former Wesleyan missionary to Tonga who 
had followed Tupou I and Baker into the Free Church in 1885 and had 
been its President and chaplain to the King since that time, 
invariably acted as Tupou II's interpreter and may have been advising 
him regarding the Treaty. Other European missionaries and former 
missionaries also seem to have given Tupou II advice, including the 
French priest Father 01ier and even the Reverend D£. J.E. Moulton, 
who had been cecalled from Tonga by the Australasian 
Wesleyan-M~thodist Church in 1888 and was visiting Tonga at the time 
of the negotiations. Baker, too, had a hand in the deliberat:tons; in 
1898 he had returned to settle in Tonga and although his influence was 
no longer decisive, he apparently translated the Treaty for Tupou II. 
24. Ibid., p.195; Thomson to c.o., 28 Nay 1900, CO 225/60. 
' \ ... ,_..J i I ' ' d 
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The advice that he gave the King is a matter for speculation in 
September 1900 this former champion of an independent state who now 
found himself left out in the cold wds urging on New Zealand's Premier 
the advantages of annexing Tonga.[25] Tupou II's only other sources 
of European advice were local traders and others who shared his 
distrust of Britain and believed that British influence might threaten 
their position with the Government. 
With the assistance of his advisers, Tupou II proposed a number 
of amendments to the draft Treaty. He sought, for example, to add the 
words 'A~1d thte Queen undertakes never to seize the islands' • In view 
of his instructions Thomson could not agree to th:s amendment. 
Instead he declared it an insult, and argued that Britain could have 
seized Tonga 'at any moment during the 127 years since Captain Cook'. 
The King's second proposal was that Europeans working for the Tongan 
Government should be amenable to the Tongan Courts and punished 
according to Tongan law. This too, Thomson dismissed outright; no 
European would be tried by the Tongan courts. A further amendment 
proposed by the King met with Thomson's approval: Article IV of the 
draft Treaty which provided for the appointMent of a British Agent and 
Consul to be the 'authorised medium of all communications' between the 
two Governments was amended to allow the King of Tonga to appoint his 
own represenlative to conduct negotiations with the British 
Government.[26] 
25. Baker to Seddc,a, 4 ;ieptemher 1900, NZNA, Seddon Papers, 1/60/73. 
Baker to Seddon, U August 1900, ibid., 1/60/67; 
26. Thomson, The Scene Changes, p.197; Treaty of Friendship between 
Great Britain and Tonga, 1900, Article III. 
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By this time Thomson realised that Tupou II had no intention of 
signing the Treaty if he could avoid it and was employing every 
delaying tactic he knew. On 2 May, in reply to a request from Thomson 
that the day for signing be fixed, the King wrote: 'Our reply is, on 
the day we are agreed about it it shall be concluded.'[27] Thomson's 
impatience was growing. It was time, he decided, to show 'the 
ungloved hand'. In a move which he failed to report to the Colonial 
Office, Thomson attempted to intimidate the King into signing by 
fabricating a report that he had received 'secret orders' which made 
things look very bad for the King. His ploy was assisted by local 
rumour which alleged tha~ if Tupou II refused the protectorate, 
Britain would simply seize Tonga. To force home his advantage, 
Thomson wrote a private letter to the King, remonstrating with him for 
his opposition to the Treaty, and likening Tonga's situation to that 
of a loved one trying to commit SJicide. Thomson admitted later that 
his letter 'must have stirred up the ~ing considerably', and from the 
extremely abject tone of the reply it evoked, there can be no doubt of 
that. [28] 
At discussions the next morning it seemed to Thomson that he had 
finally managed to convince the King that a protectorate was the least 
of the possible evils which might befall Tonga. Solemnly he declared, 
'Tupou, neither you ncr I can stop this Protectorate. It has been 
decided upon'.[29] But Tupou was not yet beaten. After some time 
27. Tupou II to Thomson, 2 May 1900, encl. in Thomson, to c.o., 28 
May 1900, CO 225/60. 
28. Thomson, The Scene Changes, p.l98-9; 
private, -z- ME.' 1900, PO/KNF 1900; Tupou 
translation, 2 May 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 
29. Thomson, The Scene Changes, p.l99. 
-- -----
Thomson to Tupou II, 
II to Thomson, private, 
4 in no. 6. 
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had been oc:upied in discussing the merits of various 
translations of the word 'protection', it was agreed between the two 
men that the signing of the Treaty should be delayed until the nobles 
and other important chiefs[30] were assembled from all over the 
group. According to Thomson, the King gave an assurance that the 
waiting would not be in vain, and that the Treaty would be accepted 
and signed once the assembled nobles had considered it.[31] 
If this assur,mce was given (and we have only Thomson's dubious 
wora for that), it is surprising that Thomson accepted it at face 
value. No doubt he did so out of his own conviction that the presence 
of the nobles would aid his mission. At the outset he had encourageJ 
the King to share with the nobles the responsibility of signing the 
Treaty, but the King had preferred to be guided by his Ministers in 
Privy Council, on whose support he knew he could rely. Throughout the 
negotiations, Thomson acc•lsed Tupou II of standing virtually alone 
against the Treaty, with the support of only some of the nobles whom 
he described as 'the more ignorant'.[32] He stated in his report 
that the nobles Tungi, Ata, Tu'ipelehake and Vaea, and the chief 
Mateialona, were all openly in favour of the protectorate. 
30. In his report Thomson refers to 'All the forty-one Chiefs 
("nobele")'. Since there were at that time thirty-one nobles, it 
is likely that Thomson meant to refer to the nobles, all of whom 
were due in Nuku'alofa shortly for the triennial Parliament. 
Amongst those he mentions in this context, however, are some 
chiefs, such as Mateialona, who were not nobles. 
31. Thomson to c.o., 28 May 1900, CO 225/60. 
32. Ibid. 
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The support which these nobles and chiefs gave Thomson and the 
protectorate had its origins in divisions within Tongan society and in 
a long-standing alliance between certain opponents of the Tupou 
dynasty and the repret>vl!tatives of the British Government. All of 
those Thomson named h ~,: n•,l::nns to oppose Tupou II' s rule and they saw 
British protection as a means of increasing their mm influence and 
restricting the power '' ,,ing. One of the most prominent was 
Mateialona, the Governor of Ha'apai and an illegitimate grandson of 
Tupou I. Like Ata and Vaea, Mate:talona was a Wesleyan who had 
accepted exile in Fiji between 1887-1890 rather than join Tupou I's 
Free Church. During the turmoil of the 1880s the Wesleyans had found 
support from British officials and they continued to foster links with 
Britain. The noble Tungi was one of Tupou I's most powerful rivals. 
He was a direct descendant of the Tu'i Ha'atakalaua line which, 
according to tradition, had exercised temporal power for the Tu'i 
Tonga before the Tu'i Kanokupolu took over in the seventeenth century. 
Tungi's son, Tuku'aho, was appointed PrLmier at British instigation 
after Baker's deportation in 1890, but was dismissed by Tupou II in 
1893. Both he and Tungi had worked closely with Thomson during his 
term as Deputy Premier in 1891 and although Tuku'aho had died in 1897, 
Thomson regarded the elderly Tungi with particular affection. In 
1899, a few months before Thomson's arrival, factional rivalries had 
intensified as a result of Tupou II's choice of a wife. Until shortly 
before the wedding Tupou II was expected to marry Ofa-ki-Vava'u 
Ma'atu, who belonged to the Tu'i Ha'atakalaue. line and was favoured by 
many of the nobles. Instead, however, Tupou II married Lavinia 
Veiongo, great-grandaughter of Laufilitonga, the last Tu'i Tonga, and 
daughter of the Hinister of PolicE.~, Kupu. The extent of ft:eling ~vhich 
Tupou II's decision aroused we1s indicated by attempts tu burn down 
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houses by the opposing factions. The Reverend Shirley Baker, who had 
for some time been tryin~ to regain influence in Tonga, found willing 
converts for a branch of the Church of England among Ofa's 
relatives. (33] For many months after the Hedding Tupou II rarely 
ventured from the Palace except under guard and, according to Thomson, 
Tungi and Ata had not spoken to the King sinte the wedding. [34] 
It was clear, then, that Tupou II did not have the 11nanimous 
support of the nobles and other leading chiefs, and Titomson obviously 
hoped to use the divisions to his advantage. Ncverthelt>ss, when the 
nobles and chiefs were finally gathered together in the Palace on the 
16 Hay, it rapidly became evident that the King's will prevailed. 
Thomson apparently expected a division amongst the nobles -- an 
indication of the extent to which he had failed to understand tlH.' 
relationship between King and nobles and the sanctions against open 
disagreement. HorE•over, there is no strcng evidence to support 
Thomson's assertion that those who tavoured the Treaty were in the 
majority. At the meetiag (from whi.ch Thomson was excluded after he 
had made an opening speech), several of those present, including Tungi 
and ~futeialona, apparently expressed support for a protectorate. But 
on the second day Thomson was asked to agree to an amendment 
guaranteeing the King's throne for ever; this he would do only if the 
words 'making the islands a British Protectorate' were added. Fina:.ly 
a messenger informed Thomson that the meeting would not agree to the 
first clause of th@ T~eaty, and the discu sio~s concluded with Thomson 
33. 
34. 
See A.H. Wood, Overseas Missions of the Australian Netnodist 
Church, vol. 1, Tonga and Samoa, Helbour11e, 1972, p.269.-·~-~-·-
[Tregear, E.?], The Right Hoi'!.:.. ~-L :?.~ddon' s lTh~ fr.;::~Ier of ~-~::': 
Zealand) Visit to Tonga, Fiji!.. Savage ..!_sland !.!,~~ .!:_11c C~~i 
Islands, Nay 1900-;--Wellington, 1900~ pp.20-22; 1-J'.E. tJeil, (~~an 
~lsfe":-11elbourne, 1902, p.l03; Thomsoa to C.O. • 2~1 U~J' l':JUU, 
co 2i576u. 
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no closer to his objective.[35] 
Thomson's patience was running out. He had expected the meeting 
of chiefs to settle the matter; now hi;! determined that the Treaty 
should be signed before the night was out. But by thi~ stage the 
hing's dislike of the Treaty had widened from Article I to include 
Article II as well. Tupou II would not sign unless the restriction 
'except under the sole advice and through the channel of Her Najesty's 
Government' was removed from the conduct of his foreign relations. 
Thomson blamed the King's renewed resistance and sudden awareness of 
the full ramifications of Article II on the background activities of 
Father Oliert the acting head of the French Roman Catholic mission, 
whom he described as 'the snake in the grass'.[36] Thomson accused 
Olier of intriguing to make Tonga a French Protectorate, and he 
claimed to have private information 'from a trustwurthy source' that 
the French priest had promised the King that a French warship would 
visit Tonga in June 'with instructions as to a Treaty'.[37] According 
to Vice-Consul Leefe, however, Olier satisfactorily explained the 
warship rumour and declared himself delighted with the idea of a 
British Protectorate over Tonga, as this could be expected to ease the 
Freuch mission's struggle to develop its Church.[38] 
36. ~' p.211. 
37. Ibid., p.213; Thomson to Leefe, 19 Hay 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 3 
in no. 18; Thomson to c.o., 28 May 1900, CO 225/60. 
38. l?~d., Leefe to O'Brien, 14 June 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. in 
no. 28. As recently as 1896 a French Naval Cotll!llander had been 
called upon to induce the King to assign land in Nuku'alofa for 
the French Catholic mission (Hugh Laracy, 'The Catholic Hir.sian', 
in Rutherford (ed.), Friendly Islands, Oxford U.P., 1977, p.l97). 
-~------
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Whether as a result of Olier's influence or not, it became clear 
to Thomson that the King was now 'obstinately determined to resist at 
all costs'.[39] Thomson had no real choice but to acquiesce, and 
allow the King to sign only those sections he pleased. The prospect 
of further delay could not be tolerated. Nor was it desirable to put 
any more pressure on the King than Thomson's cont ... nual outpouring of 
unveiled threats provided; if a contingent of marines were landed 
from HMS Porpoise there would be no doubt that Thomson had extorted 
the Treaty by force. Horeover, he was astute enough to realise that 
if he created an open breach with the King, there was every 
possibility that Tupou would simply reject the whole Treaty, including 
the extra-territorial! ty clauses, and Thomson's mission \vould be a 
complete failure. 
Accordingly Thomson agreed 'under protest' to the omission of 
Articles I and II of the draft Treaty and the inclusion of a new 
Article I on condition that the Treaty was signed immediately. The 
new Article which was intended to strengthen Tonga's independence, 
resembled the pledge signed by the King and Captain Stuart in 1899: 
His Hajesty the King of Tonga agrees that he will have no 
relations of any sort with foreign powers concerninr, the 
alienation of any land or any part of his Sovereignty, or 
any dl~ands for monetary compensation.[40] 
At 2 a.m. on the morning of 18 May the Trt•aty was finally sie;nt>d, 
with Thomson and Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, who was Tupou II's father and 
the Minister of Lands, acting as plenipotentiaries for their 
respective monarchs. 
39. Thomoon to c.o., 28 ~k1y 1900, CO 225/60. 
40. Article I, Treaty of Friendship BetWc:!Cn Great. nritain and TlH1(~,a, 
1900; see Appendix !(vi}. 
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In the eyes of his Tongan subjects Tupou II had triumphed in the 
negotiations. He appeared to have prevented a protectorate and kept 
control of his own foreign relations; his victory was translated into 
song and celebrated widely. Even Thomson observed that the Tongans 
assembled at his departure were saying 'There they go, beaten; they 
fought our chiefs for our country and got the worst of it! '.[41] 
After reading Thomson's report the High Commissioner, Sir George 
0' Brien, commented in the same vein ,that 1 the King seems to have bf't>n 
too muc~ for the Envoy'.[42] But although the resourceful Hr Thomson 
had failed to secure formal agreement to the Treaty as drafted, he 
nevertheless managed to secure the essence of the missing first two 
Articles by other, more dubious, means. 
The Treaty as sign~d contained no provision for British control 
over Tonga's foreign relations, but Thomson insisted that it did. He 
maintained that a letter which Tupou II had written on 2 May 
expressing his general agreement with the Treaty apart from the first 
Article, constituted a 'formal undertaking'.[43] Thomson later 
described the letter aH 'a business-like document' and 'an official 
letter ••• (which) seemed to put an end to all negotiations 1 , [ 4!+] but 
in fact it wao nothing of the sort. The King denied that it was an 
'agreGment', and from the format and the wording there can be no doubt 
that Tupti•t did nor: intend it to be final. In translation it began: 
I write this letter in reply to the questions you put to me 
yesterday, which were as follows: (1) What is our mind 
towards the new Treaty? And our answer is, we a3ree to it, 
but the first section only is difficult to us where tlw wnrd 
'protection' is used. 
42. Hinute by O'Brien, 11 Jmw 1900, t-lPHC !+, 2/1900. 
43. Thorm;on to Tupou II, 18 Hay 1900, FOCP 75()4, encl. 6 in no. 6. 
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And later, 
Do not be pained at this letter, Mr Thomson, for I agree to 
everything that is in the Treaty; it is only the first 
section that appears difficult to me; and if you will 
consent to alter the first section it would be easy for us 
to agree on the matter.[45] 
Thomson's interpretation of this letter was obviously an 
c· ·aggeration, but he used it now to his advantage, warning the King 
that 'he would be held'bound by his written agreement of the 2nd 
Nay'.[46] To reinforce the point he i.1formed the King later in the 
day that Her Majesty's Government ~·lOuld regard the letter of 2 Hay, 
'as forming part of the Treaty', and that if the King entered into 
'negotiations of any sort whatever with any f~ :eign State, except 
under the advice and through the channel of Her Hajesty's Government, 
such negotiations will be regarded as a breach of TreRty entailing the 
usual conse:uences'.[47] 
Thomson next turned his att~~tion to the missing Articla I. 
Having failed to secure his objective by treaty he determint:.d instead 
simply to proc:aim a protectorate and present the King with a fait 
,g.ccompH. Thomson reasoned that unless he took some definite step, 
another nation, notably France, would be free to execute a Treaty of 
Protection with Tonea. Moreover he declared himself satisfied that 
'all the more powerful and intelligent chiefs were in favour of a 
Protectorate'.[48] Conuequently, he prepared a Proclnr:lation, which 
was to be read publicly as his final act befor~ sailing away from 
Tonga. The Proclffillation stated that: 
!+ J. Tupou II. to Thomson, 2 HaJ- 1<100, FOCP 7504, cn~l. 2 :i.n no. b. 
46. Thomson to c.o., 28 t·fay 1900, GO 225/60. 
47. Thomccm to Tupou II, 1B thy 1900, FOCP 750!+, e tel. 6 in no. 6. 
4G. Thonc;on to c.o., 28 Hay 1900, co 22'}/60. 
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Whereas His Majesty the King of Tonga has been pleased to 
sign an Agreement, dated the lnd May, 1900, and a Treaty, 
dated the 18th May, 1900, wherein he agrees that his 
relations with foreign Powers shall be conducted under the 
sole advice of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and that 
her Majesty shall protect his dominions from external 
hostile attacks, it is hereby proclaimed that a Protectorat~ 
by Her Britannic Majesty has been established 
accordingly. [49] 
The following day, 19 :t-fay, Thomson, accompani(!.d by Commander 
Ravenhill. Vice-Consul Leefe, and an escort of 50 armed men, proceeded 
to the Palace to take official leave of the King. After Thomson had 
rebuked the King for his obstinance and issued a further warning as to 
the conduct of Tonga's foreign relations, the two men shook hands and, 
according to Thomson, parted on the best of terms. At the head .:f the 
British guard Thomson now marched to Hala'e Pangai, the main square, 
where a large crowd quickly gathered. There Thomson read the 
Proclamation in both English and Tongan, while in the background m1s 
Porpoise, dressed overall with the Union Jack at the main, fired a 21 
gun salute. In deference to the intensity of the Tongan people's 
~~votion to their own flag Thomson had deliberately arranged to 
proclaim the protectorate without hoisting the British flag on shore. 
A few hours afterwards, Thomson sailed victoriously away, leaving the 
Kingdom ro carry on its own government and to come to terms with the 
new 1~ l 1tions on its power. 
!•9. Proclamation, Nul~u' alofa, l'J Hay 1900, FOCP 750!+, end • 7 in 
no. 6. 
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THE King's reaction to the proclamation of the protectorate was 
at first one of quiet submission. He was well m.rare that the desires 
of a 'great and powerful State' were all that really mattered in the 
long run, [SO] and he could do little about Thomson's proclamation, 
of which he had no forewarninr; and at which he was not even present. 
The saddened and submissive tone of the final private letter which he 
sent Thomson just before his departure is almost poetic: 
I thought that the British flag would have been hoisted this 
morning, anc .f it had been done we should have been 
content, fo~ that is the way with strong Governments; they 
do what seems good in their eyt!s. 
He went on to point out that he had not wanted ~o seem discourteous to 
Thomson, but 'our minrl9 are stirred at the thought of our land being 
taken by one of the Great Powers'. Movingly he concluded: 
our land could 
State, or for 
wished to keep 
happened to us 
not be justly seized for having wronged any 
having broken any Treaty, but only for having 
ourselves independent, and something has 
today, yet we are content.[Sl] 
As the King so clearly realised, Easil Thomson's ~roclamation of a 
protectorate was final proof that ultimately, the preservation of 
Tonga's independence lay not within Tonga, but with the attitude of 
the Great Powers. 
Tupou II made one attempt to protest to the British Government 
against the Treaty. In late July the Colonial Office received a 
telegram on behnlf of the King of Tonga., begging that the Tteaty might 
remain in abeyance until a letter from him was received. [52] The 
SO. Tupou II to Thomson, 7 May 1900, fOCP 7504, encl. 5 in no. 6. 
The full quotation is at the title page of Chapter 2. 
51. Tupou II to Thomson, private, 19 May 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 8 in 
no. 6. 
52. O'Brien to c.o., tel, 23 July 1900, CO 225/59. 
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promised letter, which arrived in late October, disputed 
Thomson's interpretation of the 2 May letter in relation to the 
inclusion of the foreign relations provision, and also protested the 
'considerable difference' between the Tongan and English translations 
of the Treaty.[53] The King's arguments were soundly based, and were 
supported by Vice-Consul Leefe, who advocated the appointment of a 
'Mixed Commission' to agree on au interpretation and translation of 
the Tr1aty.[54] 
The Colonial Office was prepared in principle to consider the 
King's protests before proceeding with the rat.fication of the Treaty. 
After a brief examination, however, officials found no cause to modify 
Thomson's arrangements;[SS] these arrangements provided the simplest 
means of meeting British requirements in Tonga, and unless Britain's 
reputation was seriously jeopardised, it was easiest to accept the 
fait accompli. The King of Tonga was in no position to make an 
efiective protest. Moreover, the Colonial Office could do little but 
rely on Thomson's interpretation of events. He was, after all, 
Britain's chosen representative. Wheu the King's letter was referred 
to Thomson for comment, he alleged, predictably enough, that the King 
was inten~ionally misleading the British Government and merely seizing 
upon any excuse for disclaiming responsibility for the Treaty among 
his people.[56] 
53. Tupou II to c.o., 15 August 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 3 in no. 65. 
54. Leefe to O'Brien, 24 July 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 2 in no. 57. 
55. c.o. to F.o., 30 October 1900, FOCP 7504, no. 65; F.o. to c.o., 
6 November 1900, co 225/60. 
56. Thomson, Memorandum, 12 October 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 3 in 
no. 57. 
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Although the Colonial Office now gave its full support to 
Thomson's arrangements, some officials had initially been taken aback 
by his methods. In particular, there had been some doubt as to 
whether the foreign relations Article could or should be read as part 
of the Treaty. In a note to the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office 
commented that although the Treaty was not of gceat value without the 
foreign relations clause, the leases were nevertheless important and 
the Treaty should be ratified.[57] Subsequently these doubts were 
cast aside and the Colonial Office approved Thomson's actions and 
recognised the letter of 2 May as valid. It was considered that, in 
the circumstances, Thomson had achieved a considerable measure of 
success, for which the thanks of Her Majesty's Government were to be 
conveyed to him. The knighthood which Thomson had hoped for and 
subsequently requested was not forthcoming;, it was not until after 
the First World War that Thomson was knighted for his services in 
Scotland Yard during the war.[58] 
To further justify the British position, officials pointed out 
that the undertakL.g to protect Tonga against foreign powers implied 
control by Britain of Tonga's foreign relations.[59] Although the 
offending Article was not in the ratified Treaty, Britain continued to 
maintain that in fact it was. By a mixture of threats and habit, 
Tonga's foreign relations were thereafter for the next 50-60 years, 
conducted for the most part through British representatives. 
57. c.o. to F.O., 13 July 1900, FOCP 7504, no. 6. 
58. Ibid., I am indebted to Angela Hoollacott for the informacion on 
Thomson's knighthood. 
59. c.o. to O'Brien, Conf., 30 November 1900, CO 225/60. 
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On the question of the protectorate there was also some doubt. 
As late as October 1900, for example, High Commissioner O'Brien was 
unsure whether an effective protectorate had been established[60] but 
officials in London were adamant. Thomson's Proclamation had been 'a 
bold step' , but one whic11 they considered justified in the 
circumstances.[61] Although the King had refused to accept formally 
the relevant Article of the Treaty, he had nevertheless 'acquiesced in 
the Proclamation of a Protectorate, a step which was taken with the 
approval of the majorlty of the chiefs' .[62] H.B. Cox in the 
Foreign Office summed up Thomson's mission succinctly: 'We appear to 
have obtained the substance if not the form, but we may have to put 
the screws on King George a little if he is restive.'[63] 
It was with the purpose of 'keep(ing) this slippery gentleman to 
his Treaty' [64] that the Colonial Office decided that the High 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific should himself proceed to Tonga 
in a warship to 'f.acilitate' matters at the exchange of the Treaty 
ratifications. The High Commissioner was to impress on the King, as 
forcibly as possible, that: 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
Her Majesty's Government will not suffer the provisions of 
the Treaty to be broken with impunity; and in especial that 
any attempt to enter into negotiations with foreign Powers 
through any but the proper cltannel, viz., Her Majesty's 
Government, will be regarded as a grave and deliberate 
breach of Treaty, and will entail the most serious 
consequences.[65] 
O'Brien to c~o., 3 October 1900, WPHC 4, 2/1900. 
C. 0. to F .o., 13 July 1900, FOCP 7504, no. 6. 
Minute by Cox on Thomson to c.o., 28 May :900, co 225/60. 
Ibid. 
Minute on O'Brien to c.o., tel., 23 July 1900, CO 225/59. 
65. c.o. to O'Brien, Conf., 30 November 1900, CO 225/60. 
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The warning was, as one Foreign Office official noted, 'a little 
stiff, but it is desirable that there should be no room for ambiguity 
in dealing with a ruler so "shifty" as the King of Tonga' .[66] 
Thomson's view of the King and of the negotiations had obviously been 
wholly accepted. 
When O'Brien, accompanied by the new Agent and Consul, Hamilton 
Hunter, arrived in Tonga on 15 February 1901 he lost no time in 
acquainting the King, in the presence of his Ministers, with ~he 
British Government's attitude. The King accepted th~ warning without 
demur, replying that he understood fully that the obligation was 
strictly binding on him and giving an assurance that he would never 
attempt to infringe it.[67] The exchange of ratifications was 
carried out on 16 February with only a minor hitch in the proceedings 
when the Reverend Dr. J.E. Moulton (who had produced a 
translation of the Tongan Bible) pointed out 'at least one serious 
mistranslatio·t in the Tongan version'. The p't'oblem was settled 
however, when both Moulton a~d O'Brien agreed that the English version 
only should be binding on the King.[68] 
In striking contrast to Thomson's observations, O'Brien declared 
himself most impressed with almost every aspect of his visit, 
including the behaviour of the King. Throughout his term as High 
Commissioner he maintained considerable faith in Tupou II's ability to 
rule the Kingdom satisfactorily. As far as O'Brien could discern 
during his 1901 visit, there was only one cloud hanging over Tonga's 
horizo>·, and that was the continuing fear of annexation. He described 
66. Minutes on c.o. to F.O., 16 November 1900, FO 58/335. 
67. O'Brien to c.o., conf., 21 February 1901, WPHC 27/1/7. 
68. Ibid. 
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the King as 'passionately attached to the independence of his 
country', and argued that the threat of annexation was stunting the 
country's economic development because the King feared any increase of 
foreign influence.[69] O'Brien therefore suggested to the Colonial 
Office that the King should be relieved of his apprehension of 
impending annexation, and left to carry on his own government and 
develop Tonga's resources. 
The High Commissioner's suggestion went further than either the 
Colonial Offic.e or Foreign Office was prepared to allow. The British 
Government did not see that it was possible to give the King any 
definite assurance beyond a statement that Her Majesty's Government 
had 'no present intention' of annexing Tonga. And as such a statement 
would probably confirm rather than allay the King's apprehension, it 
was decided simply to drop the High Commissioner's suggestion[70] 
and the question of annexation was shelved. In the meantime, it was 
sufficient for British purposes that Tonga was definitely, if 
reluctantly, a British Protectorate. It remained to ts seen what this 
might mean in practice~ and what impact protectorate status would have 
on the government of the Kingdom. 
69. O'Brien noted that the King had recently declined a very 
advantageous offer by a foreign company willing to pay 33% of its 
gross proceeds as a Royalty, in return for a concession to fish 
for pearl shell. (O'Brien to c.o., conf. 22 February 1901, 
ibid.) 
70. C.O. to F.O., 24 April 1901, FOCP 8089, no. 67; F.O. to C.O., 6 
May 1901, CO 225/61. 
'II 
CHAPTER 3 
A Protectorate in Name Only 
but nevertheless when we extend a Protectorate over a 
nation, we have, I think, a certain moral responsibility to 
see that that nation is governed on such vital principles of 
freedom justice and decency as marks our Rule all the world 
over ••• 
[Leefe to Seddon, conf., 5 June 1900, NZNA, Seddon Papers, 1/60/38.] 
.. \ 
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Britain's desire to establish a diplomatic presence in Tonga 
resulted in the proclamation of a British Protectorate in 1900. In 
the Treaty of Friendship that defined the new relationship between the 
two nations, the British Government shied away from any overt 
involvement in Tonga's administration, hoping to avoid any unnecessary 
commitments. But, having assumed international responsibility for 
Tonga, the British Government could not resist for long _.te temptation 
to have at least some say in its internal affairs. 
Tonga's status as a British Protectorate created a new avenue 
for, and new expectations of, redress for aggrieved Europeans and 
Tongans. It also created new expectations of cooperation with thu 
Tongan Government on the part of British representatives in Tonga and 
engendered a sense of responsibility which even officials in London 
could not finally evade. As the first few years of the twentieth 
century passed, it became increasingly obvious to these officials that 
Britain's relationship with Tonga, as defined in the Treaty, was 
unworkable. The dilemma Britain faced was perhaps best described by 
Sir John Thurston: 
I do not believe in 'Protectorates'. In fact I don't quite 
know what it means, nor did I ever meet anyone who did. 
My own opinion is that if we want the place -- or the place 
wants us -- we should hoist the flag on it. If the reverse 
-we should not meddle.[1] 
By the end of May 1900 the British Government had meddled in Tongat 
and, sooner or later, it would have to face the consequences of that 
action. 
1. Thurston to Noss, 28 October 1890, F.J. Hoss Papers, HS215, llm: 
2, Auckland Huseum and Institute Library. J. am indt~btl'd to Dr. 
Deryck Scarr for this reference. 
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The British Colonial Office had been adamant in its deliberations 
prior to the establishment of the Protectorate that it had no desire 
to intervene in Tonga's internal administration. Under the Treaty, 
Tonga's external relations were to be conducted through the British 
Agent and Consul and jurisdiction over non-Tongans was in some cases 
removed from the Tongan courts, btt Tonga's internal affairs we'e 
otherwise unaffected. Article III of the Treaty, which provided for 
the appointment of 'a suitable person to act as British Agent and 
Consul in Tonga' , maue this quite clear. The Agm. t -tnd Consul was to 
exercise the jurisdiction vested in the H~gh ~ommissioner's Court and 
was also to be the authorised medium of all commu11ications between the 
two Governments. But beyond this, the .\t .icle WAnt on: 
The Agent will not interfere in any way in the internal 
affairs and administration in matters where the interests of 
British subjects or foreigners are not concerned, but will 
at all times be ready to advise the King and his Government 
in any matter as to which they wish to seek his advice.[2] 
Despite the prohibition against interference, it is clear that 
British officials expected to have some influence over Tongan affairs. 
The reference in Article III to the interests of British subjects and 
foreigners indicated that the Agent and Consul had a particular 
responsibility in this regatd and implied that some 
intervention on their behalf was legitimate. Further, the explication 
form of 
in Article III of the Consul's advisory role underlined the British 
Government's expectations that tlw Consul would exercise an informal 
influence over the Tongan administration. Government by advice wts 
not a new device in British colonial circles. The protected Malay 
States had been governed on this principle since the 1870s without the 
2. See Appendix I(iv). 
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extension of a formal protectorate.[3] The gentle art of advising 
was the least burdensome method of influencing Tongan affairs and the 
British Colonial office clearly hoped that the Agent and Consul would 
be able to persuade the T.ongan Government to follow 'wise' policies. 
But if behind the Treaty had lain the fond hope that Tonga would 
adopt Great Britain ss its mother, to guide and nourish its growth 
into a miniature Britain, there was little on which to base such a 
hope. The King of Tonga had no desire to heed British advice, 
especially when it was proferred by power-seeking British officials. 
Britain's role in the political turmoil of the late nineteenth century 
had given the King ample reason to mistrust the representatives of 
Great Britain. Throughout the 1880s the British Vice-Consuls and High 
Commissioners had identified themselves with the anti-Baker dissidents 
and had given support to those who disobeyed Tupou I by refusing to 
join the Free Church. Moreover, since at least the 1870s the Tongan 
Government had felt threatened by the possibility of British 
annexation. Little wonder then that both Tupou I and Tupou II viewed 
the British Consul as being aligned with their opponents. 
Tupou II's resistance to the Treaty and the circumstan~es in 
which the Protectorate had been declared only added to the alienation 
of the British Consul from the Tongan Government. Just as successive 
British representatives had failed to gain the ear of the King in the 
late nineteenth century, so now the Consul was treated with suspicion 
and mistrust and his i?resence was ignored whenever possible. The 
Consul's determined attempts to assert his influence only intensified 
the breakdown in rulationo. In a letter of complaint to tim Secretary 
3. See Emily Sadt:a., ~ Prot~£}_'!_ Hal~": .~t;!ttc:E. _!:8L"::l~~_95, Sinr,.:1pur~J, 
1968. 
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of State for the Colonies written in June 1903, Tupou II claimed that 
the !lritish Consul was continually interfering in matters that did not 
come under his jurisdiction, was threatening to ruin the Tongan 
Government and 'spreading reports that keep my subjects in a perpetual 
state of excitement' .[4] 
:~eKing's view of the British Consul contrasts strongly with the 
naive expectations of infltwnce harboured by local British 
representatives. In early December 1900, for example, R. Beckwith 
Leefe, an ex-planter from Fiji who was British Vice-Consul in Tonga 
from 1887 until the Treaty ratifiC'ation in February 1901, took 
considerable trouble to explain to the Tongan Premier his view of the 
Treaty relationship and of why the British representative should be 
kept informed of government matters, in this case the Government's 
intention to procure arms. Leefe began by impressing upon the Premier 
Great Britain's generosity in establishing the Protectorate. Great 
Britain, he said, knew very well that Tonga would sooner have Great 
Britain as its suzerain than any other Power, and for this reason it 
had engaged to proteci.. Tonga. If it had not done so, he declared, 
'Tonga would have lost her independence, country, flag and all she 
prizes most highly in six months'. Having taken on the burden it was 
only right, he felt, fClr Britain to expect some response from the 
Tongan Government. Of course, since the Tongan Government was 
spending Tongan money, G~~at Britain really had no wish to interfere 
in internal matters, 'unless absolutely obliged to do 
Nevertheless: 
considering that now l.Verything which is of interest to 
Tonga io alno of interest to Great Britain, that we t~re both 
in one firm, so to speak, Great Britain requires that siw 
sha.Ll be made fully con,•ers;..mt of everything which is. going 
SO I • 
4. Tupouii toc.o., 20June 1903, FOCP 8507, encl. 1 inno. l':'W. 
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on in Tonga, and that the British representative shall be 
freely and spontaneously informed of everything of any 
importance without having to ask for the information. 
The only way for things to go smoothly and well in Tonga, Leefe 
concluded, was for the Tongan Government to treat the British 
representative 'with perfect candour and confidence, and look upon him 
as your best friend'.[S] 
Far from regarding Leefe as their 'best friend', however, the 
King and Government ignored his efforts at intervent~on. Predictably 
enough, in view of his resistance to the .lreaty il• the first plac<•, 
Tupou II was determined that Tonga's new atatus ,.,auld make as littln 
difference as possible to his Government. At the session of 
parliament which opened shortly after Thomson's departure, the Kins 
acknowledged no change and merely alluded indirectly to 
protectorate: 
What shall I say concerning the Treaty the Britlsh 
representative brought, in case I go astray in what I say, 
for hasn't he written notices and circulated them; we give 
thanks for the love of Britain.[6] 
Apart from this brief reference, the Treaty was awarded 
tlw 
no 
recognition: it was neither laid befo't"e the Assembly nor pul-,lished 
until much later. Leefe was undoubtedly correct when he complained 
that 1 the country at large knows nothing of its terms'.[?] 
5. Leefe to O'Brien, 7 December 1900, FOCP 8089, encl. 2 in nu. 41. 
6. Sp~t~ch of the King at the Upening of Parlia:nent, 2~} Nay 19LIL>, 
(trano.), Koe Kancte, Tohi XIV, Ko h. 10, 11 Julai 1Q00, NZ~~~ 
Seddon Paper;:· ·-~--~-
7. Leefc to 0 1 d, 12 July 1900, encl. in otnrien to C.0., 23 July 
1900, co :~Z:>r~ .... 
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Although the King'~ resistance to the Treaty and Protectorate was 
more passive than active, Leefe gave credence to a rumuur of planned 
active resistance to British encroachment that gained currency in the 
months before the Treaty was ratified. Soon after Thomson's visit, 
Leefe got hold of various snippets of information to the effect that 
the Tongan Government was attempting to procure arms, and he linked 
this information to local gossip that the Government intended 'to 
imitate the Chinese and annihilate the Europenns'.[8] Although the 
Premier explained that the Mauser rif~es, ammunition and battery of 
guns were for the use of the Royal Guards and for signalling steamers, 
Leefe remained unconvinced as he felt the quantities excessive. He 
warned the High Commissioner that '50 modern rifles in the hands of 
men ready and able to use them would place the European popul ~ion 
entirely at the mercy of the Tongans if they were at any time 
influenced thereto by the Chiefs', and he reported t:hat by January 
1901 many of the Tongans were actually talking of actively res'sting 
any attempt to annex Tonga.[9] 
Leefe's fears were not well-founded; it is unlikely that the 
King would have risked a showdown of this nature. The Colonial Office 
censured Leefe for believing all the wild talk about wiping out 
Europeans, but nevertheless believed it wise to use 'a little firm 
handling now' to o·· .... id trouble in the future. Although unsure of its 
right to intervene in a matter properly classed as internal defence, 
the Colonial Office decided to warn the King that the Britiuh 
Government, havine undertaken the protection of Ton;:.a, would not 
S. L0efe to O'Brien, 5 SeptL~ber 1900, encl. in O'Brien to c.o., 19 
October 1900, CO 225/59. 
9. Ibid., Leefc to O'Brien, 26 January 1901, FOCP 8089, encl. 2 in 
n(~·56. 
P~e 56 
permit the importation of arms, and it gave consideration to the 
enactment of a Regulation prohibiting the exportation of arms from any 
British possession into Tonga. Further action was precluded, however, 
when Sir George O'Brien sought Gnd received an assurance from the King 
at the time of the Treaty ratification that there was no intention of 
procuring a battery of guns, ancl that the rifles were only for the use 
of his bodyguard.[lO] 
After the Treaty ratificatio~ Leefe was retired and the British 
Government looked to a new man to establish more sa:·isfactory 
relations with the Tongan Government. Leefe was considered rather too 
old (he was then 66) and not qualifie!\ to perform the duties of the 
new post; O'Brien considered that he was 'not of 
particularly 30od judgement' and that 1 his tactics were often 
mistaken'. [ll] A skilful man, he asserted, might well use the King's 
vanity to advantage. Findine such an officer was not easy: the field 
of choice was rather limited, especially since experience with Pacific 
Islanders was considered an important pre-requisite. Moreover, the 
post was not particularly important or desirable: the salary (£ 700) 
per annum (plus £50 allowance from the l•'or~ign Office for consular 
duties), was not as high as that )f the British Resident in the 
Solomons, for example. Ha'llilton Hunter, the man O'Brien recommended 
for the job, was a"' ex-planter who had 27 years experience with the 
British Colonial Service i.. Fiji. After annexation it. 1874 Hunter had 
left his plantation at Taveuni to join the colonial Government, and he 
later became Chief Police Hagistrate. In 1898-9 he had acted briefly 
10. Hinute on O'Br. to c.o., 5 
F.O., 2 April 1901, FOCP 
February 1901, CO 225/61. 
Feburary 1901, 
8089, no. 56; 
CO 225/61; c.o. to 
O'Brien to c.o., 21 
11. O'Brien t0 c.o., con£., 22 February 1901, CO 225/61. 
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as British Consul and Deputy Commissioner for Samoa and had earned 
praise for his tact and discretion under difficult circumstances. 
0 'Brien was confident that Hunter possessed every qui: Hfication for 
the appointment and that 'no person more competant to fill it 
satisfactorily can be found.'[l2] 
In appearance, Hunter was apparently every inch the colonial 
official. The trader, Alexander Cameron, commented that he was 'a 
little over medium height, tanned complexion, grizzled hair and 
moustache, very neat in his trim white ducks. I was very much 
impressed with him; he looked the epitome of power, without 
bluff.' [13] The appointmeTJ.t to Tonga came to the 55 year old Hunter 
as a reward after many years of waiting. Sir John Thurston, who had 
been High Comhlissioner from 1888-1897, had never promoted Hunter, 
despite the latter's appeals to the Colonial Office, as he believed 
him to be 'anti-native' and a planter's man.[14] In this Thurston 
was probably correct; Hunter possessed a racial arrogance and a 
sympathy for the views of white settlers which was not exceptional for 
a man of his times, but nevertheless did not bode well for his 
relationship with the Tongan Go,rernment. In addition, Hunter felt the 
importance of his new post keenly, and was rather over-convinced of 
his own authority and status. None of tl.,•se qualities prepared him 
for the rebuffs he would experience at the hands of the Tongan 
Government. Convinced of his own importance yet frustrated by his 
obvious impotence, Hunter developed an increasingly high-hancied 
12. F.O. to Treasury, 21 December 1900, FOCP 7504, no. 97; 
to c.o., 3 October 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 1 in no. 84. 
O'Brien 
13. Alexander Cameron, 'Hemoirs', p.4. 
possession.) 
(~1anuscript in writer's 
14. ~ am grat~ful to Dr. Scarr for this infor~ation. 
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attitude towards the Government and became convinced, as Leefe had 
been, that annexation was the only means by which good government 
could be secured in Tonga. All hopes of influencing the Governm~nt by 
friendly and unobtrusive British advice had long before faded. 
Soon after his arrival in Tonga in Febr.uary 1901 Hunter clashed 
with the Tongan Government over two issues relating to his status as 
British Consul. The first concerned the site of a new consulate, 
which Hunter believed would add weight and dignity to his new 
position. Hunter initially asked for an enlargement of the present 
consulate site but, although this was arranged, he later set his heart 
on acquiring new land-- either at Male'e'aloa or the Mala'e Pangai --
which he ~onsidered in a better position and closer to the Palace. 
While Fatafehi, the Minister of Lands, co-operated over the land at 
Mala'e'aloa, neither the King nor the Premier wanted Hunter to have 
it, probably because the new schoolmaster, Edmund Lowe, was occupying 
a house on the site. It was only after a visit from ~iS Torch on 21 
September 1901 and some 'firm and judicious language' from Commander 
MacAlister, that Hunter managed to obtain a settlement of the 
Mal~'e'aloa site.[l5] 
The second matter c~ncerned Hunter's liability to pay import 
duties on goods for his own personal use notably liqt•or. 
Presumptuously, and in a manner more resewbling an order than a 
request, Hunter demanded of the Premier in February 1901 that 'in 
accordance with the general usage, you will be good enough to instruct 
15. Premier's Department correspondence 1901 and Royal and Consular 
correspondence 1901, PHB 505; Rear-Admiral Sir L. Beaumont to 
Admiralty 29 October 1901, FQCP 8089, encl. in no. 198; Gunter 
to im Thu;n, 10 October 1904, FOCP 8507, encl. 4 in no. 150. 
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the Customs authorities that all building material and other articles 
required for use or consumption in the British Agency be admitted free 
of duty'.[16] When informed by Sateki that according to the lmv of 
Tonga everyone but the King must pay duty, Hunter was outraged and 
drew the King's attention to 'the fact that I am not am~nable to any 
Tongan law'.[17] Since Hunter was not actually a diplomat his claim 
was a false one, and the Tongan Government took no noti. e of it. 
Although the building materials appear to have been admitted duty 
free, Hunter was not successful in claiming an exemption from duty on 
goods for his personal use, de~pite his Gtrong language and the 
backing of Commander MacAlister.[18] 
If Hunter received little cooperation in regard to these matters, 
he received even less in connection with his representations on behalf 
of local European residents. The European population, made up in the 
main of British, German and New Zealand traders, was not particularly 
signifcant in numbers: a census carried out by the Free Church on 1 
January 1901 numbered 239 'foreigners' and 120 'half-castes', out of a 
total population of 20,677.[19] The Europeans were, however, very 
vocal. They felt none of the Tongans' restraint in speaking their 
minds and, determined to make a comfortable Western living in a 
country only barely westernised, they found plenty to complain about. 
Although an American evangelist who visited Tonga i~ 1900 found that 
16. Hunter to Sateki, 26 February 1901, FOCP ~507, encl. 5 in 
no. 150. 
17. Hunter to Tupou II, 15 July 1901, FOCP 8507, encl. 7 in no. 150. 
18. Rear-Admiral Sir L. Beaumont to Admiralty, 29 October 1901, FOCP 
8089, encl. in no. 198; Tupou II to c.o., 20 June 1903 and 
subsequent correspondence, FOGP 8507, encls. 1-11 in no. 150. 
19. Cjted in Geil, Ocean and Isle, p.l36. 
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the Kingdom had 'as good a class of white traders as I have found in 
any archipelago in the Southern Ocean',[20] they were not all of 
good repute. Tupou II denounced the 'white trash' and 'godless 
tr'lders' whom he considered brought nothing but harm to Tonga[21] 
and he paid scant attention to their complaints. 
The attitudes of the Europeans towards Tongan society and 
government were determined in large part by the cultural baggage they 
brought with them. DesDite appearances, European and Tongan views as 
to what constituted acceptable government did not match up. The 
Eur0peans, whether officials or traders, expected the Government to 
operate according to the principle of the equality of all men before 
the law (at least in theory), and they struggled constantly against 
the Tongan environment in which a man was treated according to who he 
was. Be it in the courts, in the leasing of land, or in any cf the 
many regulations affecting trade, administrative action tended to 
depend on the circumstances and the attitude of those in authority. 
And while the Europeans would no doubt have been only too happy to be 
on the winning side of such a system, they resented the treatment 
meted out by this quasi-Western administration. Their resentment was 
compounded, too, by contemporary European ra~ial attitudes which 
assumed the St\periority of all things 'white; and 'Western'. Although 
most Europeans in Tonga accepted that the Tongans were amongst the 
most capable and intelligent of the Pacific peoples, few were 
convinced that they w~re yet fully capable of governing themselves, 
let alone the Europeans who lived amongst them. 
20. Ibid., p.l02. 
21. Ibid., p.ll9. 
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These attitudes were shared by Hunter, ann by other local British 
officials involved in Tonga. With few exceptions, they found the 
Tongan Government corrupt and inefficient. In almost every branch of 
government they found examples of maladministration too blatant to be 
ignored. The Government, it seemed, was in a hopeless mess. There 
was no money in the Treasury, no attempt to carry out public works, no 
definite system of land tenure, the administration was run on 
favouritism and, despite the Constitution and other European forms, 
government was by the chiefo xor the chiefs. After only a few months 
in Tonga, Hunter reached the conclusion that: 
The Government is r;orrupt from top to bottom: they have no 
ideas of truth, honesty or any other virtue, which would 
tend to guide them to do common justice to those living in 
the islands.[22] 
His opinion only confirmed that of his predecessor, Leefe, r>'ho had 
found that: 
The King has no 
the Ministry 
consequence the 
only empty show 
backbone, which is an unfortunate accident, 
is venal corrupt and ignorant, and in 
people are dissatisfied and see no good but 
in return for the taxes they pay.[23] 
Hunter and his colleagues put much of the blame for the 
misgovernment they found onto the King. Judged against British ideals 
of monarchy and democratic government, Tupou II seemed to display a 
selfish and irresponsible attitude to the kingship. He openly flouted 
the notion that the King should be subservient to the Constitution, 
and appeared determined to exercise as far as possible the absolute 
power of which Tupou I had supposedly divested himself. European 
observers found Tupou II vain, selfish and ignorant. In 1900 Basil 
22. Trade Report for 1900, Hunter to FO, 9 Septembur 1901, CO 225/62. 
23. Leefe ~o Seddou, conf., 5 June 1900, NZNA, Seddon Papers, 
1/60/38. 
: 1 • \ " • .I .. ' 
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Thomson censured him for showing 'that he cares more for playing at 
European Royalty than for the welfare and good opinion of his 
people' .[24] It was a criticism echoed constantly by British 
officials. According to W.L. Allardyce, Acting High Commissioner in 
1901-1902, the King was 'of an excessively vain and selfish 
disposition and has long shown himself to be regardless of all but the 
gratification of his wishes'.[25] Tupou II's expensive tastes and his 
liking for alcohol and women did nothing to temper this reputation. 
Sir Everard im Thurn, High Commissioner between 1904-1910, believed 
the problem was that Tupou II's 'moral fibre' was 'not sufficient to 
enable him to withstand the temptations incidental to the royal 
position in which he was somewhat unexpectedly placed' .[26] British 
officials also failed to understand Tongan politeness and diplomacy, 
which precluded open disagreement with another person. Thus Basil 
Thomson accused Tupou II of 'clumsy duplicity' in the Treaty 
negotiations and Leefe, in exasperation at his own inability to 
influence the King, described Tupou II as 'such an egregious young 
prevaricator that you cannot believe or at any rate rely on a word he 
says'. [27] 
If Tupou II won the unpopularity stakes with British officials 
his Premier, Siosateki Tonga Veikune, came a close second. Sateki, as 
he was called, wa~ appointed Premier by Tupou II in November 1893 
24. Thomson to c.o., 28 May 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 1 in uc. 6. 
25. Allardyce to c.o., secret, 15 August 1902, CO 225/63. 
26. 'Report on 
encl. in im 
no. 182, no. 
Tongan Affairs (December, 1904-·January, 1905)', 
Thurn to c.o., 15 March 1905, CO 881/11, hustraliaP 
62. Originals located in WPHC 21/60. 
27. Thomsot to c.o., 28 May 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 1 in no. 6; Leefe 
to Seddon, conf., 5 June 1900, NZNA, Seddon Papers, 1/60/38. 
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after the latter dismissed the pro-British Tuku'aho (whose appointment 
had been engineered by Thurston when he deported Baker i~ 1890). The 
son of a minor chief from Vava'u, Sateki had considerable ability and 
experience in government; he had begun work as a clerk in 1875 and in 
1885 was appointed Assistant Premier under Baker. Sateki's loyalty to 
Tupou II was unswerving. With no real power base of his own Sateki 
was not a rival for the King's power; instead he depended entirely on 
Tupou II for his continued authority. In 1903, to mark the lOth 
anniversary of Sateki 1 s appointment, Tupou II created for him the ne\v 
noble title, Veikune.[28]. Tupou II's appreciation of Sateki's work 
as Premier wa~ not shared by British officials nor by most of Tonga's 
European residents. In 1893 these latter had welcomed him as 'the 
most honest man in Tonga' .[29] Within a short time however, h~ had 
gained a reputation for corruption and inefficiency. In 1900 Leefe 
described him as 'ignorant, obstin~~P; dishonest and dishonourable' 
and other British officials found no reason to doubt this assl~ssmen\.:. 
As far as Allardyce could see in 1902, Sateki was 'the fons et origo 
of Tongan maladministration.'[30] 
Sateki's unpopularity sprang in part from his subserviecce to 
Tupou II. He was suspected, probably correctly, of allowing the King 
a free hand with the finances: 
The King is said to keep Josateki as Premier because he 
obeys every order without question, and the King is thus 
28. For an account of Sat(•ki's career see Eseta Fulivai Fusitu'a, 
'King George Tupou II and the Government of Tonga', M.A. thesis, 
Auntralian National University, 1976, pp.68-73, 142. 
29. Cited in ibid., p.77. 
30. Let:fe to 
1/60/38; 
Seddon, conf., 5 JtJ'1e 1900, NZNA, St•ddon Papers, 
Allardyce to c.o., secret, 15 August 1902, CO 225/63. 
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enabled to draw advances from the 
stipend of £ 2,000 without any doubt 
the legality of the proceeding.[31] 
British officials were also horrified at 
Treasu.. a~~inot t. 
being raised regard i . :" 
the blatant. uepot'sm 
Sateki's administration. The Cabinet posts of Treasurer, Minister 
Police and Auditor-General were filled by his relatives, as were 
in 
of 
a 
number of other important posts in the Government, and this heightened 
the impression that power was concentrated in the hands of a small 
self-interested 'government cli~ue' or 'cabal'. Those on the inside 
a~peared to do well for themselves; those on the outside -- like the 
British officials and many of the local Europeans -- felt left out in 
the cold. 
But not all Europeans were treated in this way. For example, 
Sateki's close friendship with the Auckland-based traders Emil and 
Heyer Hutter was a particular cause of resentment. The Butters, whose 
Austro-Hungarian origin lent itself readily to the epithet 'the Jews', 
carried much of the Government's trade in Tonga from the late 1890s, 
and also acted as its Agents in Auckland. Their favoured position was 
the subject of much acrimony, not only amongst the other traders, but 
amongst British officials who distrusted the Butters' motives and 
their influence on the Premier. According to llunter, whose sympathies 
were undisguised, the Butters got nearly all government orders, 
advanced money 'on their own terms', and made 'enormous profits to the 
detriment of the honest trader.'[32] 
More than their trading activities, it was the Hutter's political 
activitie~ that caused British officials most concern. The easy 
credit that the Uutters allegedly offered high government officials 
31. Thomson to c.o., 28 May ~900, CO 225/60. 
32. Hunter to F.O., 9 September 1901, encl. in F.O. to C.O., 
November 1901, CO 225/62. 
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appeared to bring definite rewards. On more than one occasion rival 
traders who could not get their leases renewed in Cabinet blamed their 
misfortunes onto the influence of the Hutter<>. According to Hunter 
the British trader, Mrs. Krause, was 'virtually being hounded out of 
the country by the Hutter brothers, who have such influence with the 
King and Premier that they are dangerous to the foreign 
community.'[33] But while there can be no doubt that the Hutt<:!rs, and 
especially Emil, were one of the main sources of advice for the 
Premier, it is equally certain that Hunter and his colleagu(!S 
exaggerated their influence. Sateki wanted European advisers he could 
trust, and who would not sell out the country to Britain. It is clear 
however that he did not always follow their advice, and that he was 
not as malleable as Basil Thomson implied when, in 1900, he described 
Sateki as 'the subsidized tool of a Polish Jew'.[34] 
As far as many European residents could see, the security of 
their livelihood in Tonga was threatened by Sateki's administ~ation. 
According to llunter, Sateki took every opportunity 'to thwart and 
oppose the interests of both British ~nd foreign residevts.'[35j In 
1903 Hrs Krause, appealing to the High Commissioner over a land 
dispute, claimed that 'the attitude of the Government and natives in 
general every day becomes more pronounced against the 
foreigner.' [36] One of the most common causes for concern was the 
33. Hunter to Jackson, 26 September 1903, encl. in Jackson to c.o., 9 
October 1903, CO 225/66. 
34. Thomson to c.o., 28 May 1900, CO 225/60; For an indication of 
the Butters' relationship with Sateki see printed correspondence 
between Emil Hutter and Sateki, 1901-1904, encl. in t-:PUC 4, 
261/1906. 
3). Hunter t'! F.O., 9 September 1901, 
Nov~mbcr 1901, CO 225/62. 
encl. in F.o. to c.o., 
36. Mrs Krause to Jackson, 25 September 1903, encl. in Jackson to 
~.o., 9 October 1903, CO 225/66. 
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insecurity of land holding. No European could hold freehold 
title and there were no guarantees that leases would be renewed, nor 
I·' 
at what rents. There were no regulations covering the leasing of land 
to for~igners -- Leefe had drafted some for the King but they had been 
convePiently lost, and Hunter's offers to provide new ones were turned 
down. Instead, foreigners leasing land from private individuals were 
subject to the decisions of Cabinet, which took over the land from its 
owner and could grant or reject applications and fix rents.[37] 
A further cause of the 'intense and incr:wsing dissatisfaction 
among Europeans' concerned the manner in \-lhich justice \-las 
administered by the Tongan Courts.[38] Under Article V of the 1900 
Treaty the Tongan Courts had jurisdiction over all non-Tongans for 
violations of laws relating to 'customs, taxation, public health, and 
local police' . But the Europeans were not satisfied that they were 
fairly treated by Tongan magistrates. In mi.-1902 a petition 
addressed to the Consul by 102 European resident::; asked that all court 
actions involving non-Tongans be tried in the l£igh Commissioner's 
Court before the British Consul. According to the petitioners: 
The liberty of the subject, as known to all civilized laws, 
is in jeopardy owing to the ignorance and incapacity of the 
native Hagistrates who are called upon to administer the 
laws affecting us.[39) 
Allardyce, who supported the petition, added that 'the general opinion 
is, especially as affecting the Chief Justice, that conviction is 
., .. 
-" . Tongans wishing to lease their 
by the Law of Tonga, 1891, s. 
King. (!!?_~'!_. ) 
land to foroigners wen• rt'quin·u 
448, to first surrender it to tht> 
38. Allardyce to c.o., conf., 16 July 1902, CO 225/63. 
3Y. Petition of Alexander D. 
undatt!d, end. in ibid. 
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certain in all proceedings instituted by the Government, i.e., by the 
Premier. ' [ 40] 
Although it was not a matter that concerned them directly, the 
Europeans were also dissatisfied with the administration of the 
Kingdom's finances which, they alleged, resulted in 'peculation, 
extortion and corruption'.[41] Allardyce described the situation in 
1902: 
The charges of corruption and inefficiency are based upon 
the fact that the periodical audit of revenue officer's 
accounts generally discloses large deficiencies, due either 
to cart!lessness and bad book-keeping or, as is usually 
alleged, to peculation. To whatever cause the deficiencies 
may be due and it is even said that they are chiefly 
apparent and not real -- no attempt is ever made to follm-1 
them up. [42] 
Tupou II, who was knmm for his expensive tastes, was suspected of 
having free access to the Treasury and, according to Harry Hatkin t-1ho 
was government schoolmaster between 18'l7-1901 and conducted several 
audits of the Customs and Post Office books, the go\Ternment Auditor 
'draws a salary of .~ 105 per annum, and lives at the rate of £ 500 a 
year •••• His audit is a farce and the whole of the Treasury books are 
in a state of chaos. 1 [43] 
40. Allardyce to c.o., secret, 15 August 1902, CO 225/63. 
41. Petition of the Foreign Residents of Nuku'alofa 
May 1903, encl. in Jackson to c.o., secret, 
co 225/65. 
to Jackson, 30 
19 June 1903, 
42. Allardyco to c.o., secret, 15 Aur,ust 1902, CO 225/03. 
43. Watkin to Jackson, 30 Jun0 1903, encl. in Jackson to c.o., cont •• 
18 July 1901, CO 225/65. 
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The vehemence with which local British officials denounced the 
Tongan Government was matched only by the enthusiasm with which they 
attempted to persuade the Colonial Office to intervene. If the 
Protectorate meant anything at all, these officials argued, surely it 
must place some check on the excesses of the Tongan Government. Leefe 
put the idea succinctly when he reported to tlw Colonial Office in 
July 1900: 
Of course, it may be s~id that it is their money and not 
ours. but if Great Britain ~ taken Ton~~a under her 
protection, 1 imagine that beside the change of ~olour on 
the map, she is morally responsible that the people's mont>y 
is not to~ast,~d away, and that the Government is carried on 
with that decency, honesty and liberty such as distinguishes 
our Empice all the world over.[44] 
It was unthinkable that the representatives of the British Empire 
should accept the role of impotent observers of ~o~hat ~o~as seen as 
blatant misgovernment. Not only would Britain's reputation as a 
colonial power be damaged by disorder in Tonga, but Britain must alno 
take responsibility in the eyes of the other powers for the treatment 
afforded their nationals in Tonga. 
Britain 1 s responsibility for Tonga increased after 1900; ito 
ability to influence the administration did not. The Kinr, and his 
Government simply ignored Hunter's constant thr · .ts and cajolings, and 
relied instead on the advice of l~tter and its own inclinat1ons. All 
Hunter's attmnpts at intervention on behal£ of ~ouis Harpfner, a 
German rtwident. of Ha 1 apai, for example, acllieW!d nothin · HG.rpfner, 
who had traded in Ua'apai for some 40 years, wao rcfusE>d a 
hiu lt~ace and trading li<.·enc(? in late• 1901 and wan forl't'<i to quit, 
44. Leefe to O'Brien, 12 Julv l~UU, en~!. in O'Brien t~ c.o., ~3 July 
1900, co :.!:!5/59. 
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apparently to the advantage of Emil Hutter.[45] Simile. ,, , Hunter's 
representations on matters ranging from court actions to the need for 
particular legislation fell on deaf ears. Before long, Hunter had 
almost exhausted his repertoire of threats. In early 1904 when he 
heard that the Cabinet had allegedly resolved to dispossess one 
Polutele Kaho of a piece of land he had leased to Hrs Krause, and 
thereby expel her from her store, Hunter was determined to take 
action, whether legal or not. In a letter to High Commissioner 
Jackson he related: 
I at once made nrrangements that if m1y action was taken to 
eject the unfortunate widow the British flag was to be 
hoisted over the building, and the Tongan Government 
notified that I had taken temporary possession of the 
premises on behalf of my Government, in order to protect 
British interests; and that any further steps taken to 
harass Hrs Krause \-lould be regarded as a direct breach of 
the existing Treaties, and dealt with as such.[46] 
What little success Hunter did have, was generally tied to the 
visit of a British warship. After he had secured his consulate site 
with the aid of Commander MacAlister, Hunter put in a strong plea for 
the presence of one of Her Majesty's ships in Tongan waters for at 
least a month each SPason, as he felt this would have 'a good effect' 
on the Tongan Government.[47J Although the Admiralty had other 
priorities, a number of matters were settled by brief visits. In 
45. Hunter to Allardyce, 10 February 1902, encl. in Allardyce to 
c.o., 4 Uarch 1902, CO 225/63; 'In re Louis Harpfner', FOCP 
8507, encl. 4 in no. 85; Uun ter to Tupou II~ January 1902, 
and subsequent correspondence, Correspondence 1902, ~lB 505; 
Hunter to Major, conf., 13 September 190<+, encl. in Hajor to 
c.o., 5 October 1904, CO 225/67. 
46. Hunt.cr to Jact~non, 3 March 1904, encl. in Uajor to c.o., 24 !-b.rch 
1904, co 225/67. 
47. Rcar-Adciral Bt>aumont to Admirality (c.~::trac:t), 
encl. in no. 53. 
FOCP 8089, 
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early July 1903, for exam~ ~, tt>~ visit of HHS Pylades under Commander 
da Costa, convinced the King that he should offer reparation, as 
demanded by High Commissioner Jackson, for the actions of a sentry who 
had tried to prevent Hunter'~ entry to the Palace. The sentry's 
behaviour was considered by Hunter to be a 'gratuitous insult to the 
person of His Britannic Majesty's Repreaentati\~.' In accordance with 
Jackson's c!emands, as presented by da Costa and Hunter, the King 
apologised and on 3 July 1S03 the British flag was hoisted to the 
accompaniment of the British National Anthem, ar.~l a 21 gun salute was 
fired.[48] Similarly, an interview which Hunter held with the King on 
31 October 1904 in the presence of Captain Millat of ill!~ Torch, 
resulted in the King giving a verbal assuran'-e that Mrs Krause would 
not b~ forced off her land.[49] 
Despite these limited successes, it was obviouL that British 
influence over the Tongan Government was minimal. Swampecl with 
complaints from aggrieve~ Europ~ans, treated wjrh disdain by the King 
and his Premier, made to feel foolish by the ineffectiveness of his 
repeated attempts to be heard, Hunter knew he was fighting a losir.g 
battle. As .te ,-.onfided in a private letter to Jackson in Harcl1 1904: 
I canr.,,t fight ."\.ying 
unscrupulous Jews and 
moral support.[50] 
and cunning natives, supported by 
others, single-handed without some 
;:,~nee his arrival in Tonga, Hunter had tried to persuade the British 
Government to intervene more forcefully and reduce, or remove 
altogether, the autonomy of the Tongan Government. Had he been given 
48. Ihmtt.~r to .Jackson, 1 tune 1903, Wl>HC 4, 88/1903; Hunter to 
Jackson, 3 July 1903 and subsequent correspoitdence, ibid_. 
49. Major to c.o., 5 October 1904 and enclosed correspondenc~, 
co 225/67. 
50. Hunter to Jackson, 23 March 1904, CO 225/67. 
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a free hand from the start, he told Jackson, 'I should now ~e driving 
the Tongan coach along a smooth road with a mixed team of White and 
Black.' Instead, he claimed, the Government was , Jing from bad to 
')rse and making a mockery of British rule.[Sl] 
The Eu.rop·.-an residei.'lts were not the only ones who found cause to 
be dissatisfied with the existing Government. Those chiefs and nobles 
who opposed Tupou II' s rule fourtd much in common with the aggrieved 
Europeans, although not always for the same reasons. They shared the 
Europeans' feelings towards Sateki, for example. As the King's 
closest ally and the holder of great power, Sateki was a natural 
target for the King's opponents, c.nd they sought every opportunity to 
discredit him. In the 1900 Parliament the dissidents, led by 
Mateialona and Sipu, the Governors of Ha'apai and 'Eua respectively, 
carried a motion of impeachment against Sateki's Ministry for alleged 
emh~ ~zlement. Th'~ trial lasted several days and, according to Leefe, 
several things were proved 'which in any other country but perhaps 
Morocco, would have led to grave results. 1 [52] But just when it lo(•ked 
as if things would go hard for Sateki and Manase Lavaki, the 
Auditor-General, the proceedings were suddenly called to a halt. All 
resc~ .lance between the Tongan 'opposition' and similar movements in 
the British tradition ended abruptly. c.n. ~>lhitcombe, a former 
government official, described what happened: 
suddenly one afternoon the ring sent a ver?al message to 
Mataelona[sic~, head of the opposition, to stop his fooling 
and let the Fale Alea [Parl!~ment) close up its regular 
business and fin~sh supply, as he wanted to shut up 
Parliament and send the members homf'.. So t;.e Opposition 
dutifully obeyed and proposed an..t carried a resolution that 
things had not been conducted quite according to Cocker, but 
51. Ibid. 
52. LeEfe t0 O'Brien, 12 July 1900, encl. in O'Brien to c.o., 23 
1900, cu 225/59. 
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that they had no doubt matters would mend now after this 
little hint; and that Sateki and his Ministry were a jolly 
good lot of fellows and th~y wished long life and more power 
to them. [53] 
As Whitcombe commented to Richard Seudon, Premier of New Zealand, 
'Don't you wish your opposition would.borrow a leaf from the Tongan 
book?' 
It seemed impossible for those opposing the King and his 
Government either to loosen Sateki's hold or to increase their own 
influence. There was, however, one avenue that might yet prove 
effective. If the proclamation of the Protectorate was a severe blow 
for the King, it was just as much a triumph for his enemies. It 
provided them with a new weapon to use against the King, ior while he 
might ignore his nobles and chiefs with impunity, it was unlikely that 
he could do the same to the British Government. With British backing, 
the power of the King's opponents would be greatly enhanced. 
One of those who decided to 'invoke the assistance of the BriLsh 
Government' vu his own behalr was Sipu, a high-born 'Tongan without 
noble title who had been Governor of 'Eua sir:.ce 1893. According to 
Hunter, Sipu's involvement in the move to impeach Sateki had resulted 
in his being charged with having been drunk many months before, fo: 
which offence he was found guilty, fined and dismissed from office. 
In September 1901 Sipu appealed formally to Hunter against the seizure 
by the Tonfi:1il Govermuent o· the island of Fafa which he claimed had 
been given to him by Tupou II in 1900. Although th~ British 
Government w..1s not prepared to intervene at that time in what was 
considered a purel'' 1te.,.nal rr .tter, the complaint provided tangible 
:i3. W'Etc:ombr· '\ S<>ddon, 15 August 1900, NZNA, Seddon Papers, 
' 1;0/6fJ' 
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evidence of Tongan dissatisfaction. A year later however, the Tongan 
Government was forced by High Commissioner im Thurn to give Faf:1 to 
Sipu.[54] 
By far the most outspoken of those Tongans who opposed Tupou II's 
Government was Tevita Polutele Kaho, a man of strong character and an 
astute politician. Pol~ltele, as he was generally known 'n.'fore 
receiving the noble title Tu'ivakano in 1912, joined the government 
service in 1888 and worked for a number of years as the Premier's 
clerk and private secretary.[55] In November 1900 he resigned his post 
claiming later that his action was prompted by a falling-dut with the 
Premier over the rol~ of the Hutters in orderi.;g government· supplies, 
At about the same time, Polutele was also involved in a libel case 
following the disappearance of a considerable quantity of government 
stamps.[56] Whatever the circumstances of his resignatio1, Polutele 
was strongly opposed to Tupou II and to Sateki, and made no effort to 
hide his antagonism towards either. 
In September 1904 Polut~le took the bold step of appealing to the 
British Government to intervene in Tonga's affairs. Taking care to 
keep his letter secret F~r fear of banishment if it should come to the 
attent.~on of the King, he prefaced his letter to the High Commissioner 
with the words: 'Still, the way of this world is, when the weak are 
54. Sipu to Hunter, 3 September 
September 1903, and related 
to c.o., 9 October 1903, CO 
1903, and Hunter to Jackqon, 25 
correspondence and minutes in Jackson 
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55. List of His Majesty's Civil Servants, Tonga, undated, PO, 
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afflicted to appeal to the strong, whoever the strong may be.' His 
immediate concern was the Government's threat to deprive him of the 
piece of land he had leased to Mrs. Krause. Although it seems that 
Polutele had not fully complied with the correct procedures, he 
attributed the Government's actions to Hutter who, he claimed, wanted 
the land for himself and had offered him money or a government 
appointment to evict Mrs Krause. If he was driven off his land as the 
result of a desire 'to kindly assist a Zritish lady', Polutele 
expect~d the British r.overnment to protect him. Polutele used the 
incident to condemn Se1Leki' [) administration: 
They (the Governmmlt.l pay absolutely no attention to the 
law, but just do a~ they and the Jew like ••• the reason of 
what is going on is th~ want of knowledge here how to 
conduct Government affairs, and the Jew is directing the 
Government's conduct to make money himself regardless of the 
welfare of the country. 
He went on to make his object perfectly clear: 
If the Treaty made by Mr Thomson in 1900 can be altered so 
that the Consul migh': direct tl!L; Guvl~rnment affairs, it will 
be most beneficial to the people of Tonga. How can Tongan 
people carry on a Government? We still have faith that the 
British vessels (men-of-war) l-7ill come to rectify matters, 
and we fully expect them to come quickly ••• [57] 
It is difficult to determin(' ltl)l-7 far Polutele spoke for the rest 
of Tonga, and how \vidC':>pre;ll( v1as the dissatisfaction ~;ith ~ateki' s 
administr~tion. Polutel~ himself alleged that the chiefs and people 
in general •rere amtiunu for: Britain to take action, but were too 
frightened to speak 1 ( ·~;t they suffer exile or lose their property. 
Hhile he acknowledr;ed that u , 1,y r•eople were unaware of what the 
Government was dr,: ag, he i;:·orn.fully r~_, jected newspaper reports written 
br Europeans whu clai'"' ,,1 l :tJ.t the Tonga no were cont ..!nt with their 
57. Polutde Kaho tr ,jor, private, 8 September 1904, encl. in Major 
October 1904, CO 225/67 • 
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lot.[58] On the otqer hand, Polutele was not an objective witness, 
and was using every argument he could find to convince the Brit~sh 
Government to take action. As one astute European observer noted in 
1900, it was not a question of the people regarding their liberties as 
infringed by the Crown: 'It is the position of the chiefs that is in 
dispute.' In an historical parallel, the Tongan position resembled, 
'not the quarrel of Charles I and the people, but the dispute between 
King John and the noble11. which ended at Runnymede.' [59] Contemporary 
descriptions of the T1mgan commoners weeping for joy when Tupot• II 
stopped to talk to them convey a more realistic picture of Tongan 
attitudes towards their King.[60] 
Despite these co~siderations, local British officials used the 
same tactics as Polutele to add weight to their appeals to the 
Colonial Office. Hunter, in particular, was keen to convey a picture 
of widespread discontent. Imposing his own values onto Tongan 
society, he claimed that 'the lower classes' looked forward to 
annexation as 'a means of deliverance from the oppression of their 
chiefs and the exactions of the government.'[61] In March 1904 he 
surp~ssed even his own usual eloquence, claiming that 'the King and 
the hungry gang who surround him rob the unfortunate natives, both 
chiefs and Commoners, who live under their tyrannous rule.' He 
concluded: 
The natives are terrified to complain to, or 
assistance from, the Protecting Power. Discontent 
and they only require a leader to themselves put an 
58. Ibid. 
seek any 
is rife, 
end to 
59. [Tregear?], The Right Hon. R.J. Seddon's ~is it !£_ Tonga!.. Fiji t. 
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the present oppressive and despotic form of Government under 
which they are supposed to maintain their independence. I 
feel sure that any change, even annexation, would be hailed 
with delight by the masses of the people ~ho are groaning 
under their burdens.[62] 
Hunter was supported in his desire for strong action by the 
various High Commissioners who followed O'Brien. In July 1902 while 
Allardyce was Acting High Commissioner, Hunter sailed to Fiji to 
confer with him. As a result, Allardyce sent a long report to the 
Colonial Office, setting out in detail the grievances of the 
Europeans, and arguing that the time had come for the Colonial Office 
to make some decision as to the future of the group. Otherwise, he 
predicted, 'matters can only drift on from bad to worse until 
intervention becomes unavoidable. ' Allardyce suggested four 
alternatives, all of which involved decisive Bri~ish action. The 
least drastic was to insist on the dismissal of Sateki as Premier and 
the appointment of a successor approved by the British Government. 
Secondly, he proposed a treaty revision that would give the British 
Consul a leading part in the Administration. His other two 
suggestions involved annexation -- either at once or at the death of 
Tupou II. [63] 
Annexation was the option most consistently favoured by those on 
the spot. Basil Thomson, for example, had been eager to point out the 
advantages annexation would bestow. In his report on the Treaty 
negotiations he alleged that even the Tongans knew it would relieve 
them from 'over-taxation and bad government', and suggested that the 
most suitable opportunity for annexation would be at the death of the 
62. Hunter to Jackson, 3 March 1904, encl. in Major to C.O., secret, 
24 March 1904, CO 225/67. 
63. Allardyce to c.o., secret 1 15 August 1902, CO 225/63. 
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King, which he believed was imminent. According to the King's 
physician, Dr Maclennan, the disease of 'fatty degeneration of the 
heart', which had allegedly cut off so many of the King's family, must 
inevitably prove fatal to the King himself within six or seven years 
at the most. As the heiress was then but a few months old, Thomson 
felt confident that at the death of TJpou II 'the majority of Tongans 
would ••• secretly or openly welcome annexation.'[64] His conclusion 
was shar8d by Hunter and other officials in the High Commission, 
although Hunter saw no point in waiting for the King to die. He 
argued that most Tongans regarded annexation as inevitable, sooner or 
later, and he was in no doubt that the British Government should 
act.[65] It was up to the Colonial Office in London, however, to make 
the decision. 
WHILE the British Consul and th~ High Commissioner were pressing 
the Colonial Office for. a greater $ay in Tonga's internal 
administration, pressure from quite a different quarter was also 
calling for change. The imperialistic designs of the New Zealand 
Government, and in particular of the Premier, Richard Seddon, had 
suffered a blow when Britain had given up Samoa in 1899. To lessen 
New Zealand's disappointment, and perhaps also to relieve its own 
impending responsibility, the Colonial Office had intimated at the 
time that Tonga might at some stage be hu~ded over to New Zealand: 
64. Thomson to c.o., 28 May 1900, CO 225/60. 
65. See Allardyce to c.o., tel. 27 June 1902, CO 225/63. 
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As the great bulk of Tonga trade is with New Zealand it 
might be lrranged for New Zealand to assume political 
control of [the] group on [the] same understanding as exists 
in regard to [the] Cook Islands, the Solomons being placed 
similarly under [the] Australian Commonwealth.[66] 
No definite undertaking was given however and, after the declaration 
of the Protectorate, the matter was deferred. 
The decision against immediate action was largely based on 
uncertainty as to the reaction within Tonga to New Zealand control. 
BasH Thomson, who had been asked to investigate the matter during his 
visit, reported that the King was indifferent on the question. But 
Tupou II's response 
'Let the British Government decide where their 
Consul shall take his orders .•• it is difficult for us to meddle in 
things that concern the British Go~ernment' -- was in fact a studied 
rejection of the idea that the Consul would have any effect on the 
Government.[67] In any case, the Colonial Office was not convinced by 
Thomson's report and believed that the people and Parliament 
'distinctly prefer to be under Her Majesty's Government'.[68] 
Officials were also aware that the precedent cteated by thr annexation 
of the Cook Islands to New Zealand in October 1900 might influence 
Tongan attitudes. As O'Brien stressed, any decision to place Tonga 
under New Zealand control would be regarded as the first step towards 
annexation, and he ha~ no doubt that the King and his people would 
object strongly to being annexed by New Zealand.[69] The Colonial 
66. See A.B. Keith, 'Note on Proposed 4nnexation of Tonga to New 
Zealand', conf., 14 October 1911, CO 881/12, Australian no. 200. 
67. Tupou II to Thomson, 2 May 1900, encl. in Thomson to c.o., 28 
Hay, CO 225/60. 
68. c.o. to Treasury, draft, December 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 2 in 
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- Office therefore decided that Tonga would remain under the High 
Commissoner's control 
until the natives have become familiar with the new position 
of affairs, and the question of the transfer of the contr1l 
of the group to the New Zealand Government can be approached 
without exciting their suspicion and possibly leading to 
disturbances.[70] 
New Zealand's interest in the group did not flag. Although the 
annexation of the Cook Islands was some solace, it only encouraged 
Seddon in his grandiose dream of an Island Federation, in \vhich Tonga, 
Fiji, the Cook Islands and possibly even the Society Islands, would be 
brought together under New Zealand leadership. In Hay 1900 Seddon 
visited Tonga in the course of a cruise around the Islands; the 
cruise was ostensibly for health purpo":_ but Seddon nevertheless 
managed a fair amount of politicking. At Nuku'alofa he spoke with 
Sateki and the King, offering his advice, and impressing on the latter 
1e benefits of British protection. He proposed a postal convention 
between the two countries, and discussed matters ranging from trade 
and taxation to education and 'moral tone'. Not surprisingly, the 
official report of his visit reached the conclusion that 'the general 
feeling in Tonga' (amongst Europeans, no doubt), was that Great 
Britain should follow up the Protectorate with annexation. So long as 
the Tongans' rights to their land were asstred, regular incomes were 
given to the King and chiefs, and a fonn of local government 
introduced, there could be no objections to such a c~.rse. The report 
added that annexation to Fiji was not favoured: it would be 'like 
holding a red ?:ag to a bull' while on the other hand 'most of the 
70. c.o. to Treasury, draft, December 1900, FOCP 7504, encl. 2 in 
no. 84. 
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Europeans desired annexation to New Zealand' .[71] 
The motives oi those who supported annexation to New Zealand were 
mixed. Leefe, for example, who shared Seddon's view of 'the white 
man's burthen that New Zealand is called upon to face', offered his 
services as Administrator of Tonga.[72] Another notable convert to 
Seddon's design \\1as, surprisingly enough, the Reverend Shirley Bak~r 
who had once fought so determinedly for Tonga's independence. In 
September 1900, he worte to Seddon, praising the idea of an Island 
Federation and assuring him that he was 'quietly tvorldng 
for ••• annexl:\tion to New Zealand.' Like Leefe, Baker's motives t.;rere 
probably personal for he, too, had earlier applied to Seddon for 
appointment as Resident of Tonga.[73] Other local Europeans also 
supported the idea of annexation perhaps hoping, as O'Brien believed, 
that it would enable them to get cheap labour and trading concessions. 
When the Governor of New Zeal~nd, Lord Ranfurly, visited Tonga not 
long after Seddon, he declined to recPive a deputation from a group of 
Europeans in favour of annexation to New Zealand because he conside~ed 
it to be beyond his authority.[74] 
71. [Tregear?], The Right Han. R.J. Seddon's Visit... pp.57-8; 
For a discussion-~~ --of ---geddo'il'S-Federatj '"'U idea see 
D.K. Fieldhouse, 'New Zealand, Fiji and the C~_Jnial Office, 
1900-1902', Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand, VIII 
xxx, 1958 and Angus Ross, New Zeal'!_nd' s AspVati~fn .!:_he 
Pacific in the Ninenteenth Century, Oxford 1964. 
72. Leefe to 
1/60/38; 
Seddon, con£., 5 June 1900, NZNA, Seddon Papero, 
Leefe to Seddon, private, 21 July 1900, ~bid., l/60/b6. 
7 J. Bat:er to Seddon, 8 August 1900, ib~d., 1/60/67; Bakc>r to Seddun, 
4 September 1900, ibid., 1/60/73. 
74. O'Brien to c.o., conf., 22 · bruary 1901, WPHC 27/1/7. 
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At the beginning of May 1902, having waited two years since the 
establishment of the Protectorate, the New Zealand Government grew 
impatient and tried to prod the British Government into action. In a 
telegram to the Colonial Office Lord Ranfurly reported that Tupou II's 
health was causing Seddon concern, for he believed that the King's 
death would provoke trouble between the various factions in Tonga. 
Seddon was anxious to use the opportunity to annex Tonga to New 
Zealand. To pave the way, hi.J Government offered to send its oHn 
representatives to Tonga, and even selected two candidates for the 
job. Although Lord Ranfurly acknowledged that New Zealand had no 
authority to interfere in Tonga, he nevertheless shared the New 
Zealand Government's opinion that the annexation of Tonga was most 
important, especially in view of the valuable harbour at Vava'u. Even 
if the King lived out his present illness, annexation might still be 
arranged by pensioning him cff.[75] 
The Colonial Off~ce ~esponded cautiously to this initiative, 
preferring to seek :mt the opinion of thane on tlw spot before mat.~ing 
any decision. Neith~r Allc1rdyce nor Hunter had any knowledge of a 
change in the Kingro health. But while Allardyce had no strong 
feelings on the matter, Hunter matched his enthusiasm for annexation 
only by his distast0 fGJr New Zealand control. Taking the opportunity 
to urge again the l.!lvantages of anne. adon, Hunter warned that if a 
N Z 1 d " tive approa,.+ed the Tan"'ann it would ar\mse .ew ea nn reprcsen~a. ~ • u 
suspicion and disteuot, would destroy the influence and authority of 
the riritish Conoul .:.nd, at the same time, endanger the prospect of a 
peaceful scH;tlemen~ .[iJ} 
75. I.ord R;H c Iv tu CoO,, tel., 5 Hay 1902, FOCP 8185, c'n,:l. 1 in 
no. 67. 
7 1 2~ ~· 190~ CO 225/63, Allardyc0 tu 6. Allard··, tc' ~.o., te ·~ '' .-.ay .... , 
C • 0 • , t • , :_. 7 J UtlL' 1902, (~~~.' 
J \.\ 
0 
Page 82 
There was never any doubt in the Colonial Office, however, that 
if Tonga was annexed it would be handed over to New Zealand -- it was 
felt that the statement made to New Zealand ln 1899 'amounted 
practically to an undertaking' [77] and, tn any case, the Colonial 
Office did not want the administration of Tonga. If Seddon was given 
Tonga, it might also be a means of stopping 'any further intriguing or 
manoeuvring in Fiji.'[78] Lord Onslow, t.he Under-Secretary of State, 
could see no objection to sending an officer to Tonga and handinG it 
over to New Zealand as soon as the King died. But he could see no 
great urgency for action. On the assumption that Thomson's 
information on Tupou II's health in 1900 had been correct, he 
commented: 'it seems rather hard on him to take away his independence 
when his life is not likely to be prolonged more than a year or 
SO • I [ 79] 
When the newly-formed Australian Commonwealth Govermnent was 
informed in October 1902 that the British Government had under 
consideration a proposal to annex Tonga and hand over its 
administration to New Zealand, it protested strongly against such a 
move. Its objections had been foreshadowed during discussions at the 
Colonial Office in August 1902 with Sir Edmund Barton, the Pri Ir.\9 Nmi!.-!1-'i , i 
the CommonW£!alth. Barton areued that although the various otate 
Governments had not object;':ld to the idea of New Zealand control when 
it was firF· · contemplated, the creation of the Commonwealth had 
77. c.o. to Tennyson, 31 October 1902, FOCP 8185, encl. 6 in no. 137. 
78. !-Um~te by Sir J. Anderson, 24 July 1902, on Allardyce to c.o., 
tel., 17 July 1902, CO 22~/63. 
79. !Hr.ute by I.ord OnGlow, 2& July 1902, on ALlnrdyce to C.J., tel., 
27 June 1902, CO 225/63. 
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altered the whole position. His main concern now was that an 'Island 
Federation' under New Zealand would be a serious obstacle to the 
Commonwealth's O\~ dream of an 'Australian Federation' encompassing 
Australia and New Zeala~d. Barton argued that by giving Tonga to New 
Zealand the Colonial Office would be making it easier for New Zealand 
to remain independent. The Commonwealth also felt that it had prior 
claim to any Pacific Islands that the Colonial Office wanted to hand 
over. [80] In a telegram 9f protest sent ir January 1903 the 
C·)mmonwealth Hinisters pointed out, quite rightly, that the bulk of 
the Tongan trade was with the Australian roloLdes rather than New 
l 
Zeal.:md. If the British Government considered it ne.cess·ary to malr.e 
any change in Ton~a's political situation, annexation to the Empire 
and government from Fiji would be preferabl(l. [81] 
The Colonial Office was not greatly perturbed by the reaction 
from the Australian Government. Hhat concerned it most was the 
prospect of active Tongan resistance to annexation and New Zealand 
control. There could be no doubt thai.: Tupou II would oppose 
annexation fiercely. A telegraphic message in July 1902 prompted by 
the news that Seddon was trying to get Tonga joined to New Zealand, 
left no doubt of that: 
I hereby declare on behalf of the Government that we do 
in the least consent to the proposal. Our desire is M 
continue in the same poGition as we are in at the present 
time. [ 82] 
But the King wan not the real problem. t"hat worried the Colonial 
BO. mnute9 bv Sir J. Anderson, l September 1902, on AllardyC't' to 
c.o., tel:, 27 June 1902, CO 22~/63. 
81. Lord Tmmya\Jn to c.o., tel.,,l January t903, FOCP G270, end. 1 
in nu. 4\J. 
Se0 Allardy~e to c.o., tel., 17 July 1902, CO 22q/63. 
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Office more was the possibility of a 'native uprising'. Such an 
event might ser~ously damage B • ti h · ld h · 
L r~ s pre~tlze, cou ave ser~ous 
repercussions in Fiji, and was altogether not to be countenanced. 
Thus in replying to Lord Ranfurly, the Colonial Office, as well as 
deprecating the idea of sending a New Zealand representative to Tonga, 
also informed him 
that it is not desirable that His Majesty's Government 
should move in the matter unless they are assured that there 
would be po active opposition on the part of the King of 
Tonga and his people. [ 83] 
In order to obtain definite information on tl>is point, the 
newly-appointed High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, Sir Henry 
Jackson, was instructed at the end of October 1902 to take the first 
convenient opportunity to visit Tonga and find out 'whether the king 
and his people would be likely to make an offer to cede the group to 
His Majesty, or, at ~..,y rate, to acquiesce without disturbance in its 
annexation and administration by New Zealand. 1 [84] As Sir John 
Anderson in the Colonial Office. put it, Jackson was to 1 spy out the 
land and see if the king would be likely without any great fuss to 
accept a pension and surrender to King Richard.'(i.e. Seddon.)[85] 
tihile this time-honoured device of an official inquiry would keep 
New Zealand demands at bay for a while, it provided no immediate 
solution to the problems with which the High Commissioner and his 
deputy were faced. The Colonial Office noted thclt since the 
Government was undoubtedly both weak end corrupt, its annexation would 
83. c.o. to Lord Ranfurly, secret, 31 October. 1902, CO 881/11, 
Australian no. 182, no. 6. 
84. c.o. to Jackson, secret, 31 October 1902, ib!_~, no. 5. 
85. !-1inute by Sir J. Anderson, 1 September 1902, on Allardyce to 
c.o., tel., 27 Jutw 1902, CO 225/63. 
Page 85 
be very much to the advantage of both Tongans and Europeans.[86] But 
in the meantime it felt that th~ difficulties could be met by means of 
some straight-talking to the King. The same despatch that sent 
Jackson to Tonga, gave instructions for Hunter to place the grievances 
of the Europeans before the King and to address to him 
a strong remonstrance to the effect that His Majesty's 
Government are under a special responsibility for securing 
justice and good government to British subjects in Tonga; 
nor can t~ey regard with indifference any misconduct of the 
native AdmiL.•stration, such as neglect or corruption in 
financial matters, which may lead to discontent and 
disturbanc~s among the Tongans themselves; that they are 
satisfied that in his dealings both with British subjects 
and foreigners and with his own subjects the King has given 
legitim~te ground for serious complaint, and that the 
present state of affairs c3nnot be allowed to continue 
indefinitely.[87] 
Consul Hunter, no doubt relishing his appointed task, held an 
interview with Tupou II on 30 December 1902. In the presence of 
Fatafehi (Tupou II's father), Sateki and two interpreters, he scolded 
the King for more than an hour and a half, dealing in detail with the 
grievances of not only the Europeans but of the Tongans as well. At 
the end of his tirade Hunter handed the King a 'letter of 
,/ remonstrance' containing the Colonial Office warning, and demanded 
some definite answer as to what would be done to remedy the 
grievanr.es.[88] Topou II had no reason to be especially imp~essed by 
86. Minute by Sir J. Anderson, 24 July 1902, on Allardyce to c.o., 
tel., 17 July 1902, CO 225/63. See ~lso minutes on A1lardyce to 
c.o., tel., 27 June 1902, }bid. 
87. c.o. to Jackson, secret, 31 October 1902, ~0 881/11, Australian 
no. 182, no. 5. 
88. Hunter to Jackson, secret, 13 January 1903, encl. in Jackson to 
c.o., 31 January 1903, CO 225/65. 
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this latest effort on Hunter's part. After all, the Consul had, 
on his own admission, been threatening the King both verbally and in 
'"riting for some time and nothing had come of it. Tupou II evaded the 
issue, claiming the need to consult his Cabinet. But at Hunter's 
insistence he sent a reply some days later: 
In reference to what you were pleased to inform us, there is 
nothing new to reply -- only the replies already made, those 
which you are acquainted with.[89] 
Such a curt dismissal to an official remonstration angered Hunter 
and Jackson but did not immediately spur the Colonial Office into more 
drastic action. While acknowledging that the reply 'was not 
satisfactory' officials still wanted to wait for the result of 
Jackson's inquiry.[90] Jackson himself was not content with the terms 
of his mission -- he felt decisive action was now called for, but his 
instructions gave him very little scope: 
You should, of course, confine yourself to inquiry in such a 
way as you may think best, unless you obtain a satisfactory 
offer of cession or find in the state of the group 
overwhelming reason for immediate action.[91] 
Unconvinced that the affairs in Tonga were in a serious state, the 
Colonial Office was obviously stalling. A 'satisfactory offer of 
cession' was an extremely remote possibility, and High Commission 
officials were already convinced that they had given the Colonial 
Office 'overwhelming reason for immediate action'. In a telegram in 
early March 1903, Jackson was ~irmly reminded that his superiors 
89. See Jackson to c.o., tel., 6 March 1903, CO 225/65. 
90. Minute, on Allardyce to c.o., secret, 15 August 1902, CO 225/63. 
91. c.o. to Jackson, secret, 31 October 1902, CO 881/11, Australian 
no • 182 , no • 5. 
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desire nott ~ more than a report on facts of situation at 
Tonga, unless you come to the conclusion that action is 
urgently required and that delay would lead to difficulties 
later.[92] 
In reply, Jackson pointed out that the King of Tonga had already 
been warned in strong terms that the present state of affairs could 
not continue, and had treated the warning with indifference. As a 
tesult he alleged, 'the whole of Tonga, the King included,' were 
awaiting some consequent action on the part of the British Government. 
Any delay could only weaken respect for Britain and render impossible 
any later course short of annexation. And in the meantime, Jackson 
argued, the King would have plenty of opportunity for fresh aggression 
towards foreigners, amongst whom the Germans in particular were 
already comp:i.aining that their position was now worse than before the 
1900 Treaty. Jackson therefore recommended that he should be given 
authority to negotiate revision of the Treaty, 'so as to give His 
Majesty's Government controlling power in internal affairs, as well as 
in foreign relations.'[93] 
Jacvson's arguments were persuasive and the Colonial Office was 
halr convinced. While making it quite clear that 'on the information 
now befor. ~hem, His ~ffijesty's Government do not feel justified in at 
once directing you to take extreme measures', the Secretary of State 
nevertheless approved Jackson's suggestion. If, on his arriv~l at 
Tonga, the High Commissioner felt that further continuance ("f the 
existing state of things was impossible, he should obtain from the 
King a revision of the Treaty: 
92. c.o. to Jackson, tel., 12 Harch 1903, ibid., no. 9. 
93. Jackson to c.o., tel., 12 March 1903, CO 225/65. 
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by which he would be bound, like the Sult~ns in Federated 
Malay States, to ask and act upon the advice of [the] 
British Resident on all questions, especially those of 
general administration, such as measures affectin5 Europeans 
and their rights, and collection and control of revenue.[94] 
Jackson's rhetoric had finally had effect: the British Government had 
agreed to a new system of administration which, as it was well aware, 
involved more than the mere giving of ad vice. Gcvernment in the 
Federated Malay States was as close to annexation as could be achieved 
without using that word. The High Commissioner had now effectively 
been given approval to take over the Tongan administration. 
Ironically, having obtained Colonial Office permission 'to 
convince the King that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to 
allovT their advice to be disregarded,' [95] Jackson was thwarted in 
carrying out this task. An outbreak of measles in Fiji obliged him, 
reluctantly, to postpone his visit to Tonga and then provided the King 
of Tonga with an excuse to refuse him permission to land. In his 
eagerness to reach Tonga while Parliament was in session and bO be 
able to meet ani talk with its members, Jackson left Fiji a little too 
soon. According to him, measles were still prevalent in the country 
districts of Fiji, but they had not been of epidemic proportions in 
Suva since early May and the occasional cases were now isolated under 
treatment. But the health officers in Tonga had been instructed to 
refuse pratique to any vessel from Fiji so long as any sign of measles 
remained there. Despite Jackson's repeated requests, the King would 
not allow any relaxation of the strict 15 day quar3ntine and, since he 
could not wait that long, Jackson was forced to return to Fiji.[96] 
94. c.o. to Jackson, tel., 19 Harch 1903, co 881/11, Australian 
no. 182, no. 11. 
95. Jackson to c.o.' secret, 28 March 1903, WPHC 27/1/8. 
96. Jackson to c.o., secret, 19 June 1903, CO 225/65. 
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The King's refusal to bend the quarantine rule was on the surface 
quite reasonable and justified. The measles epidemic of 1893 in which 
at least 1,000 Tongans died had resulted from inadequate quarantine 
measures, and there was no guarantee that Jackson was correct in 
claiming that there was now 'absolutely no risk'.[97] Jackson had 
timed his visit foolishly, and, considering the motive for his visit, 
his assurance to the King that he would not have come to Tonga if the 
visit involved the slightest risk, was somewhat ironic.[98] 
Although Jackson was compelled to remain on board the ship at 
Tonga, Hunter was permitted on board to confer with him, and his 
report to the Colonial Office was a reiteration of the complaints of 
incompetent administration which Allardyce had furnished some 10 
months earlier. It was given added weight and detail by a petition 
prepared at Hunter's request by a committee of seven Europeans elected 
at a general meeting of 'the representative residents of Nuku'alofa'. 
The petitioners, among whom were Robert Skeen, George Scott and 
Alexander Cameron, all of whom were to figure prominently in Tongan 
politics through the first decade of the twentieth century, gQve full 
details of alleged corruption and maladministration in areas of 
government ranging from customs and shipping to the courts and the 
treasury, and drew attention to the refusal of the King and his 
Government to grant relief from the grievances.[99] It had become 
impossible, Jackson summed up, to secure good government in Tonga and 
he was ~etermined to see the King and his Premier subjected to British 
97. Ibid. 
98. Jackson to Tupou II, 18 July 1903, WPHC 27/XXII/1. 
99. Petition of the Foreign Residents of Nuku'alofa 
May 1903, encl. in Jackson to c.o., secret, 
co 225/65. 
to Jackson, 30 
19 June 1903, 
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dominati<:>n: 
The longer the King and his advisers are allowed to persist 
in their contemptuous attitude towards His Majesty's 
Government, and the longer the delay in assuming the direct 
control, the more certain ·i.ll be the opposition when 
affairs have drifted into such a condition as must make 
annexation inevitable in the interests of the natives 
themselves.[lOO] 
On receipt of the Europeans' petition, Jackson had invited its 
authors to make su, :estions as to how their grievances might be 
remedied; the response was predictable. The European residents were 
not in favour of annexation probably because this would remove any 
control over events from their hands and perhaps give it, unthinkably, 
to New Zealand Government officials. Instead the European residents 
put forward a proposal which would involve them intimately in the 
administration of the islands. They proposed to retain a measure of 
jndependence from the British Government with the King becoming a mere 
titular head without executive or legislative power. The parliament 
and the Tongan administration would be abolished with the Kingdom 
governed through a British representative assisted by an elected 
Council of Europeans with European officials in charge of the various 
government departments. An Advisory Board of Tongan chiefs would 
consider purely Tongan matters and appoint governors to oversee the 
Tongan population in the various districts. The office of noble, with 
its control over land, would be abolished.[lOl] 
100. Jackson to c.o., ibJ~· 
101 .• Suggestions made by the Public Committee of 
Residents, encl. in ibid. 
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Jackson found these proposals impracticable, noting that the 
British Resident would have little effective control if he had to 
contend with an elected Council of whites. The best solution, he 
argued, was to go along with Seddon's demands and let New Zealand take 
over the responsibility for an annexed Tonga. Although Hunter wa.s 
s~ill vehemently opposed to this idea, Jackson declared that he had 
been unable to elicit any reasons for the opposition, and he therefore 
discounted it. Provided the New Zealand Government was prepared to 
guarantee fair and even gen:roue treatment of the 'natives' in the 
matter of land security, Jackson felt !t would be the easiest way out. 
The New Zealand Government would be in a position to provide, from its 
local resources, the staff to carry on the Government after annexation 
and also, somewhat ominously, the local forces necessary to maintain 
order. If, however, New Zealand control was disdained, Tonga could be 
governed as a separate colony, subject to the Governor of Fiji but 
with a separate legislature and treasury. As an alternative to 
annexation, should the British Government attach weight to the alleged 
disinclination for a change of flag, Jackson still favoured a treaty 
revision giving the British Consul effective control. To carry this 
out it would be necessary to deport the Premier, and possibly the King 
as well, in which case Jackson felt that Fatafehi, the King's father, 
would be a suitably compliant successor. It was not to be expected 
that the King would willingly consent, even if allowed to retain his 
position, but he might be induced to do so if he understood that the 
alternative was annexation.[l02] 
Anticipating Colonial Office 
alternatives, Jackson arranged with 
approval for 
the Admiral 
one of 
Commanding 
his 
the 
Australian Station to keep at least one warship in Tongan waters 
o 102. Jackson to c.o., ibid. 
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'until matters :r-e settled', and planned to return to Tonga in late 
August.[l03] In the event the Colonial Office issued no further orders 
until 15 months later, by which time Jackson was in Trinidad, his 
authority against the Tongan Government never asserted. The del.:1y 
caused considerable frustration to officials in the High Commission. 
Throughout the rest of 1903 and 1904 they took every opportunity to 
prod the Colonial Office, urging that action was not only necessary 
but expected. The British Government's inaction, they argued, was 
making matters much worse in Tonga and was l:>eing interpreted by the 
Tong~n Government as a victory. It would be a severe blow to British 
prestige in the Pacific, if Tonga were to be allowed to continue to 
defy British auth0rity. 
Hunter in ~articular felt the delay keenly and personally. 
Indirectly he accused the British roovernment of leaving him in the 
lurch, directing him to issue a remonstration and then withdrawing all 
support when it was ignored. At Jackson's request he had invited the 
foreigners in Tonga to send a petition to the British Government: ,_ 
.L 
foolishly ••• assured them that their wrongs would soon be righted'. 
And to those 'Loyal Chiefs' who looked to him for support, he had 
given assurances that the British Government would take their part. 
'Under the present position of affairs I am discredited by the 
Foreigners, and soon will be by the Loyal Chiefs' • Hunter had staked 
his position so completely on strong British action, that if the 
British Government was determined to do nothing, he wanted out. The 
Colonial Office should transfer him to an appointment elsm.;here and 
replace him in Tonga with 1 a new man who is pledged to nothing' • [ 104 J 
103. Ibid. 
-
104. Hunter to Jackson, 23 Harch 1904, CO 2'25/67. 
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Sir Charles Major, acting as High Commissioner after Jackson's 
departure in March 1904, shared Hunter's views. In early October he 
informed the Colonial Office that he had no reason to disbelieve 
unofficial reports claiming that the entire population, Tongan and 
European, with the exception of the King's immediate entourage, was 
'seething with discontent' and 'eagerly waiting for some sign from the 
B=itish Government that the day of their deliverance is at hand.' 
Major could no longer refrain from expressing his regret that: 
His Majesty's Government has apparently found it impossible 
to deal with the serious situation of affairs in the group 
which has been fully set forth in former despatches. Prompt 
and decisive action is much needed if the obligations of the 
Protecting Power are to be fulfilled, and an end put to, 
and, if necessary, punishment meted out for the effrontery 
with which the King and his Ministers disregard both their 
obligations to British and foreign subjects and the warnings 
and counsel of His Majesty's Representative, whose p0oition 
in consequence has become almost untenable.[l05] 
By this time the British Government had, in fact, already taken 
steps to arrange a visit to Tonga by the new High Commissioner, 
Everard im Thurn. The delay had not been deliberate, it was largely 
the result of uncertainty as to how far it was really necessary or 
desirable to go. Officials in London were simply not convinced, even 
by Hunter's extreme language, of either the seriousness of the 
grievances or the urgency of redressing them. On the receipt of 
Jackson's report the Colonial Office noted that the faets did not 
support extreme measures: 'The instances of misgovernment do not 
amount to more than the ordinary slackness and corruption of all 
~r}J. ~·fajor to c.o., secret, 5 October 190ft, CO 225/67. 
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native governments and even of some non-native ones.'[l06] Far away 
from the scene of the power struggles, the Colonial Office could keep 
the Tongan situation in perspective: 
His Majesty's Government do not wish to apply to a native 
Administration in a small community scarcely removed from 
barbarism the standards of government which prevail in a 
large European State possessing a civilisation many 
centuries old, and they desire to make every allowance for 
the difficulties inseparable from the presence of white 
traders and merchants in islands where the Government and 
the population are of non-European origin.[l07] 
Officials in London were also sceptical as to the accuracy of 
some of the tales they received. They had, it ~•as noted, heard only 
one side of the story, and no doubt the King would be able to make Ottt 
his own good case. Sir John Anderson, who dealt with the Tongan 
papers in the Colonial Office until he left to become Governor of 
Singapore in early 1904, was of the opinion that trade jealousy was at 
the root of the dislike for the Hutt"''t"S and that Consul Hunter had 
lent too ready an ear to the tales against them. Hunter's judgement 
was doubted -- he had not always acted with tact and discretion, he 
had made no attempt to sift the vague complaints he had collected, and 
he was undoubtedly prone to exaggeration.[l08] 
106. Minute by H.E. Dale, 18 August 1903, on Jackson to c.o., secret, 
19 June 1903, CO 225/65. See also mlnutes on .Jackson to c.o., 
secret, 3 February 1904, CO 225/67; minutes o,t Major to c.o., 
secret, 5 October 1904, CO 225/67, 
107. c.o. to im ThurD, secret, 14 October 1904, CO 881/11, Australian 
no. 182, no • ..~ 
108. Minute by H.E. Dale, 18 August 190~, on Jackson to c.o., secret, 
19 June 1903, CO 225/65; c;ir J. Anderson to U.E. Dale, 
undated, annexure on Jackson to c.o., secret, 3 February 1904, 
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The case against the Tongan administration was simply not strong 
enough to justify annexation. If annexation had been expedient or 
desirable for other reasons, it would have provided an answer. But 
given the climate of hesitancy which surrounded the quGstion of 
annexation, and particularly the question of New Zeo 1 and involvement, 
the Colo~ial Office was disposed to give the Tongan Government every 
possible chance to work out its own destiny. This same consideration 
now led the Colonial Office to rejt•vt the idea of forcing a treaty 
revision on the King. If the British Consul was given full control 
over the administration, as was the case in the Federated Malay 
States, it would mean stripping the King and hLr. Government of all 
authority. In the opinion of H. Johnson, who took over the Tongan 
papers from Anderson, this would be equivalent to annexation in all 
but the name, and the Colonial Office would still be bound to hand 
over control to New Zealand.[l09] 
While any drastic change was ruled out, the Colonial Office 
nevertheless accepted the need to take positive steps to improve 
matters in Tonga, Misgovernment did exist; there was no dot-"t of 
that The Tongan Government fell short of 'even the comparatively low 
standard which it should attain' and British officials 'would be 
evading their responsibilities if they hesitated to take the measures 
which they consider necessary for giving the island an administration 
under which both whit~ und native inhabitants may live with some 
degree of peace and confidence.'[llO] Thus the Colonial Office decided 
to force some reform without a treaty revision. Its justification, 
insofar as it needed one, was taken from a loose interpretation of 
109. !-Iinute by Johnson, 8 August 1904, on Jaclwon to c.o., secret, 3 
February 1904, CO 225/67. 
110. c.o. to im Thurn, secret, 14 October 1904, 
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Article III of the 1900 Treaty. In matters where th~ interests of 
E~ropeans were vitally concerned, Article III was taken to mean 'that 
the Br 1 tish Agent may not only interfere by maldng requests, 
suggestions or protests, but is entitled ..!:..<: make demands ~ ~ the 
King is bound to~~' (emphasis added).[lll] 
Iru Tht• ·n, Jackson's successor as High Commissioner, was therefore 
instructed to visit Tonga as soon as conveniently possible. He was to 
hold an inquiry into all grievances and call upon the King and his 
Hinisters to give any replies or explanations. Any persons found to 
be the cause of discontent were to be dismissed or .:; ... ported. Further, 
im Thurn was to insist on the King carrying out any other reforms he 
deemed requisite, and the King must undertake not to disturb these 
arrangements after im Thurn's departure. Should he refuse to 
cooperate, Tupou II was to be threatened with deportation. In the 
event of his remaining obdurate, he was to be removed to Fiji, and an 
ordinance passed providing for his custody there as political 
prisoner.[ll2] As one official commented, it would be useless 'to 
threaten this besotted and sensuous potentate any more. He must be 
thoroughly convinced .hat we mean business ••• '.[ll3] 
111. c.o. to im Thurn, tel., 25 October 1904, ibid., no. 31. 
112. c.o. to im Thurn, secret, 14 October 1904, ib~d., no. 30. 
113. Minut~ by n.n. Cog, 9 August 1904, on Jactson to c.o., sc~ret, 3 
February 1904, CO 225/67. 
CHAP'l'ER 4 
The coup d I e·tat of Christmas 1904 
-- --- -- -----
It has been committed to me to tell you plainly that you 
have been going on in a bad road. You must now t:urn, and go 
on a good road ·.vhich I am here to show you; not only a good 
way, but by far the best possibl~ one, aot only for 
yourselves, the King, Chiefs and Hereditary Councillor·, of 
Tonga, but for all the people, including the Europclans who 
live here, and for the welfare and prosperity of all, high 
and low, rich and poor, in these rich and beautiful lands. 
[Notes of Interview between His Excellency im Thu..-n and tha King of 
Tonga, at the Palace, Nuku'alofa, December 10, 1904, Annexure A to 
'Report on 1-ngan Affairs (December, 1904-January, 1905)', encl. in im 
Thurn to c.o., 15 Harch 1905, CO 881/11, Auntralian no. 182, encl. in 
no. ri2. J 
Page 98 
Im Thurn needed no encouragement from the Colonial Office to take 
a hard line in Tonga. A former Curator of the British Guiana Museum, 
he had worked in both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office 
before becoming Lieutenant-Governor and Colonial Secretary of Ceylon. 
In 1903, during political disturbances in the Maldive Islands (a 
dependency of Ceylon), he had deposed one sultan and set up another in 
his place.[l] Now, in late 1904, im Thurn was ready to take whatever 
action might seem desirable in Tonga. 
Shortly before leaving for Tonga, im Tl.urn learnt from Hunter 
that the King was sufferi~g from a mastoid abcess and was considered 
to be in 'a very critical condition' • This seemed to provide an 
admirable opportunity to secure a more satisfactory government and, 
like Jackson before him, he sought Colonial Office sanction f,r any 
steps 'that may appear absolutely desirable, especially in the event 
of the King's death.' ~~ort of annexation 1 1 ~ Thurn considered the 
?est course would be to fo..:ce "l revision of the Treaty, giv:lng the 
British Consul a leading part in the administration. [2] But the 
Colonial Office damr!' 'ed his enthusiasm because it did not feel 
justified in going beyond the instructions already issued if the 
King died, the new regime should ai.. least be given a £air trial. [3 J 
Im Tl-.urn arrived at Nuku' alofa with Hunter on 8 December 1904, a 
mere eight days after receiving his instructions from London. His 
conveyance in a British man-of-war w<.s a portent of what was to come. 
His business ir Tonga was neither compromise nor negotiation, nor even 
1. Th<.: Cyclopedia of Fiji, Sydtwy, 1907, p.193. 
-- ~---~-- -~ - ~-~-
2. Im Thurn to c.o., tel., 9 t;ove;nb(•r 1904, CO 225/67 • 
.J. !Hnut s, ibid.; c.o. to im Thurn, tel., 25 Octobt'r 19U!•, FOCI' 
8507, enc1:"4 in no. 117. 
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impartial inquiry. He had come to Tonga to 'put.things straight'; to 
make changes which, as he noted, amounted to 'something like a 
Revolution in Tongan affaJ.·rs.' The Tog G t h d 
.. nan overnmen a gone wrong 
and they were now to be given a new lease of life by 'a kindly and 
powerful Surgeon who cuts off a diseased part howtver unpleasant the 
operation may be.'[4] 
The focus of im Thurn's mission was not so much any specific 
grievances as the system itself. With Lrue missionary zeal he saw his 
role in Tonga as that of the haruinger of white civilisation to the 
wayward children of the Pacific. He had come with teaching from His 
Hajesty the King of Great Britain wlu a his wisdom, was aware that 
1 
the Tongan Governmt>at and people are yet as ·::.hildren' and that it was 
a comparatively short time since they had begun to adopt Western ways: 
he [Edward VII] feels confident that with the help I shall 
give you, he can trust you to carry out these Western 
methods, and that you will learn to do so efficiently.[S] 
From. practically every area of government im Thurn drew examples to 
prove that the problew was that the Tongans did not yet fully 
~~derstand 'how civilized white men rule'. The King was not behaving 
like a British constitutional monarch, the laws were neither framed 
nor administered properly, the police force was busy 0ppressing 
4. Speech by im Thurn to King and Chiefs, 28 December 1904, 'Report 
on Tongan Affairs (December, 1904-January, 1905)', encl. in im 
Thurn to c.o., J.J March 1905, CO 881/11, Australian 110. 182, 
encl. in no. ·J2, Annexure Y; Interview of the High Commissioner 
and King and '..:hiefs of Tonga, 10 December 1904, 'Report on Tongan 
Affairs', Aunexure A; im Thurn, Diary, 28 Novemb~r 1904, im 
Thurn Papers. 
5. Interview of t'w High Commissioner and rang and Chiefs of Tonga, 
10 Decembr~r 1904, 'Report on Tongan Affairs', Annexurt1 A. 
'\ 
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instead of protecting, financial matters were quite unsystematic, and 
that revered British notion of individual private property seemed 
quite unprotected. For all these failings im Thurn had an answer. He 
would point out the right path to follow, and other white men would 
line the route, assisting Tonga to become a minature Britain. To im 
Thurn it did not really matter that 'some of yo·1 may not want to walk 
in this path, and some of you may even be unable to see that it is the 
right one.' He had come, he told the King, to save the Kingdom of 
Tonga, and nothing was going to divert him frc~ that purpose.[6] 
Im Thurn spent six weeks in Tonga, interviewing the aggrieved, 
addressing meetings of chiefs and issuing ultimatums. He had arrived 
with a fair idea of th(. measures he intended to take, and tl 1 views of 
Hunter. and other Europeans served to reinforce his desire for strong 
action. But it was from amongst the group of dissatisfied Tongan 
chiefs who sought British assistance against the power of the King and 
his Premier, Sateki, that im Thurn found his real inspiration. Their 
views confirmed and justified his own and gave him a support base from 
which to work. Im Thurn's reliance on these chiefs was so great that, 
unwittingly, he played right into their hands. The British High 
Commissioner was an admirable instrument to bring about the sacking of 
the present Government. When im Thurn left Tonga on 21 January 1905, 
the Kingdom had a new Government in power. With the exceptions of the 
King and his father, Fatafehi, the i~icumbents of every major 
government post ~1ad been changed. 
6. Ibid., Speech by ;f.m Thurn to King and Chiefr:;, 28 Decembl.'r 1904, 
ibid, AnnexuH~ Y; High Commissioner's Speech to King and Chiefs, 
'2'January 190!1, ibid, Annexure z. 
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Sateki was the first to go. He was deported to Fiji as a 
political prisoner after im Thurn had been in Tonga only five days. 
The impetus for this precipitate and drastic action came from a 
meeting of chiefs held on 12 December. Although initially reluctant 
to speak frankly, the chiefs responded, according to im Thurn, 'like a 
spark to gunpowder' when asked whether they wished to rule themselves 
with the help of the British Government or be ruled, as had lately 
been the CP.se, by the King and Sateki under the direction of a white 
trader or two. Polutele Kaho led the way in denouncing Sateki, 
calling the Cabinet a 'family affair', and pointing to his connection 
with 'the Jews'. He was supported by a number of others, including 
the nobles Ata, Fin"lu 'Ulukalala, and Vaea. [7] 
The crimes for which Sa teki was deported were never stated 
explicitly. On the afternoon of 13 December im Thurn subjected Sateki 
to 'a long and weary examination', receiving only 'evasive and 
obstinate' answers to his questions. It was clear, he later wrote, 
'that Sateki would obstruct my enquiry by every means in his power and 
that he and the King were doing their best to prevent my obtaini~g any 
results.' The High Commissioner, therefore, determined to send off 
Sateki in the morning and, despite an apology, the unsuspecting 
Premier was marched on board the Fiji Government yacht Ranadi on 14 
December by an escort of marines. As im Thurn himself put it: 'Thus 
was brought about a great coup d'~tat in the affairs of Tonga.'[8] 
7. 'Report on Tongan Affairs'; Note of Interview with the Chiefs, 
12 Decmnber 1904, ibid., Annexure B. 
8. 'Report on Tongan Affairs'; im Thurn, Diary~ 13 and 14 December 
1904. 
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Im Thurn also took the opportunity to deport Sateki's son, Fotu, 
who was Treasurer and Minister of Finance. Apparently Fotu had 
followed his father's example of unhelpfulness, and 'though by no 
means equal to his father in ability, is, if I am not mistaken, more 
than equal to him in the matter of unscrupulousness.'(9] The 
decision to deport him was made after im Thurn had, in his own words, 
taken possession of the Treasury, in order to facilitate a thorough 
examination of the Kingdom's financial state. According to Edmund 
Lowe, a government schoolmaster who was present during the 
examination, Fotu was deported after a hastily-struck balance showed a 
~ 
deficit of if 2, 000. Lowe claimed that subsequent examination reduced 
the deficit to about £54, but by that time Fotu and his father had 
boarded the Ranadi, amidst much weeping, and were bound for Fiji where 
they remained until May 1906.[10] 
The deportations of Sateki and Fotu were carried out as an Act of 
State which, as H.E. Dale in the Colonial Office minuted, was 
technically an act of war.[11] Neither the 1900 Treaty nor the 
Western -~ific Order in Council of 1893 gave the British Government 
jurisdiction over Tongan subjects. Follm>1ing West African precedents 
however, an Order in Council was issued to provide for the Tongans' 
9. 
10. 
11. 
'Report on Tongan Affairs'. 
Edmund R. Lowe 'Report relating to the Investigation into and 
the Assumption' of Control of the Treasury at Nuku'alofa by the 
High Commissioner for the Western Pacific during the month of 
December 1904', 8 March 1905, encl. Bin Tupou II to c.o., 21 
March 1905, CO 225/69; im Thurn to c.o., tel., 26 May 1906, 
CO 881/11, Austr~lian no. 182, no. 80. 
Minute by H.E. Dale, 1 December 1904, on im Thurn to c.o., tel., 
1 December 1904, CO 225/65. 
(/ 
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detention in Fiji as political prisoners. The 'Fiji Political 
Prisoners Order in Council 1905 I, dated 12 January 1905, 
retrospectively validated the High Commissioner's actions in arresting 
and detaining the Tongans. Clause 8 of the Order prevented the 
bringing of a 'writ of habeas corpus or other process calling into 
question the legality of the removal from the Islands of Tonga or the 
detention of the political prisoncrs ••• or any other matter connected 
with the said removal or detention' .[12] 
With Sateki and Fotu out of the way, im Thurn set about putting 
the rest of the Kingdom to rights. Throughout the next two weeks he 
interviewed many of the aggrieved chiefs, amongst them Polutele Kaho, 
Mateialona, Sipu and Ata and he also sought the views of a number of 
European residents. Then, on 28 December, he addressed a meeting of 
the King and Chiefs at the British Consulate, setting out what he 
believed to be wrong with the administration of the Kingdom, and 
outlining the changes he proposed to make. Subsequently his speech 
was printed on the government press and widely circulated. 
Im Thurn began his address by censuring Tupou II for ruling 
'merely in accordance with his own will.' He pointed out that this was 
not the way in which 'a real Constitutional King' ruled, and informed 
Tupou II that in future he must r1lle in consultation with his Cabinet 
and chiefs. R~ also made it clear that the King and his Cabinet must 
'in all things take the advice of the British Consul who is put there 
to help them.'[l3] At his meeting with the chiefs on 12 December im 
12. Hinutes, ibid., 'The Fiji Political Prisoners Order in Council 
1905', 12 January 1905, CO 881/11, Australian no, 182, no. 44. 
13. Speech by im Thurn to King and Chiefs, 28 December 1904, 'Report 
on Tongan Affairs', Annexure Y. 
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Thurn had claimed rather less extensive powers for the Consul: 
A Cabinet in Tonga, managing the affairs of Europeans and 
Tongans, must take the advice of the British official put 
here for that purpose. You are ignorant of the ways of 
foreigners, and do not know how to deal with them; 
therefore it would be the best thing for the Tongan 
Government if the King and Cabinet consulted the British 
Agent, who is here for no other purpose than to help and 
guide you, on all important foreign matters. [14] 
On 28 December im Thurn made it clear that the Consul was to 
consulted in all matters, whether foreign or domestic. 
Im Thurn's address left few areas of government untouched. As a 
result of his investigation into the Treasury, which was pronounced 
empty, he insisted that the Government accept a loan of £4,000 from 
British colonial funds so that, somewhat ironically, the New Year 
would be started 'free of debt'. Im Thurn went on to deal in detail 
with the land system, calling on the King to carry out distribution of 
the lands, to return to the Government the rents of lands \vhich he had 
lately made over to himself, and to ensure that his Government renewed 
leases to foreigners. He demanded that the laws be published in 
English as well as Tongan, that the laws governing the sale of alcohol 
be strictly enforced, that the Estimates for 1905, as revised by 
himself, be adopted and that the King not 'tamper with' the rights of 
succession and inheritance of his chiefs.[15] 
The personnel of the Government was to undergo cons:1erable 
change. Two Cabinet Ministers, Sateki and Fotu, had already been 
deported and three ~ore were to suffer slightly less notorious 
removals. Asipf'li Kur:m, the King's father-in-law who was Hinister of 
Police, Man-1SQ Lav.Jki, the Auditor-General, and Siosiua Kaho, the 
14. Note of Interview with the Chiefs, 12 December 1904, ibid., 
Annexure II. 
1S. Speech ••• , 28 December 1904, ibid., Annexure Y. 
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Chief Justice, were all dismissed 
ostensibly on the grounds of 
incompetence. Only the King's father Fatafehi, who had managed to 
keep a foot in both camps, retained his position as Minister of Lands. 
The replacements im Thurn insisted upon, without any pretence at 
consultation, could hardly have been more distasteful to the King. 
Instead of being surrounded by his supporters, the King was now to 
face a Cabinet of lm Thurn's nominees, many of whom had used the 
British alliance to attack the King and his former Government. 
As Premier, im Thurn chose Sione Mateialona -- a relative of the 
King, but one of his strongest opponents. Mateialona did not have a 
noble title but, as the illegitimate S{n of 'Isileli Tupou, who was in 
turn an illegitimate son of Tupou I, Mateialona was of high rank. One 
of the small group of Wesleyans who had been exiled ·co Fiji in 1887, 
Mateialona had been educated at Tupou College in Tonga and later in 
Auckland. As Governor of Ha'apai since 1897 ~e had experience in 
government and was clearly the most popular choice amongst the other 
chiefs consulted by im Thurn. At the 12 December meeting Polutele 
Kaho had suggested Mateialona's appointment, and this was supported by 
the others present. According to im Thurn, Mateialona had 'an 
unexpectedly great fund of moral strength', and enjoyed great 
consideration from his fellow countrymen, despite his 'somewhat 
exceptional taciturnity.' Im Thurn concluded: 
He is the one man whom the reformers and most other natives 
in Tonga, and almost the whole of the European residents, 
look to as their proper political leader and premier.[16] 
Other positions in the Cabinet went to those wl1o had cooperated 
with im Thurn, and whose compliance seemed assured. MP:teialona was t(~ 
be Auditor-General as well as Premier; the post of Treasurer -v;,; 
16. 'Report on Tongan Affairs'. 
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given to Fatafehi, who was also Minister of Lands. Polutele Kaho was 
to become Hinister of Police and Sipu would become Governor of Ha'apai 
in place of Mateialona. Finau 'Ulukalala, who had been dismissed as 
Governor of Vava'u some six months earlier, returned to that post. 
Outside the Cabinet, positions were found for two more 'loyal' nobles. 
Solomone Ata, a 22 year old whom im Thurn described as 'the one Tongan 
who dares to speak his mind to the King' became Secretary and 
Assistant to the Premier, and Vaea, another formerly exiled Wesleyan 
whom im Thurn considered 'honest, conscientious and able', was to be 
Police Magistrate at Nuku'alofa.[l7] 
Im Thurn's list of appointees included a number of Europeans in 
posts which he felt could not be suitably filled by Tongans. ffi1ile 
expressing a desire to keep 'as many Tongans as possible' in 
government employment, im Thurn nevertheless pointed out that 'as the 
Tongans have decided that theirs is to be a civilised and not a 
barbarous country ••• the King and his chiefs should have a certain 
number of white men to help them.' [18] The most important of the 
European appointments was that of Robert L. Skeen as Chief Justice 
and Legal Adviser to th~ ~'remier. The post of Chief Justice carrie'.! 
Cabinet rank so that for the first time since Baker's deportation in 
1890, the Tongan Cabinet would contain a European. Skeen was a New 
Zealand lawyer who had worked in Samoa before coming to T0nga in 1901. 
He was one of those who had composed the petition to Jackson in Hay 
1903, and was highly recommended for appointment by Hunter, who had 
worked with him in Samoa as well as Tonga.[19] 
17. Ibid. 
18. Speech •• 28 December 1904, ibid., Annexure Y. 
, ----
19. Hunter to .Jackson, conf., 12 January 1904 and en~~lG., encl. in 
Jackson to c.o., secret, 3 February 1904, CO 225/67. 
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Although Fatafehi was to be Treasurer, im Th:trn ap_uointed a 
European, T.V. Roberts, as his assistant. Roberts was a son of 
'Professor' J.H. Roberts, head of the Government Col2 ege, and had 
come to Tonga from Sydney in May 1899, aged 19, to take up a 
government p1st at the request of Sa teki. He later fell out with the 
Government and in September 1903 was dismissed from his post as Chief 
Clerk in the Customs Department on flimsy grounds. Roberts had 
appealed to the British Government against his dismissal and the 
Colonial Office had instructed im Thurn, should he find no adequate 
grounds for the dismissal, to insist on Roberts' rrinstateme~t or on 
the payment of adequate compensation.[20] 
To reorganise the police force and show the new Minister of 
Police how to go about his duties, im Thurn proposed to recruit a 
European from Fiji to take charge of the polj ce :or about six months. 
For this task he had in mind Sergeant J.M. Gosstruy, whom he 
described as a first-rate police officer, married to a Tongan and 
fluent in the language.[21] In the Customs and Post Office 
D..::partment im Thurn demanded the dismissal of two Europeans who had 
been close to Sateki -- E.M. Lee and J. Macau1.ay. I::t their place he 
proposed R.G.M. Denny as Collector of Custor.s and Postmaster and W.G. 
Bagnall as Chief Clerk, both of whom had recently arrived in Tonga. 
20. Roberts to Hunter, 3 
Australian no. 182, no. 
1904, ibid., no. 29. 
October 1903 and encls, CO 881/11, 
27; c.o. to im Thurn, secret, 14 October 
21. Speech ••. , 28 December 19U4, 'Report on Tongan Affairs', Anne::ur<::• 
Y. 
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Im Thurn was not acting under any delusions as to the source of 
his authority to reorganise the Tongan Government. Outwardly he 
justified his actions by claiming, as the Colonial Office did, that 
under the Protectorate Britain was pledged to see that the interests 
of both Tongans and foreigners were safeguarded. But on the practical 
level he was fully aware that he had might or. his side and the trump 
card in reserve. When Tupou II protested that it was all a matter of 
the strong talking to the weak, im Thurn agreed with him. 'Of 
course', he added, 'I am only strong as representing my King whom I am 
glad you recognise as the greater power here.'[22] He made it 
r~rfectly plain from the outset that his mission was not to be 
hampered by non-believers. The King's options were either to agree to 
the High Commissioner's demands or be removed. 
As im Thurn himself was aware, all semblance of an independPnt 
Tonga was gone. On 2 January 1905 he called a further meeting of the 
King and chiefs and demanded that Tupou II give an 'immediate and 
definite' answer to the proposed changes. Im Thurn was not prepared 
to listen to objections. He informed the gathering, which consisted 
of the King and some 30 chiefs assembled from all over Tonga, that the 
real choice before them was either frank acceptance of his own 
'guidance' or the immediate loss of their King and, eventually, of 
their independenc.e. Even the hardened im Thurn felt some sense of 
occasion. He described it as 'a strange and dramatic and to some 
degree a painful interview': 
It covered the real crisis of the fall from independence of 
an interesting and in a sennc a powc~rful peopll'• I had 
askc:d tile King to yield the eonrlidemblc absolute pow.:}r 
~ote of Interview with th0 
~·, AntH.murc AA. 
King and Chi(.!fs, J,muary lCJO'l, 
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which -- rightly or wrongly '"- he had continued still to 
cling to ••• '[23] 
The day that Hunter had long predicted had arrived the King of 
Tonga must do as he was told or lose his Kingdom. Tupou II, with his 
hands thus tied, gave his reluctant consent to im Thurn's proposals. 
Having settled the broad outlines that the new Government was to 
follow, im Thurn sailed for Ha'apai and Vava'u. During this trip, 
,.,hich occupied him from 3-11 January, im Thurn talked with the chiefs 
about the proposed changes and distributer! copies of hb address of 28 
December, as well as his concluding npcech at the meeting of 2 
January. On his return to Nuku'alofa im Thurn learnt from his chiefly 
allies that Tupou II was shm.,ing no enthusiasm for the 'reforms' • Im 
Thurn described Tupou II's attitude as 'sulky', and noted that he had 
'snirked' signing the gazette notices for the new appointments.[24] 
Im Thurn immediately arranged for a further meeting of the King 
and chiefs at the Consulate on 17 January. In order to 'facilitate' 
tlte King's final concurrence, im Thurn prepared what he called a brief 
summary of the more imrortant points of his proposals, for tlw King's 
signature. This document, which was headed 'Note of Points accepted 
by the King', contained 12 ultimatums drmm from the spel'Ch of 2R 
Deeemb(>r. Although it was not intended as a revision of thE Treaty, 
tht> 'Note of Points' was clearly drawn up for the purpose of placing 
>or:w continuing restraint on tlw King -- im Thurn was determinPd that 
Tupou II woul\ not dismiss his new Government and forget his promines 
as Goon i1G thl' Hi ch CommioGiOtwr I G back was turrkd. Tlw 'Note• nf 
Pointn' thtw C'iillll! to uscum~! tlw GtatuG of an amendment to tht' Trl'aty 
2:>. Ir;; Thurn, Dio.ry, 2 Janua.ry 1905. 
~· ~s J 1' ..1'•.~, ''O ~J·;·/c·g· 
.. 4, IP."; Thurn to c.o., nec!rc•t, ... anuary u, " -- '· 
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and was generally referred to as the Supplementary Agreement of 
1905.[25] 
At the 17 January meeting Tupou II objected strongly to signing 
the summary of points. He argued that to do so would involve a breach 
of the 1900 Treaty, by which the British Government had pledged itself 
not to intervene in Tonga's internal affairs. He particularly 
~bjected to the second point, which stated blandly: 
'The British 
Agent and Consul to be consul ted and his advice taken' , and also to 
points 9 and 10, which stipulated that nt~w appointments to the public 
service and changes among leading officials were to be made only 'in 
consultation with' the British Consul.[26] Not only did these pointR 
contravene Article III of the 1900 Treaty, bu.: they were also in 
conflict with Tonga's constitution. These provisionJ had the effect, 
he later protestod, of 
virtually transferring to the High Commissioner the complete 
control of the internal administration of my country and its 
laws, and leaving to me, my Cabinet, and my Parliament 
nothing but an empty name, and reducing us to the position 
of simply carrying out his or his nominee's 
instructions.[27] 
In reply im Thurn arguec. ~~h6.t although by the letter o.Z the 
Treaty it was only permissible to, and not ~lllperative on, the Tongan 
Government to consult the British Consul, the intention of the Treaty 
was that this permission should be used in all cases 'affectinG the 
poac(~ and quiet of the islands. 1 In accordance with the spirit of the 
' 
Treaty, the British Government hnd a duty to lllit 'nativu affairn' in 
o~d0r, for the recent state of unrest had been 'a s0riouo me~1cc to 
2r:i. See Appendb: I(v). 
26. Ibid. 
-~ ... ~""" 
27. Tup:m !I to c.o., 21 ~·!urch 1905, CO 225/71. 
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the peace and quiet of the foreign residents.'[28] 
At this point im Thurn called off the meeting. Although he knew 
he held the trump card, he apparently decided, 'out of consideration 
for the King', to proceed without all the chiefs present. The 
following day he arranged to meet the King with just five of the 
chiefs, including Fatafehi, Mateialona and Polutele. In no uncertain 
terms im Thurn informed Tupou II that if he refused to sign the 'Note 
of Points' and the two printed speeches he would be taken on board HHS 
Clio to join Sateki and Fotu in Fiji.[29] Without further delay, 
Tapou II sig ed the documents. As he later recorded, 
The revolver 1f an .. exation was presented to me and 
the deportation bullets thereof had already been 
and a third similar bullet was there ready for 
against wys~lf.[30] 
two of 
fired ••• , 
discharge 
At though the King's capitulation saved him from immediate 
deportation, the possibility was by no means ruled out. Tupou II was 
left in no doubt that if he altered any of the arrangements once im 
Thurn's back was turned, he would be bringing annexation upon his 
Kingdom. 'Fiji', im Thurn reminded the assembled King and chiefs, 'is 
but a little way off'. At the first sign o• anythir1g going wrong he 
would be back to take away their country. 
You must pardon me if I remind you of the fact that it is 
your 'last chance', and that if you do not avail yourselv~s 
of it, there must be a complete change.[31] 
28. In Thurn to c.o., secret, 28 January 1!10;' CO 225/69. 
29. !hid. 
lU. Tnp~u Il to c.o., 21 March 1905, CO 225/71. 
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TUPOU II was defeated and humi.liated by im Thurn. In 1900 he had 
fought the British representative and, to a large extent, won. In 
1905 he had been forced to watch im Thurn compromise his Kingdom and 
his rights: But he did not give up easily. Tupou II never fully 
accepted the new regime that had been forced on him, and he nev~r gave 
up trying to have the Supplementary Agreement revoked. As soon as the 
High Commissioner and his warship had sailed away, Tupou II began to 
seek advice in the hope of having the new arrangements removed. 
Before long he was bombarding the Colonial Office with pro~ests and 
demands for the immed:Late release of Sateki and Fotu. In the meantime 
hls dissatisfaction wlt:h his new position was obvious he made no 
effort to work with his net·J Hinistcrs, keeping himself as aloof and 
intractable as possible. 
Realising that his only hope of extracting himself from the 
pledges he had been forced to sign was to prove their il1egali ty, 
Tupou II employed OM of Auckland 1 s best-known lawyers to argue his 
case. Thomas Cotter was legal adviser to the Auckland City Council; 
and was later described by the New Zealand Herald as one of the 
soundest lawyers in the profession.[32] It appears likely that his 
services were suggested to the King by the Butters, who withdrew their 
business an, made a rapid exit from Tonga in earl·• 1905. [33] On 28 
1 January 1905, just ·•er a week after im Thurn's departure from the 
Kingdom, Tupou II addressed two letters to Cotter, seeking his opinion 
as to the legality of im Thurn's actions. Cotter took the King's part 
J 32. Obituary, Thomas Cotter, K. C., E.£~ Ze<!l_~nd _Het:_~!_d:, 15 Novt'lll bl•r 
1913. 
3'3. H. Hutter to 
correapond(mce, 
Thurn, 10 Harch 
im Thurn, 4 April 1905, and suhwc~qlll'nt 
~VP!lC t+, 66/1905; •m:• (indec.iplwrabl(•) to im 
1905, encl. in t-.THC 4, 2/1900. 
"\ 
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entirely. Describing the High Commissioner s proceedings as 'most 
harsh, illegal p~,d unconstitutional', he advised Tupou II that, under 
British law, t!ie Supplementary Agreement was null and void because it 
had been signed under duress. Cotter shunned the King's idea of 
asking for a Royal Commission to be appointed from Britain to enquire 
into the matter, arguing that that would be tantamounL to an admission 
on the King's part that the British Government had a right to 
interfere with Tonga's internal affairs. Instead, he suggested that 
the King should at once revoke the appointments made by im Thurn and 
reappoint whoever he saw fit. He also strongly recommended that the 
King should call a special meeting of the L~gislative Assembly and 
submit the whole affair for their consideration.[34] 
The King was unwilling to take such drastic steps but he summoned 
Cotter who arrived in Tonga on 13 Harch in the company of Heyer 
Hutter. For two weeks they conferred daily and continuously. As a 
result a long letter of protest was addressed to the Colonial Office 
and to King Edward VII, claiming that the 1900 Treaty had been 
'flagrantly, openly, and designedly broken' by im Thurn and that 'a 
gross outrage had been committed in my country by my sworn Treaty 
friend'. With considerable point, the letter argued th8t: 
when it suits the High Commissioner in making charges 
against me or my Government he refers apparently with 
respect to the Constitution of Tonga and the laws thereof, 
the Treaties between Tonga and Great Britain, and what the 
constitutional monarch of the latter country would not think 
of doing, but practically in the S~·~lle breath and when it 
again suits his purpose he ignores, overrides, and 
disparages my authority and prerog~tives, and the 
Constitution, laws, and customs of my kingdom, assumes a 
greater l~nowlL'dge of what is or is not good or beneficial 
for my subjects than their own Parliament, infringes and 
violates the liberty of my subjects, and does what I 
unhesitatingly submit no constitutional :nonarch in the world 
would do or think of doing or authorize being done. [35] 
34. Cotter to Tupou I, 7 February 1905, Royal Correspondence, 
1904-05, PHB 505. 
35. Tupou II to c.o., 21 Harch 1 W\5, CO 225/71. 
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Cotter also advised Tupou II to take action against the High 
Commissioner in the Supreme Court of Fiji for the illegal removal and 
detention of the Premier and Treasurer. Humphrey Berkeley, a Fiji 
lawyer, tried to institute proceedings on behalf of the King and 
Cotter but he was unable to do so because the Order in Council had put 
im Thurn's action above the law.[36] 
In order to continue to have the benefits of Cotter's counsel, 
and also to place himself in direct telegraphic link with Britain, 
Tupou II left Tonga for Auckland on 25 March. His visit to Auckland 
lasted three months, and it may well have been inspired by more tt1an 
the prospect of a direct telegraphic link with the Colonial Office. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, one of the people Tupou II turned to for 
support was Ri.:hard Seddon, the pro-annexationist Premier of Ne~.;r 
Zealand. A weelt after im Thurn 1 s departure, Tupou II wrote to Seddon 
seeking advice and assistance, for 'my contry is in jeopardy and I 
fear my power has gone from me'. He wanted Seddon's opinion on the 
appointment of a Royal Commission to determine whether his treatment 
at im Thurn's hands had been 'right'. He also suggested that Seddon 
might be prepared to bring the matter before the next Conference of 
Colonial Premiers, and expressed his intention of visiting New Zealand 
to discuss the whole matter with him.[37] Seddon was only too 
pleased to have the King lean on him in his troubles and responded 
sympathetically, assuring him of assistance and suggestlng thaL, while 
it was too late for the Premier's Conferertce, a petition to the King 
36. Berkeley to Cotter, 30 M~rc~ 1905, and subsequent correspondence, 
Royal Correspondence !j04-05, !~B 505. 
37. Tupou II to Seddon, 29 January 1~05, Royal Correspondence 
1904-05, P}1B 505. 
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of England asking for an inquiry would be quite in order.[38] 
Tupou II's motive in applying to Seddon seems to have been that 
association with New Zealand might prove a more amicable arrangement 
than the present one. Would it be possible he asked Seddon, for Tonga 
'to remain a Protectorate but to be associated with New Zealand, the 
British Resident to be appointed by New Zealand • ' [ 3 9] This 
arrangement had the advantage in his eyeb of severing the connection 
with Fiji and with the High Commissioner and his methods. The King 
argued th~t since Tonga had nothing in common with Fiji, it was 
somewhat anomalous to be linked politically with that colony. On the 
other hand, Tonga's commercial relations with New Zealand were 
considerable, and provided a reason for political association.[40] 
In view of the Cook Islands precedent, where annexation had developed 
out of a protectorate administered by New Zealand, Tttpou II' s approach 
to Seddon is surprising. Nevertheless it was an opportunity worth 
exploring and, since the majority of Tupuu II's advisers were New 
Zealanders, they may have convinced him that the New Zealand 
Government would treat him more as befitted an independent monarch. 
Although it was widely rumoured that Tupou II favoured a 
settlement similar to that in Rarotonga, nothing further came of the 
idea. It might simply have been a ploy to get New Zealand sympathy 
and support against im Thurn. But, perhaps of more importance, both 
the Colonial Office and the new Tongan Cabinet were strongly opposed 
38. Seddon tD Tupou II, tel., 8 February 1905, PO, uncatalogued 
papers. 
39. Tupou II to Seddon, 24 February 1905, Royal Correspondc.!UCL: 
1904-05, PHB 505. 
40. Ibid. 
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to the scheme. Im Thurn and Hunter believed that Tonga would not 
benefit from control by New Zealand, and they saw in ·' r the workings 
of intrigue-- the King was being tricked into New Zealand's clutches 
by the activities of self-interested traders and politicians. ~fuen 
Beatrice Grimshaw, the author, told im Thurn in December 1904 that 
Seddon was still very anxious for Tonga's annexation to New Zealand, 
the High Commissioner noted succinctly 'not if I can help it' .[41] 
The case against New Zealand was also reinforced by opinion within the 
Tongan Cabinet and parliament. On 11 June 1906 a resolution was 
passed by a large majority in the Legislative Assembly, 'protesting 
against New Zealand and other Australasian colonies interfering in the 
government of the Friendly Islands'. The resolution, which was 
forwarded to the Colonial Office, asked that the Treaty of 1900 be 
strictly adhered to and that the Government of Tonga 'remain in the 
charge of' the British Government, through the High Commissioner in 
Fiji.[42] 
The opinion of the Leg ;lative Assembly on this point was 
probably indicative of general opinion in Tonga on the question of New 
Zealand control. Noticeably, however, the resolution made no 
t:ference to the events ~"f 1905, for on that que :tion opiaion in Tonga 
was as divided as the leaders were. Some ne· spar ;::- rer~rts alleged 
that 'the majority of the natives entirely disapprove of the action 
taken' , and claimed that bloodshed would have ensued had the King been 
deported. One claimed that when im Thurn asked those chiefs satisfied 
td th what he had done to stand up, only the new Hinister of Police did 
41. Im Ynurn, Diary, 18 December 1904. 
42.' See Hunter to im Thurn, tel., 20 June 1906, encl. in im Thurn to 
c.o., 22 June 1906, CO 225/72. 
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so.[43] On 20 January, the day before im Thurn left, 21 chiefs had 
signed a petition recording their agreement with all that im Thurn had 
proposed, 'both verbally and in writing', and agreeing that Hunter 
'shall he:Ne a voice in all matters relating to the Government and the 
Country.' [ 44) Several of them, however, were later to show that they 
supported the King's cause. 
Amongst the new Cabinet anc1. ~:hose who supported it there was 
consternation at Tupou II's attempts to revert to pre-im Thurn days, 
and even a sense of disappointment that the High Commissioner had not 
completed his work in Tonga by deporting the King. His presence and 
defiant attitude made their positions very insecure: if the British 
Government did not back im Thurn, there was no telling what the King 
might do to them for their disloyalty. In early April the new 
Premier, Mateialona, reported to the High Commissioner that the King's 
attitude was worrying, 'not from any overt act, but because he adopted 
a policy of passive resistance to changes being carried out.'[45] 
Polutele Kaho noted the same resistance: 
it was apparent that he was anticipating something, as at 
our Privy Council meetings, every time a Minister asked for 
something for his Department, the King did not accede to it 
at once, but appeared to postpone it, in hopes that the 
Government would be again changed.[46] 
The settlement in Tonga thus rested on tenterhooks, awaiting the 
43. Unmarked newspaper clipping, 8 March 1905, encl. in WPHC 4, 
2/1900; 'The Tongan Coup D'etat', The Globe, 10 April 1905. 
44. Fatafehi and 21 others to im Thurn, encl., WPHC 4, 2/1900. See 
also 'Report on Tongan Affairs', Annexure FF. 
45. Hateialona to im Thurn, 6 April 1905, encl. in im Thurn to c.o., 
19 April 1905, CO 225/69. 
46. Polutele Kaho to im Thurn, private and conf., 4 April 1905, 
CO 881/11, Australian no. 182, encl. 2 in no. 67. 
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outcome of the King's protests and the reaction of the Colonial Office 
to im Thurn's measures. 
The appearance of Hutter and the lawyer, Cotter, on 13 Harch 1905 
increased the feeling of insecurity amongst the new Cabinet. And when 
the King suddenly announced on 24 March taat he was going to New 
Zealand with his lawyer, ostensibly on doctor's orders, the Ministers 
reacted strongly. The Doctor denied giving any such advice; it was 
clear that the King's trip was tied to his attempts to undo im Thurn's 
work. At a hurried meeting, the Cabinet attempted to prevent the King 
going, or at least to restrict his movements while he was away. The 
Ministers decided that since the Government was in debt and the 
country in difficulties, no money would be voted for the trip, and a 
letter was sent to the King expressing Cabinet's disapproval. In a 
further bold assertion of their authority over the King, the Cabinet 
Hinisters also agreed that Mateialona should send a letter to Seddon 
pointing out that he had been instructed 
by a unanimous vote of His Tongan Majesty's Cabinet to 
inform you that His Hajesty King George II of Tonga has no 
authority or power to pledge the credit of, or in any way to 
arrange as to, the future government of Tonga. 
As a final touch the Cabinet also decided to place advertisements in 
Auckland and Sydney newspapers stating that the Government of Tonga 
would not be responsible for any debts or liabilities on any account 
whatever contracted without the signature of the Premier.[47] 
Tupou II was not deterred by his Ministers' disapproval, nor by 
their refusal to find funds, and it was widely rumoured that the Free 
47. Mateialona to im Thurn, 6 April 1905 and encls., encl. in im 
Thurn to c.o., 19 April 1905, CO 225/69. 
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Church of Tonga was £inancing his trip.[48] At 5 a.m. the following 
Sunday morning he embarked for New Zealand to the accompaniment of a 
21 gun salute and the strains of 'See the Conquering Hero Comes', as 
rendered by the Government College band.[49] Not surprisingly, the 
distrust which his Cabinet displayed towards him was fully 
reciprocated. He had appointed Fatafehi as Prince Regent, to 
administer the affairs of the Kingdom during his absence, as required 
by Section 46 of the Constitution. But Fatafehi's letter of 
appointment limited his powers to such a degree that he was, as 
Mateialona complained, 'practically without kingly power': [50] 
You will not repeal any law or make any nt.:i' la.'l! or add to or 
abridge any clause in the law or Constitution. You are not 
permitted to sign any document that is brought to you, that 
is if it is anything that does not appecr in the law and 
Constitution.[51] 
Tupou II was not taking any chances. 
On his trip to New Zealand, Tupou II carried with him a document 
purporting to be from the nobles and the people's representatives of 
the Tongan Legislative Assembly, protesting in strong terms against 
the changes wrought by the High Commissioner. Obviously an attempt by 
the King to follow the advice of his lawyer and present the British 
Parliament with the protests of the Tongan Parliament, the petition 
declared: 'We do not wish the High Commissioner or anyone ••• to have 
anything to do with matters concerning our country'. It went on to 
48. Hunter to im Thurn, 4 April 1905, encl. in im Thurn to c.o., 
ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Mateialona to im Thurn, 6 April 1905, encl. in im Thurn to c.o., 
ibid. 
51. Letter of appointment to Fa tafehi, 25 t-Iarch 1905, encl. in Hunter 
to im Thurn, 4 April 1905, encl. in im Thurn to c.o., ~· 
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state that the Assembly and the King were very much av~~s~ t 0 being 
subservient in anything, but especially to have to put everything 
before the representative of Great Britain. They were very opposed to 
the Constitution being altered, and were hurt by the suggestion that 
Tupou II might be taken to Fiji if 11e didn't sign. [52] It had been 
the King's intention to circulate this petition for the signature of 
all the nobles and people's representatives in the Assembly. For this 
purpoJe a copy was taken around after the King's devarture by two of 
his supporters, the dismissed officials Ma'atu (a noble, and 
ex-Governor of Niuatoputapu) and Siosiua Kaho, who had been Chief 
Justice until im Thurn removed him. But the Cabinet Ministers 
apprehended Ma'atu and Kaho while the petition showed the signatures 
of only 13 nobles (six of whom had already put their names to the 20 
January document approving the High Commissioner's actions) and six 
representatives. Kaho and Ma' atu were brought before the Poli.'!e 
Magistrate to inquire into their actions. The Court found that two of 
the noble signatories, Viliami Lamatau and Osaiasi Tovi, had been 
unaware of the nature of the document when they signed it and in fact 
agreed with im Thurn's actions. But it was apparently unable to press 
any charges against Kaho and Ma'atu -- they had simply been obeying 
the King's express orders. The defendants argued in court that the 
King was supreme as he had the power to appoint judges, police and 
Ministers, and that his commands over-rode jcdgements and orders of 
the Cabinet.[53] 
52. Petition, undated, encl. F(A) in Ma teialona to im Thurn, 6 April 
1905, encl. in im Thurn to c.o., ~· 
53. t1ateialonu to im Thurn, 6 April 1905, ibid. 
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Failing to thwart the King's petition, the Ministers turned to 
the High Commissioner for protection. They prepared a 
counter-pet! tion, designed to destroy tile weight of the former one, 
which called upon the High Commissioner to intervene. This petition, 
signed by eight nobles and seven chiefs (including all but two of the 
Ministers), approved im Thurn's coup, affirming that since his 
departure there had been qui~tness and peace, the laws had been obeyed 
and taxes paid. It included a declaration of faith in those put into 
office by the High Commissioner who, of course, comprised mo,t of the 
signatories they had been carrying out the laws 'to our 
satisfaction 1 and should retain office and so have the opportunity to 
govern well • The King had gone off 'w·ithout r..onsulting us', and had 
takf~n with him a signed statement against im Thurn and the present 
Goverrnnent. The High Commissioner was requested to 'carefully 
consider' the action of the King and those ,.,ho 11'•d signed with him, 
and 
to take such steps as you think best to ~reserv~ Tonga in 
peace and quiet, and the present system of Government and 
its officials as we consider the way ~he King is acting is 
against the welfare and prosperity of Tonga. [54] 
The petition was a cautious indictment of the King. But Polutele 
Kaho, writing private. ly to im Thurn, had no qualms about speaking his 
mind freely, and no doubts as to what the lligh Commissioner should do. 
Polutele asserted that 'the whole world knows' that all the 
wrong-doing in Tonga had transpired from the King, and he implored the 
British Government not to go back on their word nor to alter 'one 
little portion of the good work' which im Thurn had don.:. Hl' 
~oncluded dramatically: 
54. Petition to im Thurn, encl. F, ibid. 
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I can quite see that one of the two must go betwepn the King 
and country, because I can quite see that the King will 
never alter his action. And if he is permitted to reign and 
go on as he is doing, what is the use of the country? If 
the King were only taken away from here and Fatafehi crowned 
King all would go well.[55] 
The protection which the new Cabinet sought from the High 
Commissioner was readily forthcoming. On 17 April im Thurn 
telegraphed the Colonial Office with the information that the King was 
intriguj.ng with his recently dismissed Ministers, with the connivance 
of Hutter, Watkin and Cotter, and that the new Ministers were 
appealing against him. I-:n Thurn wanted power to depose the King a<ld 
substitute Fatafehi, 'if any great difficulty should arise' .[56] The 
Colonial Office agreed. There was no point in deporting the King's 
white advisers, as he would probably soon find similar ones again.[57] 
At the same time, the Colonial Office hoped that im Thurn would find 
it possible to arrange matters on a satisfactory basis without 
proceeding to this extr~~e measure: 
They are content, however, to leave the decision to you, in 
full confidence that you will treat the King with all the 
patience and consideration consistent with the paramount 
necessity of guarding against a recurrence of past 
misgovernment.[58] 
The King could not, of coursP.J be deported from New Zealand. But if, 
either before or after his deposition, he returned to Tonga, he could 
be deported from there to Fiji as an Act of State, and either an vrder 
55. PolutclE.> Kaho to im Thurn, private and conf., 4 April 1905, 
CO 881/11, Australian no. 182, encl. 2 in no. 67. 
56. Im Thurn to c.o., tel., 17 April 1905, CO 225/69. 
~~. Hinutp, ~· 
"8 ;:: 6 J 190"l CO 881/ll, Austral ian > • c.o. to im Thurn, con ... , unc . , 
na. 182, no. 68. 
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in Council or a local ordinance would be passed t 1 1· hi o ega 1se 8 
detention. [59 J 
In the event, however, im Thurn found no pressing reason to 
depose Tupou II. When he paid a return visit to Tonga from 20-28 July 
1905, just six months after his first visit, he believed the King had 
finally resigned himself to the new situation. The King and Watkin 
had not long been back in the Kingdaffi from New Zealand and, in im 
Thurn's opinion, the trip had done the King a great deal of good; it 
had helped inculcate in him 
a more accurate conception of the nature of his relations to 
His Britannic Majesty's Government, through the High 
Commissioner, and of his own true personal interest in 
conforming to these relations imposed on him.[60] 
Im Thurn was very impressed by the King's obvious determination to be 
'even profusely friendly' with both Hunter and himself. Horeover, it 
se~med to the High Commissioner that the King was also in a mood to 
work harmoniously with his Hinisters. Hhile there were rumours of an 
occasional renewal of strain between the King on the one hand, and the 
Ninisters and the British Consul on the other, im Thurn put these down 
1.s much to an occasional 'want of tact' of some of the Hinisters, as 
to any 'natural momentary reversion of the King to his old habits of 
thought' .[61] 
Under these circumstances, im Thurn saw no m~ed to depose Tupou 
II -- he was, after all, the rightful Kin~~ to whom all Tongans (with a 
few notable exceptions), bm>~cd. And there wan no telling what might 
be the reaction to his depoaition -- not only within Ton,~,t, but also 
19. c.o. to im ·nmrn, secret, 27 April 1905, t.J'l>HC 22/II/lH. 
f10. Im Tnurn to c.o., conf., u February 1906, CO 2.25/7 !.. 
61. !hid. 
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in the New Zealand and Austr~lian press, which had been very critical 
of the High Commissioner's earlier actions in Tonga. Consequently im 
~ 
Thurn contented himself with issuing the King a stern warning in the 
presence of his Ministers, and with handing him the Colonial Office's 
official replv to his protest, embellished with im Thurn's own 
paternalistic touches.[62] The King was publicly reminded that it 
had almost been necessary to pull down the Tongan flag and reduce His 
Majesty to the position of a private individual, and he was censured 
for being so badly advised as to try to repudiate his 'r~romises' to 
the High Commissioner, but he was left upon his throne. 
The official reply from the Colonial Office to Tupou II 1 s 
protests was predictable. Faced with the King's protests, Seddon's 
intriguing and im Thurn's fait accompli, the British Government chose 
to settle for the latter. It approved im Thurn's proceedings in 
Tonga, including the deportations and the 'somewhat forceful methods' 
he had used. His vigorous measures had been necessary in the 
interests of all the inhabitants of Tonga Tongans as well as 
foreigners -- and were iustified because they facilitated the task of 
reform. The SecrP.tary of State WIG quite lavish in his praise he 
expressed his appreciation of im Thurn's 'tact and firmness' and 
conveyed the Government's high opinion of his ability in a difficult 
and delicate mission.[63] 
62. Im Thurn to Ttlpou II, 21 July 1905, WP!IC 2i/XXII/l. 
rJ3. c.o. minutes on im Thurn to c.o., 15 Narcl1 1903, CO ::!25/69; 
c.o. to im Thurn, secret, :n Harc1t 1905, WPHC 22/II/17; c.o. to 
im Thurn, conf., 6 June> 190.5, CO 881/11, Australian no. 1G2, 
no. 68. 
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It was true that im Thurn had ex-:eeded his instructions by 
securing an amendment to the Treaty extending the internal authority 
of the British Consul. And although the undertaking constituted an 
'apparent departure' from the 1900 Treaty, officials argued that most 
of the Points involved little more than a promise on the King's part 
to rule in accordance vii th the Constitution and the law. The new 
conditions, they claimed, werd only a logical outcome of the Treaty: 
I£ the new undertaking extends the Treaty of 1900, it does 
so only because the King has disregarded the underlying 
assumption of that Treaty, which was that the King would 
gu: :e himself by the law and the Constitution: and your 
Report, leaving as it does no ro .- for l~oubt that the King 
has not so guided himself, l plains and justifie~ the 
divergencies of the undertaking of 18 January from the 
Treaty of 1900.[64] 
By this tortuous reasoning, the High Commissioner's use of force to 
extract the Agreement was given respectability. The King was informed 
that the British Government would regard the undertaking as binding on 
him equally with the existing Treaty and c..s supplementing them. He 
was expected to carry it uut in the spirit and the letter, and so long 
,'S he did so, Britain had no intention as sl; had no desire, to annex 
hb Kingdom tu the British dominions. 
It was, as the newspap»t'S claimed, a resounding defeat for King 
Tuufa' •au Tupou II. 
r1r._ c.o. to im Thurn, ronf., tJ June 1905, ibid. 
CHAPTER 5 
!:_ Str1 _,gle for Control 
The Consul maintains that he is the controlling pvwer in all 
matters in Tonga and insists that his advice must be 
followed without questioning. On the other hand I contend 
that the Government rests \vi. th the King and his Cabinet and 
that the Consul's advice is to be t'lken on important 
matters. 
[Robert Skeen, Chief Justice, to Sir Everard im Thurn, 13 Harch 1907, 
WPHC 4, 279/1906.] 
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The attempt by the ~~igh Commissioner for the Western Pacific to 
'disentangle Tongan affairs' in early 1905 produced neither harmony 
nor stability in t~e Tongan Government.[1] Hhen im Thurn returned to 
Tonga some six months after his first visit, he was quick to boast 
that by his bold intervention he had done the Tongans a favour.[2] And 
certainly, by his own criteria -- the balance in the Treasury and the 
provision of public works Tonga after 1905 showed distinct 
improvement. But the circumstances under which the new arrangements 
had been foisted upon the Kingdom created tensions ard struggles 
within the Government. Three forces now vied with each other for 
c, control of the Kingdom. The King, '1hose hereditary rights had been 
curtaiLd, made no secret of his continued dissatisfaction with his 
new position. He had no intention of submitting to his Ministers or 
to the British Consul. The Cabinet was no longer the loyal executive 
arm of the King; it was now composed of British nominees, many of 
whom felt little allegiance to the King, and some of whom regarded him 
with open hostility. Over both King and Cabine>t the British Agent and 
Consul attempted to exert a controlling influence. 
Though the Kingdom had escaped im Thurn's ravages with its flag 
intact, the autonomy of its Government had been compromised. In im 
Thurn's own words, the King now headed a 'quasi-independent 
Government' • (3) Its decisions were subject to the approval of 
British officials, and in many ways it was dependent on the British 
Government for its very existence. The King could no lo~ger be 
confident in his possession of his throne, and almost all important 
1. Im Thurn to c.o., conf., 6 Febru<try 1906, CO 225/72 • 
2. Ibid. 
3. Im Thurn to c.o., 4 April 1905, CO 225/69. 
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.:1ppointments no~v rested in British hands. 
But in practice the 
r..:lationship was not so simple. The po~ver of British offic!Lals over 
t:w :::'ongan Gover!Uilent had not been prGcisely defiaed b~; the '!. 905 
As a result the natur..: and extent of British intervention 
,i,:pended l:1rgely on the personali th~s involved '1!1d became c:he source 
,): :nuch .;ontroversy. In the years after 1905 there 1vas ao ready 
':',)ngan acceptance of Br i.. tish dominance -- not t)nly the King but some 
,>: tiu: :1inisters e1s ~vell, J:esent..:d lvhat they sc1~v as hi:.,;h-handed 
:.nth the :3econd \Ti:~~t: ,)f the Hicih Commissioner in l:lte July lql)'j 
:.tt~::~ tvas no :nore J0ubt tvithin '!'onga that the ne~v Government \vou!.J 
3f:.I:1d. Tu;,1ou !:I \vas '.::n·c.ed to rHal i..se that he would get no further by 
Cotter waB 
In Cotter's opinion, im 
~m::-n r c> !...:tte;: was s:E.:nply a quibble and an evasion, justifying his 
,~:=::::-wrdinary actions only in terms of might. He therefore continued 
::0 'lrge I'apou II to take steps to put his caBe before the British 
?u·LLunenc, nartii!uL~rly since the resignation of the Balfour 
;,~··e::-"llllent ;:;ave him an opportunity to present his ca.se to the new 
~.i. 1lt~::-a:. :•U::tistry a.nd the nmv Secretary of State, Lord Elgin. Although 
:,;::t.l~r :3uggested a number •Jf ways this could bt~ achit:vt:d, includiag a 
:::::- ~:-: to EngL.1nd by the ICing or by Cotter himself, there was little 
. ' :D~t:121: to Ttl~Ol! 
~ ~~, :·t+-;: ·; 1t 2"·113 J;:;. 
Tunou II wa.s not w!'!.ling to risk 
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the money (which his Government would certainly not vote) or his 
throne, on such an expedition.[5) 
With further protest ruled out, it appeared, at least to the High 
Commissioner, that the King and Cabinet now had little option but to 
make some attempt to work together.[6] But im Thurn's perception of 
a reformed Tupou II the prodigal son returning to the fold -- is 
much more revealing of im Thurn and of British attitudes than of the 
King. Tupou II now had to accommodate the British presence and he had 
no choice but to allow his Ministers to stay in office, but he 
remained deeply resentful of the incursions on his independence 
the usurpation of his privileged position. His reaction to im Thurn's 
ne,vs in July 1905 bore striking resemblance to his great-grandfather's 
reaction to the deportation of his Premier, Shirley Baker, in 1890. 
Tupou I had moved his residence to Ha'apai as a 'gesture of 
rebuke'; [7) now Tupou II left the scene of government for a long 
visit to the northern groups, showing his contempt for the new 
Ministers by ignoring them. Surrounded by an entourage of chiefly 
supporters Tupou II left Nuku'alofa in mid-August for Vava'u, where he 
received a loyal welcome from Finau 'Ulukalala.[8] Some two months 
later, with Finau also in tow, the party proceeded to Ha'apai where 
the King had strong ties. Here there could be no doubt of the great 
love the people had for their King: the people of Felemea, for 
5. Ibid., Cotter to Tupou II, 7 February 1906 and 7 March 1906, 
PO/KNF 1906; Tupou II to Cotter, 22 February 1906, Royal 
Correspondence 1906, PMB 506; Cotter to Tupou II, 3 April 1906, 
~., Cotter to Tupou II, 2 May 1906, ibid. 
6. Im Thurn to C.O., con£., 6 February 1906, co 225/72. 
7. Rutherford, Shirley Baker, p .171. 
8. Hunter to im Thurn, 21 September 1905, WPHC 4, 196/1905. See 
also WPHC 4, 268/1905 and 235/1905. 
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example, brought 5,168 baskets of food to the King in one day.[9] 
During their sojourn in the northern groups the King's party, 
safely removed from the Government and its British benefactors, gave 
free voice to their opinion of the new arrangements. Repo,ts reached 
Nuku'alofa that they had been flooding the countryside with 'shocking' 
talk against Great Britain and especially against the new Government. 
In Vava'u, where the Premier was sent to keep an eye on the King's 
activities, it was reported that the e~-Auditor-General, Lavaki, and 
the noble Fakafanua had publicly stated that the King had obtained all 
he had petitioned for from the British Government, and that the 
present administration would end in October when Sateki \vould be 
re-appointed.[10] In Ha'apai the story was the same: at a large ~ 
lotu (prayer meeting) in mid-October, Tapueluelu, who had been 
Governor of Vava'u before im Thurn's visit, warned that on 16 November 
next, 'those that are to be killed will be killed, those to be hung 
will be hung, those to be banished will be banished.' The dismissed 
officie.l Siamu also made a long speech, claiming, among other things, 
that there were no other chiefs in Tonga but those in the room.[ll] 
Sipu, the Brit~~h-appointed Governor of Ha'apai, was well aware at 
whom the talk was aimed and he sought the assistance of his colleagues 
in Nuku'alofa against 'the scum of the country that are with the King 
9. Akau'ola and Tulimafua 
encl. no. 2 in Kaho to 
235/1905. 
to Polutele 
im Thurn, 
Kaho, 20 
21 October 
October I. 905, 
1905, WPHC 4, 
10. Hunter to im Thurn, 21 September 1905, WPHC 4, 196/1905. 
11. Polutele Kaho to im Thurn, 21 October 1905 and encls ·, WPHC 4, 
235/1905. 
• 
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and are responsible for all the talk and ill-feeling.'[12] 
If the King and his supporters appeared to wish some members of 
the Government dead, their feelings were ·fully reciprocated. The 
rifts were long-standing, but they were exacerbated by the new 
circumstances. It was not insignificant that, as a result of im 
Thurn's coup, there was no Cabinet "Hinister who belonged to the Free 
Church the King's Church. In particular, the appointment of 
Mateialona was hailed in certain quarters as a victory for the 
Wesleyans over thP ~tate-linked Free Church.[13] Im Thurn repeatedly 
denied any such implication, deploring the activities of 'certain 
misguided persons 1 intent on causing trouble by reviving the ··~hurch 
dispute. But he did admit after his second visit that adherents of 
be Free Church did not like the fact that 'accidentally but 
unavoidably', the chief political power in Tonga now lay with a 
Hesleyan. [14] Although im Thurn high-mindedly believed that 
Mateialona had 'honestly and successfully tried to abstain from all 
undue favDur to his own Church', he noted that nobody else gave him 
credit for this, and that he was constantly viewed with 
suspicion. [ 15] Before Mateialona had been ir1 power for long, the 
Free Church was complaining about the number of officials who were 
12. Sipu to Polutele Kaho, 20 October 1905, encl. in ibid. 
13. See, for example, ':ntervicw with J .M. Masterton', New Zealand 
Herald, 7 January :105. 
14. Im Thurn to c.o., emf., ,", F<Jbruary 1906, CO 225/72. 
15. Ibid. 
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being dismissed and replaced by Wesleyans.[16] 
Early in 1905 a dispute over the future of the Government College 
demonstrated the depth of sectarian rivalries. The Government 
College, established in 1882, had become a Free Church rival to the 
l·!esleyan Tupou College; now the new Cabinet wanted government 
financial support withdrawn. Their arguments were on the surface 
quite reasonable: there could be little doubt that from an 
educational point of view, the College was something of an expensive 
indulgence: over £2,450 of government money was spent on it each 
year, for which sum the boys apparently spent about one day a week 
learning higher mathematics and shorthand, the rest of their time 
being spent in the King's plantations.[17] The Ministers, led by 
!-fateia1ona, wanted the College handed uver to the Free Church, for 
they claimed that it existed solely for the Church and the King.[18] 
Although the High Commissioner shared the H5nisters' opinion that the 
College did not justify further expenditure, he was prepared to leave 
the matter to the Government. Without his backing the Cabinet could 
do nothing. Despite the continued u::gings of his Ministers and the 
British Consul, the King refused to consider the matter and the 
16. Hunter to im Thurn 20 October 1905, WPHC 4, 234/1905. 
, ' 
17. Im Thurn, notes of interviews with (6) Chiefs of Tonga, WPHC 
21/59. 
18. Ha teialona to im Thurn, 6 April 1905 and encls · , encl. in im 
TI1urn to c.o., 19 April 1905, CO 225/69. 
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College remained the Government College.[l9] 
Amongst the Cabinet Ministers the most outspoken was undoubtedly 
the Minister of Police, Polutele Kaho. He had already made plain his 
desire to see Tupou II removed and he continued to push the idea, 
reporting to the High Commissioner in detail every uncooperative 
action on the King's part. In his dealings with the King, Polutele 
showed a similar forthrightness. He had no hesitation in addressing 
the King d~7ectly concerning what he considered his mis-rule, even 
though such directness was not condoned by Tongan society. As 
Minister of Police, Polutele held a position of considerable 
authority, and, with British support, he was prepared to use it 
wherever he saw fit. Unlike Kupu, the previous Minister of Police who 
was the King's father-in-law, Polutele did not see himself primarily 
as a servant of the King. His own view of his role was foreshadowed 
by a comment he made to im Thurn shortly before his appointment: 'The 
common people, and the poliee, will listen to the King, and do what he 
tells them. If there were a new Minister of Police, the police would 
obey the new man.'(20] Polutele was now the new man, and obviously 
determind to break the King's hold on the Kingdom. 
19. Tupou II to im Thurn, 23 July 1905, WPHC 4, 22/1906; im Thurn to 
Tupou II, 26 July 1905, encl. in im Thurn to c.o., conf., 6 
February 1906, CO 225/72; Hunter to Tupou II, 14 August 1905, 
Royal Correspondence 1904-05, PMB 505. 
20. Interview with Polutele and Ata, 20 December 1904, 'Report on 
Tongan Affairs (December, 1904-January, 1905)', encl. in im Thurn 
to c.o., 15 March 1905, CO 881/11, Australian no. 182, encl. in 
no. 62, Annexure s. 
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~oon after his appointment Polutele attempted to wrest from the 
King control of the King's Guards which had hitherto existed as an 
independent unit under the King. Sergeant J.M. Gosstray, whom im 
Thurn had selected from t tw Fiji Police Force to help in the 
reorganisation of the Tong<.m police, E::tpported Polutele' s contention, 
;~s did the Cabinet. They ar :uc'li tk ~ the Guards were not under proper 
control and were foremost amongst the troublemakers in the Kingdom. 
Moreover, since the Guards possessed a considerable quantity of arms 
and ammunition, chey were represented as a possible threat to 'the 
welfare of the country' • But Tupou II objected to the idea of his 
Guards being subject to Polutele. And since the High Commissioner, 
who described the Guards as 'a toy of the King's', decided not to 
interfere, no change was made. Nevertheless Polutele, in defiance of 
the King, took possession of all the ammunition and dynamite. 
According to Mateialona, the King was extremely displeased, but he 
neither said nor did anything.[21] 
During the King's stay in Ha'apai in October 1905 Polutele took 
the opportunity to demonstrate his new power. The King's entourage 
indulged in a fair amount of alcohol not that this was unusual 
amongst either high-born Tongans or local Europeans at that time. 
Polutele Kaho himself was reportedly so drunk following a wedding in 
Nuku'alofa on 25 May 1905 that he had to be escorted home by two 
police constables,[22] and a number of European officials were known 
21. J.M. Gosstray to Tupou II, 6 March 1905, PO/KNF 1905; 
Hateialona to im Thurn 6 April 1905 and im Thurn to c.o., 19 
J f I April 1905, CO 225/69; 'Report on Tongan Af airs • 
22. Hunter to im Thurn, 31 May 1905 and encls., WPHC 4, 90/1905. 
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to have drinking problems· Under Tongan law only persons holding 
a permit were permitted to drink alcohol but before 1905 the police 
appear to have done very little to prevent the open sale of liquor. 
Im Thurn was shocked to find the Courtroom and other government 
offices stacked up with old champagne and whisky bottles and both he 
and the Consul were determined to put a stop to the e?sy access to 
liquor. Sergeant Gosstray's secondment from F!ji had been aimed at 
this, as was Clause 8 of the Supplementary Agreement, which read 'Laws 
regarding spirituous liquors to ~e enforced.'[23] In view of the 
High Commissioner's attitude, and even more since alcohol was one of 
the King's om1 weaknesses, it was not surprising that the new Minister 
of Police took up the campaign against illegal drinking with 
considerable vigour. 
Hhen members of the King's entourage in Ha'&pai held two drinking 
parties in mid-October 1905, the police arrested 25 of them, including 
the nobles Ma'atu (ex-Governor of Niuatoputapu), Lasike, Malupo and 
Luani and other officials such as Sami Mafile'o, the Captain of the 
King's Guards. The noble Tuita escaped prosecution because he 
apparently required alcohol on medical grounds, and Finau 'Ulukalala 
because he was Governor of Vava'u and of very high rank.[24] At the 
request of Hunter and the Cabinet, however, 'Ulukalala was later 
dismissed from office for supplying liquor to Tongans without 
permits. [25] The trial of the others took pl ~e on 31 October, and 
23. 'Report on Tongan Affairs.' 
24 • Ai~au' ola and Tulimafua to Polutele Kaho, 20 Oc tobcr 1905, encln ·, 
HPHC 4, 100/1906. 
25. Hunter to im Thurn, 30 Harch 1906 and encln., WPHC 4, 235/1905. 
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for th~ occasion Polutele and the Chief Justice travelled up from 
Nuku'alofa. Twenty-two of those prosecuted were convicted and fined 
£ 10 each for drinking liquor without a permit. According to Hunter, 
many of the fines were paid by the King himself; many of the accused 
pleaded !"hey had bee.1 given the liquor by the King and were therefore 
permitted to drink it.[26] Tupou II refused to see either Polutele 
or Skeen while they remained in Ha'apai, but Polutele did not lose the 
opportunity to make his feelings known. The day after the trial he 
wrote to Tupou II, censuring him for the company he kept, and for 
'incessant breaches' of a law he had already approved. In typically 
bold fashion he declared that he wished he could take legal 
proceedings against the King himself.[27] 
Polutele's feelings on this score cannot have lessened any by 
June 1906, when, in response to a report from two of his sergeants, he 
climbed up the Palace wall to the King's verandah where the King was 
entertaining Polutele's own sister and two nieces with alcohol. 
Insulted and angry at the King's behaviour Polutele removed the women 
and they were later fined £10 each for drinking without a permit.[28] 
The extent of bad ~eeling between Polutele and the King is 
demonstrated by reports current in 1905-06 which implicated Polutele, 
26. Hunter to 
Kaho to 
im Thurn, 
im TI1urn, 14 December 1905, WPHC 4, 268/1905; Polutele 
Hunter, 6 November 1905, encl., ibid., Polutele Kaho to 
private, 10 December 1906, HPHC 4, 289/1906. 
27. Polutele Kaho to Tupou II, 1 November 1905, encl., Polutele Kaho 
to im Thurn, private, 10 December 1906, ibid., (Note: this 
sentence does not appear in another translation of this letter in 
HPHC 4, 268/1905, but the former seems more lik(~ly to be 
accurate.) 
28. Polutcle Kaho to im Thurn, 10 December 1906, ibid. 
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together with Sipu, in a plot to assassinate Tupou II. Although such 
rumours are not easy to substantiate, this one is given credence by a 
letter of confession addressed to Tupou II from a man who claimed to 
have been prevailed upon by Polutele to carry out the assassination. 
Three nights in a row he had, at Polutele's behest, lain iP wait for 
the King beside the path leading to the King's toilet. Rain had 
apparently thwarted the plan.[29] 
That Polutele was eager to hold power cannot be denied. But 
although his antagonism towards Tupou II was long-standing and 
deep-set it is hard to escape the conclusion that he was genuine in 
his desire to see Tonga governed well and fairly. Certainly the 
issues over which he attacked Tupou II the consumption of liquor, 
granting of lands, and useless and inefficient expenditure 
reflected well on his sense of good government. For this reason he 
impressed High Commission officials. Moreover, Polutele seems to have 
seen his own task in very straight terms: 
I am a true Tongan and I intend to speak up my views 
whatever it may cost me. The King's or Chiefs' displeasure 
is as nothing to me. The blood and bones of my forefathers 
are buried here, and, therefore, I am greatly in love with 
my country. You are aware how afraid to speak the Tongan 
chiefs are ••• otherwise they would join in beggine you to do 
your utmost for us during those difficulties, and prevent 
the wrong that the ene~y is striving for, and permit the 
Tongans to share with the rest of the world the great 
freedom of civilisation.[30] 
29. Siosiua Falevatu to Tupou II, 27 June 1905, Royal Correopondence 
190t+-05, PHB 505. According to one informant, the late Lupeti 
Finau, Sipu'o Diary, which in unavailable, contains an account of 
an assassination plot. 
30. Polutele Kaho to im T1~urn, private and conf., 4 dpril 1905, 
CO 081/11, AuotraHan no. 182, encl. 2 in no. 67 • 
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Polutele's own fearless expression of his views and strength of 
character led him to scorn those 'foolish' chiefs who lived in terror 
of the King. No doubt Mateialona was the prime target of Polutele's 
complaint concerning 'the cowardice and prevarication exercised by 
some leaders of the Government'. He accused such persons of trying to 
be friendly with both sides, and so making mischief between the 
British Consul and the 'evil-minded oppositions' by criticising the 
Consul's good work. Polutele was also scornful of the church 
factionalism which had again surfaced in the Gover.1!llent. His own 
Church of England affiliation led him to regard both Wesleyans and 
Free Church adherents with equal suspicion. The officials of the Free 
Church ('that church ~.;rhom he [the King] has talked over') he accused 
of paying little heed to things heavenly: 'they are not quite sure if 
they are true or not.'[31] 
The extent to which Polutele, like Hateialona and other 
colleagues, relied on the British Consul for support against the King 
cannot be over-emphasised. Without his backing Polutele could not 
have attacked the King in this way. For him, the British 
representative was the 'good guide of the government' and the 'true 
friend of the country'. It was up to British officials, he urged, 'to 
take such action as they think proper with the King'. [32] But in 
thiG he was only partly successful. A1 though his diatribes produced 
so:1e feeling in High Commission headquarters towards the end of 
!l'ovcmber 1905, that the King's deportation might again have to be 
31. Polutele Kaho to im Thurn, private, 10 December 1906, t{PHC 4, 
289/1906. 
32. Polutele Kaho to im Thurn, 4 April 1905, 
no. 182, encl. 2 in no. 67; Polutelc 
October 1905, WPHC 4, 235/1905. 
CO 881/11, Australian 
Kaho to im Thurn, 21 
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considered as necessary for good government, there was also an 
awareness that Polutele's hatred for the King produced somewhat 
coloured and exagger:~.ted accounts. [ 33] It seems likely in fact, that 
one of the reasons why im Thurn did not proceed to the King's 
deportation was that his second visit produced in the High 
Commissi ·.ler a vague awareness that issues and personalities in the 
Kingdom were not as straightforward as he had earlier seen them. He 
began to realise the extent of the divisions within Tongan society, 
and of his two protegees, Polutele and Mateialona, he revised his 
opinion. Mateialona, he concluded, displayed what appears to be 'an 
even unreasonable dislike and distrust of the King', ,md Polutele 
Kaho' s distrust of the King was 'excessive ••• or at least impolitic and 
mischievous' .[34] The High Commissioner was not eager to wi.'en the 
rift which he hed -..rea ted in the Tongan Government, and he decided it 
best to tat<e no action on i:olutele' s reports. Instead he wrote to him 
informally expressing his eympathy but urging that to avoid annexation 
he must try to work wit.;\ the Kin3 and perhaps persuade him to give up 
his tr0uble-making entourage. [35] 
The one conciliatory and stabilising influence within the 
Government throughout this period remained Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake, the 
King's father and MinistElr of Lands. Had he chosen to challenge his 
uon or build up his own support, Fatafehi could have created turmoil 
in an already divided kingdom. It was to him that Polutele Kaho and 
33. Hinuten on 
268/1905; 
235/1905. 
Uuntec 
minute 
to 
by 
im 
R. 
Thurn, 14 
Rankine, 
November 1905, WPHC 4, 
7 November 1905, WPHC t*, 
34. I:n Tlwrn to c.o., conf., 6 February 1906, CO 225/72. 
3~. Im Thurn to Polutele Kaho, 9 November 1905, p ... ivate, encl., lolPHC 
4, 235/1905. 
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British officials looked for a king to replace Tupou II, and certainly 
his birth, as Tu'ipelehake, was perhaps even more respected than his 
son's. But Fatafehi was not interested in his own claims. Although 
he seems to have been aware of Tupou II' s faults, and did not always 
back his son, he nevert!~less respected him as King. Fatafehi was not 
amongst those who spoke out against the King during the liigh 
Commissioner's 1904-5 visit, and in April 1905 he refused to sign the 
petition against Tupou II because, as he explained privately to 
Huntet, he knew the King was making a fool of· himself and he had no 
wish to give him a 1mrting kick down hill. [36 J This same attitude 
led him to argue i.1 Cabinet against the publication of the British 
Government's reply to Tupou II' s protests. The Premier wanted the 
reply to be printed in a special Government Gazette, to leave no 
doubts in Tonga as to the King's defeat. But Fatafehi argued 
successfully that only if the King himself declared that his petition 
nad been granted should the truth '1e published. [37} 
Similarly 5n November 1905 when the Cabinet, at the instigation 
of the British C~.:nsul, sought to hold a Privy Council meeting to pass 
the Estimates in the absence of the King, it was Fatafehi who stood up 
for the King's rights. According to the law, the Privy Council was 
required to pas . Appropriucion Ordinance and the Estimates for the 
ensuing year during the month of November, but the King was not 
present to convene a meeting of the Council. The Consul had no doubt 
that the King was purposely staying away in order to embarrass the 
Governwent, and the Premier and Hinister of Police sharf.!d his opinion 
tnat the Privy Council should mE:'et to consider tlw Estimates, despite 
36. Hunter to im Thurn, , April 1905, £mel. in im Thurn to c.o., 21 
April 1905, CO 225/69. 
37, llunt(•r to im Thurn, 21 September 1905, HPHC 4, 196/19Cl5. 
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the King's absence.[38] Fatafehi contended, correctly, that only the 
King could summon and preside over a Privy Council meeting, and that 
the Estimates should therefore await his arrival. After heated 
discussion, it was agreed that if the King had not returned to 
Nuku'alofa by 22 November, a 'Privy Council' meeting would take place 
the following day. Even. the High Commissioner in Fiji lent his weight 
to this unconstitutional proposal if the King subsequently 
attempted to interfere with the 'Privy Council' decision on the 
Estimates -- (which he c0uld have done, for example, by persuading 
parliament to disallow them as being contrary to law) -- he should be 
informed that the High Commissioner 'would not allow it', since the 
action was made necessary by tle King's continued absence at a time 
when his presence was required.[39] In the event the King returned 
to Nuku'alofa at 1 a.m. on the 24th t. o days past the dead line 
and the Estimates were passed smoothly at Privy Council meetings on 
the 29th ;md 30th. [ 40] Tupou II had turned up in time to ~eet the 
requirements of the Constitution, and he had also demonstrated, as far 
as he dared under the circumstances, that though he ~s King might 
ignore his Cabinet with impunity, they were still on risky ground 
should they attempt to do likewise. 
' 
" II 
38. Hunter to im Thurn, 14 Novemb.::!r 1905, WPHC 4, 268/1905. 
39. Im Thurn to Hunter, 20 December 1905, WPHC 4, 268/1905. 
40. Hunter to im Thurn, 14 December 1905, ibid. 
-
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IN the struggles which were played out between the King and 
Cabinet during this period, the influence of the British Consul was of 
crucial importance. The Cabinet stood little chance against the King 
without the backing of the Consul and the High Commissioner. Much of 
the Consul's influence on the administration was achieved through his 
alliance with the Cabinet, and in particular with the Premier. Hunter 
now occupied a very powerful position~-- if he chose to over-rule the 
Government, he was likely to succeed. But the power which he wielded 
wrs not well-defined and depended for the most part on his own 
interpretation. The development of the relations• '· p between the 
Tongan Government and its British overseer after 1905 centred around 
the definitton of Point 2 of the Supplementary Agreement: 'The 
British Agent to be consulted and his advice taken.' Even at the 
various levels of British control Colonial Office, High 
Commissioner and local Consul -- there was no common opinion as to the 
extent of the powers conferred under the Agreement. And between the 
British Consul and Tongan Government there was even less agreement. 
The question camP. down essentially to whether the Consul's advice, or 
the Tongan law and Constitution, took precedence. 
In keeping with its previous reluctance to remove too much of the 
responsibility of government from the Tongans themselves, the Colonial 
Office balanced its enthusiasm for im 'l'hurn' s proceedings with its 
interpretation of the limited role the Agreement conferred on the 
British Consul. Officials in London had never been entirely convinced 
of the seriousness of the misgovernment in Tonga and, now that some of 
the troublesome elements had been removed, they were willing to give 
the Kingdom every chance to work out its own affairs. Besides, the 
British Government was also anxious not to press its official role in 
Tonga too far because this would undoubtedly excite the hopes of the 
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Premier of New Zealand, Richard Seddon. They were therefore adamant 
that 'th~ Agreement signed by the King on the 18th January does not 
reduce the native Government to a position of impotence.' The King and 
his Ministers should not be deprived of their authority, but should be 
left as free as possible to carry on the administration in accordance 
with the law, subject only to the ultimate control of the British 
Consul and the High Commissioner. The Colonial Office made it quite 
clear that Point 2 of the Agreement was not to be interpreted 
strictly. It should be taken as meaning that the King must consult 
the Consul in matters of importance, 
i.e., whenever the King and his Chiefs see that anything is 
going wrong, and also whenever the British Agent privately 
points out that anything is going wrong. 
The possession by the British Consul of the right to be consulted and 
to give advice in such cases had been shown by past experience to be 
essential if the administration was to be maintained on a satisfactory 
footing. And the more faithfully the King followed his undertaking, 
the less necessity there would be for the Consul to be consulted or 
offer advice: 
Hi" Haj'!sty' s Government hope that the 
will henceforth be so conducted that 
British Agent's interventi0n will be 
between. [41] 
native Government 
occasions for the 
few and far 
But while these idealistic words satisfied officials in London, 
they were of little relevance and even less importance to the man on 
the spot. A1 though im Thurn at time~ tempered his desire to intervene 
41. C.o. to im Thurn, 
no. 182, no. 68, 
1905, co 225/69. 
conf., 6 June 1905, CO 881/11, Australian 
see also minutes on im Thurn to C.O., 15 March 
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in 'purely Tongan
1 
matters, the Colonial Office interpretation simply 
did not account for the realities of the struggle which had been going 
on in Tonga and it did not tally with the forceful intervention which 
the High Commissioner had already made into Tongan affairs. Just as 
it had become clear by 1878 to those involved in the Government of the 
Protected Malay States that the theory of giving advice was 'one of 
those fictions in which we seem to delight', so it soon became obvious 
that the Tongan Government was subject to more than the mere advice of 
the British Agent and Consul. [/•2] 
In practice the 1905 Agreement endowed the Consul for the first 
time with real power to enforce his wishes and he took full advantage 
of both the Agreement and his unofficial influence with the new 
Ministers to ensure that the Government was run as he desired. 
Hunter's role in government matters was not restricted to that of 
ultimate sanction: he was intimately involved in nearly every branch. 
In d successful petition for an increase in his salary shortly after 
im Thurn's visit he wrote: 
Hardly a day passes that I am not asked to advise on matters 
closely concerning the welfare of the native Government, 
such as Lands, Finance, Customs, and Gaols.[43] 
Hunter believed that the effect of im Thurn's visit had been to 
place the Tongan Treasury, the Judiciary and the other departments 
under his own and t~~ High Commissioner's supervision.[44] Before 
long he had earned himself a reputation as the real power behind the 
42. Speech by Sir Frederick Weld. Cited in Sadka, The> Protected 
Halay States, p.l20. 
43. Hunter to im Thurn, 4 April 1905, WPHC 4, 67/1905. 
44. Hunter to im Thurn, 26 April 1909, WPHC 4, 450/1909. 
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Tongan throne. There was much to support the view of one European 
resident who wrote in 1906: 'The Consul is virtually dictator and it' 
is little exaggeration to say that the laws come out of his 
mouth.' [45] 
Hunter certainly sa";v his o\m role in Tonga in much wider terms 
than did the Colonial Office. In part this was due to the 
frustrations he had experienced during his first four years in Tonga. 
Before 1905 he had threatened the King that there would come a day 
when the King of Tonga must do as he was told or see his Kingdom 
annexed. Now Hunter's day had finally arrived. He saw himself as 
responsible for the welfare of Tonga: he was 'prepared to accept the 
responsibility of guiding Tonga into smooth waters.'[46] And to this 
end he expected the loyal support of those whom im Thurn had raised to 
office. It was thus a constant source of frustration to Hunter that 
neither his advice nor his status waa automatically accepted. Those 
who dared to questif ·.. or oppose him, particularly if they were 
.i'::uropean, he regarded as akin to traitors; his job was a constant 
struggle against those who appeared to be trying to revert to 'the old 
style of things 1 in Tonga. Without his firm hand on the Government it 
must surely degenerate into chaos for which the only answer would be 
even tighter control or annexation the solution which Hunter 
himself had favoured all along. 
Hunter managed to achieve a considerable amount of reform in 
Tonga without coming into open conflict with the Government. Im Thurn 
believed this """'' because Hunter always acted with great tact, 
45, C.M. Lee to E.R. Lowe, 23 March 1906, BCT 1, set 43, lot 45, 
Lee Papers. 
46. Hunter to im Thurn, 20 October 1905, WPUC 4, 234/1905. 
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discretion and proper bearing under trying circumstances.[47] There 
is little evidence to support this view: although Hunter did not 
brandish his authority in the manner that was to bring his successor 
into trouble, he showed little sensitivity towards the Government 
whose power he had usurped. Rather, much of Hunter's new pre-eminence 
sprang from the relationship he enjoyed with the new Cab~net, and in 
particular with the Premier, Mateialona. Mateialona felt the 
necessity to obey Hunter, even against his own judgement. He was not 
a particularly strong-willed man and he was plainly afraid that by 
defying Hunter's advice he would lose his own position and also his 
country's independence. 
Mateialona's willingness to listen to Hunter and the High 
Commissioner meant that many of their proposals aimed at improving the 
Government now came to fruition. Among these were many which im Thurn 
had recommended during his visit -- legislation, such as that making 
British currency the only legal tender, was introduced despite the 
King's resistance, and even a law to regulate the landing of destitute 
persons in Tonga, which Hunter had earlier tried unsuccessfully to 
induce the King to accept, was now passed.[48] It was on Hunter's 
initiative that growing importance was attached to public works, and 
over the four years 1905-1908 a total of £4.,,279 was spent on 
ferro-concrete wharves at Nuku'alofa and Vava'u; new hospitals at 
};uku' a1ofa " and Vava'u (and in Ha'apai in 1909); and £, 9, 876 worth of 
government buildings, including a new Customs, Post Office and 
Treaoury building which still houses the Treasury. In addition, a 
47. Im Thurn, 'Report on Tongan Affairs'. 
48. Mateia1ona to Tupou II, 3 February 1905. PMB 505, Royal 
Correspondence 1904-05; Hunter to Tupou II, 17 June 1901, PHB 
505, Royal and Consular Correspondence 1901; Hunter to im Thurn, 
4 April 1905, WPHC 4, 65/1905. 
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start was made on the provis.:_on of a water supply by installing large 
concrete tanks in all the larger towns, and some progress was made on 
the roads and on surveying land although the latter work, suggested by 
im Thurn in 1905, met with opposition and obstacles because of the 
unsettled nature of land ownership.[49] The extent to which Hunter 
was involved in these matters cannot be doubted -- the first time the 
Cabinet saw the plans for the £ 8, 660 wharf at Nuku 1 alofa was after 
the arr·ival of the contractor, when the Cabinet was asked to meet him 
at the Consulate.[50) The hostile press describ,~d the wharf as 
'another of Mr Hunter's extravagances which poor Tonga has to suffer', 
arguing that no tenders were called and that the existing wooden wharf 
had only needed two piles repaired.[51] Similarly, the new road to 
Pea, which led to deadlock between the King and Cabinet, was begun 
without the Cabinet even being consulted.[52] 
In the area of finance, Hunter kept a very tight reign. He 
regarded himself as 'virtually responsible for the financial position 
of Tonga' and, in turn, the Premier acknowledged that 'the finances of 
Tonga are practically under the control and supervision of the British 
Government. ' (53) Although the 1905 Agreement made no specific 
mention of financial control (apart from the Estimates for 1905), im 
Thurn had made his intention plain by taki.ng possession of the 
Treasury, making the Government accept a loan of £ 4000, and revising 
49. Statement of Finances under the Protectorate, 1905-08, encl. in 
Hunter to im Thurn, 26 April 1909, WPHC 4, 450/1909. 
50. Skeen to im Thurn, 13 March 1907, encl. in WPHC 4, 279/1906. 
51. Unmarked newspaper clipping, 7 April 1906, Page, scrapbook. 
52. Skeen to im Thurn, 13 Harch 1907, encl. in t.WHC 4, 279/1906 • 
53 • Hunter to im Thurn conf., 17 November 1906, WPHC 4, 280/1906; 
Mateialona to Sedd~n, 10 May 1905, WPHC 4, 89/1905. 
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the Estimates for 1905. 
importance, 
imperative. 
and one 
Finance was obviously an area of considerable 
in which the Consul felt his advice was 
As important as the supervision which the Consul exercised over 
Tongan finances was the control he kept over the appointment of 
leadi~g officials, particularly Europeans. It was obvious that the 
administration could not be run on European lines without some 
European assistance: im Thurn noted in mid-1905 that some of the 
"'1inisters 1 though not without consicerable ability, are not 
sufficiently educated politically speaking, to carry on the work of 
government without considerable assistance from others.' The trouble 
was, im Thurn went on, they did not always seek assistance from 'the 
proper persons'. Mateialona, in particular, was apt to listen 'with 
unfortunate readiness' to the 'irregular counsels 1 of certain 
interested Europeans.[54] And of course the King was constantly 
looking around for new sources of advice to thwart the influence of 
the British overseers. 
Thus t~e High Commissioner and his deputy found themselves in 
constant competition with successive Europeans who challenged their 
monopoly on advice and threatened to oust them from their tenuous 
position. Some of these rivals were fairly easily eliminated by 
invoking those points 
appointments to the 
of the 
Public 
1905 Agreement 
Service were 
that specified that 
to be made only in 
consultation with the British Consul. This was taken to mean that 
where the British representative objected to an appointment, lw would 
Vt'to it, as was done in the case of A.t.:. Nackay' s bid to become 
Assistant Premier. 
54. Im Thurn to c.o., 6 Fobruary 1906, CO 225/72. 
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Mackay (who was also known as Captain Alexander Mackay, or the 
'Copra King'), had enjoyed a varied career in the Pacific since his 
arrival from Dublin in 1887, via the Australian colonies.[55] He had 
become a master mariner, worked in Tonga buying copra and engaging in 
other quasi-mercantile activities and had been involved in the 
fighting in Samoa. Although Mackay was not t,imself a Wesleyan, nor 
probably of any particular religious leaning, his connections with the 
Wesleyan Church in Tonga were strong. In 1891 he married the daughter 
of the Reverend Dr. J .E. Houlton ando during the height or th.-! Church 
troubles he had been closely involved with Mculton's cause in 
opposi~ion to Baker and the King. In 1897 Hackay had applied to the 
Tongan parliament for appointment as Premier in ,;lace l)f Sateki, and 
had received the support of Fatafehi and Hateialona and others who 
were known as the 'Wesleyan Party' .[56] In the face of Tupou II's 
anger, however, he had left Tonga for New South Wales, where he spent 
the next few years as Governor of Gaols at Goulburn and then Bathurst. 
Soon u~ter im Thurn's intervention he returned to Tonga and took up 
residence with his old friend Hateialona, with whom he had developed a 
close friendship during the latter's exile in Fiji, and began to see 
himself in a good position to become Assistant Premier. To this end 
he had the support of Mateialona and Fatafehi and he was also backed 
by a fellow fighter from the days of persecution, Robert 
Hanslip.[57] Hateialona needed allies, he was also in need of fairly 
55. The Cyclopedia of Tonga, pp.62-63; im Thurn to c.o., 6 February 
1906, CO 225/72;~fe to O'Brien, 7 February 1899, FOCP 7358, 
encl. 2 in no •. 55. 
56. Fusitu'a, 'King George Tupou II and the Government of Tcnga', 
pp.87-94. 
57. Hunter to im Thurv, 20 October 1905, WPHC 4, 234/1f1J5. 
/ 
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substantial assistance in his executive duties his English was 
minimal and his ability in government administration limited -- and he 
looked to Mackay for support. 
But when Mateialona and Fatafehi suggested Mackay as Assistant 
Premier, they met determined resistance from the High Commissioner. 
In im Thurn's book Mackay was 'one of the European political birds of 
ill omen of the Pacific 1 he was obviously looking to fill the 
vacuum left by Baker and then by the Hutters.[58] Im Thurn wanted 
his own nomirees in positions of influence, and Mackay did not 
qualify. Moreover, there could be no doubt that the appointment of 
Mackay would intensify sectarian jealousies and quarrels: 'No one 
ivould believe that he was not really the choice and the Agent of the 
Hesleyans.'[59] As one chief commented, 'if you allow Mackay to join 
the government the country will soon be under the control of Moulton, 
Hanslip, and Mackay, and Mateialona is merely a tool in their 
hands.' [60] Despite repeated requests, the High Commissioner 
remained firmly opposed to Mackay's appointment. By requesting it, h~ 
argued, the Ministers were falling into a trap laid by certain 
Europeans not interested in the preservation of Tonga's independence. 
It was only by listening to the High Commissioner that Tonga would 
stay secure: 
lives.' [61] 
After all 'you owe it to me that Tonga still , 
58. Im Thurn to c.o., 6 February i906, CO 225/72. 
59. Im Thurn to Fatafehi and Hateialona, 8 November 1905, WPHC 
27 /XXII/1. 
60. See Hunter to im Thurn, 20 October 1905, WPHC 4, 234/1905. 
6: • Im Thurn to. Fatafehi and Hatcialona, 8 November 1905, Wl'HC 
27 /XXII/1. 
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Although he prevented Mackay's appointment the High Commissioner 
was well aware that the Premier was in need of assistance. More 
importantly, Hunter knew that only by filling important government 
posts with men who could be relied upon to toe the British line, would 
his self-appointed task of running the Government continue to be 
possible. He thus secured the transfer of T.V. Roberts from the 
Treasury to the Premier's Office where he became Chief Clerk and 
secretary to the Premier in place of Ata who, according to Hunter's 
successor, W.T. Campbell, had proved himself 'quite useless'.[62] 
Ata was transferred to the new post of Assistant Minister of 
Education, and Roberts took over in the Premier's Office from 1 
January 1906. His appointment was particularly unpopular, and 
accepted only with great reluctance by the King and Cabinet. Apart 
from the fact that he had been dismissed by the Tongan Government in 
1903 and reinstated with promotion by im Thurn in 1905, Roberts' 
manner had not endeared him to the Tongans. He was, as the High 
Commissioner had now become aware, a somewhat overbearing young man; 
his brusque manner, excessive interference in Tongan affairs, and his 
lack of deference towards the chiefs had earned him the active dislike 
of many Tongans. Im Thurn noted that most Tongans would gladly see 
Roberts deported but Hunter believed him to be indispensable for the 
time being, and badly needed in the Premier's Office.[63] Hunt~r had 
initially intended Roberts to be Asslstant Premier, but in view of 
heated objections from the Cabinet, he settled for the lesser title. 
62. Encl. VIII ~.n Campbell to im Thurn, 25 April 1910, WPUC 4, 
426/10. 
63. Im Thurn to c.o., 6 February 1906, CO 225/72. 
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Roberts' place in the Treasury was taken by Howard Watkin, a 
nephew of: ';he Reverend J .B. Watkin, the King's chaplain. Like 
Roberts, hb appointment was not particularly welcomed by the 
Government. From 1897-1901 Watkin had been a schoolmaster in Tonga 
but his cont·cact was not renewed in 1901. Soon after im Thurn's 
intervention Watkin applied to him for a post in Tonga. Im Thurn was 
careful t.o acknowledge that it was not up to him to make appointments 
but only to give or withhold his approval.[64] In practice, however, 
his influence was much greater -- he forwarded Watv.in' s application to 
Hunter, commenting that Watkin was 'of good repute and on the right 
side.'[65] At Hunter's insistence, Watkin took over in the Treasury 
from 1 January 1906. 
HUNTER'S dominance over the Tongan Government did not go 
completely unchallenged. Even some of those he had helped into power 
began to resent his high-handed decisions and his :· ~stence that his 
'advice' be taken on all government matters. Tupou II, who had been 
cowed into submission by im Thurn's threat to deport him, refused to 
submit to Hunter's continual interference. In late 1905 he took on 
the British Consul i1\ a lengthy dispute over the building of a new 
road from Nuku'alofa to Pea, a village about thrne and a half miles 
from Nuku'alofa. Well aware that his throne was staked on his action, 
64. Im Thurn to Fatafeh~ and Hateialona, 8 November 1905, WPHC 
27/XXII/1. 
65. Im Thurn, minute, 9 September 1905, WPUC 4, 169/1905. 
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T\!.pou II issued a direct challeage to the Consul. 
At Hur£ter' s instigation, the new road had been surveyed and work 
begun when the King discovered, in December 1905, that his property at 
Tufumahina would be seriously affected by it. Tufumahina was a narrow 
strip of property fronting the lagoon which Tupou II used as a quiet 
resting place. Considerably annoyed, and believing that the road had 
been so surveyed solely in order to vex him, Tupou II ordered 
Fatafehi, as Minister of Lands, to stop work on the road. Fatafehi 
obeyed and work was stopped on 18 December 1905. But Hunter was not 
prepared to allow the King to interfere with his plans for Tonga's 
,~velopldent. He insisted that the new road as surveyed was the 
shortest and best route and he saw no reason for the King to interfere 
with his decision. If the King could get away with it, he argued, 
'every noble and commoner whose land is touched will object and 
road-making in Tonga will be an impossibility.' [66) 
To break down the King's resistance Hunter made use of the 
Cabinet, seeking to isolate the King as the sole opponent to Tonga's 
progress. Invoking a rather free interpretation of Section 44 of the 
Constitution he reminded the Ministers that they were responsible for 
the good government of the country (which extended to road-maki'<lg). 
l-llwn Tupou II finally agr .d to meet Hunter on 7 February to discuss 
the matter, Hunter took it upon himself to invite the Cabinet along 
too. [ 67] According to Hurd er, the Premier, the Minister of Police 
and the Chief Justice all supported him, arguing that the King was 
amenable to the laws just like any other Tongan, and that he should 
sut .1n example instead of trying to defy the Government and retard 
6(). Hunter to im Thu.cn, 15 January 1906, WPHC 4, 22/1906. 
67 • Hunter to im Thurn, 9 February 1906 and encls., ~· 
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development. For Fatafehi the position was more difficult. As he 
tried to explain to thL High Commissioner: 
In the first place I have my loyalty to the country and 
sincere wish for its prosperity ••• on the other hand there is 
the King who is strongly against the very road that we have 
chosen to work on ~!rstly ••• [68] 
When the King said he would agree to the road providing the Cabinet 
was unanimous it was obvious that unanimity was impossible -- as the 
Chief Justice remarked, 'certain members would vote as the King 
wished'.[69] 
As a result of the meeting, Hunter reported that Tupou II had 
consented, albeit in a very half-hearted way, to che road going ahead, 
and work was set down to begin again on 14 February. But Hunter's 
views were coloured by his determination to see the road made, by his 
use of interpreters, and by his own limited understanding of the 
Tongan art of polite refusal. Tupou II claimed that he had never 
given his consent.[70] Immediately aftct the meeting he called 
Hunter back for a private talk and, with Fatafehi also present, showed 
his extreme displeasure at the actions of Hunter and the Cabinet by 
declaring his intention to abdicate in favour of Fatafehi. He told 
Hunter that he was afraid of making mistakes and being deported, and 
that his love for Tonga was so great that he would give up his throne 
and his rights to save Tonga's flag. Hunter realised that such a move 
would only increase support for Tupou II and he therefore deprecated 
68. Fatafehi to im Thurn, private, 5 February 1906, encl. in im Thurn 
to c.o., 21 February 1906, CO 225/72. 
69. Hunter to im Thurn, 9 Fe .uary 1906, WPHC 4, 22/1906. 
70 • Tupou II to im Thurn, 12 March 1906, encl. in ibid • Scott to 
Tupou II, 26 Febru1lry 1906, P~B 506, Royal Correspondence 1906. 
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the idea. He did ho~"ever propose as an alternative that Tupou II 
should take time out to travel the world and 'repose from his kingly 
worries', leaving Fatafehi as Regent.[71] But Tupou II hnd no 
intention of leaving his Kingdom to Hunter. 
Having failed to counter Hunter's influence by means of his 
traditional prerogatives, Tupou II reverted to European advice to 
fight Hunter on his own terms. This time it was to George Scott, a 
lawyer born and educated in Hobart, Tasmania, that Tupou II turned. 
Scott had been resident in Tonga since 1900, working as a solicitor 
when the opportunity arose, but apparently combining this with 
auctioneering to earn a living.[72] Now, with Scott supplying th~ 
correspondence, Tupou II reminded the Premier and Cabinet on 14 
February that he had not given his consent to the new road and that 
the people who had begun working on it again that day must 'on no 
account ..• trespass on my property or attempt to construct a 
thoroughfare thereon' .[73] He further submitted that no law existed 
under which he could be compelled to give up his land for road-making. 
Section 94 of the 1903 Law, on which the Cabinet relied, merely 
empowered the Minister of Lands to make roads. It did not, he argued, 
confer on the Minister any right to take possession of land for 
road-making. He al8o appealed to Section 18 of he Constitution 
('which no l~ws can over-rule'), which gave to the Legislative 
Assembly the power to take propPrty for road-making. Thus, in a 
letter to the High Commissioner, Tupou II claimed that Hunter had 
ignored the proper way of doing things and was trying to take away his 
land unlawfully and unnecessarily. While he had every wish to fall in 
71. Hunter to im Thurn, 9 February 1906, WPHC 4, 22/1906. 
72. The Cyclor>ediu of Tonga, p.62. 
- _.._ ___ -- ... --
73, Tupou II to Mateialona, 14 February 1906, WPHC 4, 22/1906. 
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with the views of the British Government 'on all reasonable points', 
he appealed to im Thurn against such unfair and high-handed treatment 
in a matter of private right.[74] 
Im Thurn was in a difficult position. He had not wanted to 
become involved in the dispute in the first place and had noted in 
late January that it was not a matter for any more direct intervention 
on the Consul's part.[75] But now that Hunter had forced the issue, 
im Thurn had little choice but to back him. Under the mistaken 
impression that the King had no private rights to Tufumahina, he 
advised him to withdraw his opposition, and, since he no longer wished 
to abdicate, to at least take the long holiday Hunter had suggested. 
The High Commissioner presented the central issue clearly: 
You will not see that in order to remain on the throne it is 
necessary that you should rule according to the constitution 
and to the wishes of His Britannic Majesty's Government.[76] 
Tupou II's answer was just as clear cut. When the wishes of the 
British Government clashed with either the Constitution, or what he 
considered his private rights, he would do whatever he deemed 
necessary to protect himself and his people.[77] 
74. Tupou II to im Thurn, 12 March 1906, WPHC 4, 22/1906; see also 
Tupou II to im Thurn, 2 June 1906, ibid., Scott to Tupou II, 14 
February 1906, PO/KNF 1906; Scott to Tupou II, various dates, 
PMB 506, Royal Correspondence 1906. 
75. Im Thurn, minute, 29 January 1906, WPHC 4, 22/1906. 
76 • Im Thurn to Tupo~; II, 26 Uarch 1906, WPHC 21/63 • 
77. Tupou II to im Thurn, 2 June 1906, WPHt- 4, 22/1906. 
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But it was not skilful argument which carried the day. Tupou 
II's standing as King amongst his own people was a far more powerful 
force to be reckoned with. Since 14 February work had again been 
authorised on the new road, but by early April the European engineer 
had b~gun to despair that any progress would be made -- he had great 
difficulty in getting prison labour, or carts or horses, so that the 
work was proceeding very slowly and unsatisfactorily. When ; ~ 
complaine.·d to Fatafehi he was told just to carry on until the King's 
opposition was withdrawn.[78] There was obviously no likelihood of 
this. And a petition from 33 foreign residents addressed to Hunter in 
early April expressing sympathy with the King and hie subjects in what 
was termed 'their sincere and reasonable objections' to the 
continuance of the new road, must have made im Thurn realise that the 
King was not alone in the matter.[79] After discussions with Hunter 
in Fiji during April-May 1906, he decided to opt for a comprnrnise 
solution whe.reby, in deference to Tupou II 1 s wishes, the road would 
not pass through Tufumahina.[80] 
The King had won an obvious victory. The British Consul had been 
thwarted in his attempt to insist that the King's traditional rights 
were defunct. But a few months later when the tw~ protagonists again 
got into battle dress, the outcome was very different. The High 
Commissioner had been prepared to consider the King's feelinbs and opt 
for compromise over Tufumahina. But in the deadlock which ensued over 
the passing of the Estimates for 1907 no such allowances :;~~; .. ~ made. 
Realising that the King was testing his new position, im Thurn took 
78, C.E. Cooke to Hunter, Report on Road to Pea, 4 April 1906, ibid. 
79, Petition of 33 European residents to HurH:c~:, 4 April 1906, ibid. 
80, Im Thurn to Tupou II, 24 May 1906, encl. in ibid. 
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the opportunity to reinforce th~ restrictions he had made in 1905. 
His visit to Tonga in May 1907 proved conclusively that real authority 
in the Tongan Government now emanated from the High Commissioner and 
his local representative, the Agent and ConsuL 
At the centre of the dispute was the right of the Consul to 
decide the Estimates in opposition to the constitutional powers of the 
Privy Council. During the two previous years, the Estimates had been 
prepared by the Consul and simply rubber stamped by the Privy Council. 
Similarly on this occasion, although the first draft was prepared by 
the Treasurer and the Secretary to the Premier, the copy as submitted 
to the Council bore Hunter's alterations and had received his 
approval. At the completion of four Privy Council meetings dealing 
with the Estimates in November 1906, three significant changes and a 
number of minor ones had been made. Hunter refused to condone this 
interference with his administration. But the King in Council, 
perhaps heartened by the outcome of the Tufumahina dispute, was not 
prepared to be guided by his 'advice'. 
Three main points were at issue. The first concerned Hunter's 
intention to amalgamate the positions of Treasurer and Collector of 
Customs in the person of Howard Watkin. The previous Collector, 
R.G.M. Denny, was leaving 
enough for a separate officer. 
and Hunt~r argued that the work was not 
More importantly, he was trying to 
ensure that the appointment went to one of his trusted officials. The 
Privy Council rejected Hunter's proposal -- it was convinced that one 
man would prove unequal to the duties of both posts -- and instead it 
proposed either Scott or Ht\ckay for the vacant position. Mackay was 
obviously out of the running as far as British officials were 
concerned, and Hunter had no time for Scott either. The lawyer had 
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come into conflict with Hunter both as an adviser to the King and as 
Secretary of the local Chamber of Commerce. Hunter also suspected 
him, quite correctly, of having something to do with critical articles 
in the Fij!_ Times, and described him as 'a persistent 
oppositionist' .[81] Rather than sanction either appointment, Hunter 
wanted the duties of Collector added to those of the Treasurer. The 
only other solution was to employ someone else from Fiji, but im Thurn 
believed the salary was not eno~gh to attract a g9od man.[82] 
Hunter's decision to insist upon this ne\v arrangement was 
calculated to cause strife. Merton King, the Secretary to the High 
Commissioner, plainly regretted that Hunter should have taken up the 
position he had. After all, as he minuted, the Kingdom was not in the 
financial position to necessitate the amalgamation of the Customs and 
Treasury as a measure of economy, and if the Ministry wished to keep 
the uppointments separate, he could see no reason why not. Although 
Scott was persona~ grata with Hunter, he was the less objectionable 
of the two nominees, and im Thurn was not averse to the appointment, 
provided Scott first resigned as Secretary of the Chamber of 
; 
Commerce. [ 83] 
At this stage im Thurn was at this stage vaguely unhappy with 
Hunter's relations with the Tongan Government. In view of his own 
repeated statements that he had no power to confer appointments of 
Tongan officials, he thought it unfortunate that Hunter had told Scott 
that the appointment of a Collector of Customs rested with the High 
Commissioner. Im Thurn therefore took some pains to point out to 
81. Hunter to im Thurn, 17 November 1906, WPHC 4, 279/1906. 
82. Minutes, 29 November 1906, on WPHC 4t 279/1906. 
83. Ibid.; im Thurn to Hunter, 18 December 1906, ~bid. 
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Hunter that he was under a misconception as to the present relations 
of the High Commissioner and the Tongan Government: 
The power of making appointments to public offices in Tonga 
rests, I need hardly say, with the King and His Ministers. 
The effect of the 1905 Agreement, he declared, had simply been to 
pledge the King not to dismiss any of the officials who were then put 
into office nor to make any new appointments without the High 
Commissioner's consent, and im Thurn had 'no intention of acting 
beyond the powers assigned' to him by the Agreement.[84] 
The second point of contention concerned T.V. Roberts, whose 
repeated promotion at British instigation had caused strife on two 
previous occasions. Hunter wanted Rober-ts to be appointed 
Auditor-General as well as Secretary to the Premier. He argued that 
the appointment would improve the present system whereby Mateialona 
\qas nominally Auditor, but the work was cbl.:ried out by Europeans 
appointed for each audit. His real motive was to increase his owr1 
influence over the Government, for the post of Auditor-General 
conferred membership of the Cabinet and Privy Council. But when the 
Privy Council objected to the idea, Hunter claimed they were trying to 
re-open the doors to peculation.[85) 
A third issue over which Hunter and the Privy Council clashed was 
the Privy Council's decision, taken on 1 November, to raise the salary 
of Skeen, the Chief Justice, by £100. Hunter's objections to this 
were not born of economy but, rather, from the personal antagonism 
which had developed between Skeen and himself. As the only European 
in the Cabinet, and as Chief Justice, Skeen occt~pit!d a very powerful 
84, Im Thurn to Hunter, 18 Deca~ber 1906, ibid. 
85, Hunter to im Thurn, 12 December 1906, WPHC 4, 279/1906. 
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position. He had been put into power by im Thurn at Hunter's 
suggestion, and hunter obviously expected his unquestioning loyalty. 
It is not difficult to believe Skeen's claim that Hunter had told him 
he must take his orders from Hunter, that Hunter 'must have such a 
Minister in the Privy Council' and that there 'cannot be two masters 
and that he is the master' .[86] 
Skeen did not see his own role in this light. He wa8 a 
well-educated and able man born in Ne~q Zealand in 1862, he had 
progressed through Auckland Grammar. School and the University of New 
Zealand, being admitted to the: Bar in 1885. From 1889-1901 he had 
practised in Samoa, serving among other things as Secretary to the 
International Land Commission and as Municipal Magistrate in Apia. In 
1901 he had come to Tonga with his Samoan wife, and, refusing Sateki's 
offers of a job as Collector of Customs, auditor and school teacher, 
had settled for a living as a lal'lyer until im Thurn made him Chief 
Justice in 1905.[87] Although he claimed to have tried at all times 
to avoid friction between the King, the Consul and the Cabinet, he ha~ 
obviously had enough of the Consul's domineering control and the way 
in which the Cabinet, himself included, was ignored by the Consul. As 
he explained to the High Commissioner in March 1907, he and the Consul 
had 'an unfortunate difference of .nion' concerning the respective 
po~1ers of the Cabinet and the Consul: 
The Consul maintains that he is the controlling power in all 
matters in Tonga and insists that his advice must be 
followed without questioning. On the other hand I contend 
86. Skeen to im Thurn, 13 March 1907, WPHC 4, 279/1906. 
87. The Cyclopedia of Tonga, p.S3: Interview between Skeen and im 
ThUrn, i6 December-r~4, 'Report on Tongan Affairs', encl. in im 
Thurn to c.o., 15 March 1905, CO 881/11, Australian no. 182, 
encl. in no. 62, Annexure H. 
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that the Government rests with the King and his Cabinet and 
that the Consul's advice is to be taken on importunL 
matters. 
If the Consul disappr.oved of expenditure or resolutions, Skeen argued, 
these should be reconsidered by Cabinet and if necessary referred to 
Fiji. The fact that the 1905 Agreement had left the King to rule, 
with and through the chiefs, and that im Thurn himself had left such 
matters as the future of the College and the Guards to the decision of 
the Privy Council seemed to Skeen to belie the Consul's view of his 
own authority.[88] 
Skeen's views naturally appealed to Tupou II, and he was to prove 
a valuable ally to the King until his death in December 1915. But to 
the Consul, Skeen and his associates were anathema. Unable to see 
that the King and Ministers had real grievances in which they sought 
the help of men like Skeen and Scott, or in fact of anyone available, 
Hunter persisted in regarding these Europeans as the cause of all the 
friction in Tonga. They were, he believed, deliberately fomenting 
trouble in order to further their own ambitions. Tonga was full of 
'Underhand intriguing carried on by dishonest and unscrupulous whites 
with weak natives.'[89] Skeen himself had been 'quietly undermining 
my influence and authority with the chiefs and had ingratiated himself 
with the King.' [90] Hunter believed that Skeen was entirely 
responsible for the alterations which the Privy Council had lliade to 
the Estimates: 'an expression of opinion from him, however indiscrete, 
88. Skeen to im Thurn, 13 Harch 1907, WPHC 4, 279/1906. 
89, Hunter to im Thurn, conf., 17 November 1906, WPHC 4, 280/1906. 
90. Ibid. 
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carries great weight with the native members [of Privy 
Council]. 1 [91] Had Skeen simply drawn the Council's attention to the 
King's Treaty obligations, Hunter was sure the Estimates would have 
been passed without demur. Relying on information supplied by his 
ally, Roberts, Hunter informed the High Commissioner that Skeen had 
insisted on the vote for the Auditor-General being struck out, had 
strenuously opposed the amalgamation of the offices of Treasurer and 
Collector of Customs, and had even used his 'complete control of the 
Cabinet' to insist upon his own salary being raised.[92] 
These accusations Skeen absolutely denied. He had been present 
for only two out of the four Privy Council meetings on the Estimates, 
being on leave of absence in New Zealand from 3 November 1906.[93] 
The incident marked the beginning of established opposition between 
the Chief Justice and the British Consul. It also sparked off a 
long-term campaign by British representatives to remove the Chief 
Justice from his position on the Cabinet and Privy Council. It had 
not been foreseen, the High Commissioner remarked, that the Chief 
Justice should take a leading and active part in government 
administration. In hardly any British Crown Colony was the Chief 
Justice a member of the Legislative Council, and although in Fiji he 
was a member of the Executive Council, this was more in his capacity 
as Deputy Governor. Im Thurn declared: 'It is a mistake, for which I 
admit that I am partly responsible, that in Tonga the Chief Justice 
should have a voice in financial matters.'[94] He seemed to have 
91. Hunter to im Thurn, 12 December 1906, WPHC 4, 279/1906. 
9... Hunt€~r to im ThurnJ conf., 17 November 1906, WPHC 4, 280/1906; 
Roberts to H•mtcr, 10 December 1906, encl. in~· 
93. Skeen to im Thurn, 13 ~farch 1907, WPHC 4, 279/1906. 
9tt • Im Thurn to Hunter, conf., 18 December 1906, ~· 
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forgotten that it was the law and the constitution of Tonga that 
gave the Chief Justice his Ministerial status.[95] 
Hunter's refusal to approve the Estimates as altered by the Privy 
Council produced something of a crisis in the Government. On 16 
November, Mateialona and T.V. Roberts conveyed the Consul's decision 
to the King. The Privy Council Estimates, they told him, could not be 
published because of the promises the King had made in 1905.[96] 
Tupou II responded with an appeal to the High Commissioner against 
Hunter's excessive interference in Tongan affairs. By treating the 
decision of the Cabinet with indifference, he claimed, the British 
Consul was exercising an arbitrary power which gave 'great uneasiness' 
to the whole Government.[97] He remained resolute that the Estimates 
to be published were those as passed by the Privy Council for, as he 
told Mateialona, the law appointed the Privy Council ~o make the 
Estimates and no one could then alter them. He warned Ma~eialona: 
If you do not do as was discussed in the Privy Council, then 
the Privy Council is useless, and it will be impossible for 
me to work with the Privy Council again, or to call another, 
because it is useless, as the rulings ean be altered and put 
aside ••• and the request that we hold a meeting is only a bag 
of dotage. [ 98] 
In the ensuing conflict the Premier was caught in an unenviable 
position. Unable to decide whether to have the Estimates printed in 
accordance with the Privy Council resolution as prescrib~d by law and 
demanded by th.a King, or whether to be guided solely by the wishes of 
95. ReJort of Proce~jings of His Excellency the High Commissioner, 
To~~:•, ~avernmen~ £'!..~<:_, no. 7, 20 Hay 1907 • 
96. !·1ateialona to Hunter, 17 November 1906, iVPHC 4, 279/1906. 
97, Tupou II to im Thurn, November 1906, ibid. 
9!J. Tupou II to Hateialona, 28 December 1906, encl. in ih!_<!_· 
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the British Consul, Mateialona vacillated. His personal inclination 
may well have been to side with th~ Council. According to Tupou II he 
complained bitterly of the Consul's interference, and Hunter accused 
him of being 'a somewhat weak but willing tool in the hands of ~mckay 
and others'. [99] But uppermost in Hateialona's mind was the fear 
that the Kingdom might be lost. It was an attitude for which he 
received a severe reprimand from the over-confident Tupou II: 'It is 
apparent to me that no government will use force on this country 
through the publishing of the Estimates as passed by the Privy 
Council.' [100] 
The situation had become so delicate that Hunter n0\'1 declined to 
advise Hateialona any further on the question: 
If I said [to publish] the Estimates as ••• approved by me, I 
would be accusE.~d of undue interference with the rights and 
pmvers of the Privy Council under the laws and constitution 
of Tonga. 
On the other hand, if he advised the publication of the Estimates as 
passed in Council he would be selling out his own influence: 
If the Cabinet, or the Privy Council, depending on the 
JKI\'lers given them by the laws and constitution of Tonga and 
ignorin~ their Treaty obligations, are allowed to alter 
salari~s, and change the personnel of the Departments over 
which tht~ British Government Gtrive to keep supervision, it 
must end in chaos. The present, and future, GOOd officials 
will be forced to resign owing to reductions of salaries, 
and their places filled by useless derelicts from the beach 
d,mbtless much to the delight of the King, who still has 
~op~s of regaining his power over the Treasury, and 
rev~rting to the old form of mal-administration of the 
~~'J • 1upuu II to im Til urn Novt'mher 1906 1 ibid.; -luntc~r to im Thurn, 
12 IJecember 1906 :md encla., .i.bi'~[~; Hunter to im Thurn., 10 
J;mu;u·y 1907 1 ih~1· 
:rn. Tupou H to t·hteialona, 28 UeCL':nl>c>r 1906, ibid. 
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Government as it existed prior to the intervention of the 
British Government.[101] 
Hunter's only glimmer of hope in the whole~ was that the King's 
'gross breaches' of Articles 2, 9 and 10 of the 1905 Agreement might 
serve as a lever for the British Government to insist on nominating 
and appointing a white Premier and a Chief Justice with seats in the 
Cabinet, Council and in Parliament.[l02] 
Resolution of the conflict rested with im Thurn. While he at no 
time censured Hunter for his interference, his early attitude seems to 
have favoured compromise and minimal disturbance to the wishes of the 
Tongans. He sympathised with the difficulty of Hunter's position, 
agreeing that he was in a sense 'virtually responsible for the 
financial position of Tonga 1 • But at the same time he regretted the 
friction and felt it highly desirable that Hunter should exercise his 
responsibility 'with the least possible amount of open 
demonstration' .[103] His final judgement was reserved for a future 
visit, but in his correspondence advised Hunter, cautiously and 
indirectly, to back down over all three items of contention on the 
Estimates. He pointed out that nearly all the matters were subjects 
for agreement between the Tongan and British Governmen' ~ under tr,e 
1905 Agreement, and that, 
101. 
' ( ') 
.. J .... 
tr/3. 
Fr' -~ .... 
as the representative of the [British Government, !]. • .am 
not inclined to press such authority as I may have too far 
against local native opinion.[104] 
Hunter to im Thurn, 12 December 1906, ~· 
Hunter to im Thurn, conf., 17 NovCJ:abcr 1906, IVPHC 4, 280/1906. 
lm Thurn to Hunter, conf., 18 Decc>nber 1906, t~PIIC 4, 279/1906. 
tbid. 
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These words, written in mid-December 1906, represent a striking 
.:ontrast with im Thurn's actions in Hay 1907. Th~ visit we . .:' allegedly 
to get hold of the full facts and 1 tu smooth away the not very grave 
troubles' prevailing in Tonga. [lOS] But, perhaps frustrated by 
h,1ving to wait until late April for a man-of-war to convey him to 
Tonga, im Thurn again turned a visit of inquiry into something 
,1pproaching a coup. According to his own account, he had decided 
before arriving in Tonga that the best course would be to take a 
stronger stand, and 'to insist where before I had only tried to 
persuade' • [ 106] On 4 May 1907 he called the Cabinet, without the 
King, to a meeting at the Consulate. In a speech which was 
t1ubsl~qttl'l1tly published in the Government Gazette, he madE~ it quite 
pLlin that the Governmtmt had no choice but to obey the British 
Cmwul. The plan adopted in 1905 was 1 the one alternative to the 
annexation of Tonga', and only by their strictly adhering to it could 
the Ton!jan flag continue to fly. The recent troubles he attributed 
partly to 'mibunderstanding on the part of your native chiefs', but 
~ore to outside Europecn lnfluence. He made his views clear: 
I >vir>h to put before you the system 011 which the Government 
is to be carried on. It is intended, as far as possible, 
that the Executive work be carried on by you Tongans, but by 
tne advice and assistance of the British Govcrr.ment. I need 
only rt•mind you that the only mouth-piece is that of the 
prL·rHmt British Agent. [ 107] 
In Thurn then went on to inform the Cabinet in a fe~-1 ~·mrds what 
he i.;'i~;hed the Tongan Government to do. In accordance with Hunter's 
~ d • 4~4· Titurn to c.o., eonf., 10 r·!ay 107, CO 225/7b. 
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.,.~shes the posts of Treasurer and (' .. llect ,r of Customs were to be 
combined unner Watkin, ~nd Roberts was to be Auditor-General as well 
as Secretary to the Premier, with a seat in Cabinet and Privy Council. 
Skeen's increase in salary had already been approved, but im Thurn 
believed Skeen would be more willing to acl in accordance with the 
High Commissioner's viewn as a result of their conversations. Im 
Thurn also tc-ok the opportunity of his visit to settle a number of 
other matters and make various ' recomm;; ·ada tions' • These ranged from 
appointments and dismissals (which he had not long before rlenied his 
right to interfere in), to recommendations concerning r~gs and 
dynamite fishing. The posts of Governor at Niuafo'ou and Niuatoputapu 
\(.:!re 'useless' and should be abolished at the end of the year; the 
contract of the presevt Surveyor should not be renewed, and the Tongan 
foreman of roads, Maealiuaki, (who ·knew not hi ~ abou': roadma:~:l. \g but 
was a Wesleyan and loyal to the Consul) should be retained. The claim 
of a German subject, Gustav Rahn, who sought damages against the 
Government for injuries he rec~ived when attacked by a prisoner on 
leave, was arbitrated by the High Commi.ssioner -- Rahn was to receive 
r 2, 500 in a settlemE>,t whit.:h caused the CC'lonial Office to comment 
that it was a case of t'pical British generosity, but at the Tongan 
Government's expen&e.[l08] 
Despite op~nions in the Tongan Government, there was no choice 
b•~L to accept the High Commissioner's rulings; the presence of the 
man-of-war and the references to annexation made sure of that. As had 
been the case in 1905, some of tlw Higb Commissioner's dtC'i c;ions were 
basc•d on inadequate information and incomplet(! understanding of the 
issues involved. The amalgamation of the offices of Tn~asurer and 
108, !-Hnute, 21 June 190i, on im Thurn to c.o., conf., 10 Hay 1907, 
co 225/76. 
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Collector of Customs, for instance, w~s reversed as unworkable in 
1910. But the central point had been brought home clearly. As the 
Chief Justice put it during the 4 May meeting: 
The question has been whether the advice 
Agent must be tais.1: 1 or not, and now it is 
advice must be taken.[109] 
of the British 
apparent that the 
Although it continued to wear heavily on 'he King, and increasingly on 
members of the Cabinet who had not bargained for such restrictions on 
their own administraticn, the Agent and Consul's control had been put 
beyond challenge. 
109, Heeting of the High Commissioner.· • ,4 Hay 1907' Ton(.E_ 
Gazette, no. 7, 20 May 1907. 
Govermnc>nt 
·------
" 
CHAPTER 6 
The King Triumphs 
If we do not adopt the wisest course in managing our own 
concerns, that will be our affair. No nation has always 
seen clearly the right course to follow. If we are to make 
mistakes, then let ~us learn wisdom by experience, but as 
long as the interests of the few fo:."eigners living ln our 
midst are not endangered, no just cause can be found for 
robbing us of our independence, under the guise of giving us 
the 1 advice 1 of !..ne British Agem:. 
[Tupoti II to Sir Franeit:; May, 7 Septembt:r 1911, ent:l. 4 in Mn.y to 
C.o., con£., 23 September 1911, CO 225/97.] 
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From 1905 until his departure in September 1909, Hamilton Hunter 
was undoubtedly the power behind the Tongan throne. Although there 
were growing indications that even his forme1: allies found his 
continued interference irksome and debilitating, Hunter's authority in 
the Tongan Government was reinforced by the High Commissioner; the 
King and Cabinet were powerless to challenge his entrenched position. 
In 1910-11, however, when Hunter's successor, William Telfer Campbell, 
pushed british interference to even greater heights, he provoked a 
crisis with very different results. The Colonial Office was not 
prepared to condone the complete disregard Campbell showed for the 
opinions and decisions of the Tongan Government. It had never been 
intended that the British Consul shoulu usurp political responsibility 
in Tonga, and in th~ wake of Campbell's ill-advised intervention, in 
particular his closure of the cooperative trading company, the Tonga 
Ha'~ Tonga Kautaha, the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner 
withdrew their support for his actions. By 1912 the !3riti~h-Tonga 
relationship was re-defined to Tonga's adv&ntage and the authority of 
King Tupou II within his own Kingdom W3S re-established.[l] 
The appointment to Tonga of William Telfer Campbell was known to 
the E~itish Government to be sc ,ething of a risk. Campbell's record 
as Resident Commissioner in the Gilbert and Ellice · Islands 
Protectorate over the previous 12 years had revealed 'idiosyncracies 
of temper and tact' which led im Th1.1rn to warn the Colonial Office in 
1908 th~t it would be 1 a dangerous experiment to place hire in the very 
peculiar political and social conditions which prevail in Tonga.' [2] 
1. 
') 
.... 
This chapter is based on a semi~ar given in the 
Pacific and South East Asian History, ANU, 
subsequently revised aad published in Pacific 
Spring 1981, pp.l~2-163. 
Im Thurn to c. 0., conf., 11 Harch J 908, C'() 225/81. 
Department of 
in .Hay 1978, 
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Im Thurn nevertheless acknowledged that Campbell was a good 
adml.nl· strator and, in view of the latter's own urgent t requests o go 
to Tonga and his 'undoubted loyalty to the High Commissioner', im 
Thurn recommended him for the job.[3] Campbell was an fllsterman 
\;Those imposing stature suited his autocratic nature. One of his 
contemporaries in Tonga, the trader Alexander Cameron, recalled that 
Campbell 
was well OV'1r 6 feet tall, Hi th a clean-cut handsome face, 
close-cropped moustac~1e, sunburnt complexion, erect 
soldierly figure. In uniform, lw looked typical of the 
correct colonial official ••• until he raised his helmet. He 
had the most extraordinary head, quite bald at the top, with 
the skull coming almost to a p:~nnacle in the middle. He had 
an abrupt, clipped way of talking, and \vhen he gave orders, 
they were carried out ••• or else![A] 
Cameron went on to describe Campbell's relations with local officials, 
and there is plenty of evidence to support his views: 
Pt!rsonally, I found him to he an an ,,gaut , blust~ring, 
bullying man, who succeeded in arousing in every government 
official with whom he came in contact, a feeling of 
apprehension and nervousness. He would make the rounds of 
the government offices about 9. 5 a.m., and Hoe betide ;my 
one of the officials who had a,..rived late to work ··hat 
morning or who was not attending to his duties.[S] 
Campbell epitomised the patr>r;&al i ::[ i~ attitude \·:ilich 
underl2.in all the more recent dE-alings of the British Governmeat 
Tonga. He saw no worth in the Tuu(;an \vay of ll.fe or government 
;j 1 i t!Ved it his duty to G~.r .. '~'(t the Tonganr; from their 'conceit 
lud 
with 
and 
and 
·;:;':itu' f.on' -- the two principal :>tur\l.l ·r!~ blocks which, in his 
· •crt r t d T .:rom ,.;,,r,vl·ng ft•U benefit from thu ·~ ' , p even e ongau·, ... -'~ ~ -
1. Thurn~'~ >··''·• ., 1~ July 1908, WPHC 27/I/11. 
4. :""meron, 'h~:.•moi .. ,,, , 1,,.36. 
J. ~., p.37. 
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Protectorate.[6] Like Hunter, he was convinced that annexation was 
the only real solution to Tonga's problems. He found the existing 
Government hopelessly inefficient and he argued that under Tupou II, 
progress was impossible. If annexation was not favoured Campbell 
suggested that Tupou II 'be asked to abdicate, or deposed as unfit to 
rule, and a Council of Regency be appointed for the efficient 
administration of the Kingdom of Tonga.'[7] 
Campbell's interpretation of his role i.n Tonga was based on his 
reading of im Thurn's actions in 1904-5. Campbell believed that the 
Tongan Government was bound to take his advice on all matters, and he 
assumed that he would be held r~sponsible for 'any general 
inefficiency in the administration of the kingdom.'[8] By an 
oversight, he was never shown the Secretary of State's letter to im 
Thurn dated 6 .June 1905, which had defined the Colonial Office view of 
the Consul's limited role under the Supplementary Agreement. Despite 
an occasional word of caution from his superiors, Campbell persisted 
in the belief that his position in Tonga was 'practically that of 
Officer Administering the Government of Tonga.'[9] 
From his arrival in early September 1909 Campbell interfered 
without discretion in Tongan affairs. In particular, he was 
determined to keep tight control over government appointments. A few 
days after his arrival he chided the King for appointing a Tongan as 
6. Campbell, Trade Report for 1910, WPHC 4, 2032/1911. This remark 
>·ms omitted from the published Report· 
7. Campbell to Hay, 17 Hay 1911, WPHC 4, 936/1911. 
8. Campbell to Hay, 19 September 1911, WPHC 4, 1842/1911. 
9. Campbell to im Thurn, 19 November 1909, WPHC 4, 1720/1909. 
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trustee for a noble title, without consultation.[lO] Some two months 
later, in November 1909, he objected strongly to the principle of 
permitting a local European resident to fill a temporary vacancy in 
the Customs Department. Hhen the Cabinet went ahead against his 
advice and appointed L.B. Lawton, a ),cal shopkeeper, to the vacancy, 
campbell refused to approve its action. He warned the Premier that he 
could not allow his r~commendations to be so completely ignored and 
arrang~d for a passenger off the steamer to be given the job. 
Campbell attributed the Cabin·~t 1 s independent att:i '::ude to the 
influence of Chief Justice Skeen and hinted that Ministers who 
listened to Skeen rather than himself might find themselves out of a 
job. As he commented to im Thurn, 
The matter of the Lawton appointment was the first 
opportunity I have had of showing the Chief Justice, and any 
others who may be his disciples, that it is not my mission 
or intention to adopt a policy of 'masterly inactivity' or 
inertness. [ 11] 
Campbell's handling of this matter worried the High Commissioner, 
although he was unable to say exactly why. He cautioned Campbell 
against over-reacting towards Skeen, commenting with unusual insight 
that 
as long as Mr Skeen apparently has the other members of the 
Cabinet with him, it is not prudent to assume -- without 
proof --· that any action taken by the Cabinet as a whole is 
really and practically at the sole instance of Mr Skeen.[l2] 
As for the appointment itself, im Thurn noted that while he would have 
been prepared to support Campbell in any reasonable objection to 
,;) 
Lawton's appointment, he was not sure that the Consul possassed the 
lG. Campbell to Tupou II, 21 Septebmer 1909, PO/KNF 1909. 
11. Campbell to im Thurn, 4 December 
corresp'Jndence, WPHC 4, 17 :' /1909. 
1909, and 
12, Im Thurn to Campbell, conf., 4 Janmry 1910, ~· 
subsequent 
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power of veto • Admitted!), the relative positions of the Tongan 
Government, the High Commissioner and the Agent and Consul were 
'somewhat difficult to define' --
But I think it may safely be postulated that only the High 
Commissioner, and not the R.C. [i.e. Resident Commissioner 
or Agent and Consul], has by custom and mutual agreement the 
right formally and definitely to object to the selection of 
a new officer of this Tongan (native) Government.[l3] 
c 
Campbell was not happy with the proposal that he should refer to 
Suva for a final decision on any matter. Whilst denying any desire 
for autocratic power, he argued that it would appear as hesitation and 
weakness if he could not oppose the King and Cabinet when they failed 
to carry out their agreements, without referring each point to the 
High Commissioner. In view of the 1905 Agreement and im Thurn's ~•m 
directions then, Campbell believed that it wae. his duty to consider 
all appointments of Europeans to the Tongan Government and that he had 
every right to object to the selection of officials. In what was to 
be the first of many capitulations, .:.m Thurn agreed. Submitting to 
practicalities, he admitted that the Consul hau the right to lodge a 
formal protest against any contemplated action by the Tongan 
Government which might violate the 1905 Agreement. While such a 
protest would not be final without the High Commissioner's sanction, 
it would remain valid unless he over-ruled it.[l4] Since the High 
Commissioner would certainly be reluctant to <>ver-rule his deputy, the 
effect was simply to confirm Campbell's authority to take on the 
Tongan Government whenever ha l<lished. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Im Thurn to Campbell, 30 March 1910, and related correspontience, 
ibid. 
-
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Freed from the restraint of prior referral to the High 
Commissioner, Campbell force-fed his advice into the administration in 
a1• increasingly relentless fashion. 
.1\t the ·<md of March 1910 ~.rhen a 
group of 10 nobles, supported by the King, petitioned Campbell for the 
dismissal of T.V. Roberts from his positions of Secretary to the 
Premier and Aucitor-General on the grounds of drunkenness and working 
favouritismt they received an aggressive refusal. Campbell saw the 
petition as part of a conspiracy against Roberts and himself and he 
informed the King that the suppression of drunkenness should start at 
the top and that neither the King nor the petitioning nobles were 
qualified to show disapproval of drunkenness in anybody until they 
personally led an example of sobriety. The offending nobles had their 
characters read out to them by Campbell he detailed minor 
convictions anu informed them that their antecedents and characters 
ware so bad as to disqualify them from signing such a petition. 
Noreover, at Campbell's insistence the two government officials 
amongst the petitioners, Salomone Ata and Siosaia Vaea, were suspended 
by Cabinet from their respective offices of Assistant Minister of 
Education and Police Magistrate for signing a. petition against a 
senior official and member of Cabinet.[l5] 
Although Campbell could produce no evidence of conspiracy, im 
Thurn supported his action in regard to the petition. Roberts had 
been put into office by im Thurn and, while he deserved a reprimand 
for his undoubted intemperance, was clearly 'the best man' for the 
job. In a stern message conveyed through Campbel.l, im Thurn tvo.rned 
the King r.md nobles that if the 'arrangements' he made in 1905 shuuld 
break down because of disloyalty from present officials and nobles, he 
15. Canpbell to i~ Thurn, conf., 1 April 1910, and subsequent 
corresp0ndence, ViPHC 4, 426/1910. 
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Would have no alternative but to advJ.'se hi G s overnment to annex 
Tonga.[l6] Roberts, like the Agent and Consul, had been placed above 
the jurisidiction of the Tongan Government. 
Iro Thurn was in a quandary over the suspension of Ata and Vaea, 
whose aismissal now awaited his confirmation. Both men had supported 
British intervention and had been put into office by im Thurn. Ata, 
in particular, was, in im Thurn's opinion 'among the very best of the 
Tongans-- i.e. the straightest.'[l7] If they were punished for 
·such a trifling offence' as signing a petition, it might give rise to 
justifiable discontent. Unwilling to countermand Campbell's orders, 
hmvt'Ver, im Thurn suggested that the Consul and Cabinet find some 
'proper and adequate reasons' to justify the "'1issals. [18] The 
subsequent inquiries revealed little to warrant any action[l9] but 
by the time the reports reached Suva in September 1910 im Thurn was no 
longer at the reins and Sir Charles Major, Ohief Judicial Commissioner 
for the Hestern Pacific and Chief Justice of Fiji, was Acting High 
Commissioner. Major, who had shown a preference for decisive action 
during his previous occ·1pancy of this post, did not want to con.:ern 
himself with 'the various allegations and counter-allegations'.[20] 
He urged the Cabinet to charge Ata and Vaea with conduct unfitting for 
service, and if it was satisfied of their guilt, he would confirm the 
16. Im Thurn to Campbell, conf. , 1 June 1910, ibid· 
17 • Im Thurn, notes in margin on minutes by Hart-Davis, 22 May 1910, 
ibid. 
18. ~Unutes by Hart-Davis, 2 September 1910, .!_bid·; im Thurn to 
Campbell, 1 June 1910, ibid. 
19. Campbell to im Thurn, conf,, ~5 July 1910 and encls., ibid. 
2fJ, r-!inut~ by ~tajor, 2 September 1910, ~· 
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dismissals. [21] Shortly qfterwards, however, the Cabinet appointed 
Ata clerk in the Premier's Office and in early 1911 Vaea became 
Assistant Minister of Police.[22] 
Hajor' s term as Acting High Commissioner, which lasted from 
August 1910 to February 1911, came at a particularly difficult time. 
Like Campbell, Major was not fully aware of the Colonial Offic~'s 
attitude to~vards Tonga and he followed im Thurn's lead in forcing 
advice onto the Government until he realised too late, in January 
1911, that it might be wiser for the High Commissioner and the Consul 
to k~ep out of Tonga 1 s heated domestic affairs. As conflict between 
Campbell and the Tongan Government intensified, Hajor found the 
situation exasperatingly beyond him. In August 1911, while in Tonga 
in his substantive capacity as Chief Judicial Commissioner, he noted 
privately: 
I am heartily glad that my departure from this quite 
impossible 'kingdom' is nigh at hand, and I hope sincerely 
never to set foot in its shores again.[23] 
In October 1910 Hajor was faced wi. th a crisis in Tonga provoked 
by the resignation of that contentious individual, T.V. Roberts. 
According to Roberts, his resignation was tendered as a rot est 
against 'the present political position [which] I consider impossible 
in the extreme.' [24] Part of the problem was undoubtedly Roberts' 
21. Major to Campbell, 8 September 1910, ibic!· 
Campbell to Hahaffy, 6 Marclt 1911, 
~~ no. 32, 7 November 191(\: 
no. 11, 28 March 1911. 
TOt]:!;'!_ 2_?_VeE_~':l_~~ 
Govarnr:wnt Gazc•t te 
---------- T-----
2'l Jo Najor to Hay, private, 18 Aur,ust 1911, WPHC 4, 753/1911. 
24. Robert£> to Tupou II, 4 October 1910, encl. 
~·1ajur, 15 October 1910, HPHC l;, 1431/1910. 
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poor relations with the Tongan Goverr~ent, and particularly with 
}mteialona, the Premier, for whom he had little respect. The more 
immediate cause of his resignation, ho~\fever, appears to have been 
conflict with Campbell, whose dictatorial manner he found unbearable. 
Roberts alleged that his own position in the Goverument was untenable 
because of 'the system of dual control under which Tonga is governed', 
by ~•hich matters were constantly referred between Consul and Cabinet 
without a final decision being taken.[25] Later, he claimed that 
Campbell had tried to destroy his authority with the Tongans and had 
l·mnted government departments to take their orders from the Consul 
rather than from the Premier's Office.[26] According to Roberts, 
Car.1pbell wanted to dictate every minor departmental matter, and this 
is certainly borne out by his close personal surveillance of the 
adninistration. The 'final straw' for Roberts concerned J.D. 
\;llitcombe, a young clerk in t:::e Pr _•mier' s Office, who was suspended 
from duty by Roberts afL;r coc.fcssing to the seduction of the 15 
yeJ.r-old daughter of the Fui"oman. of Worl•o. Campbell, who had a 
special liking for Whitcombe and had been responsible for his 
<Ippointment, considered there was insufficient evidence to warrant a 
suspension and not only reinstated Whitcombc, but suggestPd that 
Roberts owed him an apolom~, Furious at ti ·~ Consul's interference, 
Robt:rts informed Hateiahma, thC' Premier, that he could not continue 
to hold reaponaiblo office in the Government: while the Consul had such 
dictatorial p~wors.[27] 
~'· ~l:!liiiffy, ninut' , t 
4, 14'H/1910. 
-~. Rnhcrln to c.o •. ~ -Jly 1912, CO 225/113. 
?~ 
... , . Ibfd., Ganpbel1 to M~jor, 12 October [4":fl"!l Cjl(J. 
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The Tongan Cabinet, most of whom regarded Roberts and Campbell 
with equal hostility, made the most of Roberts' resignation. A letter 
from Mateialona dated 4 October, the date of Roberts' resignation, 
instructed Roberts to resign and proceed to Fiji to meet the High 
Commissioner personally: 
You will explain explicitly to him all the difficulties the 
Government have in reference to matters being referred 
backwards and forwards from the Consul and the Government of 
Tonga, and you will explain that the Government of Tonga 
wish to have no friction \'lith the British Government but 
would like to know whether the Law and Constitution still 
exist, whether there is any further use for the Cabinet and 
Privy Council, or whether the Consul has an autocratic rule 
\'lithout reference or advice from anyone. (28] 
Roberts later claimed that he was 'urgently desired by the Natives to 
~~ork against the Consul, who was disliked by all, and in the interests 
of the Kittg' , but he owed too much to British influence to accept the 
offer.[29] Instead he claimed in Tonga that he had no grievance with 
the Consul and at a Privy Council meeting on 11 October (which 
Campbell attended) he gave no satisfactory explanation for his 
resi~jnation.[30] Two days later Privy Council accepted his 
resignation but, predictably t Campbell refused to confirm the 
Council's decision. He alleged that the incident was the culmination 
of a plot by Skeen and others to gut rid of Roberts and lw took it 
upon himself to ar,..·mge for Roberts to be granted leave of absence for 
the purpose of consulting the High Commissioner in Fiji. [31] 
28. Nateialona to Roberts, transL, tf October 1910, WPUC 4, 426/1910. 
29. Roberto to c.o., 2 July 1912, CO 225/113. 
3~. kep~rt uf Privy Council meeting, 11 October 1910, encl. VII in 
C:l1,pbdl to Hajor, 15 October 1910, WPHC lf, 1431/1910. 
,. G b 1910 d 1 1'l,· ~ • Rc•"ur'·f; to J,., ar:lp c:!.l to Hajor, 15 o~~tobcr · an enc s., _,,,~., ,, u .. 
C,IJ., 2 Jul}• 1912, CO 225/113. 
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As a result of Roberts' discussions in Fiji A.W. Mahaffy, the 
Assistant High Commissioner, visited Tonga from 26 November to 12 
Dec~mber 1910 in a misguided attempt to improve the workings of the 
executive. Mahaffy has been described by one historian as an 
intellectual whose main characteristic was great sympathy for 
Islanders, but in his dealings with Tonga he differed little from the 
approach taken by im Thurn, Campbell and Major. [32] Although he 
regarded Tonga as 1 a most interesting experiment to d, t:ermine the 
capacity of a Polynesian people for self-government under modern 
conditions', he nevertheless showed great eagerness to interfere in 
the aumiuistration i.lild lw advised Major against decreasing 'the quite 
csst~ntial control' which the High Commissioner exercised through the 
British Consul.[33] As he reminded Major in the report of his visit, 
'in the last resource the King can always be ordered to comply ~vi th 
any reasonable requiremcnts ••• '[34] 
On the recommendations of Campbell and Mahaffy, Hajor refused to 
,:;;ree to Roberts' resignation. During their discussions in Fiji, 
Ruberts had mr.tde a good impression on Hahaffy who noted: 
I car><tot but think that his [Roberts'] 
retained if possible, even at the 
exploration of the devious paths along 
of Tonga travels in the accomplishment 
services should be 
cost of some further 
which the Government 
of its destiny.[35] 
Deopite Roberta' own admission of intemperance and the heated 
objl'C'tionu of Tupou II, Ro.berts resumed duty at Hahaffy' s behest on 28 
~iovc•:JbL•r 1910. A 1 nt of chargen againat him including drunkennesa, 
?f) p 87 
"· · "':, • rr , I:':r.a, ~~,t;_t! t»~, p • 2 · • 
~~. :-b.lt',;tf,, to t·Lljor conf., 2 January :::.911, HI'BC t~, 426/1910; ~!ain:'t~·, minutc,'27 Oetobcr 1910 on HPHC t*, 1431/1910. 
)'•• '·:,lklfty to Ut\jor, conf., 2 January 1911, t~PHC 4, 42o/1910. 
;,l,,.ffy, r.1inutu, 27 Oetober llHO, m'rlC 4, 1431/lcno. 
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using unbecoming language and n:.lking decisions without consulting the 
Prero.it:!r and Cabinet, was drawn up by the King and investigated by 
who concluded Campbell that 't:hr evils to which the charges relate 
I exist, but do not consider Mr Roberts can be held responsible for 
the~.'[36] As a result Roberts was (yet again) promoted, this 
to 'Government S~cretary' in April 1911. According to Roberts, 
The object of this appointment was that the Premier being 
incapable of his work I was to do the work as 'Government 
Secretary', which position would correspond to Colonial 
Secretary in a Crown Colony.[37] 
time 
Some months later, however, Roberts left Tonga for good, His bouts of 
intemperance had become b~d enough to provok~ comment in a petition 
from the heads of the Wesleyan, Anglican and Free Churches and also in 
the Fiji. Times,[38] and Campbell and other British officials had 
lost sympathy for him. Roberts' petitions to the Colonial Office for 
reconsiJe~ation of his dismissal for desertion of duty found no 
The other measures which Mahaffy force~ onto the Tcngan 
Government during his visit in November-December 1910 were misdirected 
attempts to improve relations between the Consul and the Cabinet. 
Roberts had apparently named Skee11 as the chief source of · .. pposition 
to the Consul and Hajor therefore instructed 1-fahaffy to discuss with 
Campbell 'the best means of causing that the Chief Justice ehall no 
lon!jer have, and that the British Agent shall be given, a se.:1t in the 
36. Campbell to Hajor, 9 February 1911 and encls., WPHC ~~ 1431/1910; 
List of Charges against T.V. Roberts, 6 ~ecembcr 1910, ibid. 
37 • Roberts to c.o., 2 July 1912, CO 225/113. 
3S, Petition of Page, i-latkin and Willis to !!.J.y, 26 June 1911, HP:!C 4, 
1~52/1911; Fiji Timl'!!.• 9 Nay 1911. 
~~. '!inutc' by H<1h<1ffy, lb ~!arch 1912, WPHC 4, 1431/lCJlO. 
Page 183 
Cabinet.' [ 40] Neither Mahaffy nor Major questioned the Consul's 
right to membership of the Tongan ext!cutive, nor their own authority 
to interfere with the King's constitutional prerogative to appoint the 
members of his Cabinet. Mahaffy believed that Campbell's presence in 
the Cabinet would correct 'what really seems to be an actual 
administrative weakness in the machinerv of Government in Tonga 1 by 
eliminating 'the tedious reference of minute points of administration' 
from the Cabinet to the Consul, who 'was often unable to decide them' 
without much delay and inconvenience. [ 41] Mahaffy was also 
inatructed to obtain th~ approval of the King to the appointment by 
the British Government of a Chief Justice \vith jurisdiction over 
Tongans and non-Tongans, a move which Major mistakenly b~lieved was 
for~shadowed by Article III of the 1900 Treaty.[42] 
In instructions emanating from a man who held the substantive 
post of Chief Judicial Commissioner for the Western Pacific, it is 
surprising that the legal aspects of Skeen's removal, or of Campbell's 
promotion, were given no attention. The justification was simple 
force. Major's instructions to Mahaffy read in part: 
The British Agent and yourself are at liberty to 
any pressure you may deem expedient and prudent 
about acquiescence on the part of the King of Tonga 
Ministers ••• [43] 
exercise 
to bring 
and his 
In an interview with Tupou II on 29 November, Mahaffy demanded the 
King's signature on an agreement which set out the requirem~nts of the 
British Government. According to Mahaffy, Tupou II 'offered no marked 
.'.'), :·1ajor to H~haffy, conf., 15 November 1910, HPHC 4, 1431/1910. 
41 1911, WI~IC 4, 426/1910; • ;.zall{;ffy to Hajor, conf., 2 January 
! ') 
"~· 
:-!ailaffy, minute, 27 Octobe ... ::.no, HPHr 4, 1431/1910. 
~·!ajor to Uahaffy, conf., 15 November 1910, WPHC 4, 1431/1910 • 
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opposition to any of the requests made of him'; Mahaffy claimed that 
he treated the King with the greatest respect and courtesy and 
refrained from making any threats, even implied. [ 44] He did, 
however, note that the King asked more than once whether the 
'requests' were an order from the High Commissioner, to which Mahaffy 
replied that it was 'advice tendered by ..• [the High Commissioner]'. 
Tupou II, on the other hand, claimed that he had objected strongly to 
signing the declaration and had only done so on being told that it was 
a c.ommand from the High Commissioner. He pointed out: 
The Treaty does not grant power to ••• the King of 
England •.• to dispense with the office of the Chief Justice 
of Tonga or ••• appoint a Chief Justice except to exercise the 
jurisdiction defined and limited by Article V of the treaty 
of 1900.[45] 
In a letter of protest to Major, Tupou II declared that he had been 
compelled against his will to break the Treaty, which now appeared to 
be a valueless document, despite the revered name of Queen Victoria 
upon it. The letter concluded: 
I shall feel to the end of my life the high-handed command 
which has been made, it is not calculated to produce 
friendly feeling, besides such a high-handed command is a 
breach of the Treaty.[46] 
Tupou II's protests were considered by the new High Commissioner, 
Sir Francis May, who took up duty in February 1911. May suffered the 
disadvantage of taking over responsibility for Tongan affairs in the 
midst of a political crisis, and although he eventually Lrought about 
;1 n~conr;ideratiott of British policy in Tonga, his initial inclination 
t.;a~; to fcJllCJ~·; the lead already established. He informE:>d Tupou II that 
44. ~·!:thaffy to t·!.:ljor, conf., 2 January 1911, HPHC 4, 1431/1910. 
.~ r: 
liJ. TupcHl II to Campbell, 27 June 1911, HPHC 4, 753/1911. 
4>:,, Taps;u !1 to Ha.jor, 9 December 1910, HPHC 4 426/19Hi. , 
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.• o high-handed action had taken place in Tonga and explained to the 
Colonial Office that the protests were the result of the King's 
• shifty and disingenuous character' • [ 4 7] But officials in London 
were concerned about Mahaffy's proceedings in Tong~. They urged May 
to proceed with great caution and as far as possible to 'give no 
opening for allegations of high-handed interference and the like.'[48] 
On the matter of Campbell's elevation to the Cabinet, the Secretary of 
State commented: 
I should have thought that, as the British Representative, 
he [the Consul] would have held a stonger position had he 
remained outside, and while I do not wish to interfere with 
your discretion or to impair your and his authority by 
reversing the step which has been taken, I think it should 
be regarded at present as an experiment which should be 
carefully watched, especially as I note that the King took 
strong exception to it.[49] 
The Secretary of State's reaction to the changes affecting the Chief 
Justice :; even more cautious; he would only approve Mahaffy's 
actions on condition that Skeen's removal and the appointment by the 
British Government of his successor received the full approval <. f the 
King and his Ministers and that the Tongan Government would bear all 
expenses in connection with the new appointment. 
The conciliatory attitude adopted by the Colonial Office caused 
!·lay to re-think High Commission policy towards Tonga. In instructions 
to Campbell he stressed that it was 'of the first importance to avoid 
any appearance of coercion 1 in dealing with the King and that in order 
to remove Skeen it was 'very necessary, indeed almost essential, to 
secure thE> complete and unqualified cons·.~nt of Kinr, George 
47, ~-!ay to Tupou II, 5 April 1911, t·lPHC 4, 426/1910; Nay to c.o., 11 
Apri.! 1911, vl'PHC 4, 753/1911. 
.:.~;. C.O. to Hay, conf., 28 Jum• 1911, HPllC 4, 753/1911. 
·~9. Ibid. 
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Tupou.'[50] But May's words of caution came too late to avert a 
major political crisis. British policy in Tonga had not so far been 
based on consent and the British Conrul had become too involv~d in 
Tongan politics to extract himself gracefully. By the time Hay's 
instructions reached Campbell, he was engaged in yet another battle 
1-1ith the King and Government this time as a result of the closure 
of an extremely popular Tongan cooperative society, the Tonga Ma'a 
Tonga Kautaha (Tonga for the Tongans Company). Although Campbell was 
cleared by a court of law fro~ any official involvement in the closure 
of the Kautaha, there can be no doubt that iL was at his instigation 
and on his advice that the Kautaha was closed, its books and assets 
seized, and some £8,000 in Tonga taxpayers' money spent during the 
resultant chaos. Perhaps, without the other sources of cnnflict, 
British authority in Tonga might have survived the Kautaha affair, but 
t;.<: combination of its disastrous effects and other British actions in 
Tonga gave the Tongan King a valid reason to argue for greater 
autonomy. 
THE Tonga Ma'a Tonga Kautaha was established in May 1909 by 
Alexander D. Cameron, a local European resident. ~Vi thin a few months 
it had become an important organisation, both commercially and 
Sj~b0llr.ally, for a great many Tongans. The Kautaha provided an 
r '1· al trading avenu<: for Tongans to participate in the European comme c < 
~>YStt•m and so b~e c,:'( ~k role and profits of foreign traders· Through 
;r). !·iay tc Campbell, 8 August 1911, WPHC 4, 753/1911. 
it, Tongan producers were able to sell their copra to the best 
advantage, bypassing European middle-men. Intially the Kautaha was 
simply a commission agency which exported its members' copra and gave 
them the exact overseas price less duty, freight and 6d a sack 
(approx. 8/- a ton) commission which went to the President. It also 
imported goods in wholesale quantitites --members could obtain flour, 
cabin biscuits, tinned beef or fish or other goods at cost price, plus 
expenses and 5% commission. Plans to expand into the retail business 
had little time to come to fruition. 
Set against the normal profits which the European tra.ders 
expected £3- £4 a ton on copra and 15 to 20% on imported goods 
the Kautaha brought real savings to its members. The difference in 
prices may well have been even gr~ater than is reflected by these 
figures; it seems to have been common enough for traders to charge 
Tongans twice what they charged Europeans, an issue which intensified 
resentment against the traders.[51] There were, however, some 
drawbacks to shipping through the Kautaha. Payment was sometimes 
subject to a two-month delay so that when members needed ready money 
they would still sell to European traders. Members also contributed 
towards the Kautaha's working expenses. Apart from the membership fee 
of 12/- and annual payments of 4/-, there we~e collections, usually in 
the form of a sack of copra, towards new ventures such as the purchase 
of a schooner or the building of a copra shed. From the evidence 
available it seems certain, however, that Tongans could and did save 
money through the Kantah~ . .' 
Sl. May to c.o., conf., 23 September 1911, and encls., C( 225/97 • 
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But it was not the commercial advantage alone that attracted 
members. As the name Tonga Ma'a Tonga signified, the Kautaha served 
as a vehicle for Tongan aspirations, a means of regaining some of that 
prized Tongan independence which had been eroded in the economic as 
well as the political field. Members hoped that European business 
skills would provide the key not merely to economic improvement, but 
to a new kind of existence in which foreigners would no longer be 
needed·. Four of the key posts in the Kautaha President, 
A~countant, and Branch Managers in Ha'apai and Vava'u --were held by 
Entopeans but, according to the President, it was the avowed aim of 
this 'progressive movement' to lift the Tongans out of the 'sticky mud 
of ignorance' and throw 'the whole light of day on the business habits 
of the papalangi' .[52] The Kautaha bore some resemblance to a cult 
movement and members looked towards their association and its 
President, Cameron, with almost mystical reverence. According to the 
Premier, Mateialona, Cameron was spoken of generally amongst Kautaha 
members as 'an angel descended from Heaven to deliver them from the 
bondage of the White traders' .[53] 
With !ts nationalistic overtones and economic advantages, it is 
little ~vond,<:!r that the Kautaha rapidly took hold throughout Tonga. 
Its mass membership was testimony to its popularity: by February 1910 
the Kautaha boasted 3,280 members (1,280 in Tongatapu, 1,200 in Vava'u 
and 800 in Ha' a pi) , some 60% of all taxpayers. [54] Included in this 
52. Document 'C', Appendix to Tonga Government Gazette Extraordinary, 
no. 8, 1911. 
53. lntc'rvi2w with Premier, 9 September 1911, encl. 6 in Hay to c.o., 
conf., 23 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
54 • Doctnnent 't1' , Appendix to Tonga Government Gazette .§_x tra~r~<!_~-~<:.I.:t• 
no. 8, 1911. 
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number were many of Tonga's most influential chiefs and nobles. 
Although real control of the organisat:ion lay with Cameron, the 
~taha 1 s formal Constitution (drawn up by Robert Hanslip) provided 
the Tongans w·ith a 3ystem of Trustees and Representatives -- the 
former to collaborate on important decisions and safeguard the 
Tongans' interests, the latter to convey information back to the 
villages. On Cameron's advice, the organisation of the Kautaha was 
based on that of the Free Church,[55] which also provided a base for 
membership. After all, the Kautaha' s cc·ncern for autonomy was the 
same force that had provoked the formation of the Free Church in 1885. 
The popularity of Cameron and the !autaha contrasts strongly with 
the official condemnation heaped upon them by Campbell and other 
European officials. As the Colonial Office later noted, the officials 
involved made a crucial mistake in failing to appreciate early enough 
just how firmly the Kautaha as an idea and Cameron as its apostle had 
gripped the people.[56] Far removed from the villages and the 
attitudes of Kautaha members, Campbell seemed to find the whole 
attempt to bypass European traders contemptible. There can be little 
conjecture as to where his sympathies, and those of his superiors in 
the High Commission, lay. British and German merchants were 
definitely feeling the effects of the Kautaha trade. For individual 
small traders in particular, the Kautaha threatened ruin. [57] 
55. Cameron, 'Hemoirs'. 
'ifi. :-Iinute, 25 November 1911, on May to c.o., conf., 23 Septl~mber 
19111 CQ 225/97 • 
Hay to c.o., conf., 23 September 1911 and ends., CO '225/97. 
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While these conditions lay in the background, the decision to 
close the Kautaha was not taken in this context. It was the character 
and financial operations of the President, Cameron, on whlch the 
justification for the closure was to hinge. Cameron, a 37 year old 
Englishman, had spent four years in Ceylon, India and Australia before 
being appointed manager of the Tongan branch of Burns Philp in 1901. 
i.Jhen his business ventures on their behalf failed, Cameron took to 
drink and banished himself to 'a distant iRland' for 15 months to 
regain 'moral control'. In 1903 he married Kelela Cocker, the 
daughter of a European trader and a Tongan woman, and for a time 
worked lands belonging to her family. [58] Cameron's local marriage, 
together with his lifestyle, made him anathema to Campbell. The fact 
that Cameron had been declared a bankrupt shortly before the Kautaha 
opened and that, within a year of its operation, he had earned between 
\' 1,300- r.l,500, was not overlooked by CampbelL There was no doubt 
at all in the latter's mind that Cameron was a rogue who was 
shamefully exploiting 'ignorant and trustful natives' .[59] 
Campbell's first official involvement with the Kautaha occurred 
in August 1910, when he presided over a libel suit t'lhich Cameron 
brought against R.G.M. Denny, a former Kautaha employee who was now 
promoting a rival organisation. After giving judgement against 
Cameron, Campbell impounded the Kautaha' s books (an action which 
Cameron claimed was illegal) and handed them over to the Tongan 
Government, declaring that the Tongans were being exploited 'in a 
s•::·mdalous manner'. [60] On Campbell's urging, and t.;ri th Cane ron's 
Petition of A.D. Cameron, 10 Novl!:nber 1910, \?PUC 4, 1278/1910. 
Can:;pbf!ll to ~·fajor, 26 August 1910, ~· 
l.ampuell to Hateialona, 18 August 1910, encl. l in Cmapbell 
:·Zajor, 12 September 1910, ibi<.!_· 
to 
< 
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blessing, an audit was made by Roberts and G B h • • Hump ries, a 
Sydney accountant who happened to be passing through. Their report, 
published on the Premier 1 s sole authority in a Tonga Government 
Gazette Extraordinary on 26 August 1910 was, as an editorial in the 
Fiji~ commented, certainly extraordinary.(61] It began its 
indictment with the statement: 
that all 
exist; 
the date 
whole of 
the assets appearing in the Balance Sheet do not 
and that liabilities incurred by the Kautaha befo.e 
of balance do not appear on the sheet, and the 
the books are without a doubt faked.[62] 
Nm.;here in the report was the~e any admissable evidence to prove this 
claim. iolhile it showed that the Kautaha had not been run very 
efficiently and was subject to chiefly appropriation, the report 
contained inconsistencies and was obviously the result of prejudices 
running deeper than a mere perusal of ~he books. 
It was on the strength of this report that -the Kautaha was 
closed. But the decision did not come from the Tongan Privy Council. 
In a move which reflected the extent of Kautaha support, the Council 
ruled that the Premier and Roberts sh0uld meet Kautaha members, read 
them the report, and seek their opinion regarding the Kautaha 1 s 
closure. The meeting took place on 25 August and, although members 
and Trustees were present, Cameron was not invited. After the report 
W:ls rea.d, Hateialona mE>rely notified the meeting that the Govt.>rnment 
would close the Kautaha. In response to objections from those 
present, he dir~cted the Minister of Police, Polutele Kaho, to guard 
th•,! ~~;~t:.:~~ premises and to seize its assets.[63] 
~:. Fiji Times, 12 Octoter 1910. 
_ . ...., _____ ,--·--
• 6::. Tunt~a Govern:nent Gazette Extraordinary, no. 25, 1910. 
~--... ,;>-______ ----~- --..--~- -~----
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Mateialona's action, taken in opposition to the Privy Council and 
the wishes of the Kautaha members, was clearly the result of 
Campb~.~ll' s influence and backing. In Pr 1. vy Council, Hateialona had 
argued strongly against closing the Kautaha and, in view of this, the 
Hinister of Police questioned on whooe authority the inst ·uc tions were 
given. Polutele later reported to the High Commissioner: 
The Premier told me he had 
that these instructi0ns 
Council ••• The Premier told 
into trouble.[64] 
instructions from the Consul and 
were more powerful than the Privy 
me to close it or I might get 
This report of Campbell's attitude was subsequently confirmed from a 
number of sources, including Campbell himself. In his Memoirs 
(lvritten in old age but not published), Cameron claimed the existence 
of a letter from Campbell to the Premier, instructing him to close the 
Kautaha. [ 65] No other mention of such a letter has been found, 
however, and it may well have been no more than a Cameronian literary 
device. 
Subsequent to the closure, Cameron ~vas charged in the High 
Commissioner's Court with having 'unlawfully, wilfully and with intent 
to defraud' published a false balance sheet, anrl with a further charge 
that he 1 did use moneys of the Tonga Ha' a Tonga Kautaha for his own 
personal use without the authority of the Trustees of the said 
The embezzlc::,nent charge was throtm out at the> 
preliminary examination before Campbell on 26 and 27 October 1910. 
And at the trial, from 27 to 29 December, the Hon. A. Ehrhardt, the 
04, Intervi~w with Minister of Police, 9 September 1911, encl. 7 in 
~ay to c.o., conf., 23 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
~~. I" 
·- •.cu:wron, 'Hemoirs' • 
• ( r. in c.""'. pb·•ll to !.fa,)' or, 9 t;ovt·:nber 
'J• "opy of Information, encl. -"'·' ._ 
!910, \·1PHC 4, 1278/1910. 
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Acting Chief Judicial Commissioner for the Western Pacific, acquitted 
Cameron of falsifying the balance sheet. No evidence of deliberate 
falsity could be produced. Horeover, as Ehrhardt pointed out in his 
Judgement, Humphries, the Liquidate•: ~ had been forced to admit that 
though the Kautaha was not being run for profit, he had realised more 
than the book debts for most of 11e assets and with prudent management 
there would be sufficient funds to pay the creditors in full.[67] 
Ehrhardt's Judt~vment, delivered on 2 9 December, was severely 
critical of the Government's actions. Of Humphries he declared: 
His evident bias, and prejudice, amounting to 
against the accused, ana his want of candor, left 
impression on my mind. 
animosity 
a very bad 
As for the closure itself, Ehrhardt concluded that it has been carried 
out by the 'very high-handed and I cannot but thinl~ ill-adivsed action 
of the authorities 1 , While noting that it would be a matter of some 
surprise if those in power did not regard the formation of such a 
large and important association with some uneasiness, he pointed out: 
I need hardly say that they should take measures to secure 
that such associations are conducted in a proper and 
business-like manner ••• They should not, by indirect and 
high-handed action, attempt to wreck them or without just 
cauGe which can be upheld in a court of law stop their 
operation. [68] 
Ehr .. ardt' s Judgement weighed heavily on Campbell; complained 
to the Acting High Commissioner of the criticisms made in Court and 
d h 1 d tt nmptnd to wreck the ;u·,.,ut! t at the Tongan Governmcmt 1a never a " '"" 
J:::utaha. r~ather, 'On l!!V recommendation, steps Wl'l.''-' tak. to prl'VCtlt , 
fio-«-....... _.__=---
-- _.. .....---~----'-
f,7 • Copy of Judgt~ment in Rex v \~_<~l!~-<:12, end • in Nay to c.o.' 
l\.i~ri.l 1911,- CO 225/95~_--- ·-
GL. !bid, _.....,,____ __ 
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if possible, the Kautaha becoming bankrlpt.' If the Government had 
wanted to destroy it, he claimed, the best way Fould have been to take 
1,0 action at all, in which case the Kautaha would have ended up 
'hopelessly bankrupt and irrevocably wrecked' .[69] Mahaffy, who was 
in Tonga during the trial, was also upset at the outcome. In a 
personal letter to Ehrhardt, which the latter saw as serious contempt 
of court, he w~ote: 
I am very sorry indeed that this prosecution failed to prove 
that Cameron is the swindler th~t he most certainly is.[70] 
Although the Court had ialled to implicate Cameron in any 
fraudulent dealings and despite Ehrhardt's remarks, the campaign 
against Cameron and the Kautaha continued. Not long after the trial, 
an attempt was made to exclude from Tonga not only Cameron but also 
his former Auckland agent, Robert Millar, who was building a 
flourishing business out of the wreck of the Kautaha with the support 
of Cameron and his disappointed followers. The proposal was put 
before the Acting High Commissioner in Fiji by two lawyers -- Lancelot 
Indermaur, a recent arrival in Tonga who had been counsel for the 
,~osecution at Cameron's trial, and Humphrey B~rkeley, u somewhat 
notoriuus Suva lawyer whose retention by the Premier (with the 
Cvnsul' s connivanc~) as adviser to the Goverr.ment a.t the exorb1t:ant 
foe! of 2,000 guineas 'o'l:ls to become yet another nail in the offici.:tl 
coffin of William Telfer Caopbell. Campbell vigorously supported the 
prohibition of Cameron from the entire Western Pacific, although he 
felt Millar's exclusion premature.[71} His views on Cameron were 
1 '~· ':;i~pbell to thjor, 6 Jcwuary 1911, HPHC 4, 102/lSlll, (cmpkwio 
adcic>d). 
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shared by a number of European merchants and traders who, in 
January 1911, petitioned the High Commissioner to the effect that 
'such a state of affairs as conducted by thn sa~l~ AD c 
.... ... • • ameron is 
calculated to seriously prejudice ~he white community as a whole in 
the eyes of the uatives'. [72] 
By this time Major Wa3 becoming concerned by the proceedings. He 
realised that the situation was explosive, especially in view of 
c".meron' s acqu' ttal. He wanted no part at all in the decision and 
ins true ted Campbell tn be particularly careful not to involve the High 
Commissioner, even by implication, in any step to be taken by the 
Tongan Government: 
The matter at present solely concerns the Government of 
Tonga and your position as adviner to that Government does 
not imply t~at the High Commissioner is in any way concerned 
in the matter •• ,1 sincerely urge upon you the absolute 
necessity of regarding the matter in its present stage as 
\vholly a Tongan one to the absol·,t:e exclusion of the High 
Commissioner.[73] 
Major's w~~ds highlighted an anomalous position: Campbell's 
advice as British Consul to the Tong~n Government should no longer be 
regarded as British advice. Was it then to be merely the advice of av 
individual? If so, was the Tc')ngan Government still bound by the 
Treaty to take it? Although Major's confusion may in part be 
~ttributed to the temporary nature of his appointment, lt also 
reflects the uncertainty of the British position. 
72. Putition. of ~Ierch\. ... s and Traders of TonGa, encl. in C3 mphell 
:t:.jor, 7 January 1911, ~i_'!_· 
:'1. fJraft telegram to CanphPll, in Hinutes, 2', Janu:1ry 1911, ibi'u. 
t.o 
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Hajor' s determination that the High Commis"ioner should nor be 
associated with the matter at this stage was also reflected in hi& 
instructions to Hahaffy to proceed to Tonga for a second time • to 
assist Hr Campbell in a difficult position in which he was faced owing 
to the anticipated resuscitation of the Kautaha and the rl!turn of Mr 
Cameron from Fiji' (where he had gone. to seek legal advice).[74] It 
seems that Hajor did not trust Campbell's ability to keep aloof from 
the cr~sis in Tonga, and so Hahaffy was sent to watch events, not to 
interfere in any way, but to impress upon Campbell the necessity of 
leaving the matter to the. Tongan Government. Mahaffy's brief visit in 
Februar~/Narch 1911 earned him the name 'picnicing Hahaffy' becnuse 
the Fiji Times cor .~spondent could not discover what else he did; he 
ct:rtain1y did nothing to allevi<~te the situation. [75] Hahaffy' s 
sym;1athies decidc<lly lay with Campbell's, and the latter w,1s already 
too far embroiled to extricate himself. Besides, the Kautaha battle 
had developed its own n orr 'ntum, provoked by Berkeley and Humphri ..,n 
one side and tlv~ Kautaha lawyer, George Scott, together with SkN'n, on 
thL' other. 
By the time of }1ahaffy' s visit, the forces of the Kautaha had 
bt•gun to rally and, taking strength from Cameron's acquittal, they 
pr~epared for an assault on t.he authorities who had deprived them of 
their association and property. On 8 February 1911, Scott, acting 
under ins true tions from the Kautaha trust Pes, askt..•d Campbell to issut• 
uumra~mse>s againct Roberts, Humphries and himself as British Connul, 
f<Jr illt>gally entering tlw Kaut;_,c~}ta's premises and carrying off its 
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the value of the assets and £7,000 damages.[76] Campbell refused to 
issue the summonses, informing Scott that he would not be a party to 
'farcical proceedings' .[77] The Kautaha promptly took out the 
summonses in Suva and the .1earing was set down for mid-June, a1 though 
it was subsequently delayed until August. 
In addition to seeking legal redress, Scott proposed to the 
Premier in mid-January that a meeting between Cabinet and Council 
might settle the matter amicably, but the offer was declined,[78] and 
in mid-Harch the Kautaha solicitors in Fiji, William Scott and Co, 
(no relation to George Scott) celled on Sir Francis May asking him to 
appoint a Commis:·: ·ln of Inquiry, or to go himself to Tonga and inquire 
into the circumst.,.;<.!es of the Kautaha' s suppression. But Hay, who at 
that stage had been in Fiji only about two weeks, followed Najar's 
example of not getting involved. He told Scott that the Tongan 
Government had taken legal action in the matter and that he could not 
interfere. [79] 
The threatened action by Kautaha trustees, together with rumours 
that the Kautaha was soon to be revived, created what Na.haffy 
described as 'a big stir' amonest Tongans. [ 80] According to 
Campbell, the unrest was so considerable that 'strong measures' might 
76, \~rit of Summons and Particulars of Claim, WPHC 4, 1278/1910. 
77 • Campbell to Hajor, 17 February 1911, f!?.~c!.· 
713. ~, PO, Campbell __ , __ _ et Evidence of Mateialona in Cameron et al v 
------"' .,.-,- ·~· - -uns:ntt~d papers. 
79 • mnut(; by ~-!ay, 31 Harch 1911, WPHC 4, 1278/1910 • 
~'1. !·1ahaffy to Hay, 28 Hareh 1911, encl. in Nay to c.o., 13 April 
1911, co 22:J/95. 
Page 198 
be needed if it continued.[81] This unrest, together with the 
completion of two further official reports on the affairs of the 
I~autaha, apparently convinced the Tongan Government, or at least its 
advisers, that the immediate suppression of Kautaha activities was 
desirable. The reports -- one by the liquidator, Hump~ri~s, and one 
supplied by the Fiji Government Auditor at the request of the Acting 
High Commissioner -- were published as a Tonga Government Gazette 
Extraordinary (No. 8/11), on 3 March. Humphries' report concentrated 
particularly on what he called the exploitation by Cameron of the 
religious and nationalistic feelings of the Tongans, and repeated many 
of the charges already thrown out of court. The reports did prove 
that the Tongans themselves had very little idea of the financial 
wvrkings of the Kautaha, and that the rLnancial side had not been 
managed very efficiently, but their authors continued to overlook the 
fact that the Kautaha 1 s founders had never intended it to run for a 
profit. 
Subsequently, the Tongan Privy Council on the advice of 
Berkeley and in the absence of the King -- passed two ordinances 
directed at the Kautaha. Both Mahaffy and Campbell supported the 
legislation Mahaffy subsequently reported that they both believed 
the Govervment to be 'perfectly justified'.[82} One of the 
ordinances (No. 5/11), gave the King in Council wide powers to issue 
an Order of Prohibition against any non-native believed to be 
'disaffected' to the King or Government 'or otherwise dangerous to th.; 
P~a"e of good order of tht> kingdom' • [ 83] Obviously designed fur use 
81. Campbell to !-lay, 18 April 1911, WPHC 4, 1278/1910. 
'<? 1 · H t C 0 13 April 
..... :·!ahaffy to Ma.y, 28 J:.1arch 1911, enc • ~n .-.ay o • ., 
1911, co 225/95. 
~1. Ordinance No. 5, 1911. 
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against Cameron, the Ordinance was criticised by European church 
leaders as abrogating the right of non-Tongans to the jurisdiction of 
the High Commissioner's court, as provided in Section v of the 1900 
Treaty. [ 84] Perhaps because of this, and because the support of the 
High Commissioner could not be guaranteed in the event of a 
deportation, the Ordinance was never invoked. The other Ordinance 
(No. 4/11), was an even more remarkable piece of legislation, 
revealing 'a control and restriction of the liberties of private 
individuals ••. that can only be described as amazing' .[85] Aptly 
labelled 'panic-stricken' ,[86] it was designed to replace an earlier 
Ordinance, 17/10,[87] until proper company legislation could be 
introduced. Sections 4 and 5 had the effect of forbidding 
associations between Tongans and non-Tongans for the purpose of 
trading, on the grounds that such associations were 'likely to be to 
the loss and damage of the natives of Tonga' and, more significancly, 
were 'likely to lead to exclusive dealing or boycotting and 
hence ••• likely to cause loss and damage to non-native persons occupied 
in the legitimate conduct of trading operations with His Majesty's 
Tongan subjects'. Section 3 amouated to an indemnity for the 
authorities who had closed the Kautaha, and was obviously designed to 
forestall the threatened court action: 
It shall be unlawful for any Tongan to bring any 
lm.; in any court against any member of the Tongan 
or against any officer or officers employed by 
Government or acting by the authority of the said 
action at 
Governr.1ent 
the said 
Government 
84 • Page, Watkin, Willis, Petition to Sir Francis May, 26 June 1911, 
viPHC 44, 11.52/1910. 
86. 
Ibid. 
--
Ibid. 
-
Ordinance No. 17, 1910, forbade tlw conm'ct ion of a Europl·<m with 
a Kautal~ without Cabinet consent • 
on its behalf for any 
suppression, winding 
~ Kautaha. 
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act done by them or any of them in the 
up or liquidation of ••• the Tonga Ma 1 a 
This section of the Ordinance was made effective retrospective to 
August 1910, thus coming into conflict with Clause 20 of the 
Constitution which forbade retrospective legislation. As a final 
touch, a further section hit directly at Cameron 1 s connections with 
the Tongan people. It was made unlawful for any native of Tonga 
to give, subscribe, collect, or to aid, assist or abet in 
the subscription or collection of any money or produce for 
the purpose of helping any non-native who in the past may 
have been associated with natives of Tonga for the purpose 
of trading or in any Kautaha.[88] 
These strenuous efforts to disarm the Kautaha had little effect 
other than to make martyrs of its members and supporters because the 
case was to be tried in the High Commissioner's Court and not under 
Tongan law. Thus the case of Cameron and the Kautaha Trustees .., 
Campbell, Roberts and Humphries was heard in Tonga before packed 
houses from 9-18 August 1911. The Court was presided over by none 
other than Sir Charles Major, who had now returned to his substantive 
post of Chief Judicial Commissioner for the Western Pacific. After 
three days Major dismissed the charge against Campbell on the grounds 
of insufficient evidence. The case against the other two defendants 
continued and Major finally found for the defendants with costs, on 
the grounds that the closure and related matters were Acts of State 
into which he ~ould not inquire.[89] 
d&. Ordinance No. 4, 1911. 
89. !·lay to c.o., 1 September 1911 and t.mds., WPHC 4, 1278/1910. 
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Major's judgement was, to say the least, open to attack. In a 
private letter to May, Major himself admitted that his judgement had 
been given 'not however without some doubt'.[90] Legal officials in 
the Colonial Office had little doubt that it would be reversed on 
appeal. [ 91] The case was also suspect from another point of view. 
Few officials doubted that Mateialona perjured himself at the trial. 
He claimed that he had received no instructions to close the Kautaha 
that he had simply read the reports and come to his own 
conclusions. This, as the Fiji Times acidly commented, was rather 
strange when the Premier could not read English.[92] 
The Kautaha had lost the battle but not the war. Just. a week 
after the trial, Skeen facilitated the re-formation of the Kautaha 
when, in response to an application from Cameron and the trustees, he 
suspended the Ordinance which prohibited it. That Skeen had good 
grounds for doing so cannot be refuted. Even Major, in the course of 
his judgement, had expressed himself in agreement with the Kautaha 
lawyer's contention that the Ordinance 'was and is null and void, as 
being contrary to the Constitution of Tonga and not enacted as an 
amendment to that Constitution in valid manner'. [93] However, 
Campbell, who had no legal qualifications, was not really interested 
in legal considerations. As far as he was concerned, Skeen's action 
would have the effect of 'nullifying all the endeavours made by the 
Government of Tonga and myself to protect the interests of the people 
90. Major to May, private, 18 August 1911, WPHC 4, 753/1911. 
91. Minutes on May to c.o., con£., 2 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
92, Fi.ii Times, 31 Aueust 1911; see also minute by A.B. Keith, 
Fe'h'ruary -1912, on Nay to c.o., 21 December 1911, CO 225/98. 
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of Tonga.' [94] He immediately went to the King with Humphrey 
Berkeley and demanded that the suspension be withdrawn and that Skeen 
himself be suspended. 
This interview, which took place on 25 August 1911, represented 
the climax of Campbell's attempts to force his advice on to an 
umvl.lling King· Tupou II had already been forced to remove Skeen from 
Cabinet and had no intention of losing him al t, ·gether. He based his 
stand entirely on the Constitution, arguing L.lt the advice now 
tendered conflicted with the Constitution, while the action of the 
Chief Justice was in accordance with that revered document. But to 
Campbell the Constitution was nothing more than a hindrance to be 
relegated to second place behind the Agreement under which the King 
was 1ledged to take British advice. Campbell and Berkeley demanded a 
simple 'Yes' or 'No' answer to their 'advice' before they would leave 
the room. If the answer was no, Campbell told the King, 
By this one act you are cutting the halliards of your own 
flag, and sooner or later it must come down. 
With a characteristic lack of diplomacy, he chided the King: 
I object to being sent by His Majesty's British Government 
to deal with children, I want to deal with men.[95] 
But the King remained adamant. He refused to sign a document agreeing 
to Skeen's immediate suspension from office, and the Ordinance 
remained in abeyance. 
the Campbell's bluff had been called. Berkeley suggested that 
Consul should himself suspend Skeen, but Camp boll was not prepared to 
"~ tl · f fi th" Cabl'net, hoping to use his 
· us ar. HE! turned rst to .... 
:J4, Campbell to Hay, 28 August 1911, HPHC 4, 1489/1911. 
95 • lntervicw with His Hajesty the King, 25 August 1911' sub-encl. (b) 
in encl., Hay to c.o., 2 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
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influence there to obtain a vote against Skeen with which he might 
then over-ride the King's resistance. But the Cabinet was no longer 
with him -- loyalties were beginning to change. Even Polutele Kaho, 
who had once courted British support to get rid of the King, refused 
to cast his vote against Skeen depite being threatened with dismissal 
by Campb>!ll. [ 96] Polutele's change of allegiance indicated the 
extent to which Campbell had alienated himself from Tongan opinion. 
Finding no support in Tonga, Campbell turned to the High 
Commissioner, sending the new Tongan Government Auditor, H. Harcourt, 
to Suva to lay the situation before May. Campbell's own 
recommendation was that the King be removed from Tonga, for a time at 
least, and that two or three of the foreigners be deported. Except 
for the Premier, he felt himself to be alone against a formidable 
array of enemies. The only way he could see to improve the situation 
was by force. He was prepared 'to adjust matters and to maintain my 
position here as far as circumstances will admit' but, ominously, he 
wanted to be supplied with a small number of reliable police in order 
to carry out the strong measures he believed necessary.[97] 
96. Interview with Hinister of Police, 9 Septembt~'· 
May to c.o., conf., 23 Septe~ber 1911, CO 22~. 
97, Campbell to May, 28 August 1911, WPHC 4, 1~ 
, 171 ... in 
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MAY judged the situation serious enough to warrant his immediate 
int~rvention and visited Tonga from 7-16 September 1911. His task was 
a difficult one-- he had to reconcile Campbell's actions, and those 
of British officials in general, with the Colonial Office warning 
against 'high-handed interference and the like.' His difficulty was 
at first revealed in contradictory actions. Before his visit, May had 
noted that he was not impressed by Campbell's action over Skeen, nor 
by the 'singularly tactless language' that Campbell and Berkeley had 
used in their interview with the King on 25 August. [ 98] Then, in his 
first interview with the King on 8 September, May even went so far as 
to disassociate himself from the demand for Skeen's immediate 
suspension which he described as 'bad advice 1 • [99] Subsequently, 
h01vever, he addressed the King with a series of demands based for the 
most part on Campbell 1 s reports. It was even more unfortt.. .• ate for May 
that the legal advice tendered to him by Major also turned out to be 
'hopelessly wrong' .[100] May made three demands: that the King 
dispense with Skeen's services by Jl December; that a proclamation be 
issued declaring Skeen's suspension of the Ordinance to be null and 
void; and that no Kautaha be permitted without certain stipulated 
Although the last demand was eventually satisfied in 
principle, •the first two were never met. As one offici~l in the 
Colonial Office commented, May 
9L. May to c.o., 2 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
9~ • Ih · 1 1 1 l.C, • , (!UC • 
ccii2:>/97. 
•1 t c 0 conf 23 SCiltt>mber 1911, in •. :J.Y o • • , • • 
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••• had to 
every one 
before the 
undergo the humiliation of having to withdraw 
of his demqnds, and to appear as a humble suitor 
King who has trium?hed all along the line.[lOl] 
Tupou II had neither the leral knowl~dge nor the awareness of 
European political thinki:1g to fi,'3ht his own battle against the High 
Commissioner, and the 1uali ty of the advice he received was crucial. 
In the past he had used a variety of European advisers, including 
traders, minor officials, and resident lawyers. ln 1905 he had 
employed an Auckland lawyer, Thomas CottF'., w plead his case, and now 
he engaged another, R.N. Moody, \vhose ability and qualifications \•Wr•3 
of the highest. Moody was a !.""' tner in the Auckland law firm, Moody, 
Haek.ett and Moody and had been Lec..:urer in Lm-1 at the Auckland 
University since 1908.[102] His connection \Vith Tonga seems to have 
begun through Cameron, \Vho engaged him in the Rex v Cameron case in 
December 1910, and he subsequently acted for the Kautaha in S~~l! ~ 
~ '!._ Campbell et al. Bl' t Moody was not only solicitor to the Kautaha. 
l~'hile on a three month visit to Ne\V Zealand early in 1911, Tupou II 
had engaged Moody as his legal adviser, instructing him: 
to take such steps and matw such repree::entations to such 
persons as may seem to you advisable, lVith a view 
to ••• secure the due observance of the Treaty (dated 18 May 
1900 and ratified 16 February 1901) made between Great 
Britain and -z:::.,~a ana to remedy the grievances of which my 
subjects complain in connection with Ute present 
administration by the B:dtish Agent in Tonga. [103] 
To tlds end, Hoody was responp.i'i>le for nearly all of Tupou II' D 
correspondence. Thanks to Noody, the King's letters were a great 
d · · · 1 · 1 for tlte Consl:itution succ.;ess -- well fraiiled, au ma~ntc..4n1.ng us zea 
Ibid. 
----",.,._ 
~r:::. rJl>itUclry, Auc:l:lmtd Stdr, 2 January 1937; 
Februu~·y f91T:-t.YIS1ir. ~4;-388/1911. 
Hoody to Grve1W, 27 
l~l. IupJu II to Mc•udy, 2~ M~rch 1911, PO, unsorted papers. 
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and for his proper position as an independent sovereign. As one 
official in Fiji minuted on the receipt of one of Tupou ll's adroit 
letters-- 'The voice is Tupou's voice, but the hands are the han1s of 
~1r Moody.' [104] 
Hith the law and constitution on his side, e.nd Noody to argue 
them, the King had a strcng case. It was doubtful, he contended, if 
he had the power to dismiss the Chief Justice even if he wanted to. 
According to Clause 88 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice held 
offi~e 'during good behaviour', and the only means provided for his 
removal seemed to be impeachment by the Legislative Assembly for 
improper conduct. Although Tupou II refused to dismiss Skeep 
arbi t ;rily, he was prepared, in proper legal form, to support a 
proposal to impeach Skeen at an early meeting of the Legislative 
Assembly, provided the High Commissioner would supply him with the 
necessary evidence of Skeen's improper conduct. 
Finding his position untenable in law, Hay settled for the offer 
of impeachment. But when he attempted to find evidence, he was forced 
to back do\m. A charge of drunkenness could not be pressed, though it 
was considered, because there was no firm evidence that Skeen did 
habitually drink to excess, ,1nd even May conceded that he did not have 
the appearance of such a man. Other possible charges, relating to the 
taking of private practice and a failure to revise the statute books, 
werG similarly baaed on shaky ground. Perhaps the only subst::mt ic:l 
charge against Skeen was that he was known to consort with 'small 
tradl!rG and the lower class men on the beach', whidl rr;.ight be 
U:1t:·~·~;ir.!blc in a Chit..!f Justice but wan hardly groundr. for impvadu:wnt • 
tr;:,. ~Hnutt!, 12 April 1912, on Tupou li to Nay, l April 1912, v:PHG •+, 
1W;)/19l:i.. 
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Thus on the d::-y of his departure from Tonga, Hay wrote to Tupou II, 
informing him that 'le did not wish to pursue further the matter of 
Skeen's removal and regretting that so much of the King' 8 time should 
have been occupied by a question which he nm~ found himself unable to 
press.[lOS] Skeen continued as Chief Justice until his death in late 
1915. 
Of wider importance was the settlement of the future of the 
Kautaha. In all the turmoil surrounding the Kautaha up to this point 
-·---
the King had taken no part. As he explained to Noody sometime later: 
I had no interest in the Kautaha: but v1hen I sm~ ·the unjust 
way they were treated by the Government, I stood by the 
Kautaha [106] 
Tupou II made no attempt to deny his sympathy \~ith the views of his 
people and he took issue with the British officials' belief that such 
companies ~~t.~re inimical to the welfare of Tongans. ~107] Again with 
the support of the law, Tupou II refused to issue ~l'ly' s Proclamation 
declaring Ordinance 4/11 still in force, contending that Skeen's 
sur>pension of it was quite in order. Hay, having been handicapped by 
~!,1jor' s advice to the contrary, wisely decided not to press the point. 
But he was not happy with Tupou II' s proposal to leave to the 
Lc~r,iGl.:ltive Assembly the question of whether future Kautah<!_ should be 
uubjeet to reotrictions. Well aware how the reprem:ntatives, many of 
t.lwm outrar,ed members of tlw r ..... ·h:t~.!:~· would vote, Hay proposQd, and 
W.l~; eventually successful in oeeing pasncd, an Ordinance placing 
ninimal rt~strictions on future• .fu1.utalt(l• Provided that their rules of 
~·-' .. \·1y tu c.o., eonf., 23 Sc::pt•Jnber 1911, and c•nda. (enpc·dally 10 
~nJ 21), CO 225/97. 
~ r ~~ • Tup.Ju r r .. ~ to Uoodjt', 25 r1ovc~ht'r' 19H, PO, un:;ort(.'d p;lpL'r'[j • 
11'/"' 
I o I up m rr ta Ga1:1pbell, 28 Augtwt 1911 ~ tWL!C 1489/lCitl, 
.. 
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association were approved by His ~~jesty in Council, and that the 
account· were regularly audited by the AudiL."r General, Kautah~ w.::r8 
free to conduct business.[l08J An attempt to make the rules subiect 
to the High Commissioner's approval was removed at the King's 
insistence. [ 109] 
Under this temporary Ordinance and subsequent comprehensivl! and 
complex Company Legislation prepared by High Commission officials, the 
neiv T'lnga Ha' o. ~~ Kautaha l ~d., was set up. Public opinion in 
Ca!'leron'o favour was so strong that Hay realised it was hopeless to 
try to induce the Tongan Government to eliminate him from the 
manaGem~:.mt of the new Kautaha, but it seems Cameron 1 s enthusiasm had 
ivaned. ( 110] The second Kaut~b'!_ never regained the popularity of its 
predecessor, and was not a commercial success. In 1918 it was finally 
ivound up by the Government Receiver. [111] 
The overall cost of the Kautaha episode to the Tongan Government 
was considerable. A total of £7,742 was paid out, including over 
\'4,000 in legal expenses.[112] Shortly after ~he trial, Scott 
announced th•~ Kaut.aha 1 s decision to appeal aGainst Hajor' s judgement 
unless a cal ··!tory settlement was achie\•ed out of court. Tupou II 
had no .:ish to leave his subje~ts wi t.1 such a grievance and in 
108, Ordinance No. 7, 1911. 
11}9 • Notes <)f an Interview on 11 September 1911, encl. 17 in ~·hy to 
c.o., co, e,, 23 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
110. Cameron's association with 
(Cameron, 'Memoirs'). 
the new _!(autahc: was short-lived. 
llt. T(m:;o. GI)VL~rru:tent Gazette, no. 19, 1918. 
-.-.~~-- --"'·=-="""'~=-""""-~- -~ -~,. 
'f ~ ~ L•~• lreuoury n~pOrt for 1909-12, 
!912. 
no. 6, 
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Dec ember 1911, Privy Council voted £3,604 to t res ore the costs of 
1 iquidation. It seems that the liquidator's ledgers were even more 
suspect than the Kautaha's books. Further, the costs of the trial 
were never enforcerl against the Kautaha. Cameron also sought· 
compensation from the Tongan Government, and although he received only 
t: 200 of the £2,500 he claimed, all imputations on his character and 
conduct were withdrawn from the Gazettes by Order of the Privy Council 
in September 1914.[113] 
Although the Kautaf>a closure resulted in heavy :nancial loss to 
the Government, it also brought its own victories. Tupou II had been 
fighting for more than just the Tonga Ma'a Tonga V.aut~ or for Skeen; 
his constitutional right to control his own Kingdom, :.nd his 
Government 1 s right to make its own decisions unfettered by British 
demands had been at stake. Tupou II had never acknowledged Britain's 
right to interfere in his Kingdom and he was now in a good position to 
capitalise on Britains's mistakes. Appealing to Clause III of the 
1900 Treaty which precluded the Bri.tish Consul from interfering in 
internal affairs, the King argued that Campbel.l' s view of his owa 
position was 'totally erroneous' .[114] He claimed that the 1905 
AGreement did not give Campbell licence to insist that his advice be 
'slavishly followed' when ~r. was opposed to the best interests of the 
Y.ingdom as perceived by the King. Such a course would rob Tonna of 
the sliGhtest vestige of autonomy and 
see also iO:PHG 4, 
114. Tupou II to Hay, 7 ~, .. , ~r 1911, encl. 4 in Hay to c.o., conf., 
2) Scptmal:Jc:r 1911, CO ·· ,: · ·7. 
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would lead t~ the absurd result that the King of Tonga is to 
have ao vo1ce in any matter which he believes af~ect th 
f r h" b. . • s e wel ~re o~ ~s su Jects; ~n other words the King would not 
be the reigning monarch, but the British Agent. [115] 
In the course of demanding Skeen's suspension, Humphrey Berkeley 
had assured the King that if the British Consul gave bad advice, he 
alone would suffer.[ll6] But events had proved otherwise. It was 
not Campbell, but the Tongan Government and the Tongan people who had 
suffered from his ill-conceived 'advice'. Tupou II had good reason to 
call the system into doubt, and with Moody's pen he made an 
Lmpassioned plea for Tonga's independence: 
I am weary beyond measure of the existing condition n~ 
things. I have tried to preserve to my people thei. 
national existence, but there is a limit to my endu:an~e. 
Hhat does Great Britain want? Does s'!le desire to fur tlwt· 
extend her dominions by adding to her wide empire the little 
kingdom of Tonga? No resistance c!ln be offered. '-le can 
make no appeal to arms -- our only appeal can be made to the 
justi~e which is supposed to characterise Great Britain's 
treatment of weaker nations ••• Does Great Britain desire to 
render the foreign traders richer, or does she truly desire 
to leave my pbJple happy and contented?. 
If we do not adopt the wisest course in managing our own 
concerns, that will be our affair. No nation has always 
seen clearly the right course to follow. If we are to make 
mistakes, then let us learn wisdom by experionce, but as 
long as the interests of the few foreigners living in our 
midst are not endanger·~d, no just cause can be found for 
robbing us of our independence, under the guise of giving us 
the 'advice' of the British Agent.[ll7] 
Tupou II's plea for a re-examination of the relationship between 
Britain and Tonga was accompanied by an official request for the 
recall of Camp1ell from Tonga. Not only was Campbell the ~mhodiment 
115. Tupou II to Campbell, 28 Avgust 1911. WPHC t+, 1489/1911. 
ll6. Intervic>w with His Majesty tlw KinB, 2'i Au3ust 1911, sub-encl.(b) 
in encl., May to c.o., 2 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
117. Tupou II to Hay, 7 September 1911. encl. 4 in Hay_ to c.o., conf., 
23 s~rtember 1911, co 225/97. 
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of the British attitude of which the King complained, but he was also, 
the King contended, qujte unfitted for his position. The language he 
had used to the King and the threats which were a regular feature of 
his repertoire made him 'personally most distasteful' to the King and 
also, the latter surmised 1 to most of his subjects and to many foreign 
residents. [ l18] With point Tupou II argued: 
We are not deficient in intelligence -- send us a wise and 
tactful man, to whom we can safely appeal for advice, and 
you will find that we are not slow to take advantage of 
wisdom.[ll9] 
The request was sympathetically received. By the end of his 
visit to Tonga, May WdS convinced that Campbell's removal was 
necessary. He considered Campbell 'lacking in tact and dictatorial in 
his methods', and called on him to apologise to the King for the 
'truculent attitude' he had adopted during the interview of 25 
August. [120] Colonial Office officials agreed with May; they could 
see little in Campbell's favour and held him responsible for the 
problems arising from the closure of 'the Kautaha, including the 
financial loss to the Tongan Government. Although he was credited 
with having acted in what he believed to be the best interests of the 
people of Tonga·, Campbell was censured "for having 1 failed to realise 
t~e necessity of showing great tact in dealing with the King and to 
accept the limitations whi~h have been imposed upon the action of the 
British Agent by His Hajesty's Government.'[121] That these 
limitations had never been spelled out to Campbell, or that he had 
acted with the tacit support and more often the active encouragement 
118. Ibid. 
119. Ibid. 
-
120. May to c.o., conf., 23 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
121. c.o. to Hay, conf., 16 February 1912, WPHC 4, 1489/1911. 
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of his superiors in the High Commission, was not permitted to cloud 
the decision to remove him. 
Campbell's removal from Tonga was a sign that the Colonial Office 
had in large measure accepted the King's interpretation of Tonga's 
status. In fact, for the Colonial Office there was nothing new it 
had always maintained that the King and his Ministers should not be 
deprived of their lawful authority. One official minuted: 
I do not understand the objection to the King being an 
active Ruler. I can find nothing in the Constitution to 
indicate that he was intended to be anything else; I can 
see no ground on which we can desire that he should be a 
figurehead. [ 122] 
But for the first time since the signing of ne 1900 Treaty, 
officials at the Western Pacific High Commission gained a new respect 
for the Kingdom's autonomy. Early in his visit, May had challenged 
Tupou II 1 s statement that Tonga was an independent state. Rather, he 
claimed, it was 'a state under the protection of Great Britain whose 
full liberty of independent Government is somewhat circumscribed by 
Treaty and by the Supplementary Agreement' .[123] On the day he left, 
however, he addressed a letter to Campbell which amounted to a 
re-definition of High Commission policy and prescribed a much more 
limited role for the British Consul. May's letter, subsequently 
endorsed by the Colonial Office, stated that the 1905 Agreement 'does 
not mean that the Agent and Consul can insist on his advice on any 
matter being followed'. All it implied was that the Consul should be 
consulted on important issues, and could offer advice if he saw the 
adr:Jinistration being rr.ismanaged. If he was not eonsulted, or if his 
i22. Minute by A.B. Keith, 2 February 1912, on May to c.o., conf., 21 
Decemb8r 1911, CO 225/98. 
l23. Nay to Tupou II, 8 Septen1o~r 1911, encl. 5 in Hay to c.o. • conf •' 
23 September 1911, CO 225/97. 
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advice on important issues (such as trade, administration or external 
relation~) was ign°red, then he could do no more than report the 
matter to the High Co:nmissioner, [ 124] This interpretation, which 
formed part Jf the instructions to the incoming Consul, left much less 
room for in~.tiative by over- ~ealous British official: • May took the 
same opportvnity to reverse Mahaffy's earlier action in giving the 
Consul a seat in Cabinet. ln his opinion, Campbell's presence in ~he 
Cabinet placed hir.: in 'a false and anomalous position', a view which 
the Secretary of State supported.[l25] 
Tupou II welcomed these reappraisals, informing May that his 
'impartiality and tact' had re-established his own faith, and that of 
his people, in Great Britain. But there was one further change which 
Tupou II planned before he could again call the Kingdom his own. 
Since Mateialona's appointment as Premier in 1905, his presence had 
been a source of great irritation to the King. Mateialona had 
obviously become 'completely subservient to the British Agent' ,[126] 
and with unforgivable indiscretion had publicly declared: 
I tell you our country is protected, and if it is protected, 
it is (i.e. the country) the protector's, and it is right 
if the Consul says he is going to jump into the sea, [for] 
the King to follow him ••• [l27] 
On 14 October 1911, Tupou II informed the High Commissioner that 
Nateialona had lost the confidence of the King, Ministers and people 
d d d hi 1 nt 'I'he Tongan an that the interests of Tonga deman e s rep aceme • 
124. ~·1ay to Campbell, 16 September 1911, encl. 34, ibid. 
125. ~1inute by A.B. Keith, 1 November 1911, on May to c.o.' conf ·' 
September 1911, CO 225/Y7. 
l2n. Tupou II to May, 7 September 1911, encl. 4, ibid. 
127. Ibid. _.,..._ 
23 
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constitution empowered the King to dismiss his Premier, and Tupou II 
wanted that unfettered authority. In thb he met determined 
opposition from May and the Cr' ~nial Office who realised that 
Mateialona was being punished for his loyalty to the British Consul 
and for his belief that Tonga should be ruled in accordance with 
. 
British advice. Weighed against lheir reluctance to see Mateialona 
removed, however, was the question of their legal right to prevent it. 
The High Commissioner was authorised to make 'strong recommendations' 
to the King but no more -- annexation had been threateh~d too often 
and too cheaply • British officiaJ.s were finally forced to admit that 
~·li thout the King's consent there was 'np L~gal ~eans of 
intervention' .[128] 
On Moody's advice Tupou II allowed himself to be "persuaded. Eut 
he was not conceding anything; he had simply found a su~er way to 
defeat the Britiah Government. Relying on the- Legisla-tive Assembly's 
power of impeachment, Tupou II announced that he would wait and see 
• 
whet •er any 'spontaneous action' was taken against Hateialona during 
the next session.[l29] This was a brilliant move for it took th·) 
responsibility away from the King, and was fully in accord with the 
fundamental British constitutional principle that a Premier should 
retain the confidence of · u·Hament. The Colonial Office had no 
answer. On 15 May 1712, '1teialona was charged in the Legislative 
Assembly with having closed the Rautaha 'against the ins true tions of 
His Majesty and Privy Council', and with having acted without the 
authority of the Council on other specified occasions. With the 
out ·o f 1 i the Act{ng British Consul, I slay 
-- me a oregonc cone us on, ... 
128. Hinute by A.B. Keith, 4 October 1912, on Sweet-Escott 
conf. (3), 9 August 1912, CO 225/105. 
129. Tupou II to May, 1 April 1912, WPHC 4, 1855/1911. 
to c.o.' 
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McOwan, arranged a last-minute honourable settlement for Mateialona. 
In return for the withdrawal of the charges and the promise of a noble 
title, Mateialona agreed to resign from the Premiership.[l30] 
One final touch completed the King's ascendancy over British 
advice and over his own Kingdom. At the same session of the 
Legislative Assembly, the Governors of Ha'apai and Vava'u, Sione 
Tu'itavake and Sione Tupou Faletau, were impeached and subsequently 
removed frOi ,Jffice. The charges against them were not particularly 
grave -- Tu'itavake was accused of preventing the collection of money 
for the Kautaha law suit, and Faletau with supplying liquor to a 
Tongan \•mman. [131] But the real offence of each in the eyes of the 
King and the Assembly was that he had been in the wrong camp. Both 
had supported Campbell and not the ~autaha and, like Mateialona, both 
were Wesleyans and therefore permanently at odds with the officially 
endorsed Free Church. Their impeachment and dismissal was therefore 
not without point. All who had opposed the King and supported 
Campbell had now paid the penalty. There could be no doubt that, as 
the Secretary to the Western Pacific High Commission minuted, 
'deference to the British power is unadvisable for Tongan 
officials.' [132] 
130. MeOw an to May, 27 May 1912 and encls., ~· 
131. NcOwan to }fay, 22 June 1912 and encls., ibid • 
132. !Hnute by c.u. Hart-Davis, 8 July 1912, ~· 
CHAPTER 7 
The Search for Equilibrium 
I venture to express the opinion that the Tongans are not in 
the mood to be driven. tfuether it was ever in their 
character to submit to being bullied I cannot say as I have 
only a very short acquaintance with the peor>le. But my view 
is that the Agent and Consul will advanc.e the interests of 
the country far more by a tactfully conciliatory attitude 
and by the endeavour to guide rather than to coerce, the 
Tongan Government. 
[Sir Francis May to Colonial Office, conf., 21 December 1911, 
co 225/98]. 
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In the wake of the conflict over the Kautaha, Tupo,1 rr r.~d won a 
significant victory for his Government's right to dGcermine its own 
policies without the interference of the representatives of the 
British Government. Sir Francis Nay's visit to Tonga in September 
1911 had led to a redefinition of the British-Tongan relationship 
which ~1as, for the future, to be based on the principle of minimum 
interference in Tonga's domestic affairs. It took some time, however, 
for the practical implications of this to become clear. 
l~.T. Campbell, the British Agent and Consul whose interventionist 
activities provoked the crisis in 1911 was removed in April 1912 and 
with his departure the compulston to follow British 'advice' went too. 
Although the period im~<>dill'.:·;ly following May's visit was marked by 
uncertainty amongst British officials as to how far it was prudent to 
intervene, it was a tribute both to their own sensitivity and to that 
of prominent Tongan officials, that the tensions surrounding these 
questions were gradually eased. Occasional disputes aside, the six or 
seven years following the Kautaha crisis until the death of Tupou II 
early in 1918, saw the working-out of ground rules, and the 
development of a much more amicable working relationship. British 
advice, once freed from the strings of compulsion, was much more 
readily received. 
In the months following May's visit, Tupou II made no secret of 
his desire to follow up his victories over Campbell ant?. Matei.alona by 
securing the annulment of the Supplementary Agreement of 1905. 
Writing to Basil Thomson in December 1912, the King made his objective 
quite clear: 
It is my earnest wl.sh that the British Government should 
annul the Supplementary Agreement effected by im Thurn so 
Page 218 
that our Constitution and law can bq mdintained and that the 
Treaty of 1901 should hold.[l] 
In taking the initiative Tupou II was almost certainly acting on the 
advice of his legal adviser, Moody, who believed that the 
Supplementary Agreement had effectively been annulled and that in 
future the British Consul need not be consulted.[2] 
Tupou II's desire to free himself from the constraints of British 
advice received widespread support within Tonga. The members of the 
1912 session of the Legislative Assembly not only acquiesced in the 
impeachment proceedings against Mateialona and the others but they 
also gave voice to considerable anti-British sentiment. McQr;an 
described the sessions as 'stormy': 
It is obviously the intention of a majority in Parliament to 
strengthen the hands of the King in order that he may obtain 
full power and be in a position as formerly to distribute 
his favours amongst the leading spirits of this movement.[3] 
Much of the discontent that surfaced no doubt had its roots in the 
closure of the Kautaha and the autocratic behaviour of Campbell. A 
majority of the members of the Assembly had belonged to the Kautaha 
and ~vere well aware of Campbell 1 s role in its liquidation. During the 
debates, some members spoke excitedly about the Protectorate and 
criticised the controlling influence of Great Britain. A resolution 
\vas passed, by a vote ot 37 to 27, calling for the Chief Justice to 
draft a law making it an offence punishable as a felony for a Tongan 
subject to petition or complain to a representative of a foreign 
1. Tupou II to Thomson, 6 December 1912, PO, 
See also Tupou II to Thomson, 23 November 
to c.o., 16 January 1913, CO 225/123. 
uncatalogucd papers. 
1912, encl. in Thomson 
2. Hoody to Tupou II, 6 September 1912, PO/KNF 1912. 
:. McO~mn to Hay, conf., 27 ~·iay 1912, WPHC 4, 1855/1911; ~1c0wan to 
Swe<;t-I:scott, 9 September 1912, i-n>HC 4, 1830t1912. 
Page 219 
government either inside or outside the Kingdom, without first .seeking 
the approval of both Cab~:net and Privy Council. [ 4] Although the 
resolution was not acted upon in Privy Council it was obvious that a 
majority in the Legislative Assembly did not see Great Britain as a 
benevolent protector. 
In practice, too, the Tongan Government demonstrated its 
antagonism towards Britain. During the last few months of Campbell's 
term he was ignored by th:~ Tongan Government and, after a month at the 
consulate, his temporary replacement, !slay M~Owan, reported that his 
advice had been sought only on one or two unimportant matters.[S] 
Horeover, McOwan added, he found himself in no position to either 
advise or make suggestions to the Tongan Government because he had no 
means of knowing, except from outside and unreliable sources; what it 
was doing. With the departure of Mateialona, the Consul had lost his 
direct link with the executive through the Premier. 
The new Premier, who took officE:! Oil 1 October 1912, was the 
former Minister of Policl=l, Poll!tele Kaho, who had inherited the noble 
title Tu'ivakano a ft::.w months previously. Tu'ivakano (as he will be 
referred to henceforth) >tad aligned himself wlth the Britibh 
Government in order to achieve his own eii...:s but he had no intention of 
cowering to the British Consul as his predecessor had done. In the 
midst of the Kautaha cri~,;is Tu' iva1o1no had opposed the dictatorship of 
the Consul and, perhaps with an eye on the noble title (the 
succession to which was not straightforward) or on the Premiership, 
had thrown in his let with Tupou II. 
4. Report of the Proc(>edings of the 1912 Lt::Gisl<.~tive Assr.:;ubly, 
4, 1830/1912. 
S. HcOwan to Hay, "Onf., 27 May 1912, WPHC l+, 1855/1911. 
i·:PHC 
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In view of Tu' ivakano' s former support for British intervention 
and the undoubted antagonism which had existed between the King and 
himself, it is surprising that Tupou II should have appointed 
Tu'ivakano as Premier. It is unlikely, in fact, that Tu 1 ivakano was 
Tupou II's first choice for Premier he seems to have preferred 
Sipu, then Minister of Lands. It was on the advice of Moody that 
Tupou II appointed Tu 1 ivakano. ' Moody acknowledged that Tu 1 ivakano was 
unpopular with the Chiefs and people but he argued strongly that they 
would be 1 sacrificing their independence 1 by not accepting him. [ 6] 
Hoody believed that Tu 1 ivakano 1 s ability and strength of character 
were ·vital to the Kingdom's future and he was eventually successful in 
convincing Tupou II of this. It was also true that by appointing 
Tu'ivakano, Tupou II was demonstrating that he had overcome the 
factionalism that had threatened to break up his Kingdom. 
Relations between Tupou II and his Premier \'ere not always 
harmonious and Tu 1 ivakano continued to be frank and outspoken. 
Nevertheless the two achieved a good working relationship that lasted 
until the death of Tupou II, and there is evidence to suggest that 
many of the earlier wounds w.~re healed. [ 7] British officials on the 
whole found Tu 1 ivakano a capable and efficient Premier and their 
confidence in the Tongan Government's ability to work out its own 
desti;..y rested largely in him. In early 1913 McOqan contrasted 
Tu'ivakano 1 s work with that of his predecessor: 
I may say that the new Premier is not a mere figurehead. He 
is capable, industrious and business-like in his methods. 
The work of his office is now conducted with a promptness 
6. ~1oody to Tupou II, 6 September 1912, PO/KNF 1912. 
7. See, for example, Tu'ivakano to Tupou II, private, 8 
PO/K~F 1914. 
June 1914, 
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and despatch which is in marked contrast to the way it was 
conducted under the late Premier.[8] 
Under Tu'ivakano's administration a number of significant changes were 
made. In 1914, for example, it was at hi i it' · h 1 s n LatLve tat t1e 
constitution 'tv:lS amended to provide for smaller and more frequent 
meetings of the, Legislative Assembly; it became an aP.nual rather than 
a triennial event and was composed of only seven nobles and seven 
people's represe.Ltatives, so that the government members would be less 
easily outnumbered and the whole Assembly more efficient.[9] In 
January 1915 Hay's successor, Sir Bickham S\·leet-Escott, \-las 
sufficiently impressed with Tu'ivakano's administration to suggest to 
the Secretary of State, albeit unsuccessfully, that the Premier might 
be considered for an honourary CHG. [10] 
Tupou II also gained a new respect in the eyes of Britiah 
officials. In June 1914 and again in January 1915 Sw~et-Escott 
recommended him for an honourary KCHG in view of his loyalty to the 
British throne. [ 11) The conflict of the years 1905-1912 had 
undoubt~dly instilled in Tupou II an understanding of the importance 
of 'good government' (as British officials saw it) to the maintenance 
of his independence, but it is also true that British perceptions of 
Tupou II changed more than Tupou himself did. 
8. !-!cOwan to Swcet-E~cott, 24 ,January 1913, i~PHC 4, 263/1913. 
9 • Grunt to Swcet-Eocot t, 18 Novc:.Jb(1r 1914 .:md encls • • v1!?I!C 4 • 
29CHJ/14. 
10. Swc~t:t··Escott to c.o., 28 January 1915, t~PHC 4, d40A/19l!• Set.:ret. 
'. a. Ibid., Sweet-Encott 
147~A/1914 Secret. 
to c.o., tel., 14 June 1914, t~PUC 
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Evidence of the continuing independent attitude which Tupou II's 
Government adopted towards Great Britain was nowhere more clearly 
demonstrated than at the outbreak of the First World War in August 
1914. Although Tupou II and the Legislative Assembly assured the 
Secretary of State of Tonga's steadfast loyalty to the Brirish Throne 
and Empire, unofficial sources, including the New Zealand press, 
reported that Tupou II had declared Tonga to be neutral.[l2] 
Slveet-Escott put the reports down to annexationist designs in New 
. .;aland, but there can be 1i ttle doubt that the Tongan Government did 
at least consider the question; during a visit to Australia in 1918 
Tu 1 ivakano left no doubt of that.[l3] In January 1915, however, 
Tupou II renudiated the rumours: 1 it is recognised that Great Britain 
being at war, Tonga should not under any circumstances remain 
neutral.' (14] The Tongan Government and people contributed to the 
war effort, despite conditions of economic hardship, and many Tongans 
offered to enlist -- six saw active service as part of the New Zealand 
Forces.[15] It was perhaps du~ to no more than an oversight that in 
mid-1917 the Secretary of State was astonished to learn that a 
12. Tupou II to c.o., 17 September 1914, encl. in Grant to 
SwN?t-Escott, 22 September 1914, WPHC 4, 2431/1914; Grant to 
Sweet-Escott, 21 July 1915 and encls., WPHC 4, 2121/1915; The 
Tim~, 9 September 1914, p.S. 
13, Swect-Eocott to c.o., 28 January 1915, WPHC 4, 1840A/191l• Secret; 
cuttinG from.!!!.£ Reporter, 5 June 1918, HPUC 4, 1662/1918. 
l t. T 6 J 1915 otcd in Smith-Rewse to •· up!:>u II to c.o., 1 anuary , qu 
1'1. 
Tu'ivakano, 10 July 1917, PO, unsorted papers. 
'Tonna's 
Itodt-wll, 
Prer::ier' s 
Effort Durinrr the Great War', encl. 
14 August 1919, WPUG t., 1719/1919; 
Department for 1916, HPUC 4, 2!145/1917. 
in !·kOwan to 
Report of the 
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portrait of the Germ~n Gmp~ror and other Gecman portraits had been 
alloived to remain in prominent positions in the Palace. [16] 
Despite some evidence that Tonga retained an equivocal attitude 
tolvards the Protectorate, it is clear that the British Goverrunent's 
new emphasis on cooperation rather than coercion went a long way 
t01vards ach.i.eving a mutually satisfactory relationship. In his report 
to the Colonial Office follotving his visit to Tonga in September 1911, 
Sir Fra•.1cis Hay had stressed the importance of a 'tactfully 
conciliatory attitude' on Britain's part, and on the 1vhole his advice 
1vas adhered to. [ J. 7] In Hay 1913 R.V. Vernon in the Colonial Office 
summed up Bri tisu policy neatly: in cummenting or. <pou II' s proposal 
to re-form the King's Guards which had been disbanded in 1907 at 
Hamilton Hunter's insistence, Vernon minuted, 
We should aim in Tonga at maintain!ng the King's authority 
and dignit} as far as possible an;! interfering only when we. 
must.[l8] 
Of particular importance in the new relationship was the att:l.tude 
of the British Consul. The Colonial Office hopea that he would be 
able to acquire an informal, even personal influen"e :l.n the Kingdom 
and, ::!S B3sil Thomson now rather ironically advis<!d, guide without 
appearing to thw3rt.[l9] In a sense the downfall of (:ampbell and 
'hteialona favoured this: with the throatening aspects of the 
Connul~s authority removed, and with the Consul no lontJ··l: a member of 
the faction opposed to the King, there was a much grcatt'r c. lance that 
U;, S::li.th-P.ewse to Tupou II, 10 July 1917, BC'r 1/6. 
i7, ~tay to G.O., conf., 21 ~eccmber 1911, CO 225/98. 
!>;;. ;·!iaute by Vernon, 24 Hay 1913 on Swcct-Eocott to c.o., 2 April 
1913, co 225/114. 
u~. Tt.Ot:.Gr)n to c.o., 16 JanuLlry 1913, co 223/123. 
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he would enjoy the confidence of the King ~1'\d Government. May's 
instructions to McOwan pointed out the importance of establishing 
friendly social relations with all classes of the community with 
the European residents, 'some of whom are married to Tongan wives 
through whom they may acquire influence in Tongan society'; with the 
Tongan officials; and with the King, to whom was due 'those 
courtesies which are by eliquette accorded in Europe to perGonages of 
royal blood'. The inslructions concluded: 
I need hardly impress upon you that a sympathetic attitude 
towards the King, his Ministers and people, whu are onl and 
all imbued with the laudable ambition of managing their O\ffi 
affairs with as little interference from the outside world 
as possible, will win you no little influen~e with !he 
inhabitants of this interesting Kingdom.[20] 
The difficulties of pursuing this course were manlfold, and much 
\~as to depend on the personality of those on the spot. Discr~ti::m, 
tact and patience would be required in almost saintly proportions. 
Islay McOwan, who was Acting Consul between April 1912 an( March 1913 
and returned to Tonga far a second and longer term from August 1917, 
faced a far from simple job in taking over from Campbell. McOwan had 
gained considerable administrative and legal experience in Fiji as a 
Stipendary Magistrate and later as Inspector-General of Constabulary. 
~1ay had recommended him as a man of sound judgement with a strong but 
sympathetic character, and these qualities were amply demonstrated in 
Tonga. [21] Soon after his arrival, McOwan confesse~ to findin& •:ruite 
a number of llkeable traits in Tupou Tl.'s character, and a mutual 
t~-><:pt.•ct betwc.•en .::he two men strengthened the Connu1' G ponition as 
lt was a mark of }!cOwan's tact anJ ability that ,tt the news 
of his projected departure, a petition oigned by 44 European residents 
2'J, 1-hy to HcOwan, 25 Harch 1912, WPHC 4, 324/1912. 
2L ~-lay to Tupou II, 22 Fe bru:J.ry 1912, Q..~_<!_ • 
Page 225 
(including such former enemies of the Consul as A.D. Cameron and 
George Scott), asked for him to remain, adding that he had carried out 
his duties 'without fear or favour' and 'hed endeared hit..st>lf to both 
Tongans and Europeans in a way no pred~cessor of his has ever been 
able to accomplish.' [22j 
The petition was received favourably and endorsed by May, but 
Mc~van's term could not be ~xtended as arrangements had already been 
made for H.E.\-1. Grant to take up the post. Grant's term J.r, Tonga, 
from Harch 1913 until July 1916, was his last posting in a long career 
in the British Colonial Service. A member of the English Bar since 
1898, he had worked in British Honduras, the Falkland Islands and t'ne 
Lee;.;ard Is lands, and had at various times administered the Gover"11llent 
of each of these col<. nies. Grant followed smoothly in the tracks of 
McOwan, able to restrain ~1imself from over-interference and gaining 
the respect of those with whom he dealt. The Premier in particular 
was loud in his praise for Grant's unaggressive assistance, and a 
relationship of trust developed between them. The absence of friction 
after 1912 and the development of harmonious relations was due largely 
to the competence and discretion of McOwan and Grant. 
\>lhile conciliation and cooperation were to provide the basis of 
Britain's relationship with Tonga after 1911, this did not preclude 
the retention of some controls. It soon became clear that the policy 
of 'non-intervention in domestic matters' was not to be taken quite 
literally. This was not too difficult ~o justify: as Basil Thomson 
P~inted out in a letter to the noble Tungi in 1912, it was no simple 
;:ntter to say that any piece of govcrnmeilt business W3.s purdy 
22. Cowley et al to Sweet-Esc(,tt, 9 Nove:nber 1912 and encls., HP!lC 4, 
2168/1912; see also WPHC 4, 2075/1912. 
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domestic. [23] In practice the policy came to mean tha~ while things 
were muddling along in a way that was satisfactory to British 
officials, no intervention was attempted. But the Supplementary 
Agreement was still in force, and while the Colonial Office pointed 
out that the British Consul das not responsible for 'the peace and 
welfare of Tonga' it nevertheless noted that he should still 'be 
vigilant to prevent serious misgovernment' .[24] The difficulty was, 
of course, to decide when intervention was warranted 'to prevent 
serious misgovernment' , and w:1en the Tongan Government should be left 
to make its own mistakes. 
Immediately after May's visit in September 1911 the second of 
these courses received most emphasis. But as time and tact eased 
tensions, Britain became more bold. The period saw a gradual growth 
of British controls on the Government, accompanied by more settled 
definitions of respective roles. Much of the responsibility for 
intervention rested with the High Commissioner Sweet-Escott, who took 
over after May was appointed Governor of Hong Kong early in 1912. 
Like Hay 1 Sweet-Escott 1 s experience of the Pacific was non-existent 
prior to his appointment; his last position had been Governor of 
British Honduras and the Leeward Islands. His attitude towards the 
Tongan Government was sympathetic, although slightly more cautious 
than Hay's. In the main he followed the path laid down by Hay and the 
Colonial Office, anxious to allow the King and his Government the 
maximum amount of room to move. He did, however, tighten control in a 
few areas, though not without Colonial Office approval. ~fuere doubt 
existed he paid particular attention to his legal rights of 
23. Thomson to Tungi, 1 August 1912, encl. in Thomson to Johnson, 
August 1912, CO 225/_05. 
9 
24, Hinute by A.B. Keith on !-tay to c.o., 21 December 1911, CO 225/98. 
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interference, consulting with the Chief Jud~c~al Co · · f f 
• • mm~ss~oner or ear 
Of over-stepping his role. Sweet Esc tt' · 
- o s pr1.rrciples were not always 
shared by his colleagues -- his Assistant, Mahaffy, and the Secretary 
to the Hes tern Pacific H1.' gh Comm1.' s · c H H s1.on, • • art-Davis, were both 
disappointed at the turn of events since September 1911, and keen to 
push a harder line. Sweet-Escott ignored their protests however and, 
armed with a healthy respect for the King, defended strongly the 
existing protectorate system in Tonga. 
One of the most important controls over the administration which 
Britain had previously exercised concern ppointments to the civil 
service. From 1912 policy in this area was inconsistent although 
Clauses 9 and 10 of the Supplementary Agreement provided for 'new 
appointments to the Public Service' and 1 changes atnong leading 
officials' to be made in consultation with the Consul, there were no 
strict limits defined. May applied the Clauses ve~y loosely. When 
Campbell protested in January 1912 that a local resident, Frederick 
Goedicke, had been appointed Government Storekeeper by the Privy 
Council without consultation, May was 
not prepared to take the technical objection that the 
appointment was not made in accordance with Article 9 of the 
Supplementary Agreement ••• That article was not intended to 
be applied strictly to each and every case of the 
appointment of subordinate European officials.[25] 
Similarly, May refused to interfere with the Privy Council's dismissal 
of C.C. Howard as Principal of the Government Colleg~ arguing that the 
matter did not concern the High Commissioner in his official capacity, 
as Howard was not a 'leading official'.[26] After May's departure, 
25. May to Campbell, 8 February 1912 and related correspondence, WPHC 
4, 127/19?~. 
26. !·Iinutes ~ Ih1v .. :d to Mny, 2 February 1912, WPHC 4, 339/1912 • 
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however, other officials took a tougher line. Influence over the 
quality of those running the Government was felt to be extremely 
important and was one of the few remaining safeguards Britain could 
exercise. There was, McOwan pointed out, little enough in the 1905 
Agreement that enabled the Consui to keep reasonable control over the 
Tongan Government, and whatever existed should be guarded jealously. 
So long as the obligation to consult on appointments was strictly 
observed, he felt that was some hope for a 'clean ~nd fairly efficient 
administration of the affairs of the Kingdom' .[27] 
When McOwan found in October 1912 that a new Principal for the 
Government College and new Chief Medical Officer had been appointed 
without his knc1dedge, he began a prolonged 1 warfare of words' with 
the Tongan Government over the right of the Consul to be consulted. 
In view of an increasing tendency to ignore the Supplement~ry 
Agreement on the part of the King and his Ministers, McOwan determined 
to stand firm. He insisted that an intentional breach of the 
Agreement had been committed and refused to agree to the appointments 
until a formal acknowledgement of the breach was given together with 
an assurance that in future the Consul would be consul ted over all 
appointments except those of minor importance.[28] The Premier, 
backed by the King, saw no reason to acquiesce. His letters, penned 
by the Government s~cret.':l.ory, H.W. Harcourt, and described in the 
Colonial Office as 'almost :ua:-:.~ { ,\l.vellian', argued that 'consultation' 
did not mean what McOwan thought it did, and that the Clause in 
27, Mc~wan to Sweet-Escott, 4 December 1912, WPHC 4, 2338/1912. 
28. McOwan to Swcet-Escott, 10 November 1912 and encls., WPHC 4, 
2178/1912. 
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question referred only to executive officers.[29] The Premier denied 
any violation of the Agreement and accused McOwan of adopting a 
hostile and threatening attitude. The King took the opportunity to 
launch a further attack on the Supplementay Agreement and protested to 
the High Commissioner that the Consul's opposition to the appointment 
of two excellent men was not in the interests of Tonga and that if the 
Agreement was to be made use of in this manner, then it t 
, oo, was 
clearly not in the interests of Tonga.[30] 
McOwan's handling of the issue met with a mixed response from his 
superiors. Sweet-Escott was very uncertain of his rights. Although 
he approved McOwan's action he doubted whether the High Commissioner 
\vas competent to disallow any appointment made by the King, and he 
sought advice from London as to tl.e attitude he should adopt. [31] 
Within the Colonial Office there was some feeling that McOwan had been 
'a little too stiff' in this instance. Officials argued that 
'consultation' did not necessarily imply 'approval', and that the 
schoolmaster and the doctor could hardly be considered 'leading 
officials', especially as May had refused to interfere in Howard's 
dismissal. [32] Most officials believed, however, that HcOwan had 
29. McOwan to Sweet-Escott, 4 December 1912 and encls., WPHC 4 
2338/1912; HcOwan to Sweet-Escott, 24 January 1913, WPHC 4, 
265/1913; Hinute, 4 March 1913 on Sweet-Escott to c.o., 29 
December 1912, CO 225/107. 
30. Tupou II to Sweet-r:scott, 1 January 1913 and encls., WPHC 4, 
116/1913; Thomson to c.o., 16 January 1913 and encls., 
co 225/123. 
31. ~;:.;cet-Escott to c .o., 29 December 1912, WPHC 4, 2338/1912; 
S~o~"cet-Escott to HcOwan, 29 December 1912, ~· 
32, 'P 'iUte by Johnson, 23 January 1913 on Thomson to C.O., 16 January 
·~13, co 225/123. 
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rightly protested at a 'deliberate try-on' by the King and 
Premier. [33] As the Secretary to the High Commission had noted 
earlier, the correspondence revealed the Tongans' determination to see 
relations between the two Governments as 'between free and independent 
sovereign states' .[34] Conscious of a need to keep at least one foot 
in the door, the Secretary of State gave his approval to McOwan's 
conduct. [35] 
Sweet-Escott accordingly warned the King, in terms reminiscent of 
Campbell's reign, that he was still expected to adhere without 
reservation to the Supplementary Agreement, 'on the strict observance 
of which the safety of your Majesty's Kingdom and person entirely 
depends.'[36] In the meantime, McOwan's obstinacy had worn down the 
opposition. The Premier finally admitted that a breach had taken 
place, althoug1' in ignorance of any obligation to consult and prompted 
by a differing interpretation of the Clause in question. The 
assurance in regard to future consultation was also given, albeit with 
reservations. The original undertaking was described as ridiculous 
and the assurance given only for McOwan's occupancy of the Consul's 
post: 
The incoming Consul may take an entirely different 
the case, and it would be grossly u:\fair to ask me 
an assurance that I will adopt the views of a man 
never seen, and whose probable line of action 
impossible for me to judge.[37] 
view of 
to give 
I have 
it is 
33. Minutes by S.H. Just and others, 24 January 1913, ibid; 
on Sweet-Escott to c.o., 29 December 1912, CO 225/107. 
Minutes 
34. Minute by Hart-Davis, 23 December 1912, WPHC 4, 2338/1912. 
35, c.o. to Sweet-Escott, 2 April 19\3, WPHC 4, 891/1913. 
36. Swcet-Escott to Tupou II, 6 February 1913, encl. in 
to c.o., 6 February 1913, CO 225/114. 
Sweet-Esc.ott 
37, Tu'lvakano to McOwan, conf., 25 November 1912, WPfi~ 4, 2338/1912. 
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Nevertheless the principle was established; consultation over 
appointments continued to be an important and generally unobtrusive 
means by which British officials could keep an eye on the Government. 
The Consul guarGed his rights closely, at times reminding the 
Government of its obligations, but generally reaching a satisfactory 
compromise. 
Neither McOwan nok Grant exercised their power of veto over 
appointments in the indiscriminate manner to which Hunter and Campbell 
had been accustomed. From 1912, where the Consul had objections to an 
appointment he was careful to assign adequate reasons and to attempt 
to reach a compromise. In the case of J.N. Masterton, for example, 
whom the Tongan Government wanted as Collector of Customs in late 
1912, McOwan's reservations were contained by making the appointment 
provisional in the first instance.[38] In particular, neither Mc~~an 
nor <Jranl followed the former practice of blocking the ar-pointment of 
Europeans who were likely to support Tupou II's struggle for 
independence. In early 1913 McOwan agreed t- the appointment of 
George Scott as Chief Clerk to the Premier and Scott remained in this 
post until 1925.[39] Similarly in late 1912 M.::Owan recommended that 
Chief Justice Skeen should again take his place in Cabinet, from where 
he had been removed at Mahaffy's behest in November 1910. McOwan 
believed that Skeen's influence was for the good and he argued that 
Skeen's experience and advice would be of benefit in the Cabinet. 
When McOwan's recommendation was supported by Grant ih December 1913, 
38, HcOwan to Sweet-Escott, 7 November 1912, WPHC 4, 2174/1912. 
39. ~.fcOwan to Swcwt-r::scott, 24 .January 1913, WPHC 4, 265/1913; 
also \·lPHC 4 2337/1912, 110/1913 and 711/1913. 
see 
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the Colonial Office approved Skeen's return to the Cabinet.[40] 
In 1915 Britain's control over appointments was more clearly 
defined. Writing in June 1914, Tu'ivakano sought a ruling from the 
Hi . _ Co<.nissioner as to the extent of the operation of Clause 9 of the 
.\-;reement: it had never been observed in connection with the 
a1 )L!i 'llen' of minor Tongan officials such as police or school 
teachers, and the Premier wanted an assurance that this did not 
constitute a breach of the Agreement. British officials saw no 
objection to defining the Clause by listing the appointments on which 
the Consul should be consulted. On Grant's recommendation it was 
agreed that appointments requiring consultation should be (a) those 
filled by Europeans, (b) those carrying a salary of £200 a year or 
more and (c) those creating a new charge on the establishment.[41] 
Under the new arrangement the Consul probably gained wider powers than 
were previously ex9rcised, but the Tongan Government raised no 
objection. Its easy acquiescence must be taken as a sign of 
satisfaction with the way consultation had worked over the previous 
year and a half. Although the settlement did not preclude disputes, 
such as occurred over the appointment in August 1916 of J.B. Ma'atu as 
Relieving and Assistant Police Magistrate, it did provide a formula 
for their resolution. Ma'atu, a noble and half-brother to Tupou II's 
second wife, Takipo, was appointed to this new post without 
40. McOwan to sweet-Escott, 7 November 1912, WPHC 4, 2173/1912; 
Minutes on Sweet-Escott to c.o., 11 December 1912, CO 225/107; 
Grant to Sweet-Escott 4 December 1913, 1-TPHC 4, 2446/1913; Grant 
to S~..reet-Escot t, 27 D~cember 1913, WPHC 4, 234/1914 • 
41. Grant to Sweet-Escott, 11 July 1914 and encl., WPHC 4, 1801/1914; 
1 1915 d nncl<' '·,'PHC 4 Grant to Sweet-Escott, 28 Apri an "'· .... ' v ' 
1321/1915. 
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consultation because of Grant's absence on leave. Desr .te the 
Premier's strong views to the contrary, British offi~ials maintained 
that Ma'atu's character, and particularly his ~ntemperance, rendered 
him unfit for the appointment. He was suspended from office and later 
dismissed. [42] 
In December 1915 Eritish officials took the opporttmi ty provided 
by the death of Rol,e!:'t: Skeen while on leave in New Zealand, to press 
for the selection by the British Government ot a ~~:hV Chief Justice 
with jurisdiction over Tongans and non-Tongans. Tupou II had given 
his reluctant consent 1..o a similar proposal in November 1910 in 
response to the threat:s of :t-f.ahaffy, but the Colonial Office had not 
wanted to push the Tongan Government into the arrangement against its 
tvill. Nov;r that Skeen was gone, and relati~")ns betweet~ the two 
Governments were on a mor~ satisfactory footing, British ofiLcials 
felt the time was ripe for the change, They argued ~hat the field of 
selection at the disposal of the Secretary of State was larger than 
that of the Tongan Government and that the projectec.\ exercise of 
jurisdiction over non-Tongans, presently entrusted to the Agent and 
Consul, raadc it vital for the British Government to have a say in the 
new appointmc>nt, Some officials were still under the misapprehension 
that Article III of the 1900 Treaty reserved ro Britain the right to 
make some future arrangement of this nature.[43} 
42. Smith-Rewae to St-mct-Eocott, 27 October 1916 and encls., HPHC 4, 
2829/19lo; Smith-Rcws'.! to sweet-Escott, 28 ~lovember 191(,, HPHC 
4, 3334/1916. 
43. Grant to Hutson, 21 January 1916, WPHC 4, 246/1916; 
Sweet-Escott, 20 April 1916, HP!:lC 4, 1380/191.6. 
c.o. to 
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The Tongan Government might not have objected so strongly to this 
proposal had it not been set on the appointment of George Scott, who 
had been acting in the ·--ost (with Grant' 1) i o b s approva P nee ctu er 
1915. To the King and his Ministers, as to the nine nobles and one 
matapl'.le who petitioned the King in Council in March 1916 for Scott's 
appointment, Scott had long demonstrated his suitability and his 
loyalty to Tonga. There was a definite aversion to bringing in a 
stranger who, wi th.:>ut knowledge of Tonga and its ways, might cause 
'disturbances and changes and frequent disputes' .[44] Tupou II 
pointed out that neither the Tongan Constitution nor the Supplementary 
Agreement gave Britain any right to take part in the selection of a 
Tongan Chief Justice, and he deplored the uncalled-for interference, 
In Privy Council the Premier recalled vividly the events of November 
1910 when Mahaffy had forced the King to agree to the British 
Government selecting a new Chief Justice and he pointed out that the 
appointment of a Justice required Cabinet approva1.[45] In July 1916 
Tupou II conveyed to the British Government his Privy Council's 
decision that the selection should not be left to the Secretary of 
State, and that Scott should be appointed.[46] 
The Tongan Government's desire to see Scott as Chief Justice was 
only equalled by the British Government's aversion to the idea. In 
SHeet-Escott' s opinion, Scott w.:1s not 'socially qualified' for the job 
and it would be .:1 confession of weakness to acquiesce. He felt that 
'the effect of such an appointment on the administration of Tonga 
44, Petition to King in Privy Council, 29 Harch 1916, encl. in 
to Hutson, 8 April 1916, WPHC 4, 951/1916. 
Grant 
45. Tupou II to Grant, 18 January 1916, HPIIC 4, 426/1916; Hinuh•G of 
Privy Council, 7 Janue1ry 1916, PO, unsortl~d pap2rn. 
4G, Grant to Sweet-Escott, 6 July 1916 and endn., WPUC 4, 1755/1916• 
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would be little short of disastrous' and recommended to the Colonial 
Office that he be instructed to proceed to Tonga to settle the matter: 
It would be as well if I were authorised to inform the King 
himself, courteously but clearly, that refusal to accept my 
advice might have a not unimportant effect on the future of 
the Protectorate ••• [47] 
Colonial Office officials were not prepared to authorise such loose 
threats, and nor did they think th(c~ High Commissioner should undertake 
a visit to Tonga. But they did, for the first time since 1911, 
authorise the Consul to point out if necessary that under Clause 2 of 
the Supplementary Agreement the King was bound to take the Consul's 
advice. [ 48] 
In the event the reminder was not reqtlired. Exercising its 
established rights under the Supplementary Agreement the British 
Government simply refused to sanction Scott's appointment on the 
grounds that he was not a barrister and would not, in its opinion, 
'command the respect of suitors 1 .[49] Scott then withdrew his 
application, and although the King was tactfully invited to put 
forward an alternative candidate, he had no one else in mind. With 
Scott's appointment ruled out the King decided to 'save any 
unpleasantness' and gave his consent to the selection being made by 
the Secretary of State. [SO] The Privy Council would not, however, 
co:::ply Hi th the Colonial Office request that the salary be raised from 
,. 600 to r 700 p .a. and British officials decided not to press the 
matter. They also defcrr\!d to the Council's objections to the new 
47 • Sweet-Encott to c.o., 13 July 1916, .!.!?_~<!.· 
48. c.o. to Swoat-Eocott, tel., 6 August 1916, WPilC 4, 2286/1916. 
40 • I hid. 
----=-----
S:nitl:-RL'W~W to Swcct:-Eocott, 27 October 1916 and c.mcls., WPrtC 11 • 
21:!25/1916. 
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Chief Justice exercising jurisdiction over non-Tongans, as he would 
become 'the servant of two masters' if his duties were combined with 
those of a Judicial Commissioner in the High Commissioner's 
Court. [51] On 1 July 1917, H.C. Strange, barrister-at-law, member of 
the British Colonial Service, and previously Stipendiary and Circuit 
H.:lt;istrate in the Bahamas, begun his duties as Chief Justice of 
Tonga. [52] 
Having f:1iled to secure Scott's appointment as Chief Justice, the 
King and Premier tried soon afterwards to create him the new position 
of Attorney-General; again the appointment was blocked by the High 
Commissioner. Although Tu'ivakano argued that it was not proper for 
the Chief Justice to be legal adviser to the Government nor to draft 
lmvs and regulations \vhen he might be called upon to determine actions 
under them, Sweet-Escott felt that the value of the improvement to the 
administration of justice was outweighed by the unsuitability of 
Scott.[53] Just as the King had used the low state of Tonga's 
finances as an excuse not to increase the salary of the new Chief 
Justice, now Sweet-Escott used the same excuse. He was of course 
prepared to reconsider the matter when the financial situation 
improved, but only so long as the Tongan Government at; reed to leave 
the selection of the officer to the Secretary of State.[S4] 
51. Tupou II to Smith-Rewse, 27 October 1916, encl. in Smith-Rewse to 
Swc~ot-Escott, 28 October 1916, HPUC 4, 2826/1916; Swc('t-Eccott 
to c.o., 3 November 1916, ibi~. 
C .o. to 
53. Tu' ivakano to Tupou II, 1 t·!.:u.·ch 1917, encl. in 
St·Wet-Er.cott, 13 April 1917, HPHC 4, 1193/1917 • 
S:nith-RcWt:Q to 
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In other areas of the administration to~, the High Commissioner 
believed that men trained and experienced in the British Colonial 
service might strengthen the Tongan service. To this end he sought to 
introduce conditions of service compatible with those in the col-~Jes 
-- in particular he Aaw a need for a pension scheme. Assuring the 
Tongan Government that he had no desire to interfere in internal 
affairs, and that his suggestions were made with the sole aim of 
helping it to secure the best available officers, Sweet-Escott was 
,1damant that 
the administration of the public departments in 
be placed on a satisfactory footing until 
officers are given sec srity in the tenure 
respective offices, and until those offices 
declared to be pensionable.[SS] 
Tonga cannot 
the European 
of thei.r 
have be,m 
He uq~ed pension legislati.0n based on the Fijian model, and 
reco~mended that the approval of the High commissioner be required 
before such 0lficers could bn dismissed fl.'t.:: the service. [56] 
Sweet-Escott 1 s advice was accepted by the Privy Council and embodied 
in legislation in 1915. A list of 38 pensionable offices, including 
those normally held by Tongans as well as Europeans, was published in 
November 1916.[57] 
Only a few Colonial Service Officials joined the Tongan service 
ltoivc;ver. In 1911 the duties of Auditor had been given to a Col "<r,ial 
Servant from Fiji, u.w. Harco'Jrt, and in June 1915 he was replaced at 
Swec:t-Es~ott's suggestion by J.H. Darrell-Wall, who had worked with 
s~rc·et-Escot t as Chief Clerk to the Auditor-General of the Lc•ew:trd 
~5. St'i'l!et-Ec;catt to Grant, 30 June 1914, WPHC 4, 1627/1914. 
~~.. }.~!; Swc·L·t-Boec.tt: to c.o., 30 June 1914, !};~.id • 
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Islands· Since the Auditor-·General and Chief Justice were the only 
two Europeans in Privy Council and Cabinet, the appointment of a 
capable and 'loyal' Auditor-General was considered particularly 
important. The possibility of securing medL~al officers for Tonga 
through the Secretary of State was raised from Tonga early in 1917, 
but was never proceeded with. Apart from the shortage of available 
men during the war, the 1ongan Government was not prepared to accept 
the High Commissioner's conditions, which involved employing only 
officers from the Colc:onial Service, and making the appointments 
interchangeable with those in Fiji. [58] Other European heads of 
departmentst notably in agriculture, education and survey, continued 
to be appointed from New Zealand or Australia. In view of the 
importance of agricultural development and experimentation in Tonga's 
economy, Sweet-Escott was keen that an agricu~tural expert might be 
procured from the Colonial Service in 1914. The Pl.'ivy Council failed 
to see the merits of either of the men he suggested, but nevertheless 
enlisted Sweet-Escott's help in securing a suitable man from 
Queensland. [59 J 
Although many of the adm:lnistrative reforms which were introduced 
dt:ring the last few years of Tupou II' s reign emanated from the High 
Commissioner or the Consul, they were car-ied out as far as possible 
as Tongan Government measures. It was Sweet-Escott's desire that 
reform should come from within and not from outside t"te Tongan 
58. Smith-Rewse to Sweet-Escott 12 January 1917 and encls. and 
related Porrespondence, WPHC 4, 118/1917; Smith-ReWSL' to 
Sweet-Escott, 9 March 1917 and encl., WPHC 4, 593/1917; c.o. to 
Sweet-Escott, 21 May 1917, WPHC 4, 1891/191l. 
59, See HPHC 4, 743/1914, 939/1914, 1352/1914, 1583/1914, 2406/1914, 
2889/1914, 1664/1915 and 2222/1915. 
Page 239 
Government. [ 60] In the discussions which took place during his only 
official visit to Tonga, between 8-11 June 1914, the High Commissioner 
was careful to proceed 'by way of suggestion rather than 
direction'. [61] It would be up to the Privy Council to consider each 
matter and make the final decision. It was a course that was 
obviously appreciated: the Premier's 1914 Report made special mention 
of the High Commissioner 1 s 'invaluable' suggestion&. which 'could be 
adhered to or otherwise as Your Mc'ljesty desired'. [62] It was also 
. Hective: although some measures took longer than others to come to 
fruition, very few were rejected. Changes affecti~g both Tongans and 
Europeans were made in this !1ay, including, for example, legislation 
to provide that all civil cases brought by Europeans in the Tongan 
Police Courts should be heard by the Chief Justice rather than by 
Tongan magistrates; the amendment of legislation to permit Tongans to 
be sued for the recovery of debts amounting to between 10/- and .tS; 
a regulation prohibiting Government employees from engaging in trade 
or comme1·cial undertakings; and ' reduction in the ntunber of liquor 
permits issued to Tongans.[63] 
Clearly, the British Government's conciliatory policy towards 
Tonga did not leave the High Commissioner without influence over the 
administration. But the reluctance ~f British officials to force 
their advice indiscriminately did mean chat the end result could not 
always be guaranteed. Advice could be tendered· persuasion could be 
60. Sweet-Escott to Smith-Rew.J~, conf., 12 December 1916, WPHC 4, 
3125/1916; see also WPIIC 4, 2990/1914. 
61. Swact-Escott t:o c.o., 6 July 1914, WPIIC 4, 1362/1914 • 
62. Report of tlw Premier's Department for 1914, WPHC 4, 1057/1915. 
63. Sec WPHC 4, 1726/1914 and 8/1915; WPHC 4, 2127/1915; t~PHC 
29C2/1916 and 2097/1917; i~PllG 4, 1662/1912 and 2636/1917. 
4 , 
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used; but the decision rested ultimately with the Tongan Government. 
This course was not always easy to pursue, for it sometimes required 
British officials to sacrifice their own beliefs about good government 
to the half-digested ideal of self-government. Although there were 
many reforms in the methods of administration to be made, officials 
had to remember, as McOwan put it, that it was '~qually important [to 
'-. ' obt~(Pl the confidence and support of the King and his Ministers'.[64] 
The High Commissioner's handling of Tupou II's desire to create a 
number of new nobles and to confer tofi'a (hereditary grants of land) 
on others, provides a good example of the new British diplomacy. 
Tupou II had first indicated his intention to create 10 new nobles in 
a speech to parliament on 28 May 1909, but he had been prevented from 
making the appointments by im Thurn who believ2d they w0uld be 
'unconstitutional and undesirable.'[65] During May's visit in 
Septe~ber 1911, the King had again raised the m~tter; he felt 
considerable shame in having been unable to carry out his publicly 
expressed intention. From the point of view of policy May strongly 
deprecated tne idea; like im Thurn he felt more nobles would burden 
parliament and the Kingdom's finances. Nevertheless he was careful to 
acknoHledije the King's undoubted prerogative of appointing nobles and, 
as a compromise, suggested that not more than three 'specially 
deserving men' be appointed.[66] Tupou II accepted this advice and 
64. McOwan to Sweet-Escott, con£., 20 October 1917, 
2902/1917. 
WPHC 4, 
65. Tonga Government Gazette, no. 5, 6 July 
~ell 13 April 1910, tolPHC 4, 421/1910; 
20 June 1910 and encls., WPHC 4, 81.4/1910. 
1909; im Thurn to 
Campbell to im Thurn, 
6G, ~fay to Tupou II 16 September 1911, encl. 24 in May to. c.o.' 23 
Septemb~r 1911' co 225/97· Notes of Private Interv1cw between 
May and Tupou Ii, 15 September 1911, encl. 23, ~· 
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settled for Sipu, Afuha'amango and Mateialona, the former Premier 
who 
had been promised enoblement in 1912 as one of the conditions of his 
resignation· 
When Sweet-Escott learned of the proposed appointments in January 
1913, he sought legal advice as to his official position. In the 
opinion of the Chief Judicial Commissioner for the Western Pacific, 
Sir Charles Major, the matter was not one in which the High 
Commissioner could, or should, interfere. Major's experience of Tonga 
whilst Acting High Commissioner in 1910-11 had left him extremely 
cautious of the place and he warned: 
The King of Tonga is not doing anything unconstitutional or 
illegal and any influence or advice which your Excellency 
might give in this matter might recoil.[67] 
Accordingly S~veet-Escott informed the King that it appeared 
unnecessary for him to express any opinion on the proposal so long as 
the King was acting within the Constitution and according to the 
advice of his Ministers. [ 68] Subsequently, however, Sweet-Escott 
changed his mind. A few days after giving Tupou II his approval he 
received recommendations from McOwan who deplored the increase in the 
Legislative Assembly and suggested that the ownership of lands should 
McOwan be definitely settled before further grants were made. 
recommended that only Mateialona be appointed, although without 
tofi'a, and that no other titles or lands should be conferred until a 
'properly constituted' Lands Commission had settled the existing 
boundaries between Crown lands, nobles' tofi'as and the King's private 
67. Minute by Major, 18 February 1913, WPHC 4, 115/1913. 
68. Sweet-Escott to Tupou II, 28 February 1913, tbid. 
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lands.[69] Sweet-Escott now decided to confirm McOwan's 
recommendations and he informed Tupou II that he was relying on him to 
carry them out. Further than this Sweet-Escott was not prepared to 
go. As Major minuted: 
If the King declines to adopt them [i.e. McOwan r s 
recommendations], either wholly or partially, I repeat I 
can't see any method of compelling their adoption, even if 
compulsion were thought advisable. In my opinion, it is 
not. [70] 
In the event Tupou II created no new nobles and a Lands 
Commission did not start work until after his death. Much to the 
annoyance of British officials he steadfastly refused to ennoble 
Hateialona and his objections were well set out and quite valid in 
Tongan terms. It was, after all, the King's prerogative to appoint 
whomever he chose, and nobility was not simply a reward for service, 
as British officials tended to see it. Tupou II explained his 
position to Grant: 
All the nobles and Chiefs are descended from other nobles or 
chiefs who had the titles which they now hold handed down 
from generation to generation long before the advent of the 
Foreigner here and these names are according to our customs 
and traditions considered of the utmost importance to the 
holder. [ 71] 
Hore importantly, Tupou II would look weak and ridiculous by ennobling 
a man whose impeachment he had not long before advocated, while others 
who supported him remained without titles. In the face of the King's 
determination, Sweet-Escott again sought legal advice as to whether 
69. McOwan to Sweet-Escott, 26 February 1913, WPHC 4, 495/1913; 
Grant to Tupou II, 19 1\pril 1913, WPHC 4, 1947/1913. 
70. Minute by Hajor, 29 Mar~h 1913, WPHC 4, 495/1913; 
to Tupou II, 31 March 1913, ~· 
Swact-Escott 
71. Tupou II to Grant, 11 September 1913, WPHC 4, 1947/1913; 
to Tupou II, 24 September 1913, ~· 
Grant 
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the matter should be pressed: the Act1."ng Ch" f J di · l.e u c1.al Commissioner 
expressed frank doubts as to whether the King could be kept to his 
pledge.[72] 
Bowing to this reality, Sweet-Escott decided instead to press for 
a pension for Mateialona as a reward for past services. When in May 
1913 Mateialona appealed to the High Commissioner against the Privy 
Council's refusal to grant him a pension he found ready support. The 
Colonial Office believed that 'it would seric~sly compromise the 
dignity of Tonga that one who for so long a period held the office of 
Premier should be left in indigence' .[73] After all, the previous 
Premier, Sateki, had been dismissed and deported in disgrace but had 
still received a pension after intervention by the British Government. 
But when Sweet-Escott sought Colonial Office permission to insist on a 
suitable pension from Tongan public funds for Mateialona, he received 
a cautious reply. The Colonial Office agreed that every effort should 
be made to secure the pension but was not prepared 'to insist 
categorically' upon it. Sweet-Escott was instructed to make 'strong 
representations' to the King, and to urge upon him that it was the 
desire of the British Government that the pension be granted.[74] 
The Colonial Office's faith in the Tongan Government's sense of 
propriety was rewarded. At the end of December 1913, Tupou II 
informed the High Commissioner that despite his personal reservations 
he was prepared to concede the point to the British Government, 'out 
of compliment to their wishes'. The Privy Council decided to grant 
72. Minute by Alexander on Grant to Sweet-Escott, 29 June 1913, ibid. 
73. C.o. to Sweet-Escott, 20 September 1913, WPHC 4, 2060/1913; 
Mateialona to Sweet-Escott, 6 May 1913, WPHC 4, 1072/1913. 
74, Minutes on Sweet-Escott to c.o., 16 June 1913, CO 225/116. 
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!>!ateialona a pension and Tupou II made no f 
. secret o the concession 
involved: 
I trust that Your Excellency will realise that this 
concession of a point that I have previously maintained, in 
response to your request, is indicative of my constant wish 
that the friendly and reciprocal relations established 
between our respective ~overnments by the Treaty of 
Friendship entered upon by them, should be preserved and 
any unnecessary friction eliminated.[75] ' 
In response Sweet-Escott was increasingly reluctant to apply pressure 
to the Government and refused to support Mateialona's r~quests for an 
increase in the amount of his pension and also for his promised a 
noble title. The granting of a pension had made Tupou '(I even more 
unwilling to create Mateialona a noble and Sweet-Escott was inclined 
to accept this point of view. As he commented to the Colonial Office: 
'There are other matters of more importance in regard to which I hope 
to obtain the King's cooperation.'[76] It was not until after Tupou 
II's death that his daughter, Queen Salote, finally fulfilled the 
promise made in 1912 and granted Mateialona the nob.e title Tupouto'a. 
Although the British Consul had exercised firm control over 
Tongan finances prior to the Kautaha crisis, his influence was removed 
after 1911. From 1912, at May's direction, the Consul no longer took 
part in the framing u the Estimates and had no power to oversee the 
budget. Both Campbell and McOwan protested that this was contrary to 
established practice; Campbell pointed out that although the 1905 
Agreement did not stipulate that the Consul should be consulted on 
finances, he had been instructed by im Thurn to assist in framing the 
76. 
Tupot .. II to Sweet-Escott, 29 December 1913, WPHC 4, 238/1914. 
Sweet-Escott to c.o., 1 June 1914, WPHC 4, 1355/1914; see also 
~-lPHC 4, 671/1914, and Sweet-Escott to C.O., 20 October 1914, HPHC 
4, 2433/1914. 
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annual Estimates and while May could find no record of 
such 
instructions, there can be little doubt that it was so.[77] But the 
obvious effects which Campbell's 'scandalous extravagance' during the 
Kautaha had had on the state of Tongan finances was enough to convince 
the Colonial Off~ce that not only was Campbell unfit to criticise 
others, but that n,o Consul should interfere: 
I do not see how we can press for the interference of 
British Agent with the finances when one British Agent 
cost Tonga over £ 8,000 by his ill-advised action 
starting the proceedings for the dissolution of 
Kautaha. [78] 
a 
has 
in 
the 
May did, however, concede the desirability of the Consul being 
kept informed as to the Estimates and general financial conditions, 
and for this purpose the King agreed that a copy of the Estimates 
1-;ould be sent to the Consul in time for him to make representations 
before the Privy Council gave its final approval.[79] That nothing 
more than this was intended or desired was made quite clear by May in 
Harch 1912. Tupou II, deliberately bypassing the still intractable 
Campbell, sent the 1912-13 Estimates to Fiji for May's perusal. May 
made a few suggestions, two of which were subsequently incorporated 
into the Estimates, but he minuted quite clearly that the 
responsibility was not his: 
I think they are wrong to abolish the Agriculture Department 
but after all this is their own busi.ness • We have only to 
77. Hayto c.o., conf.(3), 21December1911, C022S/98; Campbell 
May, 14 Nov<.'l!lber 1911, encl. itt~· 
to 
78. ~inute by A.B. 
October 1911, 
1911, ~· 
Keith on Hay to c.o., ~'!_; Tupou :II to Hay, 14 
WPHC 4, 1857 /1911; Hay to T•1p"~ 1!, 12 December 
79. May to Tupou II, 21 December 1911, ~; 
February 1912, ~· 
Tur.ou II to May, S 
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see that they do not run into debt, rob the till 
foolishly with the general administration 
country.[80] 
or 
of 
deal 
the 
Six years later the Tongan Government's unfettered control over 
finance came to an end. Early in 1917, it became apparent that the 
Kingdom was in serious financial difficulties, and to British 
officials it seemed that at least part of the reason for this lay in 
inadequate supervision of the finances. Since 1912 Tonga had been 
gradually sinking lower into an economic depression brought about by 
the devastating effects ~f four hurricanes in successive years, 
followed by a severe and prolonged drought in Vava'u in 1915. The 
copra industry ~vas devastated and money was scarce. The effects of 
the First World War exacerbated the problem. Shipping services were 
seriously interrupted after August 1914 -- steamers came only once a 
month throughout the war, and this, together with hurricanes and 
disease, contributed to the cessation of banana exports to New 
Zealand. The cost of freight and of imported goods rose considerably 
while copra prices and government revenue went down. The Premier 
estimated that in 1917 the purchasing power of 20/- was less than 15/-
before the war.[81] The revenue collected during the 1915-16 
fi i 1 h 1 t i records had been kept -- at nanc a year was t e owes s nee 
£ 23,129 it fell £15,860 short of the Estimate. Scarcity of money 
was revealed too in unpaid taxes at 31 December 1916 Tongan 
taxpayers were £8, 700 in arrears. [ 82] 
80. Minute by Hay, 15 Harch 1912, WPliC 4, 470/1912. 
81. Report of the Premier's Department for 1916. 
8',1 ... Annual Report of Auditor-General for 1915-16, WPHC 4, 
Report on Financial position by Auditor-General, 7 
WPHC 4, 1204/1917. 
1486/1917; 
April 1917, 
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Tonga's limited resources and vulnerability to natural disasters 
would always bring economic problems. Nonetheless, when British 
officials examined the financial situation early in 1917 they 
concluded that better management could have done much to ameliorate 
the problem. They pointed to the need for an improved system of 
collecting taxes, at'.d to the irresponsibility of purchasing a shipload 
of timber from Tasmania at a cost of £3,600 at a time when funds were 
so short that it could not even be used. Despite the measures the 
Government had taken to curb •:>xpenditure -- such as restricting public 
works to a minimum and reducing the estimated expenditure for 1915-16 
by ~10,426 -- British officials felt it had failed to recognise the 
necessity for exerc ,ing the strictest economy. Perhaps the final 
straw was that between late 1915 and mid-1916, the Tongan Government 
had found it necessary to borrow £4,150 from Lever Brothers, a 
private firm trading in Tonga. G.B. Smith-Rewse, the Acting British 
Consul, considered it undesirable for the Kingd~m to be indebted to a 
private firm; the Secretary of State found it 'intolerable' .[83] 
Thus when Tonga approached Britain for a £10,000 loan in January 
1917, British officials felt that the time had come to intervene. In 
view of the urgent need to meet certain liabilities, including a loan 
repayment ~o Lever Bros., Smith-Rewse immediately arranged for a 
temporary advance of £5,000 from the funds under the control of the 
Official Liquidator 
Plantagen-Gesellschaft. 
of the German firm, Deutsche Handels-und 
Any further advances, however, were to have 
strings attached. On Smith-Rewse's advice, Sweet-Escott recommended a 
loan of \' 10,000 over three years on condition that the control of the 
83. Smith-Rewse to Sweet-Escott, 6 February 1917 and encls., WPHC 4, 
388/1917; c.o. to sweet-Escott, tel., 26 Hay 1917, tvPHC 4, 
1411/1917. 
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finances of the Colony -- as he put it should be entrusted to 
European officers appointed by himself and with seats in the Privy 
Council and Cabinet. The Colonial Office, while 'not anxious to 
intervene further than necessary', agreed that Tonga should accept 
this arrangement> at least until the financial position was again 
secure. [ 84] Even when it became clear, by Hay 1917, that the outlook 
had improved considerably and that no further loan was likely to be 
required, the High Commissioner remained convinced that the Tongan 
Government should be invited to agree to his appointing a European 
Treasurer to take over from Tu'ivakano who had been Hinister of 
Finance as well as Premier since 1912. 
On the advice of HcOwan who returned to Tonga as Agent and Consul 
in August 1917, this proposal was abandoned in favour of the 
re-establishment of effective supervision over the finances by the 
British Consul. McOwan believed that Smith-Rewse's proposal would 
invite friction, particularly betweEn the European and Tongan 
Hinisters in the Government: 
Increases of salary to two European officers and a reduction 
of the Premier's salary, together with the loss of the 
por~folio of Minister of Finance, would. I fear, intensify 
unnecessarily the feeling already existing that the object 
is gradually to deprive the King and his native Hinisters of 
power and of their share in the native Government.[85] 
Besides, McOwan pointed out, ~he course which led to the GoverQ~ent's 
financial embarrassment had been pursued quite openly, and the 
EuropE'an members of Government, including the Assistant Treasurer, 
lv.G. Bagnall, and the two Europeans on the Privy Council, nhould 
84, Sweet-Escott to c.o., secret, 10 Harch 1917, WPHC 4, 388/1917; 
C.O. to Sweet-Escott, tel., 26 May 1917, WPHC 4, 1411/1917. 
85. NcOYltln to Swcet-Esc"Jtt, conf., 20 Octobor 1917, WPUC 4, 
2902/1917. 
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accept their share of the responsibility. On 17 January 1918 the 
Privy Council agreed to the Consul's oversight of the finances, and 
the Premier declared himself relieved to be free of the burden. The 
draft Estimates were to be submitted annually to the Consul before 
being finally passed by Privy Council. All supplementary expenditure 
and all loan proposals were also to be submitted to the Consul. In 
addition, the Government agreed to adopt certain procedures suggested 
by HcOwan for the better control of authorised expenditure. [86] 
The Tongan Government's acceptance of the British Consul's 
intervention in the finances was a sign that the protectorate 
relationship was finally working as the Colonial Office had intt:nded 
from the outset. The Consul no longer belonged in the camp of the 
King's enemies and his advice was not seen as a threat to the 
Kingdom's autonomy. Nonetheless the sensitivity of British officials 
towards the Tongan Government's desire to determine its own policies 
remained a crucial ingredient in the relationship. The British 
Government had learned that attempts to force unwelcome advice onto 
tl:e Tongans would only cause conflict, and in 1916-17, -cn an 
unsympathetic Consul recommended wholesale reorganisation of the 
Government, his enthusiasm was kept in check. G.B. Smith-Rewse, who 
was Acting Consul in Tonga for 11 months hetween September 1916 and 
August 1917, had been a Distric~ Officer in the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands Colony for eight years, and he was horrified at the 'abuses' 
h f d i · t ti M,...ny nf Smi th-Rewse' s e ound within the Tongan a m n~s ra on. u " 
criticisms reflected his own prejudices, bin career hopes, and his 
frur;tr.:ltion at his lack of direct authority. Nevertheless, his 
January 1918 and cmcls., ~~THC 4, 
secret, t• Narch 1918, HPHC tf, 
!kO'lan to Sweet-EGcot t, 18 
217/1918; c.o. to Swect-Escott, 
980/tne. 
Page 250 
descriptions of, for example, the disorganisation in the lands, the 
r~lice and education departments and the continued power of the nobles 
and chiefs over the majority of commoners were d bt dl un ou e y accurate. 
Although McJwan noted in late 1917 that 'the progress made since the 
year 1905 in the methods of administration has been little short of 
remarkable', it was also true that in many aspects government Lll 
rather short of the organised, efficient and equitable British 
ideal. [87] British policy allowed the structures and patterns of 
Tongan society to remain central ~ td British officials had perforce 
learned to t:urn a blind eye to Lluch that could not easHy be changed. 
In Smith-Rewse' s opinion, how·ever, change was imperative, The 
Tongan system of government offended his sense of the 'ideals of 
British justice and fair play' a.,d he boldly took up the cause of the 
Tongan commoner, defending his ri:;hts against a system which ruled 
'not for the benefit of the whole community but for a smc.ll 
clique' .[88] His brand of paternalism d~ffered little from that of 
Campbell. He had no respect for the ability of the Tongans to govern 
themselves, and longed for the opportunity to enforce efficient 
government and inculcate the spirit of British justice into the minds 
of all. Inevitably his views had some impact on British policy. 
Reference to the Supp.1.-=mentary Agreement and the Consul's power 
thereunder b ti ble and before '-!cOWan 1 s return, ecame more no cea , ~ 
Smith-Rewse's proposal· to put Tonga's finances into the hands of 
Europeans was accepted. But although his supel'iors had some sympathy 
87 '' Ow .., t f 20 October 1917, • ;;.c an to Swcct-.:.Gco t, con ·, WP!IC 4, 
2902/1917. 
G3. St:Iith-Rcwnc to Sw<:ct-I:acott, conf., 26 Hay 1917, t·iPUC t+, 
1492/1917; Smith-Rewse to Swcet-Escott, con£., 8 JunuJry 19lt. 
WPHC 4, 103/1917. 
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with his views, tht~y were not prepared tc abandon the policy developed 
since 1912. With the memory of the crisis provoked by Campbell still 
fresh, Smi~h-Rewse was continually reminded that he should not 
interfere in the administration, that changes must come from within, 
and that he should not put definite proposals before the Tongan 
Government without first obtaining the approval of the IU gh 
Commissioner or the Secretary of State.[89] His desire to prevent 
the formation of new Kautahas which he felt would not be in the 
Tongans' interests, and his conce<n that the King refused to set a 
definite date for his daughter's marriage, both met with a warnine not 
to interfere. Similarly, Smith-Rewse's contention that the issuing of 
liquor prohibition orders against Europeans by a Tongan Police 
Nagistrate was 'too much power to place in the lands of a native', and 
should be transferred to the High Commissioner's Court, was not 
approved by the Secreta~y of State.[90] 
Unlike his predecessors, Smith-Rewse was not impressed with the 
abilities of the Premier, Tl!' ivakano. While he doubted whether the 
country would ever progress under a 'native·' Premier, he found 
Tu'ivakano particularly distasteful. The main reason for his dislike 
appears to have ben Tu'ivakano's close relationship with Scott, Chief 
European clerk in the Premier's Office, whom Smith-Rewse described as 
'virtually Premier' .[91] Tu'ivakano, he alleged, had been led astray 
89, Swcet-Escott to Smith-Rewsc, conf., 12 December 1916, HPHC 4, 
3125/1916; Sweet-Escott to Smith-Rewse, 29 January 1917, WPHC 4, 
103/1917. 
90. 
91. 
Swcct-Escott to Smith-Rewsc, 9 January .L9 1, WPHC 4, 
Sv1C!c.>t-Escott to Smith-Rewr;e, 28 Hay ... 917, WPHC 4. 
c.o. to Swect-Escott, 23 July 1917, WPHC 4: 2559/Bl7. 
SrJith-Rewse to Swcet-Escott, conf., 8 Jam:;ry 
10'3/1917; Smith-Rcwsc to Swcct-EBcott, conf. 
WPIIC t•, 2829/1916. 
2983/1916; 
94/1917; 
WPHC 4, 
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by Scott to the point where progress was impossible and the country 
was being ruled for the benefit of those.. at the top. In Tu 1 ivakano 1 s 
place, Smith-Rewse was keen to see l .. 1 noble Tungi, whom he 
more amenable. When, in March 1917, Smith-Rewse learned 
saw as 
<>f an 
incident ill which Tu' ivakano, together with Vaea, the Minister of 
Police, and the latter's clerk had been seen drunk in public, he 
seized upon the opportunity to try to oust the Premier. 
In Tongan terms the incident was, as the King pointed out, not a 
serious one; even lass so 'when the conduct of Prime MinisterR and 
other Ministers of civilised countries is considered'.[9~] But 
Smith-Rewse would not let the matter rest -- he considered it a 
scandal and sought the High Commissioner's permission to suspend the 
Premier and Minister of Police from duty, replace them temporarily 
with Mateialona and Tungi respectively, and conduct h:ls own inquiry. 
Sweet-Escott would not approve this course, but backed Smith-Rewse's 
call for a full inquiry with an appeal to Clause 2 of the 
Supplementary Agreement.[93] After much correspondence concerning 
the King's constitutional rights, Smith-Rewse's biased judg~ment and 
the necessity of tak1ng the High Commissioner's advice, Tupou II 
~greed to a Commission of Inquiry to consist of the Chief Justice, the 
Auditor-General and Salomone Ata, who was then Magistrate at 
Nuku'alofa and Acting Governor of Vava'u. The report was considered 
by Tupou II in consultation with the new Consul, McOwan, who took a 
far more sympathetic attitude than Smith-Rewse. The outcome was 
predictable -- the Premier's conduct was censu. ed, but he remained in 
92 • Tupou II to Sm i th-Rewse, 20 April 1917, BCT 1/6 • 
.~. SWC!:.>t-Enc.ott to !;mith-Rel..'ce, 28 April 1917, WPHC 4, 958/1917. 
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office. Vaea, who apparently had been the most intoxicated 
' 
and was 
past retiring age and not particularly capable in his duties anyway, 
was called on to resign and his plal~e was taken by Solomone Ata.[94] 
Smith-Rewse's attempt to force his will onto the Government had not 
succeeded. 
While Smith-Rewse endeavoured to introduce his own improvements 
wherever possible, his overall plan called for far more sweeping 
changes. His ideas were brought together in January 1917 in a report 
sent to the High Commissioner. This document, written just three 
months after his arrival, argued that the only hope for Tonga lay in a 
much more direct intervention by Britain in Tongan affairs. What 
Smith-Rewse looked for was perhaps as much a social revolution as a 
political one. He saw the King as 'an obstacle in the way of all 
progress' and he realised too that the nobles and chiefs would oppose 
any reforms that conflicted with their powers. To create 'a cleaner 
and healthier atmosphere' Smith-Re>vse advocated removing all executive 
powers from the King and countering the strength of the nobles by 
increasing the number of Europeans in the Government. Short of 
annexation, Smith-Rewse held that the only way to prevent the country 
deteriorating and the Government becoming a farce, was for the 
Consul's position to ,nce more be clearly impressed on the Tongans. 
The r.ommunity, he felt, needed a leader, and better the British Consul 
than any undesirable European. By exercising his rights under t~e 
Supplementary Agreement, and with the benefit of more British 
· council, Smith-Rewse believed tint the> representation on the Pr~vy 
the Consul's hands would be strengthened and he could then become 
'po~.;er b~hind the throne r and a new era of progress and reform would 
9~ I 'f. ~·!cOwan to Sweet-Escott, 20 
2897/1917. 
October 1917 an<l encls., WPHC 4, 
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begin.[95] 
Neither the High Commissioner nor the Colonial Office wanted any 
such action. Not that they saw the Tongan Government in a very 
different light; as Sweet-Escott pointed out: 
The strictures passed by Mr Smith-Rewse on the 
administration of the Government of Tonga are not, r 
believe, undeserved and existing defects can not be removed 
altogether unless compet~nt European officers, selected by 
the Secretary of State, are placed at the head of all the 
government departments and are given a majority in the 
Legislative Assembly, the Privy Council and the 
Cabinet •.• [96] 
These things excepted, however, the real questions for consideration 
lay elsewhere. As Sweet-Escott went on, it was really a matter of 
whether His Majesty's Government is prepared to insist on 
the adoption of the radical changes in the Constitution 
which such arrangements will entail, and whether the present 
time is opportune for the changes being made.[97] 
In Sweet-Escott's opinion, the time was not ripe and the Agent and 
Consul should be content to follow policy as already laid down. The 
consideration of further alterations and improvements should await the 
termination of the war: a view in which the Secretary of Sta;:e fully 
concurred. [ 98] 
The First World War provided Britain with a convenient excuse for 
shelving any action in regard to Tonga and by the time th~ Armistice 
was signed in November 1918, the question of altering Tonga's 
political status had been allowed to drop. Perhaps some small impact 
9" s · h E tt nf 8 January 19!.7, HPHC 4, J. m1t -Rewse to Sweet- sco , co ., 
103/1917. 
96. Sweet-Esc tt to c.o., secret, 29 January 1917, ibid. 
97. Ibid. 
98. C.O. to Sweet-Escott, secret, 8 May 1917, WPHC 4, 1681/1917 • 
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on Britain's decision to leave Tonga alone may have been made by the 
impassioned rhetoric which flowed from the Tongan Government in 
defence of Tonga's right to exist. The letter which declared the 
King's loyalty to the British throne at the outbreak ~f war was 
equally, if not more, concerned with Tonga's desire to be left alone, 
and in his annual reports during the war years, Tu'ivakano devoted 
pages to expounding the idea that the ~., r was being fought for 
right of the small and weak nations to exist and govern themselves: 
We look to the British Empire to protect us, as Belgium did, 
and she has not failerl Belgium -- so I am sure she will not 
fail us. We are weak, yet we have our love of the land from 
which we and our fathers sprang, our love of flag and race 
is as intense as that of other nations ••• Should our flag be 
taken away, we could not fight, we would have to submit; 
but we would rightly consider we had been betrayed .•• [99] 
the 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Colonial Office ever 
gave serious consideration to the possibility of altering Tonga's 
status after the war. In 1914, after a New Zealand military 
administration took over German Samoa, the idea of a federation 
between Tonga, Fiji and Samoa gained some popularity. Smith-Rewse 
advocated it as an ideal solution for Tonga, with European of:Eicials 
being interchangeable and a common policy of administration and trade 
being followed.[lOO] Sweet-Escott was also mildly in favour of the 
idea and he felt it would promote the prosperity of the three groups, 
but he strongly deprecated the annexation of Tonga while the 
Government remained loyal to ·t British throne.[l01] In 1920 the 
99, Report of the Premier's Department for 1916. 
100, Soith-Rews:e to Swcet-Escott, conf., 8 January 1917, WPHC 4, 
103/19J.7. 
101. Sweet-Escott to c.o., secret, 29 January 1917, ibid.; 
Swcct-Escott to c.o., 28 January 1915, WPHC 4, 1840A/1914 Secret. 
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Mandate for Samoa went to New Zealand without any open discussion 
of federation. Immediately before the Washington Conference in 1921 , 
rumour again alleged that a federation involving Tonga might result 
from the deliberations of the heads of governments at the Conference 
but when no such arrangement eventuated, talk of federation or any 
other change in Tonga's political status died away.[102] 
On 5 April 1918, seven months before the end of the war and three 
weeks after the 25th anniversary of his coronation, Tupou II died of 
he<>rt faHure. His death, which had once been eagerly awaited in 
British circles as an occasion for taking O'rer the Kingdom's 
administration, now passed barely noticed as an event of international 
significance. The British Government had long before come to regard 
Tupou II's policies as Tonga's policies, and in the face of his 
determination to retain Tonga's sovereig~ty, British officials had 
been content to tolerate the Tongan way of doing things. Had there 
been any pressing reason for Britain to intervene, the outcome might 
well have been different. But what would Britain achieve by a change 
in regard to Tonga? If there was a certain amount of inefficiency and 
even maladministrati<.'n in the island Kingdom, that did not mar~-: it out 
as unique. tfuat rcattered was that some reasonable form of government 
existed and appeared to satisfy the Tongans. 
102. 'Proceedings of 
Gazette, no. 31, 
1921. 
1921 Legislctive Assembly', Tonga Government:_ 
1921; Report of the Premier's Department for 
CHAPTER 8 
A New Alliance 
You are well aware that my Kingdom is very small, and if my 
people are to retain a national existence it can only be 
secured by the continued friendship and help of Great 
Britain. 
[Queen Salote Tupou III to High Commissioner Sir Eyre Hutson, 6 March 
1926, WPHC 22/I/11.] 
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The day after Tupou II's death the Tongan Privy Council met to 
proclaim Salote, the late King's daughter, Q f T ueen o onga. Her 
accession marked the beginn~.ng of a reign that was to span twice as 
many years as her fat'aer' s and to p1 ovide a stable framework for 
Tongan political and so;ial life. Salote came to fulfil her role as 
Queen with dignity, assurance and considerable political acumen and, 
where she lacked m• ·ertise, she turned to capable advisers for 
guidance. Under }.er influence the relationship between the Tongan 
Government and the British Consul reached a high point of mutual 
confidence. The latter years of Tupou II's reign had seen the 
development of cooperation and consultation the two 
Governments, but Salote carried the relationship much further. The 
support and advice of British officials was central to her rule. At 
the same time, however, Salote fostered Tonga's identity as a 
Polynesian Kingdom proud of its own heritage and integrity. The 
loyalty and confidence which she inspired in British officials led 
them to accept finally that if Tonga was not governed according to the 
British ideals ,£ efficiency and democracy, it didn't !aally matter. 
Born in March 1900, just a few weeks before the proclamation of 
the Protectorate, Salote was the daughter of Tupou II and his first 
wife, Lavinia Veiongo. As Lavinia was the grand-daughter of 
Laufilitonga, Salote's shared the ancestry of the Tu'i Tonga as well 
as her father's Tu'i Kanokupolu line. When she came to the throne at 
18 she was even younger than her .{ather. had been when proclaimed King. 
And, despite an education in New Zealand from 1909-14, sh~ lacked 
experience in government. A naturally shy person, Salote wa~ seven 
months pregnant at the time of her accession and it seem.:.•d to the 
British Consul that the demands of being Queen might prove too much 
for her. A few days after Tupou II's death McOwan reported to the 
. ·. 
. . 
' . 
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High Commissioner: 
The Queen ••• is incapable, in my judgement, of disc~arging 
the duties devolving upon her and some difficulty may be 
experienced from Her Majesty's inability to distinguish 
between good and bad advice where the interest~ of the 
kingdom are concerned.[l] 
McOwan put forward a propo~al, which he attributed to Salote, 
that the Queen should share the responsibilities of her throne with 
her husband, the noble Tungi Mailefihi. Tungi, who was some 13 years 
older than Salote, had been educated at Newington College, Sydney, and 
had six years experience as Governot' of Vava'u. His suitability was 
enhanced in McOwan's eyes by his birth; Tungi was the direct 
descendant of the once powerful Tui Ha'atakalaua line and grandson of 
william Tungi Halatuituia whose power had rivalled Tupou I's. 
According to the Constitution as amended in 1888, the thron'e would 
pass to Tungi Halatuituia and his heirs should Tupou I die without 
lawful issue. Tungi Halatuituia's son, Tuku'aho, had been ?remier 
from 1890-93, following Baker's deportation, and a numb'. of llritish 
officials, including Basil Thomson, had favoured hi·. as King after 
Tupou I. McOwan therefore found it fitting that Tuku'aho's son, Tungi 
Hailefihi, should share the throne with Queen Salote. McOwan informed 
the High Commissioner that Salote had agreed that provided the British 
Govet ~ent and the Tongan Legislative Assembly both consented, she and 
Tungi would be crowned together as King and Queen.[2] 
Although McOwan's superiors in the Colonial Office supported the 
IJroposal for a joint throne on the understanding that either the King 
r· h former, would trans.1ct all state business or '~ueen, and preferably t e 
1. Hr::Owan to Sweet-Escott, 12 April 1918, HPUC 1~, 1016/1918. 
2. Ibid. 
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on behalf of both, nothing f 3] McOwan offered the 
explanation that the views of the Colo~l1l 
.e had been transmitted 
too late to be acted upon but it is more likely that Salote was not in 
favour of the idea and that it had been McOwan's suggestion rather 
than her own. Perhaps, too, the Privy Council convinced her that the 
idea was not wise. No proposal regarding Tungi was put before the 
Legislative Assembly when it met in July-August 1918. The coronation 
ceremonies, ~ncluding the traditional fakanofo on 9 October and the 
European-style church ceremony on the 11th, honoured Salote alone. 
Tungi nevertheless remained a vital source of support and advica for 
the Queen and became the leading political figure over two decades. 
In April 1918 Salote appointed him Minister of Lands in place of Sipu 
and when Tu'ivakano retired due to ill-health in 1923, Tungi became 
Premier until his death in 1941. 
In contrast to the attitude which Tupou II had adopted towards 
British intervention in Tonga, both Salote and Tungi accepted the 
British presenc8 without resistance. From the start of her reign 
Salote assured the High Commissioner that she intended to rule as a 
constitutional monarch in terms of the 1900 Treaty and the 
Supplementary Agreement of 1905.[4] In her speeches to the 
Legislative Assembly in the early years of her reign Salote made 
constant reference to the value of British protection. In 1922, for 
example, she referred to the friendship of Great Britain as 'Tonga's 
dean~st possession', and in 1925 she stressed the need for British 
3. c.o. to Sweet-Escott, 18 July 1918, tvPHC 4, 2272/1918; HcOwan to 
Swcet-Escott, 12 September 1918, HPHC 4, 2361/1918. 
4. quce.'l Sa.lote to HcOwan, 5 June 1918, encl. in HcOwan 
Swcet-Escott, WPHC 4, 1623/1918. 
to 
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advice because of 'Tonga's inability to govern 1 proper y alone.'[5] 
In writing to the High Commissioner in 1926 Salote drew 
attention to 
the role of the Agent and Consul: 
The problems of my Government are more complex, the 
expansion of trade brings with it increasing European 
interests, and the intrusion of the Asiatic makes me feel 
how necessary it is for Tonga to have a counsellor who holds 
our confidence and is in sympathy with our national 
development. [ 6] 
Salote thus took advantage of British guidance but at the same time 
she was sensitive towards any British encroachment onto her 
prerogatives. In 1925, for example, when a new Chief Justice set sail 
for Tonga before the Queen had a chance to accept his nomination, she 
reminded British officials that their task was merely to select a 
suitable candidatE:>, but that the actu·<l appointment rested with her 
and her Cabinet.[7] 
The warmth of Salote's relations with t-he British Government and 
her willingness to accept the Consul's guidance reflected her ties 
with the 'pro-British' faction that had been her father's main 
opponents. Some time after the death of Lavinia Veiongo in 1902, 
Tupou II had placed Salote's upbringing in the hands of Rachel Tonga, 
the widow of a leading Wesleyan minister and sister-in-law of the 
former British-appointed Premier, Mateialona, to whom Salote gave the 
noblC! title Tupouto'a in 1921. Salote's marriage in April 1917 to the 
Heslcyan Tunr,i, t.zhosc father and grandfathet -- Tuku' aho and Tungi 
s. 
6. 
7. 
Queen Salote's Opening Speech to the Legislative Assembly, 13 
June 1922, Tonga Government:_~':_~ no. 20, 1922~ Queen Salc)te's 
Closing Speech ••• 24 July 1925, ~·, no. 10, 19 .. 5. 
Qut!en Salote to Hutson, 8 Harclt 1926, WPHC 22/I/11. 
v (i to 11 t 1 15 July 1925 and subseqm~nt 
.!c. w.:1n utson, e •, . · th tl 
'" d uPllC 4 696/1925• Notes of an InterVl.eW Wl. w corre .. pon encc, 1"1 , ' .., 110.,5 Qut!cn of Tonga, 6 Aur,ust 1925, i~PUC 4, 155.. .... • 
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had found allies among British officials, reinforced her links with 
Britain. In 1911 Tungi had v~s~t d B · · 
• ~ e r~ta~n at the Government's 
in~itation for the coronation of King Edward VII, and had renewed his 
acquaintance with Basil Thomson, a close friend of Tukuaho and the old 
Tungi, with whom he kept up a friendly correspondence. 
As a result of these influences, Salote did not share Tupou II's 
political orientation and, particularly in the early years of her 
reign, she encountered considerable opposition from those who had 
enjoyed her father's patronage and who opposed the influence of Tungi. 
Factions, focussing on the Wesleyan/Free Church rift and on opposition 
to British encroachment continued to dominate internal politics, with 
European residents only too ready to enter the fray. And just as 
Tupou II's opponents had sought British intervention during the first 
few years of the century as a means of increasing their o\vn influence, 
so Salote realised that an r~liance with Britain wculd strengthen her 
rule. Salote used British influence to reinforce her own position and 
subdue her opponents. In this, her interests and those of British 
officials coincided in practically every respect. In their concern 
for stability and their desire to influence Tongan affairs, British 
officials attached as much importance as Salote to her continued 
command over the Kingdom, and followed unswervingly a policy of 
supporting the Queen to their utmost. Whenever her authority was 
questioned or her position insecure, the British Government stood by 
her. Indeed, the support of some British Consuls for Salote's 
Government was so considerable that it earned the animosity of 
European residents who rcsentnd the idea that their represent,lt ive saw 
his first priority an supporting the Tong.:m Government, rather than 
their Oivn claims againr.;t it.[8] 
8. See, for t:xamplt:, 'Affairs in Tonga', Fi-1!. ,!.!!J!..t.>G a!lt !~<:.ral_'!, 
June 1937 and 'Tongan Affairn', ~·, lu Aueust 19.Jt • 
11 
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Throughout the first eight years of Salote's reign, the position 
of Agent and Consul was held by Islay HcOwan whose ability to foster 
good relations with the Tongan Government had been demonstrated when 
he acted as Consul in 1912-13 following Campbell's removal. During 
his second term in Tonga, from August 1917 to June 1926, HcOwan 
enjoyed the confidence of the Government and became a vital source of 
support for the Queen. His personal concern for the welfare of the 
Tongan people was demonstrated beyond doubt during the epidemic of 
Spanish influenza which broke out in mid-November 1918, killing some 
1600 people, about eight per cent of the population.[9] Hith much of 
the Tongan population prostrate, it was McOwan who kept the Kingdom 
running, procuring medical assistance via the High Commissioner, 
organising relief work, soup kitchens and the burying of the dead. A 
Privy Council resolution in December 1913 recorded the Kingdom's deep 
gratitude for McOwan's 'unceasing energy and unsparing efforts', 
noting that his prompt measures had prevented the death rate from 
being even higher.[lO] Hhen rumours of McOwan's imminent departure 
reached Salote in March 1926 she addressed the High Commissioner in 
glm'ling terms, speaking of 'the indefatigable effort of Mr HcOwan to 
help me and my Government in every possible way' which had brought 
about a good understanding ar.d a feeling of complete confidence.[ll] 
HcOwan's support for the Queen was nowhere so vital as during her 
attempt to unite the two factions of the tvcslcyan Church in 1921+ • 
Although herself a member of the Free Church, Salotc's links with the 
9. McOwan to Rodwell, 23 December 1918, WPHC 4, 12/1919. 
'>3D b r 1918 HP!IC 4 13/1919. Ton<~:> C~ut~cm Saloto to HcOw:Jn, ~ ecem · e ' ' · · 
1
--
2
t,-
, 1 8 J· ·try 1919• Pa<"e to Hodwc l, + (.overnm<.mt Ga:~ot te, no. , u.nuc • u 
Tin"U?try~i9'19 ;--\.h>lfcat•, 132/1919. 
10. 
ll. Queen Salote> to Uutoon, 6 !·!arch 1926, WPUC 22/I/11. 
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Wesleyans were strong. Her desire to heal the split of 1885 was 
undoubtedly a genuine attempt to secure 'national unity', on which she 
placed considerable importance, but it was seen by many Free Church 
adherents as a Wesleyan coup and as evidence that Tungi was strongly 
influencing the Queen's rule.[l2] Under the leadership of the 
Reverend J.B. Watkin, about one-third of the members of the Free 
Church broke away from the union. These anti-unionists brought a test 
case in the Land Court involving the ownership and use of Free Church 
property and in June 1924 the case was decided in their favour. The 
pro-unionists immediately appealed to the Privy Council against the 
decision and on 11 September a specially constituted Privy Council 
uplwld the appeal, ruLing that the Free Wesleyan Church, as the united 
church was called, '"as legal successor to the Free Church. [13} Both 
HcOtvan and T.E. Fell, tlw Acting High Commissioner, realised the 
importance of not becoming publicly involved in the disput(' between 
the rival factions but they nevertheless gave Salote their full 
support. During Hc0wan 1 s absence on leave Fell censured the Acting 
Consul, J.W. ~iasterton (who was also Hatkin's son-in-law), for 
adopting a partisan stance and engaging in acrimonious correspondence 
with the Premier.[l4] When the anti-unionists appealed to the 
12. Notes of an Interview oetween Hutson and the Queen, 6 Aur,uat 
1925, t~PHC 4, 1552/1925; Elinor Hordaunt, .'!!!!::, .Y_~tut:~ ~ook, 
London, 1926, pp.l45-147. 
13 • r~or a full account of the union Gee A.H. Hood, Ov~!Ee<lG !·1ir!f!iOnE. 
of the Australian Hetodist Church, vol. 1, :E_onf!:! at!'!§_~!_, 
Melbourne19T5; --mid b.w. I.o'orma ,;;;,:'lnga 'u Tortured Venture in 
Church Unity', Journal .2..{ Pac.}:tLc ~,q,r~, 13:1, 1978, pp.1-2l. 
Fell to Manterton, 13 May 1924 and ~~latcd correspondence, 
{.' 1069/1924. 
i·:PHc 
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Secretary of State against the Queen's act{ons h 
• t ey were firmly 
reminded that the Tongan Privy Council was the final court of appeal 
and that there were no grounds for Britain to intervene.[15] 
When McOwan left Tonga in June 1926 to take up the post of 
Secretary of Native Affairs in Fiji, his successor adopted the same 
supportive attitude towards the Government. J. S. Neill WU8 
barrister who had been Registrar of the Supreme Court in Fiji sinco 
1922. Neill had been seconded fvr special duty in Tonga as a member 
of the Privy Council in the Church Union appeal case and had created a 
Vl~ry favourable impression on tht.~ Queen -- so much so that in 1925 the 
Govl:!riUn.mlt had sought his return to the vacant position of Chief 
Justice. [16] Although Neill d'.:!clined the offer, which involved a 
drop in salary, he took up the Consul's job from January 1927 and 
remained in Tonga for 10 yeats, establishing close and friendly 
relations with the Queen and the Government. 
As a result of the heightened cooperation between the Consul and 
the Tongan Government over this period it was, as one resident put it, 
rather difficult to sort out where the Tongan Government ended and the 
British Consul began, or vice versa. To another resident it appeared 
that 'actually the Government "lives, and moves, and has its being" in 
the British Agent and Consul. 1 [ 17] And certainly through the 1920s 
and 1930s the Consul's influence permeated the administration; he was 
aptly described as 1 the power behind the throne 1 , of even 1 th~ 
1924 BC'£ 1/&,· 1), McOwan to Queen Salote, 20 December , 
GovL~rnr;c•nt Gazc~tte, no. 12, 21 Auguot 1925. 
--='0-""-·""---""" '" ...... ..-...... -"""'"'~-----
ll;, Fell to C.O., 5 Harc:h 1925, WPilC 4, 696/1925. 
17 • r· d •1•nr,,ld 15 June 1937; 'Tong.:m • Affairo in Tonga', Fiji l]l:.C,E.'. :11!... ..:.:...~';!. __ , 
Affairo' , .i hf.c!.·, 10 Xu'GU::it 1937 • 
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un.:rc·'ned King of Tonga 1 • [ 18] In seeking a salary rise in 1923 
HcOwan argued that he had played an important part in bringing about 
stable government and that his post was equivalent to that of an 
Administrator in one of the British possessions as it involved similar 
duties. [ 19] For the immediate future, he foresaw no change: 
The complete independence of Tonga is an ideal which is dear 
to the minds of the Tongan chiefs but is a state which they 
neither try tf'l deserve nor are capable of maintaining. Any 
relax,don of control, expecially in the matter of finances 
would, in my opinion, be unwise at present.[20] ' 
To a considerable degre\ the C0nsul's influence over the 
administration resulted from the 1918 Agreement giving him effective 
control over the Kingdom's finances. As Henry Vaskess, Secretary to 
the High Commission, observed in 1932: 
Our ••• exper~ence in Tonga shows that control of the finances 
means virtual control of all branches of the 
administration.[21] 
During the 1920s the Consul's powers under the 1918 Agreement were 
twice extended -- in 1923 the Goverr@ent agreeJ to submit all Advance 
Warrants to the Consul for counter-signature and in 1927 it also 
agreed to submit Advance Warrants fo-:- certain store purchases.[22] 
In his confidential report for 1927, Neill commented that the Consul's 
general financial control was necessary if development was to proceed 
18. See McOwan to Tungi, 1 Hay 1925, encl. in McOwan to Ht · •r"'. 5 Hay 
1925, WPHC 4, 1012/1925. 
19. !1c0wa'l to Rodwell, 24 Nay 1923, WPHC 4, 1408/1923. 
20, McOwan to Fell, 4 September 1924, WPHC 4, 1804/1924. 
21. ~·1inute by Vaskess, 9 .July 1932 on ~~PHC 1+, 1884/1932. 
indebted to Dr. B. Macdonald for this reference. 
I am 
~~ 19~ 0 d bn qtl"nt corresr>ondvncc, 
'-'- • Neill to Ii.utson, 21 February '4 '} an su ,,e .... 
WPHC t+, 774/1928. 
Page 267 
'on soucd lines'.[23] Although in pt~~tice successive c 1 tr 1·~d onsu .. s "' 
interfere as little as possible with the detdils of t'le 
, government 
to 
programme as presented in the F.stimates, they nevertheless maintained 
a very close watch over expenditure, placing great importance on 
bal~ncing the budget. Under McOwan's supervision a large surplus was 
built up during the post-war boom, and both McOwan and Neill refused 
to sanction any raid on it. Although this 'surplus policy' became the 
butt of criticism among European residents, who thought it could be 
sacrificed to tax relief, and provided a continual source of 
temptation to the less frugal members of the Legislative Assembly, it 
nevertheless helped minimise the effects of the world-wide depression 
on Tonga during the 1930s. 
In addition to the Consul's agreed role in financial matters anti 
in senior appointments to the government service, he also exerted 
considerable influence on a variety of matters ranging from health and 
education to boat-building and banana exports. Both McOwan and Neill 
exercised freely their right to make suggestiors on any aspecc of the 
administration, and they reported that not only was their advice 
sought frequently, QUt that unsolicited suggestions also 
generally accepted. In his report for 1931 Neill noted succinctly 
that 'consultation has become a matter of course'.[24] Under the 
Premiership of Tungi it became a well-established habit for the 
Premier to call at the Consulate at l'O!ast once a week for regul~r 
informal consul tat ions wi tl1 the Consul, and in this way the latter's 
hand extended ovP.r most aspects of the administration. In 1925 the 
European Chief Justice public~y ridiculed the~e person~l conferences, 
likening the Premier's vinits to the rounds of the iocal butdwr boy 
'>3 22 Feb· .... u, ... ry 1928, HPllC 4, 77:,/1928 • 
.. · ~~cill to Seymcur, " 
24. !'icill, 'Rt.~port on duties fo'L 1931', viPf~ 
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for orders, but Tungi was not moved.[25] He believed the 
consul tatiCtlS be to mutually advantageous and although he did not 
always take the profferred advice, he had no intention of curtailing 
his visits. Similarly, McOwan noted that as Consul he attached far 
more value to these meetings than to official correspondence, because 
they were conducive to harmonious relations, and enabled him 'to 
understand and appreciate more fully t~1eir difficulties'. [26] · 
Despite this general picture of harmony, the Consul did not have 
a free hand with the administration. Although the Queen and Premier 
were, according to McOwan, quite happy that 'a contr.)llL·- influence 
should be exercised by the Agent and Consul in the interests of 
Tongans and Europeans alike', certain other sections of the Governroent 
did not tolerate the Consul's role so readily.[27] Those allies of 
Tupou II who had fought against British intervention regarded the 
Queen's acceptance of the Consul as a sell-out; they resented his 
encroachment and remained extremely suspicious of his motives. The 
main avenue for the airing of this discontent was t: _ Legislative 
Assembly which, in contrast to the situation during the later years of 
Tupou II's reign, did not throw its weight behind the n~w Queen. 
A cause of particular resentment in the Assembly was the Queen's 
appointment, at AcOwan's behest, of two additional European Ministers 
to the Privy Council. After Sipu's resignation in March 1918 
St·it:t!t :.::nr "tt had surgested that the post of Minist·~r of Lands be 
abolished and the duties assigned to the Chief Surveyor, A.B. Wallace. 
::s. HcOt1::·t to Tungi, 1 May 1925, encl. in HcOtmn to Hutson, 
192:1, HPHC 4, 1012./1925. 
:.:,. • .~.fcOwan to Fell, 30 January 1925, WPHC 4, 328/1925. 
Thid • 
5 May 
Page 269 
HcOwan rejected this arr·angement as the Queen \\'anted the Minister of 
Lands post for Tungi, but he suggested L;at Wallace be appointed 
Minister of Public ~orks so that 'his mar'ced d · 
' a mrnistrative ability 
would have full scope' and the Privy Council would have the benefit of 
his advice.[28] At the same time HcOwan also recommended that the 
finan :e portfolio be taken away from the Premier (who found it 
inco~venient anyway) and given to the Assistant Treasurer, W.G. 
Bagnall, who would then be promoted to Treasur~r wit:lt ,1 seat on Privy 
Council. Out of deference to McOwan the Queen agret~d to 
appointments, albeit with considerable hesitation, but ~hey were not 
generally popular, particularly in the Legislative Assembly. 
The representatives were not only opposed to having four 
Europeans on the Tongan Privy Council, but they also resented the 
increase of government members in the Assembly to nine while the 
representatives of the nobles and people each remained at seven. The 
1919 Assembly carried, by 12 votes to 11, a resolution calling for 
section 63 of the Constitution to be amended so that all parti~s in 
the Assembly be equalised. When the Government rejected this Lhe 1920 
Assembly refused to continue business, pending aL 'Peftl to the High 
Cc missioner. Order was restored after a message from the Queen, 
together with a warning from the Chief Justice to the effect that tht• 
Assembly might find itself abolished if it refused to cooperate, but 
the resentment continued to smoulder. Th~ 1920 Assembly attempted to 
i:npcach the ChJ.ef Justice a.:td Wallace on rather flimsy charges, and in 
the 1921 Assembly a motion calling for the additi.:m of a· 
representative nf the p~ople and nobles from both Niuatoputapu and 
28. McOwan to Rodwell, 22 January 1919, WPHC 4, 20011919 ; 
Sweet-Esco .. to HcOwan, 23 May 1918, WPHC 4, 1221/1918. 
i ! 
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Niuafo'ou was passed but left to the Privy Council to decide.[29] 
The extent of discontent amongst members of the A3 sembly was 
articulated clearly in November 1920 when a deputation of the seven 
elected nobles and five of the repres~ntatives of the people 
approached C.H. Rodwell, High Commissioner between 1918-24, during a 
two-day visit he made to the Kingdom. Led by the noble Ma'atu and 
Siosiua Kaho, who had been two of Tupou II's closest supporters, the 
deputation complained of the Consul's supervision of finance and his 
:; 'vice to the Queen to appoint the two new European Ministers, and 
sought an end tG the 1905 Supplementary Agreement, which had been read 
out in the 1918 Assembly on the motion of Ma'atu. The deputation also 
complained that the Assembly's recommendations were continually 
disregarded by the Privy Council.[30] 
Tho High Commissioner was concerned at the evidence that the 
Assembly was r·'llling in the opposite direction to the Queen and Privy 
Council, but both he and McOwan gave their full support to the Queen. 
Rod\vell informed the deputation that any change in the~ role of the 
British Cot.f>tll was out of tlw 1uestion and he issued vague ,.mrnings 
that Tonga's independence dep"nded on the success of the existing 
consti:..uti" ;al arrangement.[3l] In McOwa s view, the problem was 
not so much that the Assembly was being ignored but that it was 
· '""J?t in~ to exceed its powers; he claimed that the Assembly's 
resolutions wer~ 'aimed at the ex~cutive' and constituted 
29. ,m,;a Govet·i~;:lent Gazette, no. 19, 2 December 1919; 
:;;-:-26/192(f; -~n)i'd., no. 31/1921. 
ibid., 
·, <, :; ui' Interview between Ro~ ,ell and the nobles and elected 
· 1 i A mb1y 23 November 1920 rwpr~sentatives of the Leg~s at ve sse , ' 
wr·1c 4, 3116/1920. 
Ibi.d. 
-
Page 271 
an interference on the part 
irresponsible body, with 
Government's control.[32] 
of 
the 
the elected members an 
Q I > ueen s prdrogative and the 
In his eyes, the opposition in the Assembly was merely capricious 
the work of 'an irresponsible body of mischief makers' and he argued 
that because elections aroused little interest, the 'noisy agitators' 
had the field to themselves. N ~ither McOwan nor Neill was impressed 
by the standard of politLcal or even general edul~tion amongst the 
;·epresentati ves, and they believed that this led to misunderstandings 
and ill-informed opinions. After the 1920 session McOwan was quite 
blurtt: 
The election of representatives to 
is many years' in advance of 
race.[33] 
the Legislative 
the development 
Assembly 
of the 
McOwan's criticism of the Assembly reflects the extent of his 
alliance with the Government. Because the Government had no majority 
in the Assembly it was dependent on the support of the elected members 
(both noble and commoner) to see its measures through and this was not 
always forthcoming. Although the Privy Council could (and often did) 
veto proposals put forward by the Assembly, it could not compel the 
elected members to vote Supply and under clause 81 of the 
Constitution, all expenditure required authorisation by the Assembly. 
After 1918 the Assembly became increasingly aware of its 
cons~·itutional role, particularly in regard to finance and blocked 
many government measures that were the result of the Consul's careful 
drafting of the Estimates. In many cases these confrontat~ons between 
the Assembly and the executive were settled by an appeal to the 
representatives' loyalty to the Crown; a Royal ~1essage calling on the 
32. HcOwan to Rodwell, 6 December 1920, ~· 
33 • Ibid. 
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Assembly to reconsider an issue was usually effective and so were 
the 
'informal discussions' that the Queen at times held with the 
representatives. In 1929 when a Royal Message was at first 
unsuccessful in persuading the nobles' and peoples' representatives to 
wit~dra'T their opposition to a number of provisions in the Estimates, 
W.E. Russell, the Acting Consul, considered advising the Queen to 
appoint sufficient temporary Cabinet Ministers to ensure the 
Government a majority in the Assembly.[34] This suggestion, which 
.ad first been made by McOwan in 1920, was never acted upon as it was 
impractical and might have provoked even greater unrest.[35] 
Much of the Assembly's opposition to government measures was 
inspired by a consistent desire to protect the interests of the Tongan 
people and to prevent European e1 ~roachment. On numerous occasions 
the elected members blocked proposals to increa~e the salaries of 
European officials or to create new posts for Europeans, particularly 
where the job was considered suitable for a Tongan. In opening the 
1925 Legislative Assembly, Queen Salote emphasised Tonga's continuing 
need for Europeans, 'because we ourselves have not yet acquired the 
requisite knowledge and ability to administer the affairs of the 
Government and country.'[36] But the elected members remained 
unconvinced. In the 1928 Assembly, for example, they removed the vote 
for a European Inspector of Police and a second copra inspector, 
refused the maximum salary rate for two other European officers, 
reinstated the salaries of 12 Tongan police constables retir~d as one 
of Neill's economy measures and refused his proposal to amalgamate the 
34, Russell to Seymour, 25 July 1929, WPHC 4, 2408/1929. 
35, McOwan to Rodwell, 6 December 1920, WPHC 4, 3116/1920. 
36, Queen Salote's speech at the Opening of the Legislative Assembly, 
3 July 1925, Tonga Government Gazette, no. 10/1925. 
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Posts of Govenor and Police Magistrate ~n Ha'apa~ 
.... .... and Vava'u.[37] 
While some of these measures were passed after reconsiderati>Jn at the 
Queen's request, others, such as the amalgamation of posts, were 
conceded by the Government. In 1934 when the Government attempted, at 
British instigation, to introduce a quota system on imports designed 
to benefit British soft goods, it was soundly defeated. In 1938, 
however, the Assembly accepted a preferential tariff on British Empire 
goods, in exchange for poll tax concessions.[38] 
Both McOwan and Neill resented the Assembly's interference with 
what they believed to be their financial responsibilities. In 1923, 
for example, when the Assembly reduced the salary of the European 
travelling foreman by £50 in view of alleged bad workmanship in the 
construction of a water tank and a wharf, McOwan argued that it 
involved 'a principle that cannot be admitted without danger to the 
Public Service': 
If the principle be oncP. admitted that the Legislative 
Assembly may increase or decrease salaries, the recognised 
scale would be completely disturbed a.1d the Service would 
come under a capr~c~ous Parliamentary control in which 
favouritism would be the controlling factor.[39] 
Sir Eyre Hutson did not share the Consul's resentment towards the 
Assembly's activities however. After the particularly difficult 1928 
session he explain~d to the Colonial Office that the opposition sprang 
from the Tongans' 'natural and heal thy desire' to manage their own 
affairs and he argued that the British Government should sympathise 
with this attitude so long as it remained compatible with Tongan 
prosperity and well-being. It was, he went on, more importan': for the 
3i • Russell to Hutson, 22 October 1928, HPHC 4, 3059/1928. 
38. Armstrong to Barton, HPUC 23/I, 2163/1938. 
39. !·1c0wan to Rodwell, 19 July 1923, HPtlC 4, 1889/19Z3. 
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Tongan people to have gradual education in self-government 
than to 
introduce 'a state of efficiency that may be possible of achievement 
only by the filling oi the more important offices by Europeans.'[40] 
IRONICALLY, perhaps, it was from European officials that the 
Consul encountered further opposition to his active role in 
government. McOwan believed that European appointments strengthened 
the administration, but he soon came to realise that they also created 
difficulties. European heads of departments in particular were often 
reluctant to accept the Consul's leadership and gave contrary advice 
to the Privy Council. The question of whose advice .hould prevail on 
financial matters came to a head in 1923-25 over the relatively minor 
issue of whether officers on half-pay leave should be paid bonus 
payments at full or half rates -- a matter that particularly affected 
the Chief Justice, tl.C. Strange, and the Auditor-General, 
J. Darrell-Wall. McOwan insisted that the Privy Council's decision to 
pay full bonus was irregular and when his protest was disregarded, he 
made a formal request for the Treasury Orders to be rescinded under 
Point 2 of the Supplementary Agreement. This was, as McOwan pointed 
out, the first occasion in six years on which he had found it 
necessary to press his advice in opposition to the Privy Council, 
he believed the principle at stake a vital one.[41] 
but 
40. Hutson to c.o., 19 November 1928, WPHC 4, 3059/1928. 
41. He Ow an to Fell, 16 July 1924 and related correspondence, WPHC 4, 
1804/1924. 
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The Privy Council resented McOwan's int~rvention, and a committee 
consisting of Tungi, Darrell-Wall and George Scott, who was Acting 
Chief Justice, prepared a case for presentation to the High 
Commissioner. Their petition, which was signeu by Tung~ as Premier, 
claimed that the Government had the right to decide the issue and 
brought back into focus the whole principle of the Consul's role in 
financial matters and his authority under the 1905 Agreement.[42] 
McOtqan was convinced that the confrontation would not have arisen 
without European initiative, as the Tongan Ministers would never have 
questioned his authority to interfere. He attributed the acquiescence 
of the Premier in the Europeans' demands to 'the usual native 
reluctance to disagree openly with anyone in authority', but he failed 
to see that thin 1tomary p3liteness affected his own position 
perhaps even more than that of the European Privy Councillors.[43] 
Although the issue was primarily a struggle between the 
Auditor-General and the Consul, the reaction of the Tongans 
demonstrated that tht desire for unfettered independence was by no 
means dead. 
r 
It was ~ reflection of the relatively smooth path of relations 
over the previous decade that when the dispute reached Suva in August 
1924 there was very little informed opinion as to the issues involved. 
C · i tried hard to avoid all T.E. Fell, the Acti11g High omm~ss oner, 
t d ··•ith the Treaty and reference to the 'difficult pointr- connec e w 
' a.nd was clearly uudocided as to whether Supplementary Agreements , 
}!cOwan possessed the authority he <'laimed.[4l•] On the advice of 
42. Tungi to Rodwell, 17 October 1923, WPtiC 23/II, 38/1212 • 
43. !·!cOwan to Fell~ 16 July 1924, WPHC 4, 1804/1924. 
44. F~ll to ~1c0wan, 27 August 1924, ibid.; 
c~rrespondence', ~· 
Fell, 'Note on Tongan 
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A.K. Young, the Chief Judicial c · · omm~ss~one~, whose ignorance of 
the Tongan situation surpassed his own, Fell pondered the 
practicability of issuing an Executive Order to prohibit the Chief 
Justice and others from receiving full bonus; it was left to McOwan 
to point out to his superiors that no cfficer of the Tongan Government 
was amenable to the direction of the High Commissioner or Secretary of 
State.[45] To avoid future deadlock Fell advocated that 
all questions affecting European officers, appointed.,.after 
consultation with the Agent, and who may be selected by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies or by the Hi3h 
Commissioner should be referred to the Agent and Consul for 
his advice thereon, and that his advice should be 
accepted. [ 46] 
This McOwan deprecated as implying that questions concerniug other 
European and Tongan officers not appointed in this way, need not be so 
referred, ,m idea which would be quite contrary to practice and 
'subversive of the present syst~~ of control'.[47] 
The Colonial Office also rejected Fell's proposal, arguing that a 
special ruling on the functions of the Consul in relation to European 
officials was neither necessary nor practicable. Its policy was to 
confirm the status quo, including the 1918 arrangement regarding 
coasultation with the Consul for the better control of finance, and to 
Su rt M 0 ' t' The __ emier was informed that the obJ'ectil)n ppo c wan s ac ~on. -
made by the Consul was well-founded and that he had been justified in 
expecting his advice to be followcd.[48] At the same time, officials 
45. Fell to HcOwan, 27 August 1924, ibid; Hinute by A.K. Young, 
Au[~ust 1924, ibid; HcOwan to Fell, 4 SeptcmbL~r 1924, ibid. 
14 
46. Fel to Tungi 27 August 1924, ihid; Fell to McOwan, 
1924, ibid; ;ell to c.o., 1 September lq24, ibid. 
27 Aucuot 
47 • HcOwan to Fell, 4 September 1924, ~· 
48. c.o. to Fell, conf., 31 Harch 1925, HPHC 23/II, 38/12/:!; 
to Tungi, 29 ~·lay 1925, ib!A· 
Hutson 
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in London were not insensitive to the Tongan Government's 
position. Unsure as to how far the protest should be regarded as 
evidence of 'a genuine dissatisfaction' on the part of the Tongan 
authorities with the Consul's supervision, they instructed Hutson to 
visit the Kingdom as soon as possible to look carefully into 'the 
nature and extent of the control at present exercised by the British 
Agent'. [ 491 
During his two-day visit to Tonga in August 1925, Hutson received 
no complaint or representation from the Tongan Government concerning 
the Consul's role. A petition addressed by Darrell-Hall to tlw 
Secretary of State dealing with his position as Auditor-General and a 
member of Privy Council vis ~ ~iG the British Consul was ~-lithdrawn and 
the matter settled amicably ~-lith Darrdl-Wall accepting the Consul's 
'!few. [50] The Queen made it clear to the High Commissioner that she 
dL~. ired no departure from the terms of the Treaty nor from the 
tnJ·. rstandings arrived at between the two Governments. Hutson formed 
opinion that both the Queen and Premier displayed great confidence 
_n Hc01van, and he concluded that: 
the happy relations that now exist, whereby the Queen and 
the Premier seek and rely on his advice on all financial 
tt b Con~.t'dered to be an entirely satisfactory rna ers~ may e _ 
positia• - r 51] 
t,'). c.o. to Fell, conf., :n !·1arch 1925, .iP-tc!· 
t t! , ,A ~~ .• ent and Comm 1 , :.'r • ;·!cr.tJr"<mdu:a fro:n. tho Ilic;h t:m:u;:icHJionC'r o .,( "L 
c-cmf., no date, ibid • 
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The only aspect which caused some concern was HcOwan's action in 
pressir..g for the acceptance of his advice on the issue of half-pay 
bonus •dthout first obtaining ins true tions from the High Commissioner. 
This policy, clearly defined since 1911, provided a safeguard against 
over-interference • To this end McOwan \-las reminded of previous policy 
and in 1926 •v-hen he had a difference of opinion with the Privy Council 
over leave privileges for the government dentist, he was restrained by 
Hutson from pressing the matter. [52] \~hen Neill took over as Consul in 
Janwlry 1927 he was instructed to maintain a close surveillance of 
finan,.:-L'1l procedure and measuren adopted by the Tongan Government but, 
having tendered his advice, to be careful not to press for its 
acceptance without first communicating with the 
Commissioner.[53] Although Neill's vim·ls generally prevailed, he 
refrained from openly challenging the Privy Council's right to make 
its own decisions. 
Durint:; Neill's term, the presence of four Europeans on the Privy 
Council continued to be a sour , of political disharmony • In 192.5 the 
Queen intimated to Hutson that she would welcome an opportunity to 
reduce the number of EU!'')poans on the Council, addine that it l::cmld be 
sufficient to retain the Minister of Finance. In early 1928 Neill 
forenhadowed a chanse: 
c ' Ji... 
Tlw real fact ir; that o. body composed of ~m t>qeal numbl!r 
European and Tonean membt!rs iG not o. suitable cx:cutive 
Ton2;a and H(•r Najesty is not happy with eerta 1 n of 
European Miniaters.[54] 
of 
for 
her 
C.O. to Fell, conf., 31 March 
Au1~ur;t 1 92S, ibid; Hutson 
l!t'J2/l92C:;; t·L;<Jirit1-to Hutnon, 
ocriuG A, MP M3/26/4. 
1~25 ibi.d; Hut.non tt> c.o., 14 
t( , 'c·:u:-:· 15 '·lay 1920, i-JUU~ 4, 
' ' • 
1 1'\.TITA, conf., ::!2 Arn·i.l 192(J, ib~I:.\!) • 
!Ill. 
• 
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The first to go was Wallace, Minister of Public Works, whose brusque 
manner had not endeared him to the Tongans. During the 1923 
Legislative Assembly 1-lolitoni Finau, a close supporter of the Queen, 
moved the abolition of the post of Ninister of Works and the deletion 
uf the salary from the Estimates.[SS] The matter was left for the 
Queen to deal with in Privy Council. In September 1928 she sought 
British approval for Wallace's compulsory retirement on the grounds of 
a more economic reorganisation of the tVorks Department but economy ~.,as 
clearly only a pretext for Wallace's removal. The Queen, with the 
Privy Council and Legislativl:' Assembly behind her, did not consider 
his services worth retaining. She argued that he was gu1:-c:y of 
gLmL~ral inefficiency, was the cause of 'acrimonious debates' in Privy 
Couneil, and was tactless in dealing ~dth the Legislative Assembly. 
She wanted Wallace's appointment terminated before he returned from 
h!ave. [56] 
Russell, the Acting Consul, was at firat inclined to object to 
tl n pro on~l ~nd more p~rticul~rly to tl1n mctl1ods adopted for \>..; p i:.>U. " ... u "' 
dispensing with Wallace's services. In the face of the Queen's 
determination however, RussGll realised it would not be advisable to 
insist on his retention: 
It appears quite plainly that neithe. palitical nor personal 
harmony between Her Hajenty, Her administration and Nr 
Wallace can ever be re-establiahed.[57] 
Accordinaly hl! rcotricted himsL'lf to arrm1sinn a more satisfactory 
'>t'ttlcmc'nt for Wallaco, i.ncludinr, three montho noti.ce of rettrcmcnt, 
;.zl!r':Jr.ind.u:J on Hc>orcani :;al ion of Workc; !JC'rurtr:Jent. • enel. in 
. ' . "' 
gtlG:ll'll to Hutr.;on, 22 Octobv\-·>1 92L~t i£Li• 
'fi 
•• 
.. 
' . 
.. 
~; 
.. 
·\_ 
'"' 
'1 
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which the abolition of the posts had been used 
as a pretext for 
getting rid of Wallace, but he was reluctant to emharrass the Tongan 
Government by witholding his apr)roval. H h 
owever e did make it plain 
to the Queen that, in future t h. h 
, any rna ter w ~c would ultimately 
require British approval should ud discussed with the Consul before 
sl:eps ~\'ere taken 'that would lead to the embarrassment of the Tonga 
Government should such approval be eventually withheld.'[58] In July 
1929 the portfolio of Minister for Public Works ~\las added to those 
already held by the Premier, and although Russell believed that tPe 
European strength of the Ministry should be increased, Neill respected 
the Queen's wishes and accepted that there was ILO necessity for a 
further appointment. (59] 
In 1931 the number of Europe'lns on Privy Council was further 
reduced when Darrell-Wall, ~he Auditor-General, was retired. The 
incumbent of this post was not an ex officio member of the Council and 
the Queen did not wish uarrell-Wall's successor to hold Ministerial 
rank. In 1925 she had suggested to the High Commissioner that 
Darrell-Wall's transfer would be welcome as a means of reducing the 
European financial officers in Council, but when Hutson took no action 
matters rested until Darrell-Wall turned 60 in 1931.[60] Then, 
despite his protests, he was retired and the post left vacant. The 
1930 Legislative Assembly had carried a resolution, moved by Molitoni 
SB. Hutson to Russell, 8 
Salote, 8 November 
November 1928, ibid. 
November 1928, ibid; Russell to Queen 
1928, BCT 1/6; Russell to Queen Salote, 17 
59. Neill to Seymour, conf., 11 September 1929 and encl., 
2408/1929. 
WPHC 4, 
6 A 19~5 encl. in 60. Notes of an interview with the Queen, ugust ~ ' 
Hutson to c.o., 13 August 1925, WPHC 4, 1552/1925. 
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Finau, that the office be abolished, and Neill was 
in sympathy with 
this desire. He pointed out that the audit of Tongan accounts cost 
three times as much as in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
or 
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, and suggested that the present 
European clerk, with Tongan assistants, could easily audit the local 
accounts. [ 61] 
The problem of the European Chief Justice was not settled as 
easily. To a much greater extent than that of his European 
colleagues, the Chi~f Justice's position was an anomalous one. lfuile 
his judicial functions required the impartiality of a judge, his 
executive role as a Privy Councillor implied a high degree of loyalty 
to the Tongan Government. After the death of Skeen in 1915 successive 
Chief Justices tended to understand the first but not the second of 
these two roles. With the selection of the Chief Justice taken out of 
the Tongan Government's hands, the Queen had no way of guaranteeing 
that this influential post would be held by someone whose loyalties 
lay with her Government, or even with the British Consul. 
H.C. Stronge, the first of the British appointees, challenged the 
Queen's right to sit on the Privy Council during the Church Union 
appeal case in 1924, and was amongst those who opposed McOwan's 
interve -~on in the finances. His successor, W.K. Horne (1925-9) had 
been in Tonga some three weeks when he openly challenged the Queen's 
prerogative to appoint Ministers of the Crown. 
At issue was the Queen's appointment in October 1925 of the noble 
Ata to replace Tupouto'a as Minister of Lands. Ata was close to the 
r bl h~d been educ~ted at Newington ~uean; he was also very capa e, ... 
61. J 1931 and subsequent corruspondence, Queen Salote to Neill, 2 une 
3 
"b"d 
BC! 7 /I, 52/1931; Neill to Fletcher, 3 October 19 1, 2:..2::.._· 
Page 282 
College in Sydney, and was considered one of the most promising nobles 
for service in the Government. 
In NovembPr 1917 Tupou II had 
appointed him Minister of Police but two years later he was dismissed 
for the embezzlement of money collected for the Lord Kitchener 
Hemorial Fund. [ 62] In 1925 the Minister of Lands, Tupouto'a, was old 
and frail and, as Queen Salote explained to Hutson, Ata was the only 
man with the requisite birth, education and knowledge to take over the 
post. Hutson approved the appointment but, possibly at the 
instigation of Darrell-Wall, Horne challenged the Queen's prerogative 
as a means uf opposing the appointment and claimed that, according to 
law, the appointment had to be made by the Queen with the consent of 
the Privy Council. It was only after considerable legal argument that 
the Queen's right to make the~appointment was confirmed.[63] 
A further difficulty associated with the position of Chief 
Justice was financial. If the salary was high enough to keep a good 
man, it was likely to be more than Tonga could afford and out of 
proportion to other salaries. In 1933 C.M. Murray-Aynsley, Chief 
Justice since 1931, applied for a transfer because he was suffering 
financially, and his request was endorsed by the Queen on the grounds 
that the Tongan Govern~enot could not afford £900 for a Chief Justice 
while the financial outlook remained poor.[64] In support of the 
62. McOwan to Rodwell, 8 January 1919, WPHC 4, 190/1919; 
WPHC 4, 192/1919. 
see also 
63. Horne to Queen Salote, 17 October 1925 
correspondence, PO/KNF 1925 and 1926; Hutson 
subsequent correspondenc•; WPHC 4, 2581/1925. 
and related 
to Salote and 
. f t , sfer 4 November 1933, AT/TA, 64. Murray-Aynsley, applicatl.on or ran ' d 
1 
M 1934 WPHC 
series A, MP 445/33; Queen SblOte to Howar , ay , 
23/I, 1238/1934. 
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Queen's argument, 11 gh Commissioner Fletcher d 
escribed the post 
of Chief Justice as 
a sinecure and recommended its abolition. His 
suggestion that the purely J"udicial funct 1·ons of h t e post might be 
performed by the British Consul met with no support -- the duties 
might well clash and besides, it was unthinkable that the Consul would 
be in a position, as Chief Justice of Tonga, to be impeached before 
the Legislative Assembly.[65] The solution put forward by the Queen 
and Premier and accepted by Fletcher was that the present Secretary to 
the Premier, Ragnar Hyne, should combine his duties with those of 
Chief Justice, Chief Police Magistrate and Land Court Judge. While 
this arrangement made for economy it also ensured the Queen a Chief 
Justice she knew and trusted; Hyne had worked in the Tonga Government 
Service a, Director of Education before joining the Colonial Service, 
and he had proved capable and well-liked. 
When Hyne was transferrer1 to the Solomons in 1938 his place as 
Chief Justice was taken by W.H. Stuart, a graduate of Oxford and 
Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, who was tempermentally 
unsuited to life in a small community and to his work under the Tongan 
Government. He clashed with every other European official of 
consequence, including the British Consul, the Treasurer and the 
Secretary to the Premier, and was tactless and dictatorial in his 
relations with the Government. Under his influence the factions that 
the played about the surface of Tongan politics took on new form; 
Queen's opponents found in Stuart a focus for their activities. 
Throughout his two-year term Stuart failed to understand that he was 
not a British official but a Tongan Government employee and he 
65. Fletcher to c.o., tel., 16 Hay 1934 and enclosed 
Neill to Fletcher, conf., 29 January 1935 
correspondence, WPHC 23/I, 545/1935. 
minutes, ibid; 
and subs(~quent 
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frequently appealed to the High Commissioner and 
the threatened 
Tongans with the intervention of the British Gover t 
nmen . Stuart felt 
no loyalty towards the Queen and her Government and he 
al!o attacked 
the Consul's supporting role. 
From the time of his arrival in Tonga in June 1938 Stuart 
developed an apparently obsessive hatred for his only European 
colleague on Privy Council, the Treasurer William Bagnall. The point 
of <leparture seems to have been Bagnall's occupancy of a more 
comfortable house taan Stuart's, to which the latter felt he had prior 
claim. Stuart was obviously piqued that although he claimed to have 
been informed by the Colonial Office that he would be the 'Senior 
Official' under the Tongan Government, Bagnall had the better house 
and wielded considerable influence. In a personal letter to Sir Harry 
Luke, High Commissioner from 1938-42, Stuart accused Bagnall of not 
wanting the appointt ant 0£ an overseas man and of making everything as 
difficult as possible for him. He went on: 
The Tongans have been 
and are afraid but 
Shirley Baker.L66] 
ridden by Mr Bagnall for a generation 
tired of him. He is a sort of pocket 
Stuart's chance to discredit Bagnall publicly came with the discovery 
in lfar.:!h 1939 of the alleged embezzlement over a four-year period of 
nearly £1,300 by the Tongan clerk in the Treasury, Uliti Palu. 
Stuart was convinced that Bagnall was implicated in the crime and in 
this connection publicised Bagnall's reputed affair with a part-Tongan 
woman who was a cousin of Palu's wife. When the Queen in Council 
rejected Stuart's advice to hold an inquiry ifito the Treasury and the 
character of the Treasur~r, he used his Bench as a soap-box. In the 
66. and Conf4dential, 18 January 1939, WPHC Stuart to Luke, private ~ 23/I 
4, 23/I, 1017/1938; See also Stuart's Memorial, WPHC ' 
2370/1939. 
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course of a 42 page judgement in the case of Regina v 
Palu delivered 
on 5 May 1939, he denounced Bagnall's bl' pu ~c and private conduct, 
accused him of perjury, and pronounced him so blameworthy as to be 
'pecuniarily liable' for Palu's crime.[67] 
By the end of March 1939 relations in Cabinet and Privy Council 
had become so strained that normal meetings were suspended for three 
months. Social functions were also affected; Stuart ~efused to meet 
Bagnall socially on the grounds that he had committed perjury although 
no charge was ever laid. It seems that Stuart had Ln mind a more 
resounding defeat for his colleague. After concluding his judgement 
in the Palu case, he explained to those present in the Court the 
procedure for impeachment of a Minister of the Crown. Acting on 
Stuart's advice, the Minister of Police, Sioape Kaho, refused to lay a 
charge of perjury as requested by the Premier, but on 11 July filed 
notice of his intention to impeach Bagnall before the Legislative 
Assembly on the charge of giving false explanation while on oath.[68] 
A.L. Armstrong, Agent and Cons .1 from December 1937 to July 1943, 
regarded the impeachment of one European Minister at the instigation 
of another as 'highly detrimental to the government and to European 
prestige', and the Queen and Tungi had no intention of allowing the 
impeachment to go ahead.[69] On 12 July Bagnall sought permission to 
retire on the grounds that his health had suffered considerably from 
the strain of the past few months, and the Queen accepted his 
67, See extract from the Chief Justice's Judgement in Pacific Islands 
Monthly, 15 August 1939. 
68. 
69. 
Armstrong to Luke, 1 July 1939, WPHC 23/I, 2354/1939; 
I · A MP 397/39; Tungi, 5 July 1939, AT TA, ser~es , 
Impeachment, 11 July 1939, ibid. 
Armstrong to Luke, 1 July 1939, WPHC 23/I, 2354/1939. 
Kaho to 
Notice of 
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resignation. [ 70] With Armstrong's approval, she also retired Sioape 
Kaho as Minister of Police. The immediate grounds were his refusal to 
charge Bagnall with perjury, but he was also accused of having refused 
to carry out prison reforms and the collection of poll tax arrears as 
directed by the Privy Council. It WP<> obvious that Kaho working 
against the Queen aad had 'consistently acted in a manner highly 
detrimental to the government's interests.'[71] 
Under the tutelage of Stuart, members of the Legislative Assembly 
argued that the reti '"'~ments had the effect of 'annihilating the 
efficacy' of their prerogative of impeachment.[72] The Address in 
Reply at the opening of parliament, clearly inspired by Stuart, 
a~opted a very critical tone and threatened further action in lieu of 
impeachment. The opportunity came during consideration of an 
Indemnity Ordinance which required the Assembly's ratification. The 
opening of the Assembly had been delayed till 1 August to allow 
Bagnall time to retire and also, according to Tungi, 'in the very 
great hope that the Chief Justice will no longer be in Tonga when the 
House assembles' .[73] The postponement required a simple Act of 
Indemnity, the form of which had finally been agreed upon at a meeting 
between the Premier, the Chief Justice and the British Consul, and 
subsequently approved in Privy Council. When it came before the House 
however, the Chief Justice moved its amendment by the addition of 
70. Bagnall to Tungi, 12 July 1939, and related correspondence, 
AT/TA, series A, MP 424/39. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
Armstrong to Luke, 9 June 1940, WPHC 23/I, 5297/1940; Tungi to 
Armstrong, 4 July 1939, WPHC 23/I, 2383/1939; Armstrong to Luke, 
24 August 1939 and encl., BCT 7/I, 98/1939. 
Address-in-Reply, 4 August 1939, AT/TA, series A, MP 347/39. 
T Conf., 4 July 1939, WPHC 23/I, 2383/1939. ungi to Armstrong, 
Page 287 
several clauses, the most notable of which declared that 
'no pension 
whatsoever shall be payable as of right' to Bagnall, and went on to 
stipulate that if he was granted a pension, half of it would be 
deducted prior to payment until the sum misappropriated by Uliti Palu 
was repaid to the Government. Until this was complete, Bagnall would 
not be permitted to lh•e in Tonga. Other clauses cancelled all debts 
owing to the Government by Sioape Kaho (some £ 200), specifically 
approved all the Chief Justice's actions, and provided e complete 
indemnity, criminal or civil, for anything said or done between April 
and July by everyone in Tonga except the Premier's Secretary and the 
Treasury officials.[74] 
In consultation with Luke, the Queen resubmitted the Bill to the 
Assembly, seeking the withdrawal of the amendme::1ts, and at the same 
time personally informing Stuart that as a Minister she expected him 
to support her appeal. The Assembly then withdrew the Bill as a 
whole, leaving the Ordinance to stand as law pending referral of the 
disputed clauses to the High Commissioner. Luke believed the clause 
concerning Bagnall 'savours of persecution', and that the se~.ective 
indemnity was 'dangerous, unjustifiable and unnecessary' .[75] Acting 
on his advice, the Privy Council approved the Bill in its original 
form, and settled the matter of Bagnall's pension as a separate issue. 
ttled Stuar t continued to Although the Bagnall matter was se , 
create difficulties. In a letter to the Queen in July 1940, Tungi 
summed up the Government's objections to him~ 
74. 
75. 
For a consl~derable time it has been apparent that His Honour 
the Chief Justice would not work in concert with Your 
Armstrong to Luke con£., 24 Augur,t 1939 and encls. 
subsequent correspo~dence, BCT 7/I, 98/1939. 
f 8 November 1939, BCT 7/I, 98/1939. Luke to Armstrong, con ., 
and 
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Majesty's Cabinet or Privy Council and his tt't d of 
· · h · . a ~ue dom~nat~on as, ~n m~ op~nion, been extremely prejudicial to 
the good wort ng of Your Majesty's government.[76] 
During the 1940 sessions of the Legislative Assembly, Stuart was 
involved in move by one of the 1 ' peop e s representatives, 
a 
Afuha'amango, to impeach all five Tongan Ministers, including the 
Premier, 'fungi. Although the charges were flimsy and those charged 
found not quilty, there was considerable consternation in the 
Government and Stuart, who heard the charges, was considered to have 
organised many of the representatives: 
Tt ·~"gh His Honour 1 s actions, definite 
cr~~ted in Your Majesty's Kingdom, 
becoming increasingly difficult.[??] 
factions have been 
and the position is 
Queen Salote was convinced that affairs in Tonga would not return 
to normal until Stuart was removed. In May 1939 she had appealed to 
the Colonial Office to transfer Stuart but, following a visit to Tonga 
in August 1939 by Ronald Garvey, Assistant Secretary to the Western 
Pacific High Commission, the Colonial Office had rejected her appeal .. 
lvhile Garvey regarded Stuart 1 s methods as unsatisfactory, he was not 
convinced that the difficulties were all his own making and had 
believed there were good grounds behind some of his attacks.[78] In 
July 1940, however, the Colonial Office bowed to the Queen's renewed 
appeals and appointed Stuart Second P·lisine Judge in British Guiana 
from October 1940.[79] 
76. Tungi to Queen Salote, conf., 17 July 1940, PO, unsorted papers. 
77. Ibid., Chief Justice Stuart's Book, Item 141, Tongan manuscripts, 
La Trobe Library. 
78. Garvey, Report on visit to Tonga from 10-24 August 1939, BCT ?/I, 
315/1940. 
79. Queen Salote to Luke, 18 July 
Armstrong, tel., 29 September 
AT/TA, series A, MP 437/40. 
1940, PO/KNF 1940; Luke to 
1940 and related correspondence, 
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Althoubh the Colonial Office agreed to the 
transfer of Stuart, 
its officials were not convinced that the difficulties in Tonga were 
merely a reflection on his conduct. St t f 
_ uar was, a ter all, a member 
of the British Colonial Service. To avoid future deadlock Queen 
Salote, supported by Luke, suggested that the executive functions 
should be removed from the Chief Justice post by constitutional 
amendm.:Jnt, thus 
undesirable rectifying 'anomalous an and 
situation.' [80] But officials in London believed this reform would 
meet only a part of the Tongan problem. Taking up a suggestion made 
by Garvey they urged that the situation in Tonga required careful 
examination and that it would be a mistake to try piecemeal 
expedients. The Stuart troubles demonstrated that 
the Tongan Constitutional and administrative machine is not 
functioning to best advantage and points to desirability of 
obtaining expert and detached advice on need for an overh?..tl 
of machine. [ 81] 
Accordingly the Colonial Office arranged for H.E. Maude, 
Administrative Officer and Chief Lands Commissioner in the Gilbert and 
Ellice Islands Colony and 'an experienced administrative officer of 
outstanding ability', to act as British Consul during Armstrong's 
leave with a view to his undertaking the proposed investigation.[82] 
Without ext!eption,, those clos2r to the Tongan Government opposed 
the Colonial Office propooal for an enquiry as an unwelcome and 
unnecessary intrusion into Tongan affairs. Although Queen Salote had 
approved N b r 1939 before the war Garvey's suggestion in ovem e , 
· t tlle enquiry and pointed lntervened, she was now reluctant to accep 
80. Luke to c.o., 28 November 1940, WPHC 23/I, b575/1940. 
81. c.o. 5 February 1941, WPHC 25/I, CF 82/10; to Luke, tel., WPHC 23/I, 4575/1940; c.o. to Luke, tel., 14 December 1940, 
Garvey, Report on Visit ••• , BCT 7/I, 315/1940. 
82' Luke to Armstrong, 15 February 1941, BCT 7/I, 375/1940. 
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out that: 
It is much easier to ensure the approval of Parliament to 
alterations and changes if they come from within rather than 
what may seem to be pressure from without.[83] 
Sir Harry Luke supported her contention that 
A marked trait of the Tongan character is distrust and 
easily aroused resentment of anything which appears to him 
as a reflection on things Tongan; and he would no doubt 
regard such an enquiry not only as a serious reflection on 
his Government Institutions, but as an attempt at 
interference with his system of Government.[84] 
Further, neit1.1er Luke nor Armstrong believed there was so much wrong 
1vith the GowJrnment that it required a special investigator to 
unravel. No convincing evidence of serious abuses had been produced. 
As Armstrong put it: 
The government can of course be Improved but there is 
nothing radically wrong and there is no corruption. The 
Tongan Government is 100% loyal and that means a lot.[85] 
Luke went even further in his support for the existing system in 
Tonga, arguing that: 
No matter what the result of such an Inquiry might be, so 
long as Tongan nature remains as indolent and easy-going as 
it is, no speeding-up of the administrative machine can be 
expected. [ 861 
In the face of these objections and the Queen's reluctance, the 
Colonial Office agreed to tone down its proposals. Initially, 
agreement was reached on the appointment of a temporary Chief Justice, 
who whould make recommendations for improvements. But when it was 
83. 1941 PO/Her Hajesty's Quean Salote to Armstrong, conf., 3 Ho-ch ' 
Department 1941. 
84, Luke to c.o., conf., 13 March 1941, WPIIC 25/I, CF 82110 • 
~5. Armstrong to L.Jke, 16 H?rch 1941, ~· 
86. Luke to c.o., conf., 13 Harch 1941, ~· 
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revealed that a suitable appointment w ld · 
au 1 nvolve the expenditure of 
some £ 1750 of Tongan Government money, the Que~n ~ was reluctant to 
proceed· Not only were the economy depressed by the 
there but war, 
was also the difficulty that 'these large honorariums often provok~ 
discontent in the Public Service' .[87] The Queen wanted an 
appointment more within the Tongan GovernmePt's abilitv to carry and, 
with Maude'R support, she argued that the judicial work normally dealt 
with by the Chief Justice barely justified the expenditure on his 
salary and left him 'with time on his hand!, to create mischief'. At 
Maude's instigation, a new arrangement that obviated the need to 
appoint a permanent Chief Justice or to amend the Constitution was 
agreed upon. The more important judicial duties, in particular 
appeals, were to be carried by the temporary appointment, when 
necessary, of a visiting judicial commissioner as Chief Justice. 
Other duties were to be absorbed by the Ch~ef Police Magistrate, which 
post would be held by a Secretary to Government with legal 
qualifications.[88] 
Central to this proposal was the recommendation that the post of 
Secretary to the Premier be upgradP.d to that of Secretary to 
Governro~nt, and filled by the secondment o: a Colonial Administrative 
Service employee from Fiji or the Western Pacific. Naude and Luke 
could hardly lay enough stress on the key importance of this post, on 
which much of the responsibility for the efficient workine of the 
administration depended. GaTv•y ~ad also recognised this in 1939 and 
had recommended the abolition of the post of Secretary in favour of a 
senior clerkship, and the expansion of the British Consul's duties to 
87. Queen Salote to !·laude, 4 August 1941, BCT 7/I, 315/1940 • 
88. L~kc to c.o., 13 August 1941, ibid.; 
1941, WPIIC 23/I, /~575/1940. 
Maude to LukQ, 31 Jt.\ly 
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include those of official adviser to the Premier. 
Garvey believed 
this would allow the Consul to 'have his finger on the pulse of Tongan 
admJ.nistration'. but his superiors w k 
, ere not een on the Consul 
becoming a member of the Tongan Government. [ 89] 
Instead, Maude 
advocat~d that an experienced Secretary, placed · ' 
1 1n t e very nerve 
centre' cf the Tongan Government would not only 'ginger up the whole 
administrative machine but ••• exert a personal influence which ~-1ould be 
all the mor1. powerful coming, as it would, from inside the Tongan 
service itsel£.'[90] The Queen and Tungi gave their full support to 
the proposal and in October 1941 J .K. Brmvnlees, a barrister and 
member of the Colonial Administrative Service who had been a District 
Officer in the Solomons, was appointed Secretary to Government, Chief 
Police Magistrate and Legal Adviser to the Government. 
In recommending these arrangements to the Secretary of State, 
Luke had argued that an enquiry into the administration was neither 
necessary nor desirable Eventually, the Colonial Office agreed that in 
?lace of its original 'fault-finding investigation', Maude should 
remain in Tonga for a month after Armstrong's return to advise on a 
possible reorganisation of the public service. Maude had quickly 
gained the confidence o. the Tongan Government, anti had proved himself 
tactful and discreet enough not to provoke friction. At the Queen's 
invitation he was requested: 
89. 
90. 
To review the e~dsting organisation, emoluments, and other 
conditions of employment of the Public Service of the 
kingdom of Tottga, and to make recommendations for any 
changes which may be considered desirable. [91J 
Garvey, Report on visit ••• , BCT 7/I, 315/1940. 
!·!aude to Luke, 30 June 1941, tvPHC 25/I, CF 2~/:!t•;&. 
, S .·.,with RccoQmcnd~tionc for H.E. "bud(:.> RPport on the Publl.c ~"2:.':-E::. --- --~~~·-~-=--~~ Rl•orr.anL::a~ion,-27 October -f941, Suva, 1%2, p.l. 
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His enquiry was confined to that section of the Tongan service which 
was normally staffed by personnel ootained from overseas, as well as 
members of the Hinistry, since some of their number had hitherto been 
non-Tongans. 
Haude's report, which was accepted with minor alterations by the 
Tongan Governmen.... in 1942, contained two major recommeua. .. tions, The 
first ~•as that in future all positions on the Privy Council and 
Cabinet should be held by Tongan subjects, It ,.,as difficult for 
Europe8.nf, even t-Jith the best of intenticns, not to 'exert an undue 
personal influence in the direction of pbrely Tongan affairs.' Maude 
recommendecl that the post of Auditor-General, ~•hich haa not been 
filled since Darrell-Wall's departure, be finally abolished and that 
the post of Minister of Finance be separated from that of Treasurer 
and held by ~ Tongan. This latter recommendation was never fulfilled 
and one European remained on Privy Council unt~l 1960. Maude also 
stressed the urgent need to , train Tongans to take over as mar.~· as 
possible of the 26 positions then held by Europeans.[92] His views 
in this regard were entirely in Pympathy with those of the Tonean 
Legislative Assembly. 
The second major principle underlying the report involved the 
secondment of Colonial Service officers to fill certain key posts. 
Although ~faude described the system of government as 'ideal in its 
d f 'gingering up' : w:q', he nevertheleso acl~nowledged a nee or some 
It ls true that this fillip is meant to be given by the 
leavening of Europeans in the service, and yet what have we 
provided the Tongans with up to the prenent -: u lot ~f1 no~ very supGrior N.!W ~~ealo.nders and Australl.a~s •. mo~t Y 01 
d · ,"bln Ci1ief Just1ce, nnd tr.:mporary contracts, an o.n ~mpoGGl '" . . .. 
. h i ffi'lnll"rs and "'Ood breedl.nt; this to deal with a race Wl. t w 1om , '· t, 
are instinctive.[93] 
92. ~· 
93. :·b.ude to Lui:e, 1 July 1943, HPHC 2.5/I, C~' 81/6 vol.I. 
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By the employment of Colonial Service officers, Maude hoped to convert 
the Tongan service from 'a very second 1 ff · , 
c ass a a1r into one 'as good 
as that of any British colony'.[94] 
Maude's recommendation for 1 1 · a c ose re at1onship between the 
British Colonial Services and the Tongan service was accepted by the 
Privy Council. Due to a shortage of officers during the war and the 
Tongan Government's refusal to provide inducement by tvay of high 
salaries, however, few postH other than that of Secretary to 
Government were actually filled from tne Colonial Services. 
Nevertheless, in Luke's opinirm, the Privy Council 1 s decision ~vas 'an 
eloquent indicati.on of the trust which tht;; Tongan people notv repose in 
the good faith and intentions of His Majesty's Government, and their 
fervent desire to maintain and strengthen the British connexion.' As 
Armstrong pointed out, not many years previously the Government had 
flatly refused to employ a medical officer f.''>' the Colonial Service 
frr fear that the link 'would go a l0u~ way towards the destruction of 
their own independence as regards local self-government.'[95] It was 
for this very reason that the Colonial Office advised against the 
adoption of Maude's proposal for the scheduling of ei.ght Tongan 
positions with the Colonial Unified Services for pension purposes; 
the Coloni~, Office pointed out that as a result of an impending 
reorganisation, the Tongan Government would lose control over the 
posts. [ 96] 
9!., ~·!audt~ to Luke, 18 Scptcmbt~r 19!+1, HPHC 25/I, CF 82/10. 
9), Luke to c.o., conf., 13 July 1942, t~P:IC 2?/I, Ct 
Arrrwtrong to Lul;e, 29 JunP 1942., BCI 7/I, 60/19·•3· 
C.O. to Hitchell, 10 February 1943, BCT 7/I, 133/i.941. 
82/10/l; 
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HAUDE'S report and the arrangements worke<l out in the wake of the 
troubles Stuart demonstrated the t 
ex ent to which the British 
Government was content to use its influence in Tonga to support the 
status quo· Through the rest of the 1940s, despite the death of the 
Queen's consort and Premier, Tungi, in July 1941 and the disruptions 
of the Second World War, the role of the British Consul in Tonga 
underwent little change. In part, this was due to the character and 
abilities of Salomone Ata, who. ~1as Premier from July 1941 until 
December 1949. At the time of hi~ appointment Ata was already 62 and 
was apparently anxious to retire from the Governm~<tt which he had 
served as Minister of Lands since 1925. His. decision to carry on was 
made 'out of lcyalty to the Queen', 
.• in the absence of any other 
suitable contender for the post.[97] In a sense his eight-year term 
as Premier was a caretaker one, for it was openly acknowledged even in 
1941 that the job merely awaited the readiness of the Queen's eldest 
son, Tupouto'a, then only 23. Ata \oTas, as Maude remarked, clearly the 
only man who could act as Premier until Tupouto'a, himself so clearly 
fitted by both rank and ability, had gained a little more 
experience. [ 98] 
Ata was amongs- the mcst experienced and capable of the nobleG 
but he was not of the same calibre as Tungi. Perhaps one of his most 
outstanding qualities was his unswerving loyalty to Queen Salote, with 
whom he was on terms of closest friendship. Throughout the political 
troubles of 1941 he h:!J supported her unstintingly and like Tungi, Ata 
was sympathetic toY:ards the British presence -- as a young man he had 
been onp of those cal'.inB for British intervention ar;ainst Tupou II. 
strong Sent ~ments, which caused him to be sc~en at pro-·'longan ... 
97. Maude to Luke, 31 July 1941, WPHC 25/I, CF 25/20/S. 
98 • Ibid. 
-
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times as a hater of the papalangi (white man), Ata had a good 
working 
re1atl'onshl'p with the Br1't1'sh Co 1 d 
nsu an continued the unofficial 
consultations of Tungi's era. 
As Maude had predicted in 1941, the presence of a capable and 
experienced administrator in the position of Secretary to Government 
contributed significantly to the smooth running of the administration, 
particularly after the death of Tungi. Ata relied heavily on 
Brown1ees and later on P.A. Richardson, who replaced him in 1947 
on 
secondment from Nigeria. Moreover, with the Secretary and the British 
Consul both members of the British Colonial Service, the chances of 
cooperation were enhanced. This did not mean that the Secretary to 
Government saw his loyalty as primarily to the British Consul. 
C.H.T. Johnson, Consul from Jun~ 1943 to March 1949, pointed out in 
1945 that the views of the Tongan and British Governments were by no 
means always identical, and that both he and Brownlees always tried to 
avoid the slightest suspicion that they acted as a 'Bloc' against the 
Government. [99] 
Johnson was as aware as many of his predecessors that his 
authority in matters of general administration was 'based entirely on 
goodwill -- thPre are no Treaty sanctions by which the British 
Government can enforce its will' .[100] He was therefore careful, like 
his more recent predecessors, to foster Tongan goodwill towards the 
British connection and to engender an atmosphere of trust by treating 
Tonga's independenee as a real thing as far ~~ possible. For this 
reason both Johnson and the High Commissioner, Sir Brian Freeston, 
99 • Johnson to Hautde ~ 3 February 1945, WPHC 23 /II, 38/lZ/1. 
100 • Johnson to Freestott, personal and conf ·, 2J. ~larch 1949 ' BCT 
4/1/8-1. 
6/C, 
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urged the Colonial Office not to 1 
app Y wholesale to Tonga the 
Provisions of the 1948 British National~ty Act. Th ~- e Tongan Government 
feared that its subjects might qualify as British subjects on the 
basis of residence in Tonga, and it did not want the status of Tongans 
within the Kingdom changed in any way. Following on their 
representations, the Colonial Office agreed to compromise; while 
Tongans would be able to claim the benefits of British Protected 
Persons when travelling outside Tonga, their status would not otherwise 
be affected.[lOl] 
The delicate question of how far it was possible, or wise, to 
press the Tongan Government to accept advice contrary to its own 
wishes, appears to have come into prominence on only one occasion 
during the 1940s: in 1948 the Colonfal Office objected to a proposed 
revaluation of Tongan currency to bring it into line with that of New 
Zealand. Somewhat hastily perhaps, the High Commissioner was 
instructed to press his advice against revaluation. In reply to the 
Secretary of State, Freeston stressed that he knew of no provision 
justifying him in insisting that the Tongan Government must accept his 
advice in the matter. He believed that the Tongans should be left 
with the impression that the responsibility for the decision l~y in 
their own hands, and he pointed out: 
My immediate concern is that if I had to press to the point 
of a formal demand advice whicr could not be clearly shown 
to the Government of Tonga to be in their interests, our 
present excellent relations might be seriously disturbed and 
an atmoqphere of suspicion ~nd distrust recreated.[l02] 
101 J t 5 November 1948 and • ohnson to Freeston, secre , 
correspondence, BCT 6/N, 2/1/1. 
102 • Frees ton to c. 0. , tel. , 30 Ausust 
correspoudence, WPHC 23/II, 38/12/Z. 
1948 and 
related 
related 
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Ultimately the Tongan Government accepted the B · h rit~s viewpoint 
without the need for a fo1~al d d 
eman , no doubt owing in part to the 
'excellent relationship and mutual confidence between us and Tonga' of 
which Freeston boasted.[l03] 
The first three decades of Queen Salote's reign had seen the 
stabilisation of Tongan-British relations and the growth of informal 
British influence over the Government. It was a comment on the 
relationship that, during the Second World War, American Navy 
personnel stationed in Tonga regarded the Consul as 'an unacknowledged 
governor-general' and found to their frustration that 'the God damn 
British were always sticking their nose in it'.[l04] The War also 
demonstrated the extent of Tongan loyalty to Britain, for the Kingdom 
made its resources available to the Allied cause in an outstandingly 
generous fashion. But, if the War demonstrated the stability of 
Tongan-British relations over the previous 25 years it also held the 
seeds of change. \ihile its effects were not overtly political, the 
War must be regarded as a catalyst of change, if only because of the 
broadening ~feet it was to have on the Tongans' experience. Although 
only a limited number of Tongans saw active service, Tongatapu was 
host to an invasion of over 10,000 American, and in lesser numbers, 
New Zealand troops, whose wealth 'more or less bought out 
Tonga'. [lOS] Queen Salote, supported by British officials, was 
anxious to protect her subjects as ar as prac c f ti able from too much 
disruption and change, but there can be little doubt that the troops, 
their equipment and lifestyle, opened up a new vista in Tonga. 
103, Freeston to c.o., con£., 6 April 1949, ibid. 
104, 
'Hsitory of Tongatapu' Tongatapu Advanced Naval Base: Records 
' (~I' film in the possession of the Director of Naval History. .~cro 
of Professor Glen Barclay, University of Queensland.) 
105. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The End Of An Era 
-------
[It is] inconceivable that Britain would nowadays in any 
circumstances seek to enforce its will in Tonga by pulling 
down their greatly-prized flag or interfering with their 
independence. 
[C.W.T. Johnson, Agent and Consul, to Kisch, Colonial Office, 6 July 
1951, BCT 6/C, 4/1/8 - I.] 
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During the 1920s and 30s the British Agent and Consul 
had found 
acceptance with the Tongan Government 
as a source of advice and 
authority. While his opinions were not always decisive and his advice 
was rarely forced in opposition to the Government, his influence was 
nevertheless wide-·ranging and pervasive. It was to be the zenith of 
his power. Over the next two decades, changing circumstances 
gradually pushed him. 
and British influence generally, further and 
further from the centre of power. The first recognition of this 
movement was embodied in the revised Treaty of Friendship between 
Great Britain and Tonga, signed on 26 August 1958 after four years of 
deliberations. The Treaty reduced to a minimum Great Britain's 
influence over Tonga's internal administration and eliminated finally 
the controversial Supplementary Agreement of 1905. For the first time 
in half a century the protr~torate relationship was clearly defined. 
To a considerable extent the movement towards a treaty revision 
in Tonga was a reflection of world-wide trends: the recognition and 
development of self-government as a desirable end gained prominence in 
the period after the Second World War and provided a climate 
favourable to more local control in Tonga. Within the general context 
of decolonisation, however, the Tongan treaty revision occurred very 
early and was markedly free from rict on. ~ f i Undoubtedly t owed its 
smooth passage to the unique system of government which had developed 
in Tonga. Although the Kingdom's independence had been compromised, 
self-government had not been lost, an~ the principles and practices of 
governing were not netV'. The system which had had its beginnings in 
th • d despite some problems, proved generally e previous century na , 
satisfactory and bot!t To:1gans and Europeans had confidence in the 
Tongan GoverL3ent. t • , • T lad It is also true that decolonisat~on ~n onga l 
begun long before thu rest of the world had seen its inevitability. 
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Since 1912 the British Government had recognised that 
1
.t had 
no legal 
means of forcing compliance w1·th · l.ts wishes in Tonga. British 
influence was dependent on goodwill, 
on persuasion rather than 
coercion and above all, on the Tongan Government's willingness to 
consult the Consul and to accept his adv1."ce. Th 
e initiative therefore 
remained in Tonga. By the 1950s members of th T 
e ongan Government 
showed increasingly that they os d h b P sesse t e a ility, as well as the 
enthusiasm to run the administration without recourse to any external 
authority, and the British Government had little option but to 
capitulate. At the most it might seek to slow down the process, and 
to ensure that certain safeguards remained. 
IT would be difficult to underestimate the importance to Tonga, 
as well as to changing Tongan-British relations, of the Crown Prince, 
Tupouto'a Tungi.[l] In him were combined the reverence accorded his 
hereditary status, and the awe and respect due to one who had 
succeeded so outstandingly against the criteria of the modern world. 
As the eldest son of Queen Salote and Tungi, Tupouto'a Tungi was the 
direct descendant of the three prominent lines prior to Tupou I's 
unification of the Kingdom-- the Tu'i Kanokupolu, Tu'i Ha'atakalaua 
and the Tu'i Tonga. His reputation as the first Tongan to receive a 
1. Tupouto' a Tungi was christened Siaosi Taufa' ahau 1upoulahi but 
was granted the noble titles of Tupouto' a and Tungi. Although he 
was often addressed by the latter title alone, use of bot!-, names 
in this chapter avoids confusion with his father. 
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university degree -- both a Bachelor f A 
o rts and a Bachelor of La\v at 
the University of Sydney 
set him in a commanding position from 
which to introduce innovations into the K1.'ngdom. H' i d 
1.s n ependence of 
mind did not weigh him down with a resistance to change. Even before 
his appointment as Premier, Tupouto'a Tungi occupied 
a position of 
almost Un rivalled power from wh1.' h h 1 
c e ater came to direct the 
Government practically single-handed. 
It was indicative of his authority that when signs of organised 
political opposition to the Government surfaced in 1941, it was to the 
absent Tupouto'a that the Queen and her British advisers turned. Soon 
after the death of Tungi and in the wake of the Stuart troubles, the 
recently retired Minister of Police, Sioape Kaho, had begun to 
organise opposition to the Government, advocating the abolition of the 
poll-tax and accusing the Government of making no effort to find a 
market for c0pra. Kaho was organising caudidates for election to the 
Legislative Assembly and, according to Armstrong, early wartime lack 
of money provided fertile s~il for the sowing of discontent. It was 
clear to Armstrong that the death of Tungi had left no one in the 
Government really capablP of dealing with this situation: 'the only 
person with sufficient brains and influence to overcome this 
opposition is Tupouto'a' .[2] With the High Commissioner's approval he 
advised the Queen to appoint Tupouto'a temporarily as Mi~ister of 
Education during his holidays in Tonga, and to hold parliament in 
January so he might attend. Armstrong, in what had become typical 
British support for the hierarchy, belie'H~d that the Royal Family had 
every right to representation in parliament • 
2. Ar:nstront; to Luke, 29 November 19!+1, W!lilC 25/I, CF 82/lO. 
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In the event, Tupouto'a's presence was e t d b pr ven e y the cutbreak 
of the Pacific War after Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, but nor. did 
Kaho's opposition gain any significant footing. A year later, 
however, when Tupouto'a returned to Tonga afte:: the completi.on of his 
studies in Australia, the Prince was immediately appointed to the 
Cabinet as Minister of Education. In Novembe: 1944 the job of 
Minister of Health was added to his duties, thus widening his 
apprenticeship for high office. Over the next few years Tupouto'a 
Tungi was responsible for a number of innovations, such as the 
standardisation of the Tongan al~habet in 1943.[3] He used every 
opportunity to travel widely, an occupation which hE continued to 
enjoy after becoming Premier in December 194~. Wit~ his ability and 
enterprise, and growing experience in government, Tupouto'a Tungi 
tended to sweep the other Ministers off their feet and met little 
opposition to his leadership. As the Minister. of Lolice~ 'Ulukalala, 
stated in the course of the 1954 Legislative Assembly: 
Tonga has spent money on educating Tungi, and now that he is 
back well prepared for the work of leading Tonga ·o1e in turn 
should have faith in his leadership.[4] 
From the time of Tupouto'a Tungi's rise to prominenC'e in the 
Government it became clear that he did not snare the close lin! . .> with 
Britain that had underlain the politics of his parents, and also his 
Pr d P i At With a typical opE;nness to opportunity, e ecessor as rem er, a. ~ 
that Tupouto'a Tungi saw in other metropolitan powers advantages 
outweighed those Britain could provide, and he fourtd no reason to 
l 1 1940" partl v. as a continu~ to foster British tics. From t10 ate o, 
4. 
Tong~. ~rnment Gazett'::_, r.;>. 2, 31 ~brch 1943. 
Ar::qnmbly debates' 20-21 .July 1954, IlCT Translation of Lcgis~ative --w 
6/C, 1/2/1 - 1 annex. 
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result of the evidence of American · prosper~ty during the war, he 
increased his le~Qings towards the United States and to 'things 
American', and as Premier he adopted a policy of forging closer ties 
with the United States. In a manner reminiscent of h4s df h 
... gran at er, 
Tupou II, the new Premier sought advice and expertise from a wide 
range of sources, acknowledging no exclusive Br~tish right to such a 
rol~· To him the British relationship appeared to hold no particular 
virtue or advantage if anythng, it merely placed shackles on his 
initiative and was therefore a source of irritation. There can be no 
doubt that he resented the continual reference of government affairs 
to the British Consul, and that he found the habit of consultation 
both stifling and unn~cessary. Shortly after taking up the 
Premiership he discontinued the long-standing custom, established by 
his father in the 1920s, of informal weekly discussions between the 
Premier and British Consul. Although his relations '~ith the various 
Consuls were always very cordial, he obviously saw no need for their 
guidance. 
The most irksome of the British controls as far as Tupouto'a 
Tungi was concerned, was the Consul's supervision of finance. Since 
1918 it had been required that the annual Estimates, as well as any 
proposals for supplementary expenditure, be submitted to the Consul 
for his approval. This procedure was central to the Consul's 
continuing influence with the Government but it was a control which 
Tupouto 1 a Tungi particularly resunted. lie wanted, and took, a freer 
d ti'e Connul found himself relatively hand in financial matters an • -
d '·!lll"le the Consul r s approval was pow~rless to counteract this tren • ,, 
Still required on special warrants, for example, his opinion wat> 
only sought after the 
--
expenditure had been incurred. 
under Tupouto' a Tun~:;i 'n Premiership, the Com;ul waG 
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increasingly left in the dark concerning m~tters not 
strictly within 
his province. Thus it was possible for Lhe Governm~nt ~ to embark on 
major projects, such as a new hotel or a wharf extension, using money 
allocated annually towards a development fund, without the Agent and 
Consul being informed.[5] The Consul was also excluded from finan~ial 
matters through the creation of the Tonga Copra Board, and other 
qtusi-governmental institutions. The Copra Board was set up in 1942 
under the Agricultural Organisation Act (19l1l) t t k 
. o a e over from 
commercial firms the marketing of Tongan copra. The Board was 
responsible to a newly constituted body, the Council of Agriculture, 
and was deliberately kept outside the control of the Legislative 
Assembly and the British Consul. 
Hhile Tupouto 1 a Tungi was thus able to secure considerable 
freedom within the existing system, he was nevertheless keen to obtain 
complete independence in financial matters. This desire was first 
made explicit during the LegislatiVL! Assembly session of July 1954 
when, as Premier, t-,e put to the Assembly a proposal aimed at removing 
British financial control. In the form of a motion to the House he 
advocated the appointment of a Parliamentary Select Committee as a 
'Finance Committee' which would 'consider and approve funds to be used 
by the government' • [ 6 J The proposed committee, which set.'mS to have 
becm based on a somewhat incomplete understanding of the British model 
of a Finance Committee, would help r-tinistors in the prt:.>parntion of the 
Estimates and be reoponsible for approving any supplementary 
eRpc'ndi turo. The Premier made it quite dear that tlw Comr:1i t tN' W.:lG 
tiJ 1 l c 1. nupervh;in'' .. Tonga's fi.nanc~~G· r~p ace t11e onsu 10 ~ t 
., 
'* 
~ott to Garvey, 15 Junu~ry 1955, DCT 6/C, 1/2/1 - I· 
",r.•.·.cr~t.,ly ddntcs, 20-21 Jut;.- 195<'•, r:c·;: TrdnGlation of Lc~islativc ~-- "u _ 
6/C, 1/2/1 - I annes. 
SCI 
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an expert financial adviser would be called to th . 
e commtttee, but this 
would not be the Agent and Co .• sul, for 1 Consuls appointed to Ton~:., are 
not experts' • [ 7] 
Consideratioa of this subject in the Legislative Assembly 
naturally led to the question of British control and to the continued 
existence of the 1905 Supplementary Agreement which, il was assumed, 
g;we the British Consul his authority over finance. Tupouto 'a Tungi 
obviously had scant regard for the Agreement, and he explained to the 
House that 1 it ~-las intended that this Agn~ement should only be in 
operation at the time [1905] as a sort of temorary measure, and not a 
permanent one'. Tupouto'u Tungi expressed his objections to the 1905 
Agreement and to British fina'lc:l.al control in basic ~"rms: 'We as a 
kingdom are now w.:i.se enough to run our government'. If this involved 
a change in any Agreement with Britain, then so be it, for there wet"e 
more compelling iss~es at stake: 
If you love the government, then accept the advice of a 
Tongan, but if you do not, then do not let a Tongan advise 
the government. We should appeal to Her Hajesty for the 
amendment of the Agreement so that no foreigner should have 
further control over the kingd<:1m' s f:i•1ances. [8] 
Members of the Legislativt. :\ss.embly who had at first found tt1e 
finance committee proposal confusing and unn~ceusary, warmed instantly 
to the Premier's exposition. The 1905 Supplementary Agreement was 
still a top!c which could arouse ~~onsiderable depth of fcclinn n::J.OUGGt 
moot Tongans, as could the suggestior, that Tonr;a.ns should be playing a 
~reater part in running their own Go•:crnment • The idea of aGlendint; or 
"l! ~ 1· tl A t w f' not of eourac new. 
• '[,L'il lng .te nreE.~rrlc.'U llo 
7. Ibid • 
......-~~~ 
8. Ibid., Translation of LegiGLitivc Assembly dL'bJ.tl'G, 
1~<h~4-. ibid 0 
-
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attempts of Tupou II's day, motions for its repeal had appeared 
quite 
regularly in the Legislative Assembly.[9] 
The difference now was 
that the Crown Prince was the instigator. 
The House agreed to appoint a Committee of the Premier and 
Hinister of Works (Tu'iha'ateiho), to prepare a letter for submission 
tu the Queen. This letter, which was adopted by a majority of 16-2 on 
27 July 1954, requested Salote to institute negotiations with the 
United Kingdom to have the 1905 Agreement repealed 'so that Tonga and 
Great Britain could continue living in friendly relationship under the 
provisions of ~he 1900 Treaty of Friendsip'. Making reference to the 
relation of '· .\ Agreement to the la~qs of the Kingdom and the 'freedom 
of Your Hajesty's subjecta', the letter detailed the sections of the 
Agreement still in operation. On the controversial Point 2, requiring 
the Consul's advice to be taken, it noted that although there was good 
reason for this in the past, the Sovereign should now be 'free' in 
accordance with the non-interventionist 1900 Treaty. Finally, the 
letter recommended the appointment of a parliamentary committee to 
oversee finance, particularly Special Warrants. The assistance and 
advice given by British Consuls over the years was acknowledged 
graciously, but it was made clear that this was no longer 
required.[lO] 
Throughout the debates and in the letter, members of the Assembly 
\.;c·rc .::aruful to acknowledge that t• le final decision lay Hi th the 
Queen. Her posilion was perhaps best summed up by C.lv.T. Johnson, 
9. 
'' ~~ 
Sc't' for el>am·:>le motion no. 2 in 1950 Legislative Ass•:mbly, AT/TA, 
' 5ericw D, bo=: X, F. 139 a .2. - II. 
I.. k O·f tt,,. Iiou,">C' to O.ut:t:r ~alaniuvulu, Spea er ~~ te, 22 July 1954, 
ncr 6/C, 1/2/1 - r. 
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former British Consul in Tonga, 11ho vislt<,d the Kingdom in December 
1954 for talks with the Queen. 
On the one hand she has a h~adstrong and impulsive -- and 
not always very practical -- Premier who likes having his 
own way and gets the support of all those who fenl that 
Tonga should be advancing more quickly, both politically and 
economically· On the other hand, there are many 
consm:vative Tongans who are very impatient of any change 
and suspicicus of modert& trends and new ideas. The Queen's 
own leanings are rather towards the latter group.[ll] 
It is clear that Queen Salote did not share her son's enthusiasm for 
breaking ties with Britain, and neither was she convinced that the 
time was yet ripe for Tonga to carry its own finances without the 
Co11sul's advice. Tonga must never again be at the mercy of 
:.:nscrupulous men such as the Hutter brothers, whom the Queen blamed 
for the troubles at the beginning of the century; Queen Salote 
believed that the Consul's advice in financial matters would prevent 
this. In an interview in February 1955 with C.R.H. Nott, British 
Consul from August 1954 until March 1957, the Queen explained that iu 
her opinion Tonga did not yet have enough trained and experienced men; 
'Tungi alone, trained in law, is not enough'.[l2] Salote was 
therefor., satisfied that Tonga was not ready for full independence, 
and made it quite clear to the British Government that she wished 
Tonga's const~tutional status as a British Protected State within the 
Commonwealth to continue.[l3] 
which her son At the same time, Salote realized that the issue 
had raised cuuld not satisfactori~y be shelved; tlw desire for 
t fade aWa". Horeover, although grt!ater freedom was likely to grow, no J 
shu sm., the 1905 Agreemc11t if . d nd even necesn<ny, under the as just 1.e , a 
11. E};tracts from Johnson 1 a notl~a on his visit to Tonga, 
195!f, ibid. 
12. Nott to Carvt~y, 22 February 1955, ~· 
Nott to Garvey, 6 O~t0bcr 1955 • ~~· 
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circumstances of her father's time, she nevertheless 
shared some of 
her subjects' distaste for it. But if a revjsion of the Treaty was to 
be carried out, Queen Salote did not want it done 1·n response to the 
Assembly's letter. She was obviously concerned at the political 
implicaLions of her position if she instituted negotiations at 
request of the Assembly. As she explained to Johnson: 
I did not want the initiative to come from our side because 
I did not want the Members of Parliament to feel that any 
change would be the result of their pressure. I wanted the 
initiative to come from the other side.[l4] 
the 
It was thus with 'an obvious sense of relief' that she heard from 
Johnson that some consideration had already been given in British 
circles to a revision of the Supplementary Agreement. Sir Ronald 
Garvey, who as Governor of Fiji and Consul-General for the Western 
Pacific had been responsible for Tongan affairs since the High 
Commissioner's headquarters were moved to the Solomons in 1952, had 
apparently decided as a result of his visit to Tonga the previous May, 
to take the matter up with the Colonial Office while on leave the 
following year. Queen Salote therefore merely ackno1.;rledged the 
Assembly's letter, informing them that she wished for more time to 
consider this very important subject.[lS] She made no official 
approach to the Briti~h Government, and the Tongans took no part in 
framing the revision, which was presented for the'r agreement early in 
1958. 
Although it cannot satisfactorily be clai~ed that the initiative 
for a treaty revision rame from the British side, British officials 
were nonethel\.lSS in favour of the idea and were content, for the 
1 ' T 19~1. 8 December 1954, ibid, .~. Johnson, notes on visit to onga ~·, 
15. 
annex. 
Secretary to Queen Salote to Speaker of Le[;i.;lative Assembly, 
August 1954, encl. 2 in GarV!!Y to c.o., 12 Hardt 1956, ~· 
14 
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Queen's sake, to maintain the fiction that the 
suggestion was their 
own. Since the Second World War, the context of world opinion had 
been leaning increasingly towards acceptance of self-government for 
colonial peoples, and while it emphasised the need for guidance, and 
the development of acceptable social and economic conditions, the 
British Government was not averse to the devolution of responsibility 
within this framework. [16] 
British acquiescence in a treaty revision for Tonga was made 
easier because the revision did not seek to create changes in the 
existing position so much as to formalise changes which had already 
taken place. It was obvious that the 1905 Agreement no longer 
described the re~ationship between the two Governments; in the 
Mem~randum that accompanied the revised Treaty presented to the Tongan 
Government in 195&, the British Government acknowledged that the 1905 
Agreement had bee;i 'designed to meet a particular temporary situation 
which has long since ceased to exist'. The new Treaty, which would 
consolidate into one document the various existing treaties and 
agreements, was, as the official Memorandum described it, 'an attempt 
to reflect the changes which have taken place since 1900, in a form 
which recognises the increased capacity of the Government of Tonga to 
manage its own affairs'.[l7] 
16. 
17. 
For general coverage of British colonial policy over this period 
see David Goldsworthy Colonial Issues in British Politics 
1945-1961 Oxford 197l,and Barrie Macdonald, 'Imperial Remnants: 
Decoloniz~tion a~d Political Change iu the British Pacific 
) i d Beyond Connecticut, Islands', in F.P. King (ed. , Ocean a an , 
1976J pp.244-255. 
f F i dship' in Treaty of 'Memorandum on Revised Treaty o r en ' . (f 
Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga 1958 and A~soc~a~e 
---- ---- - p Nuku'alofa 15 Septem er Papers, Tonga Government White dper, ' 
1958. 
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From a British point of view the treaty · · rev~s~on also had the 
advantage of clarifying the position of th A e gent and Consul by 
setting out clearly those matters which required formal consultation. 
Although the Consul's role had long evaded definition, it had become 
shrouded in uncertainty because of the Premier's desire for greater 
freedom. In 1950 the Colonial Off4ce, · · · 
• ~n wr~t~ng to Sir Brian 
Freeston, High Commissioner, had admitted: 
The fact is that our legal advisers find it impossible to 
define in precise legal terms the constitutional 
relationship between the Kingdom of Tonga and the United 
Kingdom in the light of the very vague wording of the Treaty 
of Friendship and the even more primitive phraseology of the 
1905 Note of Points.[l8] 
Soon after his arrival in August 1954 Nott stressed the urgent need 
for a re-definition of his position as Consul. Nott felt that he was 
kept deliberately in the dark over some important iszucs and that, as 
a result, ~is position was an unpleasant if not an impossible one. If 
major proposals should conflict with British Commonwealth policy, or 
with the interests of British or foreign subjects in Tonga, the Consul 
had no recourse but to protest and report matters to his superiors, by 
which time he was probably dealing with a fait accompli. This kind of 
'back-door relationship' was, he believed, no way for the British 
Agent and Consul to be discharging his duties.[19] 
Following Garvey's discussions at the Colonial Office in 
mid-1955, the Secretary of State announced that he was prepared in 
principle to consider proposals for a revision of the Treaty.[20] 
Detailed consideration of the proposals took three years· The delay 
was in part a reflection of the low priority given the revision by 
18 6 J 1950, BCT 6/C, 4/1/8 - I· · C.O. to Freeston, anuary 
19. Nott to Garvey, 16 November 1954, BCT 6/S, 4/1/7 - I. 
20. Fi ·· 9 August 1955 BCT 6/C, 1/2/1 c.o. to Acting Governor of J~, ' ' 
I • 
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British officials, but there was also some feel{ng ~ that matters should 
not be delayed too long. Apart from the need to prov4de a 
.... response to 
the Legislative Assembly's request, British officials were aware that 
at Queen Salote's death Tupouto'a Tungi would succeed to the throne, 
and that his independent views might present a risk to the kind of 
revision they envisaged. In March 1956 Garvey reminded the Colonial 
Office that it was most desirable that · i f h any rev~s on o t e Treaty 
should be effected while the Queen was still on the throne, 
to influence the government with her wisdom, her intimate 
knowledge of local affairs over a greater part of the 
present century, and with her strong feelings of loyalty and 
high regard for her kingdom's association with the United 
Kingdom. [21] 
It was quite clear that the British Governmemt had neither the 
intention nor the desire to abandon all of its responsibilities in 
regard to Tonga. Independence, as opposed to greater self-government, 
was not a considered option ar this time. The Queen had made it clear 
that she wished Tonga to co~tinue as a Protected State, and British 
officials saw ;he need to support her in her 'very sane and careful 
approach to change'.[22] Despite the Premier'a confidence in 
l,.imself, his Government and the members of ttle V:gislative Assembly, 
British officials still saw the need for saf.-;gu: de. Nott pointed 
out, fc.: example, that the general standard of dchat in t:w Assembly 
did not produce much faith in the competence of the members.[23] He 
was al~o aware that Tongan members of government or quasi-government 
bodies were likely to follow blindly the direction given them by their 
Premier and Crown Prince, and that some countervailing influence might 
21. Go.:vey to c.o., 12 March 1956, ibid. 
22. 
23. 
Extracts from Johnson's notes on his visit to Tonga, 
1954, ibid. 
Nott to Garvey, 16 November 1954, BCT 6/S, 4/1/ 7 - 1 • 
8 December 
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be desirable. There was no question in B . 
r1tish minds that British 
advice and expertise were still essential. 
accompanying the Treaty made clear that Tonga would 
continue as a 
Protected State within the British Commonwealth, and that the Treaty 
had been drafted 
with a view to giving the Government of Tonga the maximum 
independence of action and control over its own affai~s 
· · t t · th · as 1s cons1s en W1 1ts constitutional status and its presP.nt 
state of development' .[24] 
These two criteria allowed the Tongan Government, in British 
opinion, considerable freedom over its internal affairs. According to 
the Memorandum, the general aim of the revision was 1 to recognise the 
right of the Government of Tonga to manage its own domestic affairs', 
subject to British oversight of a few clearly-defined matters. Clause 
2 of the 1905 Agreement, which placed the King of Tonga under a 
general obligation to consult the British Consul and take his advice, 
was described in rhe Memorandum as 'unnecessarily wide in its effect 
and creates rights to inte~vene ia the internal affairs of Tonga which 
are no longer justified'. These rights of intervention had not been 
exercised for several decades, and their retention was bound, as the 
Colonial Office noted, merely to ir.ritate Tongan opinion.[25] Since 
the Tongan Government had, to all intents and purposes, been managing 
its own internal affairs for some years, the British Government did 
not have a great deal to give up. The new Treaty excluded the 
bli ti to consult the British Government of Tonga from any o ga on 
Government over matters of internal administration, except in a few 
clearly defi~ed cases. 
24. 
25. 
'}1emorandum on Revised 
FriE:!ndshi p between ~ 
Papers. 
Treaty of Friendship', in Tn.•aty of 
Britain and Tonga~ and Associ~ 
..;;_-----
~., c.o. to Garvey, 11 April 1958, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1- II. 
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These cases were set out in Article V which obliged the 
Government of Tonga to obtain the consent of the British Government 
before enacting any legislation relating to defence, banking, 
currency 
and exchange, or discriminatory measures against non-Tongans. [26] In 
the first draft of the revised Treaty, which was prepared in Suva 
after consultation between Nott, Garvey and other British officials, 
the Tongan Government was required only to 'consult' with Bri~ain 
before enacting certain types of legislation. The Colonial Office 
draft added the need to obtain British consent, which gave Lhe British 
Government a virtual power of veto over these matters but left no room 
for ambiguity or deadlock.[27] Of the subjects reserved under this 
Article, the first and last were not new. The justification for the 
retention of British control over banking, currency and exchange was 
based on the British Government's belief that these subjects required 
'expert knowledge and experience', not yet to be found in Tonga.[28] 
Of the existing internal controls which Britain abandoned under 
this new arrangement, the most important was undoubtedly finance. 
Although the related, but more specialised areas of banking, currency 
and exchange were reserved subjects, the regular submission of 
Estimates and Special Warrants was to be discontinued. No doubt this 
decision was made easier for Britain when it was considered that the 
existing British supervision of finance was, as Nott pointed out in 
January 1955, 'largely ineffective'.[29] To attempt to win back a 
measure of control might well have jeopardised future relations. 
Noreover, the submission of financial matters for British approval was 
'H. T f · d h · b,..,tW""n Great Britain and Tonga, 1958; 
.. u. reaty o Fr1en s l.P ... .... .... 
see 
Appendix I(viii). 
27 1957 , On draft Treaty, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1 -I. · ~.finute, 22 Hay 
28. '!·lemorandum on Revised Treaty.··'· 
29. ~ott to Garvey, 15 January 1955, BCT 6/C, l/Z/l - I. 
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Certal.'nly one of the most unpopul f B · h 
. ar o rl.tis controls, and had 
become something of an embarrassing political issue. It was Tupouto'a 
Tungi's desire to be rid of it that had been behind the 1954 
Legislative Assembly request for a treaty revision, and the Co~onial 
Office recognised that the retention of this control was, as Garvey 
noted, 'unnecessary and r•ow p~litically undesirable'.[30] 
Some change in the management of financial matters had in fact 
occurred well before the revised Treaty came into effect in 1959. 
Subsequent to the Premier's motion in the 1954 Legislative Assembly, 
Nott learned that the formation of a finance committe had been 
approved, and that the Privy Council had resolved to discontinue the 
submission of Special Warrants for the Consul's 'approval'. In 
response to this move, Nott reminded the Premier of the agreement made 
in 1917, of which the latter was apparently unaware, and asked that 
the former practice should continue. However, Nott also felt strongly 
that for the Consul to give his approval to a Warrant which had 
already been approved by the Queen in Council was 'supererogatory to 
say the least', and he therefore initiated the practice of merely 
endorsing the Warrants as 'seen' rather than 'approved'.[31] The 
practice, which tempered resentment towards the Consul's financial 
role, continued until the Tongan Government assumed sole 
responsibility for finance after the ratification of the Treaty in May 
1959. 
30. 
31. 
Garvey to c.o., 12 March 1956, ~· 
N f interview between Nott to Garvey, 19 October 1954, ibi~~ ot~do 
the Consul and Premier, 1 November 19?4, !£__· 
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None of the other internal controls which Britain had 
exercised by virtue of the Supplementary Agreement was retained, 
once 
The 
Consul's right to be consulted over new appointments to the Tongan 
Civil Service, as established by Points 9 and 10 of the 1905 Agreement 
and defined in an exchange of l~tters in 1915, was no longer 
considered necessary. In practice the habit of consultation over 
appointments had gradually been lost so that Nott commented in January 
1955 that it was now exceptional if the Consul was even informed of 
any changes among leading officials.[32] The Government \-Tas now well 
aware of the need to employ only efficient officials, and the 
provision had become a dead-letter. The only other provision of the 
Supplementary Agreement that found a place in the new Treaty was the 
fourth point which, in a slightly expanded form, provided for the Acts 
of the Tongan Legislature and subsidiary legislation to be published 
in both Tongan and English (Article IX). As Garvey had noted in 
writing to the Colonial Office in March 1956, the treaty revision was 
based on the assumption that in future, there 
will be free and frank consultations on those matters which 
are of common concern to the Treaty Powers. This is the 
basis on which I feel that satisfactory relations are most 
likely to continue in futu~e, rather than by an insistence 
on direct authority in matters which are clearly now the 
domestic concern of Tonga ••• [33] 
Although the role of the British Agent and Consul was 
by the removal of many of his f•mctions considerably restricted 
relating to Tonga's domestic affairs, there was still a niche for him 
to fill, if under a different name. and Consul was The title of Agent 
considered outmoded and after discussion with the Queen 
in the new Treaty by 'British Commissioner and Consul'· 
32. Nott to Garvey, 15 January 1955, ~· 
33. Garvey to c.o., 12 March 1956, ~· 
was replaced 
Article VI(i) 
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of the Treaty authorised the British Monarch to anpoint a suitable 
Person as Commissioner and Consul, to be th d' e me 1um of communication 
between the two Governments. His powers included making 
representations to the Queen or Government of Tonga on any matter 
affecting the interests of non-Tongans, and he was also authorised 
give advice to the Queen or Government should they seek it. 
to 
The change in the Consul's title was accompanied by a change in 
regard to his immediate superior in Fiji. Since 1952 when the ~osts 
of High Commissi~",.,ner for the Western Pacific and Governor of Fiji were 
separated and the High Commissioner moved to Honiara, responsibility 
for Tonga and Pitcairn had been entrusted to the Governor of Fiji; it 
did not make administrative sense for these groups to remain under the 
Higr. Commissioner. The Pitcairn and Ton1a or 'Pittt'' Office was 
esta';lished in Fiji as a separate administrative office to deal with 
Pitcairn and Tongan affairs. The move was not popular with Tonga 
however, for it seemed to imply that Tonga was il. some way subject to 
Fiji, a situation particularly distasteful to Tongans. In view of 
'strong local national feeling and the old J.ntagonismf;', Garvey noted 
that he used his title 'Consul-General for the Western Pacific' rather 
than 'Governor of Fiji' in dealing with Salote's Government and d·r.ing 
discussion of the treaty revision he suggest~d that he be given a new 
title to emphasise that he discharged separate functions in respect of 
Fiji and Tonga. [ 34} Conscious that the point miE.ht seem a minor one 
to the Colonial Office, Garvey stressed that it was of considerable 
importance in Tongan eyes. In 1958 with the appointment of Sir 
G r of FiJ'i, the title of Kcmneth Haddocks to replace Garvey as oYerno 
'l:nited Kingdom Chief Commisaioncr in Tong<:>' waG int.roducL•d. 
34. ~.; Nott to GarYcy, 22 February 1956, ibid. 
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In keeping with the principle of removing restrictions on Tonga's 
internal sovereignty, the British Government was prepared to reduce 
the extent of its extra-territorial jurisdiction over non-Tongans in 
Tonga. These rights of jurisdiction had most recently been modified 
by an amendment to the Treaty in 1928, by which all civil cases 
involving non-Tongans, but only serious criminal cases (where the 
offence was punishable by death or by imprisonment exceeding two 
years), were tried in the High Commissioner's Court.[35] Criminal 
cases of a less serious nature were heard in the Tongan Courts. At 
the time this change was made Islay McOwan, the Agent and Consul, had 
advocated the gradual abolition of the British Court in Tonga 'which 
tends to complicate the administration of justice and for which there 
is no longer any real need. 1 [36] In this McOwan was only cautiously 
supported by the High Commissioner and Colonial Office, but by the 
1950s his line of thinking was more acceptable. Since the 1952 
amendment to the Treaty, by which the Governor of Fiji took over 
responsibility for Tonga~ affairs, the High Commissioner's Gourt had 
been an anachronism and its legal position was ambiguous. A British 
Order in Council had provided for the continuation of the Court's 
jurisdiction but, particularly in view of the Tongan Government's 
intention to revise its Criminal Procedure Act of 1927 (which gave 
legal force to the 1928 T:rP.aty Amendment), the time was considered 
ripe for a change.[37] 
3e Britain and Tonga, 7 November 1928; 
· :> • Agreenent between Grt.~at see 
37. 
Appendix I(vi). 
~kCrwan to fell, 30 January 1925, HPIIC 4, 328/1925. 
. '1 19"2 and Tonga Royal Instruction;; 
Tonua Order in Counctl, 1 Aprt J 41114 _ I; Nott to ~ar1Tl'J 1 17 1952; Not2 by Doyle, BCT 6/C, Nott to G,lrvoy, 1:> Jantt.try 
Scptenber 1954, BCT 6/C, 3/3/l - I; 
1955, ncr 6/C, 1/2/1 - r. 
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Opinion among British officials as to the extent to wh~ch 
... Britain 
should abandon its nxtra-territorial 
rights in Tonga varied 
considerably. In first raising the question, Nott · po~nted out that 
under the existing system of civil jurisdiction Tongans were at a 
considerable disadvantage since they must sue non-Tongans before tlw 
High Commissioner's Court from whtch the locally qualified Tongan 
'lawyers' were debarred.[38] It was perhaps for this reason that the 
Colonial Office decided that the Tot.Jan Courts should be given full 
civil jurisdiction over non-Tongans, but that criminal jurisdiction 
should remain ao it had been since 1928, Officials in Fiji were 
inclined to go somewhat further -- the Attorney-General, B.A. Doyle, 
sa~o1 no need for the British Government to retain any of its 
extra-territorial rights, as this was only justifiable if the Tongan 
Courts were not dealing out justice.[39] \Vhile the Governor was 
inclined towards this argument, the Colonial Office was not convinced 
that the time was ripe for complete abandonment of British 
jurisdiction in Tonga. Although it believed that the existing scope 
could no longer be readily justified, it drew the Tongan Government's 
attention to 
the need to keep Tongan law and the judicial 
accordance with modern practice elsewhere to 
doubts. which may arise in other countries over the 
of the Tongan legal and judicial system.[40] 
system in 
avoid any 
adequacy 
d tl Crl.'minnl Offences In this regard specific reference was ma c to w 
(A::wndment) Act enactE.~d by Tonga in 1956, which extended the range of 
b"' ,w.,rdod ,"P punishment, and to the OffC'UCC!S for which whipping micht <, a .... L .. 
Criminal Procedure · ) Act wlli ~h madt} (British Gubjccts and Fore1.~nero · , 
38. ~~ott to Garvey, 15 January 1955, ih!2.-
:J9, ~-linute by Doyle. 6 January 195&, .fbi'!· 
40, Reid to Queen Salotc, 30 Jul1 1958, BCT 6/C, l/211 - II; 
Garvey, 11 April 195(}, ihhl· 
c.o. to 
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no satisfactory provision for appeal. While such 'deficiencies in 
in the way of the granting of full Tongan legislation' might stand 
jurisdiction sometime in the future, they were not considered an 
obstacle to Tonga acquiring full i il · i d c v Jur s iction under the new 
Treaty. [ 41] 
THE terms of the revised Treaty as they related to the Tongan 
Government 1 s control over its own internal administration were 
designed to take account of 'the independent spirit which animates the 
Tongan people' .[42] But the Bri.tish Government was not prepared to 
go too far; the Colonial Office pointed out that 'with the privileges 
of protection go obligations'.[43] If Tonga was to remain a Protected 
State, it must be prepared to accept substantial limitations on its 
sovereignty and independence in the spheres of external relations and 
defence. Such surrender • f sovereignty was considered in the Colonial 
Office to be an essential feature of the status of a Protected State, 
and although officials in Fiji advocated a greater degree of freedom 
for Tonga, the Colonial Office remained firm. 
4!. !hi5~.; r.tinu~e by UcKec, 25 April 1958, !_~id._.; 
Salote, 30 April 1958, .!E.~d..· 
4~. c.o. to Garvey, 11 April 1958, }hid. 
:.~. !hid. 
"""'"'""--"'-""""·-
Garvey to Queen 
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In respect of Tonga's defence this o~casioncd 
existing provisions under whic.h 
little change to 
Br.itain already exercised 
a 
substantial degree of control. The new Treaty clarified the position 
and brought it up to date, and was also ~ntended to 'd 
• prov~ e protectio~ 
in the event of subversive activities which might threaten Tonga's 
internal security. In February 1954, just before the treaty 
discussions began, the British Government reaffirmed its sensitivity 
to its defence responsibilities. In a l(tter to the Premier 
J.E. Hindrum, Agent and Consul .tram 1949-54, made the position clear: 
The Secretary of State particularly wishes that your 
Government should knOiv that in t' , role uf Protecting Power 
it is the paramCJunt responsibilit} ,Jf the Uniteu Kingdom to 
ensure that any proposals regarding the defence of Tonga be 
first referred to him for approval befor~ they can be 
ratified. [ 44) 
Although Tonga's defence was, in practical terms, handled by New 
Zealand, particularly aftE!r the signing of the New Zealand-Tonga 
Defence Agreement in 1957, Britain still wished to retain overall 
responsibility. For the effective discharge of Britain's defence 
oblig~tions, Artlcle IV of the new Treaty obliged Tonga to pc~mit 
amed forces to be stationed in the Kingdom, to make land, harbours 
and other facilities available, and to take such other steps as might 
be consider!?d necessary by tl·~ Protecting Power. 
The question of Tonea's external relations was more complex. The 
Office d 1 t tile exl.Lc,tl.'ng Trebcies and was concerne t a 
• ' ttte United Kingdom that degree of Hgru('::~t.:ttl '> fail to secure to ' 
cw::.rul cvm· Tonr,a' s external relations which is appropriate to a 
f' 
'+ •• 1 ~ Fcbru3 ry 1954, quoted in Cood0 \-lindru:n to Tupouto' a Ttmgi, ' 
!hddocko, 29 Dcec'mbcr 1 CJ60, DCT 3/:>EF 8 - II • 
to 
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protecting power'.[45] 
The 1900 Treaty, as printed in the rongan law 
books: contained no provision to this effect, for Tupou II had refused 
to sign the missing Article II obliging him to conduct 
all relations 
with foreign pm11ers under the sole advice and through the channels of 
the British GoV'ernment. Although th B it' h G 
e r 1s overnment had regarded 
thl·s unpublished Article as b · di 1n n'g on the King and had in fact 
conducted Tonga's external affairs for ever half 
century on the 
basis of it, the legal position was at best uncertain. In the revised 
Treaty the British Government was not prepared to settle for anything 
less than a ~lear statement that Tonga's external relations were the 
responsibility of ~he United Kingdom. 
'Pitto' officials were not 
happy with this general assumption of control in a treaty revision 
aimed at transferring some of that control. They believed that the 
terms of the new Treaty should be 'as generous as possible', and their 
. 
first draft provided only that Tonga should consult the British 
Government before entering into relations with other powers.[46] But 
.this increased freedom was not acceptable to the Colonial Office. It 
was considered essential that the Treaty should state the formal, 
legal position as was implied by the status of protection. 
Within this framework, however, the Colonial Office was p~epared 
to acknowledge and make legal provision for the practice, which ha,i 
grown up in recent yeats, of indepcndc~t action by ~onga on certain 
external matters. In fact, as the Colonial Office conceded, there 
ti to l imit this independent mi3rt well be difficulty in attemp ng 
act ion. [ 4 7 ] Tupouto 1 a Tungi (who 1 d himself Minister of now sty e -
45, C.O. to Garvey, 11 April 1958, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1 - II. 
4G. Draft of Revised Treaty, encl. 6 Ln Garvey to 
1956, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1 - I. 
c.o.' 
47. C.O. to Garvey, 11 April 1958, BCT 6/C, 1/Z/1 - Il. 
12 Harch 
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Foreign Affairs th~ Premier was as 
entitled to do under 
Constitution), obviously did not regard the missing A 
the 
• rticle II of the 
1900 Treaty LlS binding. He clearly preferred to approach outside 
governments directly, particularly over his own trade and economic 
projects. His business relations with Holland and Japan, for example, 
were conducted without the knowledge of the British Consul, as were 
such matters as a requect sent direct to the New Zealand Government in 
1954 for a marine survey and correspondence with the New Zealand 
Secretary for Internal Affairs regar~ing double taxation arrangements. 
In the years before the treaty revision the British Government had 
constant cause to remind the Premier that the proper channel of 
correspondence, at least over any political or major matter, should be 
the British Consul.[48] 
To clarify the position, the Colonial Office believed it 
desirable to set out clearly those matters on which independent 
initiative might properly be exercised by the Tongan Government. This 
was not done wi :lin the Treaty itself, but in a separate despatch 
accompaying it, thus preserving the formal position in the Treaty. 
Article III(i) stated simply that: 
The external relations of the Kingdom of Tonga shall be 
conducted by and be the responsibility of the Government of 
the United Kingdom 1 except insofar as the conduct of such 
relations may be entrusted by the Government of the United 
Kingdom to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Tonga. 
The Colonial Office again emphasised that the ultimate responsibility 
i 1 di those to be handled by for Tonga's external relations, nc u ng 
413. N t d Tupouto'a Tungi, 1 Note of an intervit:!w between t:'t an BCT 2/ 1 ~1AR 1• 1954, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1 - I; See al~o , ' 
Garvey, 21 ~ay 1957, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1- • 
November 
Reid to 
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Tonga, remained with the British Government. 
the It was merely 
cond~ct of certain matters, not the responsibil't f --~~~~~~~Y or them, that was 
being transferred. In addition, the process of transfer was not done 
by agreement, as 'Pitto' 
officials wished, but by a un~lat 1 ~ era 
delegation of authority. Although the Colonial Qff~ce agLeed to avoid 
using the word 'delegation' in official documents out of consideration 
for Tongan sensitivities, its officials pointed out that if the 
authority was transferred by agreement, it would be impossible to 
revoke or alter the contents except by agreement. The Colonial Office 
believed it necessary that the British Government should retain, at 
least in theory, a unilateral power to revoke and alter the despatch 
should this ever appear necessary. In this way Britain also retained 
the sole power of interpreting the exact scope and application of such 
matters.[49] 
In deciding on the form of the authorising despatch on external 
affairs, British officials followed the precedent set during the 
establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland when the 
Federal Government was entrusted with certain aspects of its external 
relations, and also the arrangements worked out in regard to 
Singapore.[SO] The first provision authorised the Tongan Government 
to negotiate and conclude 'agreements of purely local concern ••• with 
the administrations of neighbouring Pacific Islands and the 
Governments of Australia and New Zealand'. While matters of defence, 
security and civil aviation were specifically excluded from this 
provision, it included arrangements for the exchange 
•t t and secondment represGntatives, the recru~ men of staff, 
obtaining of expert assistance and advice, as well as 
49. C.O. to Garvey, 11 April 1958, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1 - II. 
SO. C.O. to Rogers, 1 May 1957, BCT 6/C, 1/3/l- I. 
agreements 
of 
the 
to 
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enact reciprocal legislation on 
such matters as taxation and the 
enforcement of Court judgements. 
In general, any agreement affecting 
only the Kingdom of Tonga and the other specified governments would be 
authorised by this provision. 
Direct correspondence on matters of 
purely mutual interest with countries of the British Commonwealth 
other than those specified was also permittad, on the d d 
un ·erstan ing 
that any agreements or exchange of representatives must first 
receive 
British consent. Further, the despatch authorised the Government to 
negotiate and conclude trade agreements, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, relating solely to the treatment of goods (e.g. tariff 
agreements and customs unions) and it permitted the Tongan Government 
to become a member of any international technical organisation for 
which it was eligiblt:, and to conduct any external relations arising 
therefrom. [51] 
The only obligation placed on the Tongan Government in connection 
~vith these matters was to keep the British Government informed of any 
negotiations, mainly so its officials could advise, where necessary, 
on any international implications. Although this gave the Tongan 
Government considerable freedom, the powers it gained were not 
particularly extensivP.. The despatch did not, for example, allow 
Tupouto'a Tungi unfettered initiative in his trade and economic 
projects, 1 h i 1 i non-Commonwealth countries. especia ly t ose nvo v ng 
Agreements relating to international shipping, an area in which the 
Premier displayed considerable interest, were specifically excluded 
from the delegation. However, one of the advantages of the format of 
the despatch was its flexibility; it would be possible for further 
aspe~ts of external relations to be transferred to Tonga without 
another treaty revision. 
51. Despatch on External Relations t 
see Appendix I(viii). 
Acco~pany the Revised Treaty, 
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As far as those areas of Tonga's external relations 
not covered 
by the despatch were concerned, the British Government 
acknowledged, 
(in Article III(2) of the new Treaty), a general obligation to consult 
Tonga on the conduct of its external relations and, ~n 
.... particular, to 
consult the Tongan Government before enter~ng ;
11
to i 
.... .... nternational 
agreements on its behalf. Although the Colonial Office hailed this as 
recognition of Tonga's advancing development and status, it was in 
fact a minimal concession. 'Pitto' officials, whose first draft of 
the Treaty had required the British Government not mE! rely to consult, 
but to secure the consent of Tonga in the conduct of its external 
relations, believed the Article would be unpalatable from the Tongan 
point of view. But the Colonial Office maintained that the necessity 
to obtain the Tongan Government's consent allowed the possibility of 
deadlock, and would constitute a limitation on the United Kingdom's 
effective power to control Tonga's external relations. While the 
Tongan Government's consent would probably invariably be obtained in 
practice, the Colonial Office believed this safeguard necessary.[52] 
By Article III(3) of the new Treaty, Tonga was required to pass 
legislation giving effect to international agreements entered into by 
the United Kingdom on behalf of Tonga, and to any other obligation 
imposed by customary international law. In 1956, Tongan reaction to 
the automatic application to Tonga of United ringdom legislation 
relating to the Internationa nance 1 Fi Corporation, ha·; demonstrated 
the reluctance of the Tongan Legislative Assembly to surr,,nJer its 
p01-1ers to make laws. T Government ha·( been On this occasion the ongan 
extremely reluctant to give Britain cat'!:_~ blanche to issue an Order .m 
Council applicable to Tonga over the status and privileges of 
I I N te on Revised Draft» 52. Minute, 22 Hay 1957, BCT 6/C, 1/2 1 -. ; 0 
encl. in c.o. to Rogers, 1 Hay 1957, ~· 
Page 327 
personnel of the International Finance Corporation, without the 
approval of the Queen of Tonga in Council.[53] prior 
This provision of the 
Treaty was therefore designed to uphold che Tongan Government's powers 
in this connection. 
At the instigation of 'Pitto' officials the 
wording of the Article was altered to take from the Queen the 
express 
obligation to secure the enactment of legislation. It was pointed out 
that in certain circumstances this obligation might be a particularly 
heavy responsibility on the Queen, as the constitution of the Assembly 
made it possible for the Government to be outvoted. This had occurred 
as recently as 1955 when a coalition of the nobles' and people's 
representatives had defeated the Government in connection with the 
adoption of the Ramage report on salaries. The Article was therefore 
reworded to oblige the Queen to 'take such steps as may appear to the 
Government of the United Kingdom to be necessary to ensure compliance 
with' any internat~onal agreement or similar matter.[54] 
Although Garvey and other 'Pitta' officials were concerned that 
the Tongan Government might reject some of the provisions of the new 
In Treaty, the Colonial Office did not anticipate much opposition. 
regard to the retention of responsibility for Tonga's external 
relations, its officials confidently expressed the opinion that there 
was 
'a lot of sugar elsewhere in the Treaty to coat this pill.'[SS] 
Xevertheless, the possibility of opposition to these clauses was 
State conceded ~o Garvey that 'this acknowledged, and the Secretary of 
is SO:J.ething which we cannot 
53. !;ott, 'Tonga and ~·s E;.:• 
Friendship with th0 :~~t 
force upon Tonga if Queen Salote is 
5:., ~·~inute, 22 ~·iay 1957, ibid. 
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really reluctant to accept it.'[56] 
In such a case the Colonial 
Office prepared was to make amendments 'tt' h perm1 1ng t e Tongan 
Government more effective participation in the decisions to be taken 
under it· One possibility kept in reserve was to follow the 'Pitto' 
line by conceding that the British Government should 
the secure 
consent of Tonga before entering into international agreements on its 
behalf. It might also be possible to modify the British Government's 
sole right to decide on matters of defence.[57] 
The need to 
introduce such bargaining points would not be known, however, until 
the British Government learnt of Tonga's initial reactions to the 
Treaty when it was informally presented to the Queen for her comment 
in April 1958. 
QUEEN Salote's response to the Treaty was distinctly favourable. 
In a letter to Garvey in June 1958 she expressed her gratitude for 
'another milestone in the f tual Conf idence and long history o mu 
d between Tonga and the United Kingdom' .[~8] friendship that has existe 
Clauses did not even draw comment, The external relations and there 
were no substantial amendments to be made anywhere in the Treaty. 
ifuile this reaction might well have been expect3d from the Queen, 
given her it was somewhat surprising that strong loyalty to Britain, 
it was also shared by Tupouto' a Tung!. As a mark of her dependence on 
56. 
57, 
58. 
Ibid. 
c.o. to Garvey, 11 April 1958 , ~· 
G~rvey, 6 June 1958, ~· Queen Salote to  
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her Premier son, a:_d also in recognition that 'he will 
have to sign 
for me and carry on afterwards', Salot h 
e soug t Tupouto'a Tungi's 
opinicn on the documents before responding t h 0 t e Colonial Office. 
Perhaps influenced by his mother a ~ d 
, n~ concerne primarily with the 
Consul's financial control and 
the fate of the 1905 Agreement, 
quite content with the new Treaty. Tupouto'a Tungi appeared The 
revision gave him all he had originally sought, and more. He gave no 
indication that he regarded the external relations clauses in the way 
'Pitta' ~fficials had feared. The despatch accompanying the Treaty 
gave him considerable initiative in external matters and he was not 
particularly concerned over Tonga's exar.t constitutional position. 
The standpoint which he preferred to take was that in theory Tonga had 
all the powers of a sovereign state but that in practice the Kingdom 
was glad to accept Britain's protection, assistance and services.[59] 
The only change which T·lpot•.to 1 a Tungi (and the Queen) sought was 
the introduction of a provision making it possible for the Tongan 
Government to appoint what was termed a 'Tongan Commissioner and 
Consul' in London. Such an appointment would allow the Tongan 
Government to get expert advice on a variety of subjects and there 
would be considerable advantage in having a Tongan in London with a 
knowledge of local conditions. Although the Government had no 
immediate plans to make an appointment (there being no suitable Tongan 
available), they had in mind that eventually 'such officer should be 
recognised as an 
governments 1 .[60] 
alternative means of communication between the two 
Since Britain had a Commissioner and Consul, Tonga 
59. Reid to Garvey, 4 February 1958, ~.; 
1958, ibid. 
Reid to Garvey, 6 June 
6 June 1958, _ibid; 60 in Queen Sa1ote to Garvey' . • ~1emorandum, encl. 
Reid to Garvey, 6 June 1958, ~· 
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would have one too. 
Predictably, the idea of a Tongan re 
presentative in London as an 
alternative means of communication between the Governments did not 
it might induce confusion and lead to appeal to British officia1· ,; 
a 
habit of bypassing the Bt'i tish Co1H1·~1. N did h 
-- or t e British Government 
even entertain the possiL :i: ~: tl: :_ the Tongan 
representative might 
d~~l in any kind of diplomatic or policy matters. 'Pitta' officials 
felt sure that what the Tongans really wanted was a business 
representativ. in London, who would provide a complementary channel of 
communication in commercial matters. Although the possibility of such 
an appotntment was already covered by the Treaty, the British 
Government agreed to add a special provision (Article VI(4)) 
permitting the Queen to appoint such a Commissioner. The word 
'Consul' was omitted from his title, and it was made quite clear that 
the Tongan representative would have no diplomatic status; the 
British Commissioner and Consul would continue to be the sole channel 
in diplomatic and policy matters.[61] Tupouto'a Tungi decided it 
wise to be content with this decision, at least for the time being. 
Once Salote and Tupouto'a Tungi had unofficially accepted the new 
Treaty, the formal concurrence of the Tongan Government was automatic. 
Although the issue of an extradition agreement remained to be settled, 
the British Government decided to leave it for further consultation. 
The Gigning of the new Treaty took place on 26 August 1958 in the 
Legislative Asgembly and the reaction of the members, no doubt 
reflecting general Tongan feeling, was charged with emotion. The 
nrovoked V"ry little enquiry and no criticism, but it Tre;aty itself ,. - "' 
1 Prl.de that the Supplementary Agreement Was a m.:1tter of great nationa 
61. !-tinutc, 14 June 1955, ~; c.o. to Garvey, 8 July 1958, ibid. 
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had now been formally abandoned. A matter of even greater pride was 
the simultaneous the announcement of 
award of an honourary KBE to 
Tupouto' a Tungi. In the opinion of A.c. Reid, who took over as 
Agent 
and Consul in March 1957, the latter 
overshadowed the new Treaty.[62] 
announcement completely 
With the signing of the new Treaty the rt:lationshi~ bet'..,el!n Tong 
1 
and Great Britain 
was, for the first time ~n over 50 years, clearly 
defined. Significantly, Britain's role in the Tongan administratton 
was capable of definition because it now reoted on consensus rather 
than British insistence. While the British Government retained 
responsibility for Tonga's external affairs and defence, the Tongan 
Government now had internal autonomy, subject only to a few clearly 
defined limitations, and was no longer subject to the advice of the 
British Consul whenever the latter saw fit. In his speech at the 
Treaty signing, Garvey referred to the 'great political changes' that 
had taken place in Tonga over the previous half-century leading up to 
the treaty revision. With considerable point 1'up0uto'a Tungi noted in 
reply that the changes had occured not only in Tonga but in the 
British Commonwealth as well.[63] 
The climate of world opinion had begun to swing in favour of 
self-determination for colonial peoples -- a goal which had be~n as 
dear to Tupou II as it now was to his grandson, Tuoouto'a Tungi --and 
f Fi 'i and encl., 13 October 62. Reid to the Colonial Secretary o J 
63. 
1958, BCT 6/C, 1/2/1 - III. 
Tu Outo ' a Tun(•i at the EiGnin8 of the nev: Speedws of Garvey and P 0 ' • • d Ton":t 
f Friendship be~ £~.~ Bn.t,a~n Ll..:!._ -:--;_:::.-
'I'reaty, in Treaty E._ --· ·----f -g-a Gov·•rnmcnt 1·,h .... te pap~r, 1958 and Ansociated ~~r~, on, -
'N~Eil''alofu,-f5 September 19.5!3. 
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had encouraged Britain to relax its hold on Tongan affairs. 
Xever-theless, it was fitting that Tupouto'a Tungi should sign the new 
Treaty for it was, as much as anything else, th , outcome of his own 
influence and ability, and his desire for unfettered control. For the 
most part the Treaty recognised a situation that had already been 
achieved under his Premiership and, more importantly, it demonstrated 
that the initiative for change remained-within Tonga. For this reason 
the new Treaty was as much a signpost for the future as an historical 
landmark; it could be only a matter of time before Tupouto'a Tungi 
would turn his attention to full independence for Tonga. 
CHAPTER 10 
Re-entr~ ~.£_he .comity 5!!_ Nations 
Tonga's political position as a result of the forthcoming 
change will be the same or bett:er than when His Hajesty King 
Tupou I ruled the nation and for the first part of the reign 
of His Majesty King Tupou II ••. ~~e will be able to observe 
completely the clnuses of the Constitution of the Kingdom 
concerning Foreign Affairs and our contacts with other 
nations of the world. 
[Closing Spc•uch of Kinn Taufa' ahau 
A~,st·~bly, 7 November 1969. Ton.r:a 
Ut·cv:nbvr 1%9.} 
Tupou !V to tlw 
GovernlJ'.('llt 
"'-"""~_.,,, __ ..,. -~·-~-
Ga:::c'ttL' 
-,..r..o~_ ... < __ _ 
Lq~:l.slative: 
no. 13, 23 
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With the ratification of the 1958 Treaty of 
Friendship, Britain's 
diminishing role in Tongan affairs was conft"rm"d. Tl 1 ~ 1roug wut the 
1950s, under the leadership of the Cro'm Prince and Premier, Tupouto 1 a 
Tungi (henceforth refllrred to as Tungi), the Tongan Government had 
kept Lhe British Consul on the periphery of Ton~2n lit" 
··'' po 1CS, After 
1959 this trend continued. For the most part the British Government 
was content to take a back seat; its interests in Tonga ,.,ere served 
adequately by a nominal presence. From the mid-1960s, hot·wver, the 
Tongan Government, prompted by Tungi who became King Taufa 1 ahau Tupou 
IV afte~ the death of Queen Salote in December 19b5, began to question 
the value of the framework. of British protection. In practical terms 
it now placed few restraints on government activities and had no 
visible effect on Tongan politics. From the mid-1960s the British 
Government had become a cooperative benefactor rather than an 
unwelcome intruder, but it was the colonial implications of Tonga 1 s 
i k d 1 Ki nd the few O tlwrs who concerned status that r e t 1e new ng a 
themselves with Tonga's international status. Just as Tupou II had 
resisted protectorate status in 1900, so Tupou IV wanted the Kingdom 
to stand alone. On his initiative the Treaty was again revised in 
1 6 and, 9 8 in 1970, the last vestiges of British responsibility for 
i 1 to wield unrivalled pm-tc'r Tl!ROUGUUCT the l960n, Tungi eont nuec. · 
the 
• t"n atl j hv fult no llC'r.itatton hiG country 
1 d to P:n.·sut.', 1• • t"'· WiG It' po lClCG "" 
or in 
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experimenting with 
new ideas for ~onga's development. 
His boundl~ss 
enthusiasm and self-assurance, coupled with the 
socio-political 
situation, made it difficult for other Ministers to oppose him, 
"!Specially aftet the last European Minister of Finance, J.A. Goodacre, 
rt:tired from the Government in 19'>0. s · L 1 lone atukefu rias commented 
that during Tungi' s Premiershii>, democrat.:.c institutions 
the 
Leg~slative Assembly and Cabinet in particular -- became mere rubber 
S tamps for Tungi's own policies.[l] To th1' i ht b dd d 
s m g e a e the Tonga 
Copra Board which became, under Tungi's chairmanship, a vehicle for 
his develop:nent policies. Hi th the help of Copra Board funds Tungi 
continued to travel widely, searching for new idGas and expertise. He. 
had become, 
a British as official one commertted, true 
'internationalist 1 and he was fully alive to the advantages of contact 
~vith the United States and Japan as well as Tcnga 1 s more r.radi tional 
allies. [2] 
Since the 1958 revision of the treaty, most of Tungi's econom~~ 
policies were beyond the control of the British Consul. In December 
1958 when the Colonial Office noted that the Tongan Government, 
d i f · · 1 t could b" expected to call on the espite ts ~nancLa au onomy, ~
advice of the British Consul from time to time, the Consul pointed out 
that thiu was a I remaritr ble mis-reading of ttw situation I' [3] Even 
matt('ts W1llC 1 "' ~ t • l requir'"'d nr 1· tic:11 consent u:l..der the 1958 Treaty were 
1 F · E1tchan"'c Act of 1963, for ant brought before the Consul -- t w •ore10n u 
f to the British Government. On ut,n1ple, was paooed without re .crence 
.... 
d1L~I matter. as on others of its kind, the British Government was 
rights. Late in 196l+ when the Tongan rul ue t<tn.t to prom: its treaty 
1. 
2. 
(!".l.•otc 1 S . L k f' ''L'on<•.,:l Af tl'r r'ucen ,,,.. ' 1one atu l~ u, c - '< vol. 2, 
pp.l59-162. 
NJ.ddocko t.o c.o., 
Rc.:id to H~ddoct:o, 
15 June 19fi2, ncr 3/POL 1 - rv. 
.19~9 DGT 3/?0L 1 - III. 5 Fc~bru:1ry > ' 
1967. 
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Government indicated a des~re, · d" 4 ~n ~rect contravention of an 
undertaking to abide by sterling area practices, to produce a gold 
coin issue to mark Queen Salote 1 s 65 h b t irthday, the British 
Government was uncertain how to proceed. If officials took a t?ugh 
line it was feared that the Premier might press for an end to the 
treaty relationship. And yet, as A.N. Galsworthy, the Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State, commented: 
It is not 
Tonga if 
influence 
much use our having a special relationship with 
we can only preserve it by ~ot seeking to use the 
which it is supposed to give. [ 4] 
Faced with the clear disapproval of the Colonial Offi~P hotJJever, 
Tungi was content to abide by his earlier undertaking. [ 5] 
Under the 1958 Treaty the British Commissioner and Co•1sul 
underwent a substantial diminution of status and responsibilities. 
Although the Consul's influence had in practice been circumscribed for 
some time, the new Treat~ formalised the position. Q.V.L. Weston, whv 
replaced A.C. Reid as Commissioner and Consul for a few ruonths in 
1959, pointed oat that the Consul's former role as adviser had largely 
disappeared; while Queen Salote continued to receive the Consul on a 
regular basis, the real executive authority lay with Tungi and his 
dislj , for British involvement did not diminish. Weston acknowledged 
a cont ........ dng role for the Consul as a focal point for British prestige 
and a1> a medium of communication for certain aspects of external 
affairs, but he regarde~ his duties as primarily social maintaining 
good relations with the Tongan Government and providing a conneeting 
link between the Government and the Chief CommisGioner in Suva. [ 6] Sir 
4. Galsworthy to Jakeway, lS Decemb~r 1964, BCT 3/POL 23- I. 
5. Trafford Smith to c.o., 25 January 1965, ibid. 
6. Weston to Haddocks, 7 August 1959, BCT 6/S, 3/2/1 (e) - II· 
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Kenneth Maddocks, the Chief Commissioner from 1958-63, agreed 
with Weston's views, pointing out to the Colonial Office that the post 
required 'per sis tent tmderemployment 1 , [ 7] In 1962 E.J. Goode, 
'·
1eston's replacement, noted th t h" ff" ~ a ~s o 1ce W&s increasingly looked 
upon as a mere consulate, with ,,fficial visitors dealing direct with 
the Tongan authorities on government or commercial matters. Because 
of the number of official visitors he entertained, he described 
himself as 'manager of a kind of hotel annexe' .[8] 
Despite the.:;e limitations on the Consul's official role, there 
were still opportunities for exercising informal influence. Provided 
he exP.rcised that 'necessary delicacy of touch' which remained a 
primary qualification r the post, he could, through direct personal 
contact with the Queen and Ministers, influence opinion within the 
Government. The extent to lvhich t)·e Government was prepared to listen 
depended on a number of fa,·tor_s, mostly personal, and was not 
ne:!essarily tied to the legal status of the post or the official 
actions of its incumbent. Age, island experience and personal 
commitment were all relevant to this informal influence. Reid, in 
'a particular, felt that a great deal could be achieved informally by 
kind of surreptitious planting of ideas' and there is every indication 
that he had cons~derable success.[9] 
7. Naddocks to C .a., 22 Aut;ust 1963 • ~· 
8. 
9. 
Coode, Political 
3 April 1962, 
1963, BCT 6/P.F. 
Tonga for thP period to 31 Mnrch 1962, Report on 7 111 h BCT 615 , 4/l/1 _ I; Coode to Haddocks, • arc 
- T r. 
C 
~ t<>d ~n Heston to Haddocks, 7 August Reid's comment ... "' ... 
6/S, 3/2/l (c) - II. 
1959, DCT 
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Ironically, perhaps, since Britain had relinquished control over 
Tongan financial policy in 1958, it was in this area that the British 
Government exercise.d its greatest influence from the mid-1960s. 
British officials had only 1· "t d d 1m1 e , an often unofficial, access to 
the Government's economic activities, but they were convinced that 
Tonga, like its island neighbours, needed planned economi~ development 
in order to stabilise its economic outlook. Since 1953 the Tongan 
Governnent had allocated surplus revenue to a development fund and by 
1961 this had been used to finance among other things a bulk fuel 
depot, a lands survey, the purchase of government vessels and a 
broadcasting station.[lO] Although the programme was within the 
financial capacity of the economy, British officials believed the rate 
of achievement was too low. The problems of rapid population growth 
accompanied by a shortage of land, and a lack of technical and 
professional skills, exacerbated the perennial problems associated 
with scarce natural resources, and demanded increased expenditure on 
development. 
Although the Government hao no direct access to the Copra Board 
reserves, which were in the main built up from a tax on growers 
intended for stabilisation of prices, the Board, under the 
h h f T · pnrformed the functions of a development c airmans ip o ung1, ~ 
corporation. Thtough its subsidiary, the Tonga Construction Company, 
it carried out a number of projects such as the construction of a 
Tungi Arcade, and the construction of the shopping and office complex, 
Dateline Hotel in 1965-6. Not all of its ventur8S Hl!re successful 
l Pacif ~c Coconut Processing Corpor3tivn wwever -- the ... at Pago Pago, 
f C . r)~~~ '~"Is nev~r began 'd ble ·1mount o opr, •• li..u•'- • ..... ' which absorbed a cons1 era ' 
Or>erations. Th1
·s together with the Kiagdo:-:'s pr0pcnsity to project, 
- l O'll•-1 •lt·' 
10. Annual Reports of Hinister of Finance Nr ~·· .... 
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attract businessmen of doubtful reputation, increased the British 
Government's concern for Tonga's economic stability. 
To counter these trends 
# , British officials advocated a programme 
of planned capital development with an emphasis on revenue-producing 
projects and on agriculture. In the South Pacl.'fl.'c Off' 1.ce, which 
absorbed the Pitcairn and Tonga Office from 1962 , there was a strong 
conviction that Tonga ought t b h o e mars alling its 'not insubstantial 
resources' for planned development. 1.'nstead of ' , jumping from one 
disjointed project to another.'[11) E 1 · 196~ ar y 1.n -, the South Pacific 
Office hoped to persuade Tonga into accepting the help of V.D. Stace, 
economic adviser with the South Pacific Commission, in preparing a 
development plan, but the suggestion was not received with 
enthusiasm. [12] 
Second only to the need for planning, was the emphasis British 
officials placed on the potentially important role that aid might play 
in the Tongan economy and also in Tongan-British relations. Unlike 
the other Pacific territories that had fallen under Britain's shadow, 
Tonga had not receiv~d any substantial aid under Colonial Development 
and Welfare Acts. Up to March 1962 the total grant to Tonga amounted 
to £5,560, representing a gift of broadcasting equipment and an offer 
of three scholarships to study in the United Kingdom, made at the time 
of the signing of the revised Treaty in 1958. In May 1961 the British 
Government gave £7,500 towards hurricane relief, but the only other 
expenditure on Tonga covered the salaries and expenses of the British 
Consul. Between 1920-1962 this totalled Cl49,313, compared, for 
d f the administration in the Solomon example, with grants-in-ai o 
11. S.P.O. to c.o., 4 February 1963, BCT 6/C, 6/2- I; 
on Development in Tonga, June 1961, ~· 
12. S.P.O. minute·, 7 February 1962, ~· 
Hemorandum 
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Islands totalling £. 2 720 126 over th 
' ' · e same period. [13] 
The reasons for this lack of f' ~nancial assistance were to be 
found in Tonga, not Britain. As R.C.G. Strick, Secretary to the 
Tongan Government from 1961-63, put it, the Government was determined 
to paddle its own canoe.[14] It d a opted a deliberate policy against 
loan finance or any investment of non-Tongan f unds, and held to the 
principle that all economic development must be financed and conducted 
as a government or quasi-government enterpr;se. Th' ~ ~s policy reflected 
Tungi's desire to avoid all international obligations d an , in 
particular, to ensure that Tonga did not become too closely tied to 
Britain. No doubt he was also sensitive to the implication that by 
accepting British aid Tonga would be joining the ranks of the colonial 
dependencies. In the euphoria of the copra boom of the mid-1950s, 
Tungi believed that Tonga's resources were sufficient to allow it to 
develop without external assistance. 
A further obstacle to the granting of Colonial Development and 
Welfare Funds to Tonga was the Government's refusal to pass the trade 
union legislation required where any aid project involved the 
employment of local labour. The Tongan Government was strongly 
opposed to enacting the legislation and believed that trade unions 
were unnecessary and irrelevant to the Tongan situation. In 1943 when 
A.L. Armstrong, then British Consul, first discussed the matter with 
the Govt>rnment, he was informed that the adoption of a trad!.! union 
system would be 'too high a price to pay' for aid the Government 
preferred to forego the possibility of assistance rather than open the 
13. Colonial Office Information Booklet R.5521, April 1963, ci7ed E.J. Coode, Political Report on_ Tonga fo~ the pcn.od 
January-26 August 1963, 27 Aueust 19b3, BCT 3/POL 2 - II. 
14. Strick to Claydon, 8 Mar~h 1962, BCT 6,C6/2. 
in 
28 
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way for 'legally protected agitators' to stir up disputes: 
the introduction of Trade 
against the wishes of the 
country as a whole. [15] 
Unions legislation would be 
individual and ruinous to the 
Through the 1950s and early 1960s this attitude shm·1ed no signs of 
change. In looking for opportunities to g1·ve a1."d · · 1.n conJunction with 
the 1958 Treaty, the British Government was forced to settle for a 
gift of broadcasting equi me t · d P n 1n or er to get around the need for 
trade union legislation.[16] 
Despite Tonga's lack of interest in British aid, the British 
Government continued to encourage the idea. Its enthusiasm was not 
only borne of an altruistic desire to contribute to economic stability 
in Tonga. British officials were fully conscious of the role of aid 
in fostering goodwill and in strengthening Britain's weakening links 
with the South Pacific. In 1956 when a revision of the Treaty was 
under discussi~n, the possibility of providing aid to Tonga as 'a 
constant though unobtrusive reminder' of Britain's goodwill, was 
explored at length.[17] In subsequent years, particularly when the 
influence of American entrepreneurs as unofficial advisers was causing 
concern to British officials, they advocated aid as 'the only way of 
maintaining British influence in Tonga for any length of ~ime'. It 
was clear that direct intervention in Tonga's internal affairs in 
order to avert the influence of certain individuals of doubtful 
t d · ld b 1 1 t d to provoke resentment an:l cause the s an 1ng wou e ca cu a e 
Governm.-ant to reserved 
in its dealings with British become even more 
offic~ ;is. But a 'grand gesture' on Britain's part, with 
no strings 
15. 27 May 
1943, AT/TA, Series A, Hp 145/43/11. 
Ata to Armstrong, · 
16. c.o. to Garvey, 9 August 1956, BCT 
6/C, 6/ 2 - 1 ' 
17. s.P.O. minute, 10 September 1.9.56 , ~· 
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attached, 'would place Tonga under some sense of obligation.'[l8] 
Although the Tongan Government held out against the prospect of 
external aid for many years, economic necessity eventually led to a 
reappraisal of its attitude. B 1962 T Y onga was feeling the effects of 
a 
a downward economy caused by a dcop in world copra 
prices, restrictions on its export quota of bananas to New Zealand, 
trend in the 
drought in 1958, and a severe hurricane in Vava'u in 1961. Copra 
still accounted for 80% of Tonga's export earnings but in 1962 the 
Kingdom was earning less than half the revenue from copra that it had 
earned in 1959. [19] Hith no new sources of revenue in sight and a 
growing balance of payments problem, the financial outlook was poor. 
From 1962 the Kingdom began deficit budgeting and appropriations for 
development projects ceased. There was no immediate prospect of 
financing a sizeable development programme without raiding reserves or 
borrowing. In talks with Mahe Tupouniua, Tonga's Minister of Finance, 
the Colonial Office and the South Pacific Office advocated using at 
least a portion of Tonga's substantial reserves for development or 
encouraging private enterprise to build a much needed hotel. But the 
Government was strongly opposed to both of these courses -- it was 
determined to maintain control o:f the tourist industry and refused to 
touch its reserves, which were regardt• · as a guarantee 
of Tonga's 
lessons of 
continuing autonomy in a time of disaster.[20] Perhaps the 
1917, when the need for a loan had led 
to the British Consul's 
oversight of the finances, were not forgotten. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Claydon to Uaddocks, 28 September 1962, BCT 6/P, 6/l/3. 
Strick to Ritchie, 8 March 1962 , BCT 6/C, &/Z - I. 
Marnham to Haddocks, 11 April 1963, BCT 6/C, 6/Z(c) - II. 
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In 1963 the Ton3an Government decided to try to raise an external 
loan to finance the reconstruction of the wharf at Nuku'alofa and 
' 
after visiting the United States, Mahe approached the Colonial Office 
to explore the possibility of assistance from Colonial Development and 
Welfare Funds. The decision to borrow for development was a 
significant turn-around and was taken in the light of economic 
circumstances and with the encouragement of the Queen. Once this 
decision had been made, Britain was the logical country to turn to. 
M~he had no success in raising a loan ~n th u · d  e n~te States, and 
Britain had already intimated that it was willing to look into the 
question. Tongan sensitivities to~vards external influence had to be 
sacrificed to economic need. 
In June 1964 the Colonial Office made a formal offer of aid in 
response to Mahe's approach. Although there was an awareness that any 
conditions a.ttached to the offer would cause irritation in Tonga, the 
Colonial Office was not prepar~d to waive its requirements. Aid would 
be provided only after a detailed assessment of Tonga's needs had been 
carried out for this purpose J. Inman, an economist with the 
Colonial Office, was sent to Tonga in December 1964 and, on the basis 
of his assessment, the British Government agreed to provide extensive 
aid. An initial allocation of tSO,OOO for a coconut rehabilitation 
d 'ded ft dfd not require the use of paid programme was approve prov~ ~ ~ 
· f · ts involvfng tl1"' use of labour. Any further allocat1on or proJeC • • 
labour would be dependent on Tonga pacsing trade union legislation. 
t required an undertaldng from the Finally, the British Governmen 
Tongan Government that it would conform to sterling ared practices in 
ld i This would mean restricting the regard to the issue of go co n. 
issue of to r
are commemorative occasions, and not using 
gold coinage 
the 
it for revenue-raising purposes as 
advocated by certain of 
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Premier's American friends.[21] 
Britain's offer and the coniitions attached to it were accepted 
and 
1964. 
approved at a special rneGting of the Tongan Cabinet on 3 June 
In October the Legislative Assembly, after a lively debate, 
passed legislation providing for the establishment of trade unions in 
Tonga. No trade unions have ever been registered under the Act, and 
the level of its relevance was perhaps reflected by those members who 
reputedly asked whether the legislation would apply to the Union 
Steamship Company or to the Tonga Rugby Union. [22] Hith Inman's 
assistance Tonga's first Development Plan, for 1965-70, was prepared 
and British aid began flowing to Tonga. Over the first three years of 
the Development Plan Britain pledged over £ 680,000, of which 
£ 200,000 '"as a loan for the redevelopment of the Nuku' alofa wharf. 
For the most part Britain provided direct grants for development 
projects; for example it met 90% of the cost of the new Vaiola 
Hospital, of a five-year road improvement programme and of a new 
police training school.[23] Under an agreement signed in August 196~, 
Britain also provided aid under the Overseas Service Assistance 
s~heme, or OSAS, which supplemented the salaries of certain expatriate 
officers. In this way the British Government was able to encourage 
to Tonga of competent and experienced expatriate the appointment 
officers. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
1 27 M·1y 1964 ibid. c.o. to Jakeway, te ., ' '----
b 1964 BCT 2/1, POL 3. 
Co ode to Jakeway, 9 Octo er b ', 1964 ibid • 
Legislative Assembly, June-Octo er , -----
The Tonga Chronicle, 1 July 1966 • P• 1' 
----
Debotes of the 
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The introduction of substantial amounts of British aid to Tonga 
opened up a new chapter in British-Tongan relations. Although it has 
since been complemented by aid from other sources, including the 
United Nations Development Plan and the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments, British aid provided a significant input and encouraged 
detailed development planning. At a time when linb; betwet•n the two 
Governments were becoming increasingly slender, British aid forged new 
ties which allowed Britain some oversight of Tonga's development 
without compromising .tonga's autonomy. A British finanrial adviser, 
W.J.R. Pincott, in effect took over the Cunsul's former role in 
finance. Like the Consuls, however, he found that he was not alw·ays 
privy to the Tongan Government's r ?nomic nlans. Tonga had 
compromised on its opposition to foreign aid but not on its aversion 
to outside interference. 
in June 1964 at which Tungi accepted Britain's DURING the meeting 
offer of development aid, 1 · d th" question of Tonga's he a so ra1se ~ 
future political status. 
external r<!lations and 
His main concern was the conduct of Tonga's 
he intimated that Tonga might soon seek full 
d an end to the Treaty of Friendship. independence from Britain an 
In 
the wake T 
. emphasised that he did not 
of Britain's offer of aid, ungl 
' f . dly relations with Britain, 
wish for any diminution of Tonga s rlen 
. vit·lbly too remote from Tonga to be but he argued that Britain was me ' 
He wanted to 
d t n Ton~au int~rests. Pro tect an promo <J t;' abl0 adequately to 
be free to arrangements 
direct rcprcsl'nta.tion in tlw 
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countries with which Tonga was most 1 c osely associated: a Tongan 
legation in Washington, for example, would be able to tap American aid 
and look after the welfare of T ongan students in the United 
States. [24] 
Tungi's unexpected and radical ... demarche surprised Sir Deryck 
Jakeway, the Chief Comml.'ssl.'oner, 1nd 1 h c 1 i a so t e o onial Office. 
Jakeway's satisfaction at receiving a prompt answer to the offer of 
British aid was tempered by the realisation that Britain was merely 
one of the aid sources that Tungi hoped to tap. The scale of dollar 
aid evident in American Samoa had obviously impressed Tungi, but 
greater access to aid was not his primary concern in opening the 
question of Tongan independence; he was as much concerned with 
Tonga's status and prestige as with the practical implications of 
independence. Tungi resented the colonial implications in the 
existing Treaty relationship and preferred to regard Tonga as an 
independent state in voluntary association with Great Britain. Far 
from accepting the Colonial Office view that control over external 
affairs and defence were rights which Britain had not yet relinquished 
to Tonga, he perpetrated the fiction that under the Treaty an 
independent Tonga had granted certain rights to the British 
Government. 
Tungi' s dec·ision to seek a return to indepL'ndence vJ<W in no small 
way influenced by tlw independence of '\~estern S~wwa from New Zealand 
Tlln~ 1• '1,~d for some time taken a great interest in on 1 January 1962. u ~~ 
Sam0an 1 f 
a Ton~~n-t·l'0Gt('tn S.1r.10an cuntoms 
affairs, and his proposa s or 0 
·' 1 ·110 hon1 0 d to rcasrwrt Tonga's union and other schemeH sugr,estL'u t :at 
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former imperialist role in the Pacific.[25] I 1959 n Tungi urged upon 
West~rn Samoan officials t1 B · 1e rltish-Tongan Treaty as a model for 
Western Samoa's future relationship with New Zealand, arguing that 
small countries could not afford to maintain diplomatic posts abroad, 
and commending Britain's handling of Tonga's interests. For a time 
opin.ion in Samoa favoured the British-Tongan model but, against the 
background of mounting pressure from the United Nations and strong 
Samoan nationalism, it was decided that Western Samoa should proceed 
to full independence. According to Reid, this decision led to a 
marked change of attitude in Tonga. Hitherto Tonga had taken great 
pride in being the only Polynesian kingdom to survive into the 
twentieth century. Now, however, Western Samoa ~•as claiming to be the 
only independent Polynesian state. An announcement by the Crmvn 
Agents in connection with a Western Samoan stamp issue in 1966 added 
fuel to the fire by describing i-lestern Samoa as 1 the world's first 
fully independent Polynesian state.'[26] 
Hatters of prestige ;:tside, Tungi found little to justify the 
continuation of the existing relationship with Britain. In 
discussions with a visiting Australian official, R.N. Hamilton, in 
November 1964, he made it clear that in his view Tonga gained no 
substantial advantages from the ':rt.',lt;." • In fact, he believed the 
T b td t d ,, 0 ~ r··>',!"dcti\•t.: ,md no longer serving the rea ty to e ou u e u.• "' ~ - -- -
interests of Tonga. 
Treaty placed on his freedo~ of a:ticn in the fields of shipping, 
civil aviation and forl!i.:;n rd.:1tions. 
Government 
1 L)f T.)','i•,,·1 .ud c-0uld not be expL~cted had a limited l:.not·11 cur,l' - -~ ·- · 
t 
• 1• n a r::~'!m1 L'r to pl,1cc 1ong;1 s to handle Tonga's foreign ~·l'latlom~ best 
25. 
26. 
19-~ n"- biG 4'l'b· c.o. to Garvey, 14 Auguot ,,, · ... l .• , 
Persanul cotlmunicntion frw:l Ruid; 
1966, llCT 3/IWD 12 • 
H> Auguot 
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LnterGsts foremost. He want d T 
e onga to speak for itself in London and 
Was hi.ng ton, to seek technical and f1.' nanc1.· al i h ass stance w ere it 
be1.Leved best and even, much to th" Colon1· ..,1 Off· ' · ~ u 1.ce s consternat1.on, 
to ~oin the United Nations. In the matter of defence, the other major 
arei where Britain retained responsibility, Tungi ar~ued that the 
shield of British protection \vas worthless. The S(•cond Horld Har had 
provided ample evidence that practical responsibility for Tonga's 
defence must inevitably fall to countries \'lith Hhom Tonga had greater 
geographic ties -- the United States, Nm-1 Zealand and A•.1stralia. It 
was only logical, Tungi. argu0d, for Tonfja to sePl .urect ap,reements 
with these countries. He had in mind some form of association \d th 
the ANZUS pact or a direct United States-Tonga defence agreement.[27] 
In his discussions \-lith Har:lilton, Tungi intimated that he 
intended to insist on independence in 1965, anJ that he tvould make a 
unilateraJ. declaration if necessary. He consida•red any a'rguments that 
Tonga was too small or too poor for independence to be nonsense, and 
cited the cases of We stern Samoa and Zandbar. Surprisingly perhaps, 
his des in~ for change was not opposed by Queen Salotc. Jakeway 
t•eported that when he sought Salotc's reaction to Tungi's 
announcement, ' 1 dl ' t1"'' t Tun~i 
1 
s views rat wr sa Y , ,,.. "' 
represented her m-m: ~ • ·-ft't.lL'rL,. 1."s no·one 'y . __ ,,.,. .. ~~ <!'.' •• ·.'.'• ou see, ¥ie Lj~ .. ~.... ~~ • .... """ 
else'. [28] It is also true, 
tempered by Salotc' o reluctance t,, ...: .. :;~1 -' :·;~· th. 
such an important feature of th0 
27. 
28. Ibid. 
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Tungi 18, proposals f r a change in the relationship were d: scussed 
in more detail at the Colonial Office during his visit to London in 
Sf'ptember 1964. Here his str f 1' ong ee 1.ngs about independence were kept 
in reserve he did not seek ~n end to tl T f · d h' d w . reaty o Fr1.en s l.p an 
denied any interest in membership of the United Nations. His main 
c.oncern 
'"'as a desire for din'ct representation in London .and 
Washington. Although he envisaged that these posts \vould deal 
primarily with trade he wanted the London post to function as an 
alternative channel of communication with :he British Government and 
the Washington one to deal with American aid. This the Colonial 
Office would net accept. Its officials pointed out firmly that as 
long as Britain was responsible for Tonga 1 s external relations, Tungi 
would hav~ to accept limitations on the actions of his Government ti 
representatives overseas. Horeover, the Colonial Office was not 
conv:!.nced that Tonga could spare either the money or the men for such 
posts.[29] 
In the course of these discussions, Tungi referred to the 
relationship of voluntary association between the independent Western 
Samoa and New Zealand, whereby New Zealand handled Samoa 1 s external 
affairs, and asked for an examination 0f its application to Tonga and 
Britain. The Colonial Office oppos0d the idea it would involve a 
radical policy d • f 13 • t • "':l~ t('l act as Tonb"G
1 s agent dt:>narture an· , l r .1. ,11.11 ,._ ~ ~ 
in international mattern without Gny sort of control OVL't' 
it miGht prove embarrassinr:; and load to eonsiderablc 
1 i . 'VI of Tungi I G propt.'nsity friction, especial y n Vl.L to dabble 
in 
international affairs. 1 l'.·''"n farther tal: n British offici<> s were ·~ 
aback by Tunni'G sucr.cstion 
•!r,rc!c;:~c.>nt with the United 
that tw 
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water on the idea. They also intimated that the British Treasury 
might be le&s willing to Provide a 1·d f T or onga if Britain was r.? 
longer responsible for Tonga in the eyes of the world. In view of 
Britain's record of aid to Tonga prior to 1964 
, Tungi was unmoved by 
this argument.~ 10) 
At this stage, Colonial Office policy was directed towards the 
continuation of a formal relationship with Tonga,· • Tongan independence 
was not considered. Officials were handicapped, moreover, by the 
abs~nce of dny policy on the f uture of the smaller territories 
generally. Their inclination was to let 'sleeping dogs lie' and to 
try to slow down the tempo of chanee. In particular they were 
concerned that any rapid moves towards Tongan independer,ce might 
create difficulties or at least embarrassment during the delicate 
constitutional advances under discussion in Nauru, the Cook Islands 
and Fiji. 
As a result of the discussion? in London, officials believed they 
had succeeded in establishing with Tungi a possible basis for 
amendment of the Treaty. Britain would retain responsibility for 
foreign affairs and defence but the Treacy would be streamH,1ed to 
eliminate Britain's extra-terri:orial jurisdiction and any 
responsibility for Tonga'r internal affairs. In addition, they 
examined the poss..:.:>ility of ;:n exchange of letters under which Tonga 
would be authorised to s<.. .. d representatives to London and Washington, 
the latter being given diplomatic status and attached to the British 
Embassy. In January 1965, Trafford Smith, Assistant Under-Secretatj 
of State in the c0 -,nial Office, visited Tonga to present 
a Colonictl 
1 t 'J •.;hJ.d1 Toxw,a \.;aH .:1slwd to Off ice Hemorandum un Lht' proposa s, ' • -
30. Ibid. 
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respond. [31] 
The British proposals were considered in the Tongan Privy Council 
and in the Legislative Assembly but no response was made to the 
British Gov ~rnment. Althou<>h T · · d 
o ung1 rema1ne keen on the idea of 
representation overseas (even L) the extent of designing uniforms for 
the representatives), the financial costs apparently weakened his 
enthusiasm for the idea of representation at the ambassadorial level 
and he accepted that his plans could be accomodated under the existing 
Treaty.[32] Perhaps more importantly, Tungi was restricted in his 
activities by the declining he~lth of the Queen, which kept her in New 
Zealand for much of the time. ~~en Tungi visited London in September 
1905 he made no suggestions for anending the Treaty, although in 
discussions with the Secretary of State he did refer to independence 
and a seat in the United Nations as his ultimate objective.[33] The 
Queen's death in December 1965 signalled a period of 12 months 
mourning for the royal family, during ~hi~h the new King took no new 
initiatives on the Treaty. 
W'hile the questicn of further re•;isicn lay dormant, the British 
Government took steps towards easing the unwelcome colonial 
implications of its relationship ~i :::: :'.::::;.1. Fer sone time British 
officials had been aware that tht: 7.:;~6c::'•:> disliked the .:1rrangement 
wher~by the Governor of Fiji w.:1s also C~i~f :~~~issioner for Tonga. 
The change of 
f 11· ·,r the shchlm.; of Fiji, for alleviate Tongan apprehension at a ... 1nb u::-:1<- · 
although it created ff ·~ 1·~ ~'R =~evi~Jblv identified a separate o l.t.:.t..: • ~ ""·'- .... • • 
31. 
32. 
33. 
Colonial Office Heu.ormtdum, December ~%·'>, ~· 
The Tonga Chronicle, 26 November 1965. 
----
c.o. to Reid, 2 November 1965, ~· 
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with the Fiji Government. As a · concess~on to this sensitivity and to 
upgrade the status of the local Consul, the British Government decided 
to abolish the office of Chief Commissioner. According to the 
Colonial Office, the exist1ng arrangembnts had become 'increasingly 
inappropriate'; they had been made at a tim<> when communications with 
London were slow and the Consul needed the guidance and support of a 
senior British official nearby. With better communications it was 
considered 'more appropriate and more consistent 'vith the status of 
the Kingdom of Tonga as a Protected State in Treaty relationship with 
Britain', for the Commissioner and Consul to be directly responsible 
to London. [34] The changes were implemented under the Tonga 
(Amendment) Order in Council and the Tonga Royal Instructions of 1965, 
and f~om Z~ June 1965 A.C. Reid was reappointed as Commissioner and 
Consul with direct responsibility to London. As Reid noted, the South 
Pacific Office was not mourned in Tonga: 
At the very least it was viewed as one extra time-consuming 
stage to get over, at the most it was constdered an actual 
hindrance and a source of irritatlon.[35] 
In February 1967 the state of quiescence that had followed the 
Queen's death was broken durin~ a private visit to London by the new 
King. i a me~t~ng was held at the Colonial Office to At his suggest o:;, - ... 
discuss the future of the treaty relationship. 
Tupou IV informed 
British officials that he wished Tonga to progress towards 
hi th Commonwea1t 'independence wit u e h ' and he asked the British 
Government to ~eta timetable for the achievement of this goal.[36] 
34. 
35. 
36. 
k tel 16 June 1965, BCT 3/POL 8. c.o. to Ja eway, ., 
Reid to Fairclough, 9 February 1967, BCT 3/POL 30. 
• 2;.. 1 1967 BCT 3/POL 23 - II; 
Fairclough to Re~d~ dafr~ 1 ga 21 February 1967, ~· 
meeting with tlv~ KJ.ng o on., ' 
Nott: of 
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The Colonial Office reaction to Tupou IV's proposal was 
essentially as it had been in 1964, except that British policy towards 
the independence of small Pac1"f1"c t •t · h d k err1 or•es a ta en a more 
definite shape in the intervening period. The British Government was 
not strongly opposed to Tongan independence, but it did not favour the 
idea. Officials were sensitive towards the King's desire for greater 
freedom in the conduct of Tonga's external relations but ~·,ey were 
anxious to avoid the transformation of the Pacific into 'an anarchy of 
mini-states' .[37] Tongan independence was not considered to be in the 
best interests of the Tongan people themselves, nor welcome to 
Britain's allies in the Pacific.[38] In answer to a question in the 
House of Commons in December 1966 the Brttish Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, outlined his Government's general policy in the dependent 
territories for which it was responsible: 
We are ready to work out suitable arrangements to grant 
independence to those dependent territories which want it 
and can sustain it. For the others we are willing to work 
out with the representatives of their peoples arrangements 
that would enable them, if they so wish, to continue in some 
form of association with us.[39] 
In regard to Tonga, the British Government believed that 'some 
relationship broadly analogous to free association' would be more 
• • d than complete independence.[40] The suited to the Kinguom s nee s 
led British offi~ials to doubt the precarious state of Tonga's economy 
wisdom of Tonga going it alone. More importantly, Tongan independence 
was not desirable from a strategic point of view. ~ :tain w~s anxious 
37. 
38. 
39. 
Reid to Fairclough, 10 October 1966, BCT 3/POL 30. 
Cited in~· 
Cited in 'Future Policy in t~e i:it'itish Dependent 
the Pacific', April 1967, ~· 
40. Ibid. 
Territories in 
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to maintain stability in the Pacific area and it was therefore keen to 
see Tonga develop financially and politically 'in an orderly and 
Peaceful way' d if an , possible, to stop short of complete 
independence.[41] At tripartite talks in Sydney in November 1966 and 
again at four-power talks in Washington l·n Aprl·l 1967, h A 
- t e ustralian, 
New Zealand States Govel'nments made it clear that they 
shared Britain's interests in this regard.[42] 
and United 
But the British Government's reluctance to see an independent 
Tonga was tempered by the knowledge that a refusal to at least go some 
way to meet the King's wishes might lead him to a unilateral 
termination of the Treaty. In line with the proposals put forward in 
1964, officials decided to leave independence aside and to concentrate 
on a series of treaty revisions in the hope that generous concessions 
would satisfy Tupou IV's demands for greater autonomy. For the 
meantime at least, Tupou IV was content to fall in with the idea of a 
treaty revision and asked the British Government to put fo~ward 
proposals. Althc:>t:gh he regarded it only as an intermediate step he 
was not incline~ to press the British Government for an early decision 
on Tonga's future status.[43] 
Proposals for a revised treaty Here prese1ted to the Tongan 
Government by Sir Arthur Galst¥orthy, the Deputy Cnder-Secretary of 
State in the Commonwealth Office (suc~~ssor tQ the Colonial Office), 
in December 1967. tinder th~' rrvpos,f!.s, Tonga regained full 
responsibility for its internal af~~irs c~x~~pt for defence), 
Fairclough to the British t:>nb.:ssy, i\,h~t1in~~t~':l, 
BCT 3/POL 35. 
l6 January 1968, 
41. 
42. Record of talks, BCT 3/POL 30. 
Page 355 
including banking, currency and exchange which had been reserved under 
1958 the Treaty. All British extra-territorial jurisdiction in Tonga 
~•as withdrawn and Article VII of the 1958 Treaty, which required that 
laws be printed in both Tongan and English, was also removed. These 
changes involved few concessions by the British Government, and in 
external affairs it gave away even less. Although Britain delegated 
increased authority to the Tongan Government to conduct its own 
external relations 1Tiith all countries over as wide a field as 
possible', and even gave '!'~<tga responsibility for less senstivie 
areas, it nevertheless retained Britain's responsibility for many 
aspects of Tonga's external relations.[44] Perhaps the major 
concession was in Article IV which authorised the Tongan Government to 
appoint its own representative in London who would have equal status 
with the British Commissioner and Consul as a channel of communication 
between the two Governments. As one official commented, 
If the United Kingdom is to remain responsible for Tonga's 
external affairs (and defer:~e) which we think would be in 
Tonga's own interest and would also a~cord with ~h7 ~i7ws of 
the other metropolitan governments w1th respons1b1l1t1es in 
the area, there is little or no roon to ~anoeuvre.[45] 
Amongst the more sensitiv~ areas over Britain sought 
maintain control were civil aviatic>~ .;~.i i~~t.':'~.>ti.:-:::.J.l shipping· 
was well known that Tupou IV had a kt.!t:l~ i:~~.:::.;~~ i:::. t:, .. ~se ::13 tters 
to 
It 
and 
• • ••••• - ... ·,' ~ '1-...:;t.,~ f. Because 
wished to be free to pursue negotut :.:-:.~ • ·· •• ··.o.--· • • ....... 
of the Chicago Convention, 
international responsibiltiy for:~~;~·~:~~~: 
remained under British protecti0:::.. 
44. 
45. 
Aide-Memoire on Revision ~': ::-.. ·.:~··, :·: 
of Friendship, 1968, Appt.'tt-~ix :,:., • 
Minnitt to Reid, 31 Octobt.'t' 
accept 
l~ng as it 
. ..... ~ : . 
.. .. .. ..... ~ 
,,_=-""""'"'. 
.. 
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self-interest in Britain's reluct 
ance to allow Tonga to exercise full 
control over its traffic rights -- British officials admitted the 
possibility that Tonga might act contrary to the interests of the 
British Government or other British territories in the area. 
Conversely, this was the very point th t · d 
. a t·rorr1e Tongan officials 
they felt that in representing Tonga in traffic rights negotiations, 
Britain would inevitably put its own interests first and Tongan 
interests second. Similar arguments appl1'ed to th e question of 
control over international shipping.[46] 
In one area of internal concern, the Tongan Government was happy 
to agree to British intervention. The 1958 Treaty had provided for 
Britain to come to Tonga's aid in the event of a threat to the 
int~rnal security of Tonga, and this prevision was still favoured by 
both Governments. Since the 1950s British officials had spent 
considerable energy in trying to convince the Tongan Government that a 
potentially explosive situation had developed in Tonga. Amongst other 
things, the continuing power of the nobles, the shortage of land, low 
wages, high urban unemployment, and the management of the Copra Board 
funds were felt to add up to a security threat. Just as the British 
Government had continued to support the monarchy and the existing 
social system in more subtle ways, it again accepted a responsibility 
to support it in the event of disorder. In the 1968 Treaty, however, 
the British Government preferred the agreement to be removed from the 
body of the Treaty to a confidential exchange of notes. 
i 'th' tll'' Priv·.·· Council and t~Tit!n After lengthy discuss on Wl 1n ~ y 
Galsworthy, Tupou IV announced on 
5 Doc ember 19b 7 that the Tongan 
Government was happy to proceed on tt"' basis of the 
British 
46. Galsworthy to Fairclough, 6 December 1907 ' ibid. 
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proposals.[47] In January 1968 a special meeting of the Legislativt! 
Assembly was called at the Palace to discuss the revision and although 
there was some reason to believe that the Tongan Government might not 
stand by its previous decision, the T new reaty was signed on 30 May 
1968 and ratified on 5 December. The Hon. Vaea was appointed the 
first Tongan Commissioner and Consul to Britain in July 1969.[48] 
Further plans for representation abroad were restricted by a lack of 
funds. To date, no representation in the United Stat~s or at the 
United Nations has been established. 
Even before the 1968 Treaty was signed, the Tongan Government 
made its future intentions clear. ~n February 1968 Tu'ipelehake, the 
King's brother and his successor as Premier, advised the British 
Con~ul of the Privy Council's decision that a date should be fixed for 
the independence of Tonga within the Commonwealth. To this end the 
King planned to open negotiations \\'i th the British Government towards 
the end of 1968.[49] The 1968 Treaty was little more than an exercise 
to fill in time whilst waiting for the British Government to accept 
the inevitability of Tongan independence. Considerations of prestige 
and sentiment demanded that Tonga should throw off the mantle oi 
British protection -- under British protection Tonga could not take 
what was considered its rightful ?L>.:e on international bodies 
alongside other developi. nu.tions. The : Ot;S Tre;1ty h,1d r:ontained a 
termination clause, introduced 
the' later drafts, which 
provided that the whole Trl•;>.ty, 
d ,:.,.: "':,-'·'~' W'"l~ l.:1pse when Britain agreeing to 'perpetual peace an •• •'-··---~ ..• , • ·" 
47. Ibld. 
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ceased to have responsibility for Tonga's externa~ a 
special session of the Legislative Assembly on ;,o A.pr :.1 1 r 
unanimous resolution was passed calling for an end to Br i trJ. i.n' s 
responsibility, aP-.d on 4 June 1970 an exchange of notes between the 
two Governments brought an end to British protection. [51] 
so. f 1 l~hB Treaty; Article VII(3) 0 tle 
51. See Appendix I(x). 
CONCLUSION 
The termination. of the British Government's responsibility for 
Tonga's external relations was markud · T ~ Ln onga by a week of 
celebrations on a grand scale. The day on which British protection 
June -- was chosen deliberately by Tupou IV to coincide ceased 4 
with the day on which Tupou I had granted his people 'emancipation' 
from the power of their chiefs in 1862. I T ' n upou IV s view, the 
importance of Tonga regaining its full rights of nationhood was 
matched by only two other occasions in Tonga's history the 
'emancipation' in 1862 and the granting of the Constitution in 18i5. 
The full significance of 4 June 1970 probably escaped many 
Tongans, into whose lives the British Government had never intruded. 
Perhaps for this reason, and also in keeping with his long-held 
attitude towards British protec~ion, Tupou IV did not refer to Tonga's 
new status as 'independence'. In his view, and that of most Tongans, 
the term 'independence' was not applicable to Tonga because it had 
'never beun completely and thoroughly dominate:~d by another' • Tupou IV 
explained his own interpretation of the Tongan-British relationship in 
a speech delivered during the celebrations: 
Owing to the series of Treaties with Great Britain in 1900. 
beginning due to a previous demarcation of spheres ot 
influence between Britain and Germany, Tonga voluntarily 
agreed not to exercise some of the powers relating to its 
external affairs, for fear that the exercise of those powers 
mi~ht endan[;er her international freedom. 
d l t Ton''" had retained its head of state, flat;, Tupou TV ex~laine t1a ~u 
eonstitution, 
national anthem, symbols of soverdt~nty aud Department 
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of External Affairs and was now ' · 1 s~mp y returning to its former 
position.' In the past Tonga had been a fully recognised member of the 
1.r:t.ernational community, and was now celebrating its 're-entry into 
the Comity of Nations' .[1] 
The final severing of Tonga's colonial relationship with Britain 
had few practical effects. As an article in Pacific Islands Honthly 
commented shortly before independence·. 'T 11 ff d o a e ects an purposes 
it appears that Tonga is already independent.'[2] Britain had placed 
few restraints on the Tongan Governme..nt's freedom of action in recent 
years and there was some feeling, especially amongst Europeans, that 
the Kingdom was simply cutting itself off from its 'fairy 
godmother'. [3] The end of British protection did not spell an end to 
British aid to Tonga. Moreover, it also had the effect of attracting 
increased aid from other sources, such as Australia and New Zealand, 
whose interests in the security of the Pacific had .o take account of 
Britain's withdrawal from the area. 
The ease with which the Tongan Government slipped out of its 
colonial relationship with Britain reflects the nature Df the 
relationship as it had developed since 1900. At the outset, British 
protection was a mere form -- the Protc~_·toratc had been declarL·d for 
the purpose of keeping other powers out of Tonga, and there had been 
no intention of interfering in the Kingdom's internal affairs. 
Tltis 
limited objective accorded closely ~-lith Tupou IV'n vi('W of what had 
1. 
" ~· 
3. 
. • T !V during the celebrations of 
Speech dehverod by upou . · "7 Jul. 1970. 
4 June 
1970, ,Iong~ Government ~'1z~t :e' no' 8 ' '" y 
'And i-Ihat DocG Independence Nean for "Tht.' Lant Kinr,dom"' • P'!,Sif:!:_q_ 
Ir;lands Honti~y_, June, 1970 • PP• 22- 24 • 
Ibid. 
f 
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occurred in 1900 -- by mutual agreement Tonga had allowed Britain to 
administer its external relations b~musc of the dangers of aggressive 
action on the part of other, le "d ss cons1 erate, powers. But the 
Protectorate established over Tonga by Basil Thomson had not been 
limited to mere form, nor to matters of external relations. Its 
existence led local British officials to feel a sense of 
responsibility for Tongan affairs which belied their inability to 
influence the recalcitrant Tupou II. The original objective behind 
the Protectorate was lost sight of as the frustrations of the British 
Consul and his superior in Fiji, the High Commissioner for the Western 
Pacific, bec'.lme more intense.•. From the time of im Thurn's visit in 
January 1905, the British Government forced its 'advice' onto the 
Tongan administration and British officials challenged the King as the 
highest authority in Tonga. 
For a short period after 1905 British protection meant British 
dominance, but as early as September 1911 Britain had retreated from 
the forefront of Tongan decision-making. The process of 
decolonisation, which in most other areas of the world was a 
post-Second World tolar phenomenon, had already started in Tonga. Tupou 
II won an important victory for Tonga's right to detemine its own 
ro licies in connection ~"i th the' _}'onJ.E!. :1:~' a !~nr,~ KauS:ha, and the 
British Government reaffirmed its limited interest in Tonga -- so long 
t ble and acceptable to the majority of as the Government was s a 
i 1 rfn 1•rc did not gr0atly concern Britain. Tongans, ltn nternn a. ~ 0 > 
Over the ('ttt four deeadeo th(' ljritish Gonnul contimh•d to play a 
vital role in the Govcrni"wnt, purtieularly an 
rvnult of his 
ovc~rGight of 'l'onr;an finandal policy, but his int.erv~ntiou wan by 
agreement, and 
Page 362 
to accept his advice. The Tongan Government was not deprived of its 
.(authority and, after 1911, the initiative for change remained in 
Tonga. This allowed the Government, undt'r the rule of Queen Salote, 
to call on the advice of tllf.' Consul in internal matters as it ~dshed, 
but to discard it \.,rhen it no lont;e:>r sm.,r a nL·-~d. Thus, \'lith the rise 
to prominence of Salote' s son and heir, Tupoutl'' a Tungi, tvho did not 
feel a similar need for the Consul's guidance, B i · b r taLn ecame less 
involved in the administr,ation. Tl t i 5 1e reaty rev sion of 19 8, \vhich 
brought the legal situation up to date with reality, reflected the 
extent to which the Tongan Government had gained autunomy merely by 
exercising it. 
Apart from the early years of the Protectorate, \>lhen British 
officials were seeking and taking by threat of force a leading role in 
the administration, the relationship between the Treaty partners 
worked for the most part to the satisfaction of both, and may with 
hindsight be pointed to as an ideal arrangement to cope with the 
realities of colonial expansion in the twentieth century world. 
Certainly it served to minimise the impact of colonialism on the lives 
of most 'tongans. Huch of the reason for the success of ':.he 
.f the 
relationship lay within Tonr,a itself and in the structure 
Govern..<n.unt before Britain interven~'d• Tnc Pnd~'avours of Tupou I and 
Shirley Baker to maintain Tongan indc•pend~nce and to ntahilisc the 
Government of d lt 
· t"n tll(' "'~t"bli~·,llm"nt of a stable th€.' King 0:1 r.c>su cu "'~ ... . ~ 
framework throur;h which Dri uin c·ould op•-'ratc ita indirect syste111 of 
"rod that 
influence. 
Britain would turn its control into .:1 dircet mw, thiG 
:1nd tlw G•)lnn1a1 O£fil'(' 1 G disinc-lination 
by Tupou II'o ntrong protestn ~ 
to increanc ito eomnitocnt t.o Tong~l· 
and, perhapu 
f 
and this helped to persuade the Colonial Office to be content 
back seat. 
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with a 
Throughout the early years of the Protectorate, Britain 1 s rolcdn.. 
Tonga w·as a divisive one, eJ::acerbating the tensions and factions'' 
tvi thin the barely united Kingdom. The Consul's alliance with those 
nobles and chiefs lvho opposed Tupou II' s rule increased their power ia 
the Goverment and almost led to the deportation of Tupou II, a step 
tvhich would have destroyed the basis of the existing socio-political 
systL!m and '"ould no doubt have led to much greater British 
partid.pation over the next few decades. But Tupou II's victory over 
the British Consul in 1911 was also a victory over his chiefly rivals. 
His pre-eminence tvas assnred and Ill' itish officials realised there was 
nothing to be gained by adopting a hostile attitude totvards the King. 
By the end of Tupou II's rule, the Colonial Office had accepted that 
the King 1 s pol.Lcies were Tonga's policies and supported the existing 
systt~m; there was not sufficient reason to seek a clwnge. Throughout 
the reign of Queen Salote British officials supported the monarch 
against all opposition and thus contributed to the reinforcement of 
the social and po1 t • ical system which had been crystallised under 
Tupou I. The British Government w:H; contc:nt for 'The Tongan Way' to 
operate in Tonga -- it did not interft't'L' in su.::h matters as lund 
in the operation of thL' nvblc sybtL~m, de<1pite the tenure or 
d i Of ""rtain British Cot~~;,t:s. Brith;h prutl'Ction over recommon at ons "'"" 
the firnt 
the Kingdom's DO<-:ial a.nd poli!:h',<t 
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Thr.:mghout: this am.l. is of Britain 1 s role in Tonga over the 
period of British protection, it has been clear that British influence 
operated for the most part at a level of government which had little 
meaning for the majority of Tongans. Although the Government 1 s 
policies were very often determined on tl~ advice of the Consul, his 
authority was not directly asserted ever the ~opulation. When the 
early Con~uls, Campbell in particular, attempted to intervene more 
visibly in matters affecting the people directly, they met with a 
level of opposition which was eventually succe~sful in overcoming 
their inte~vention and preventing any serious future consideration of 
direct control. Having learned from this (!xperien __ , the :Sritish 
Government found it achieved more by maintaL~ ·ng d diplomatic rather 
than a colonial r~lationship with Tonga. 
\ 
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TREATY OF FKIE@SHIP BETWEEN G REAT BRITAIN AND TONGA 
1879 
Made by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and I 1 Majesty the King of Tonga on the re and and His twenty-ninth day of November, 1879. 
ARTICLE I 
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between Her Majesty 
th~ Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland her 
he1.rs and , · i · ' 
.,uccessors, ana H s MaJesty the King of Tonga his heirs and 
successors, and between their respective dominions and ~ubjects. 
ARTICLE II 
His Majesty the King of Tonga engages to grant to no other 
Sovereign or State any rights, powers,· authrTity, or privileged in 
Tonga in excess of those accorded to Her Britannic Majesty. 
The subjects of Her Britannic }1ajesty shall always enjoy in 
Tonga, and Tongan subjects shall always enjoy in the territories of 
Her Britannic Hajesty, ~.;hatever rights, privileges, and immunities 
they now possess, or ~·lhich are now accorded to the subj.:.:· L:s of the 
most favou.red nation; and no rights, privileges, or immunities shall 
be granted hereafter in Tonga to the subjects of any Foreign State 
which shall not equally and unconditionally be granted to the subjects 
of Her Britannic Majesty. 
ARTICLE III 
(n) If any subjt>et of Her :Britannic Hajesty in Tonga iH ch<JrgL•d 
with a criminal ofhnce cor,nizablc by British La~•. sueh chargt.! may be 
tried by the Court of Her Britannic H~jesty' s Hir,h Commisr;ionl'r for 
the Western Pacific Islands. 
J 
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with (b) Iff:ny subje~t of Her Britannic Majesty in Tonga is charged ~~ 0 ence agalnst the Municipal Law of Tonga not cognizable as 
such un er British Law, he shall be amenable to the jurisdiction of 
the .Tongan Courts, the proceedings for which shall be conducted in 
publ1c, and the records of Which shall be public and accessible. 
(c) :f.any subject of Her Britannic Hajesty in Tonga is charged 
with a cr1m1nal offence cognizable as such both by British Law and the 
Laws of Tonga, the party charged may elect ••hether he will be tried by 
a T~ng~n Court or by the Court of Her Britannic Majesty's High Comm1ss1oner. 
(d) Every civil suit which may be brought in Tonga against any 
subject of Her Britannic Hajesty in Tonga shall be brought before and 
tried by the Court of Her Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner. 
(e) Every summons or warrant to appear as a witness before the 
Court of Her Britannic Hajesty's High Commissioner, issued in 
accordance with British Law, and directed to a Tongan subject, shall, 
if possible, be endorved by a Judge of the Supreme Court of Tonga, and 
when so endorsed, shall have the same authority, and may be enforced 
in like manner, as if issued by the Supreme Court of Tonga, but where 
it shall be made to appear to the Court of Her Hajesty's High 
Commissioner that the delay required to procure such endorsement might 
lead to the escape or removal of a material witness, such summons or 
warrant ;nay be issued by the Court without such endorsement, and shall 
have the same authority, and ·1ay be enforced in like manner, as if 
such summons or warrant had been directed to a subject of Her 
Britannic Majesty. 
(f) The expression "British Law" in this Article includes any 
Regulations duly made and issued by Her Britannic ~wjesty's High 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific Islands for the government of 
.. , British subjects within his jurisdiction; and the Court of Her 
Majesty's High Commissioner shall include any British Court or officer 
for the time being authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the Western 
Pacific. 
ARTICLE IV 
. , surrender to His Hajesty the King Her Britannic ~mJesty agret:!S to d or convicted of any of b' t who being accuse 
of Tonga any Tongan su Jec . t' t d .;n the territory of the King of 
d t · · d crimes com::n e .... · · t the un ermcm 1one . '. . . .. . t ry of Her Britannic NaJeS Y• Tonga, shall be found Wlthln tn~ terrl o 
The crimea for which 
following:-
such surrender may bP 
Hurder, o,· attl~mpt to murder 
Fraudulent bankruptcy 
Forgery. 
granted are the 
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Her Britannic Najesty may, ho\vever, at any time put an end to 
this Article by giving notice to that effect to His Hajesty the King 
of Tonga. The Article stu.ll, however, remain in force for six months 
after notice of its termination. 
It is agreed that the arrangement contained in this Article shall 
be subject to the restrictions on the surrender of fugitive criminals 
contained in the Acts respecting extradition which are in force in the 
dominions of Her Britannic Najesty and the procedure to be adopted 
with respect to the surrender of such criminals shall be in conformity 
with the provisions of the said Acts. 
Ratified on the eighth day of September one thousand eight 
hundred and eighty-one. 
J 
' 
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APPENDIX I(ii) 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TONGA 
189:!. 
The Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, 
a~d t~e ?overnment of His Majesty the King of Tonga, being desirous of 
s~mpl~fy~ng and rendering ~ore efficacious the provisions of Article 
III of the Trea~y of Friendship concluded between their said Majesties 
on the.twenty-n~nth day of November, 1879, the undersigned, duly 
author~zed to that effect, hereby agree and declare that--
ARTICLE I 
Sub-section (b) of Article III of the said Treaty is hereby 
cancellPd, and the following substituted in place thereof:-
If any subject of Her Britannic Majesty is charged with Ute 
violation of any Law or Regulation in Tonga relating to Customs, 
taxation, public health, or local police, not cognizable as an offence 
against British Law, he shall be amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
Tongan Courts, the proceedings of which shall be conducted in public, 
and the records of which shall be public and accessible. 
ARTICLE II 
Sub-sectic•· (c) of Article III of the said Treaty is hereby 
cancelled. 
ARTICLE :a 
The present Articles shall C(l::l<-' i::::-:<.?ji,l.t.~:.':Y i:1tt:i!r..il r .. it t 
shall be construed as forming dn 
twenty-ninth day of November, 1879. 
i~t0 operation, and 
0f th~ Treaty of the 
the prt.!se.nt 
j 
' 
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Done in duplicate at Nukualofa, on the second day of June, in the 
year of Our Lord 1891. 
(L.S.) JOHN ~. THURSTON 
(L.S.) JIAOJI FATAFEHI 
His Majesty the King 
unreservedly himself, his 
protection of Her Britannic 
the present Treaty. 
APPEND IX I (iii) 
DRAFT TREATY 
1900 
ARTICLE I 
of .Tonga agrees to place freely 
s~bJects, and his dominions under 
MaJesty from the date of the signature 
ARTICLE II 
and 
the 
l)f 
H~s Majest~ the King of Tonga further understands and agrees that 
all h~s relat~ons of any sort whatever with foreign Powers, shall be 
conducted under the sole advice and through the channel f Her 
Majesty's Government. 
0 
ARTICLE III 
Her Majesty will at all times, to the utmost of her power, take 
whatever steps may be necessary to protect the Government and 
territory of Tonga from any external hostile attacks; and for this, 
or from similar purposes, Her Majesty's officers shall at all times 
have free access to the waters and the harbours of Tonga, and the King 
of Tonga hereby agrees to lease to Her Majesty a suitable site or 
sites in any harbour or harbours in Tonga for the purpose of 
establishing a station or stations for the coaling and repair of Her 
Majesty's ships, and for the erection of any military works or 
fortifications; and will at all times, t0 the utmost of his power, 
co-operate with and aid Her Majesty's naval or military forces in the 
defence of such station or stations if requested to do so by Her 
Majesty's officers. 
Page 7-A 
ARTICLE IV 
Her Majesty will appoint 
Agent and Consul in T a suitable person to 
· . onga, who will b h act as British 
commun1cat1ons between Her Ma. ' e t e authorized medium of all 
Tonga. The Agent '11 Jes~y s Government and the Government of 
ff · w1 not ~nterf · a ~1rs and acministration in m . ere 1n a~y way in the internal 
subJects or f:->reigners are atters where the 1nterests of 
ready to advise ·he K' not concerned, but will at all British 
- 1ng and his Gov . times be 
they wish to seel' h1' s d . ernment 1n any matter ~ a v1ce. as to which 
ARTICLE V 
And whereas His Majesty the German 
the Convention between Great Britain Emperor has, by Article II of 
the 14th November last, renounced i ~:~o~~rmany, signed at London on 
rights of Germany over the r' n of Great Britain, all the 
extra-territoriality in the sa'd ~nia dislands, including the right of 
order th b 1 1s an s, and it is desirable in 
this Trea~y e~~=~ ~o e~abjle Her Majesty to fulfil her obligation ~nder 
. . .' er a esty should have and exercise civil d ~:1m1n~l Jurisdiction over all subjects of foreign Powers in Ton::. 
1S ~Jest~ t~e ~in~ of Tonga agrees that Her Majesty shall have and 
exerc~se Jur1sd1ct1on as defined in Article VI of this Treaty in the 
case of the subjects or citizens of all foreign Powers in Tonga. 
ARTICLE VI 
The jurisdiction to be exercised by Her Majesty in Tonga shall 
extend to the hearing and settlement of all claims of a civil nature 
against British subjects or foreigners, and against British or foreign 
vessels, by whomsoever preferred, and to the trial and punishment of 
all offences and crimes of which Brtish subjects or foreigners may be 
accused in Tonga except as hereinafter provided. All such cases, 
whether civil or criminal, shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of "The Pacific Order in Council, 1893," and of any Order 
amending the same so far as applicable. The authorities of Tonga 
shall at all times, to the utmost of their power, when called upon by 
the British Agent, render aid in making arrests or in enforcing 
judgments in pursuance of this jurisdiction. 
Provided that British subjects and foreigners charged with 
violations of the laws and regulations of Tonga, relating to customs, 
taxation, public health, and local police not cognizab~e as such u~der 
the provisions of "The Pacific Order in Council, 1893, shall cont1nue 
to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tongan Courts. The 
proceedings at all such trials shall be public, and the records 
th~reof accessible. 
P<tge 8-A 
ARTICLE VII 
It is agreed that the Treaty of the 29th November, 1879, between 
Her Majesty and His Majesty the King of Tonga shall be cansidered to 
be Lorogated in sc far as it may be inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Treaty. 
ARTICLE VIII 
The present Treaty shall come into ~orce and effect from the date 
of the signature thereof. 
\ 
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APPENDIX I(iv) 
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TONGA 
1900 
e ueen of Great Brit . Her Majesty th Q 
and His Majesty the King of T a1~ and Ireland, Empress of India 
relations of amity between tho~ga, be1ng desirous of strengthening th~ 
conclude a Treaty f he1r respective States, have resolved 
Pl i or t at purpo.e and h to 
en po tentiaries: Her Ha. est ' ave named as their 
Ireland, Basil Home Thorn J YE th~ Queen of Great Britain and 
T J' . . son, squne. And Hi H . 
onga, 1aOJ1 Fatafehi Tu' ipeleh l Wh s aJesty the King of 
each other their respective Fulla;~~ .. ~after having communicated to 
the following Articles:- e.s ave agreed upon and concluded 
ARTICLE I 
H' Ma' rel .1s Jesty the King of Tonga agrees that he will have no 
at1ons of any sort with foreign powers concerning the alienation of 
any land or any part of his Sovereignty or any demands for 
compensation. monetary 
ARTICLE II 
Her Majesty will at all times to the utmost of her power take 
whatever steps may be necessary to protect the Government and 
territory of Tonga from any external hostile attacks; and tor this or 
similar purposes Her Hajesty's officers shall at all times have free ac~ess to the waters and harbours of Tonga; and the King of Tonga 
hereby agrees to lease to Her Hajesty a suitable site or sites in any 
harbour or harbours in Tonga for the purposes of establishing a 
station or stations for the coaling and repair of Her Majesty's ships, 
and for the erection of any military works or fortifications which may 
be necessary or desirable for the protection of such •,tations, and 
will at all times to the utmost of His power co-operate w<ith and aid 
Her Majesty's naval or military forces in the J.dence of such station 
or st3tions if requested so to do by Her Hajesty's officers. 
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ARTICLE III 
Her Majesty will a . 
Agent and Consul . Tppo~nt a suitable person ~n onga l . to act as B "t" 
communications between Her M~ .w lo ~all be the authorized medium ~~ l.Sh 
Tonga. And His H . Jesty s Government and the G all ~epresentative to condu~~esty h the King of Tonga may o:erm'lent of 
l.nterfere in any wav . sue negotiations. The Ag tppol.nt his 
. ~n the inte 1 en will not 
matters where the interests of Brit"r~a a~fairs and administration in 
concerned' but will at all time ~s subJects or foreigners are no .. 
Government in any matt s e ready to advise the K. . L 
exerci8e the jurisdi~~-as to which they wish to seek his ~~~i~nd hlds 
Tr t . 1.on vested in Her H . e, an 
:a y u~tl.l such time as other aJesty by Article V of this 
HaJesty l.n that behalf. arrangements may be made by HeY 
ARTICLE IV 
And whereas His Hajesty the German Emperor 
the Convention betwe~n Great Britain and has by Article II of 
the fourteenth day of November 1 Germany! signed at London on 
Britain all th i h ast, renounced l.n favour of Great 
e r g ts of Germany over the T I 1 
the right of extra territorialit . th .ongan s ands, including 
desirable in order t y l.n ~ sald Islands, and it is obligatio~s under this ~:ea~;tte~h~~ P.~:ble H:r Hajesty to fulfil her ;xercis~ civil and criminal j~risdictionrov~J=~~Ysu~~~~~~ 0~•;:re~;~ 
owers ~n Tonga. His Majesty the King of Tonga agrees th H 
Majesty shall have and exercise jurisdiction as defined in ~tti ~r 
five of this Treaty in the case of the subjects or citizens 0~ ~1~ 
foreign Powers in Tonga. 
ARTICLE V 
The ju:-isdiction to be exercised by Her Majesty in Tonga shall 
extend to the hearing and settlement of all claims of a civil nature 
again&t British subjects or foreigners, and against British or foreign 
vessels by whomsoever preferred, and to the trial and punishment of 
all offences and crimes of which British subjects or foreigners may be 
accused in 1onga, except as hereinafter provided. All such cases, 
whether civil or criminal, shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of "The Pacific Order in Council, 1893" and of any Order 
amending the same so far as applicable. The authorities of Tonga 
shall at all times to the utmost of their power, when calle>d upon by 
the British Agent, render aid in maldng arrests or in enforcing 
judgments in pursuance of thls jurisdiction. 
Provided that British subjects and foreigner:: charged with 
violations of the Laws and Regulations of Tonga relating to Customs, 
tmw.tion public health and local police not cognizable as such under 
the pro~isions of "The' Pacific Order in Council, 1893" sh<1 ·.1 continue 
,. :. . . 
' 
r ~ . ,. • 
' .. 
I •>\ , i 
.. l ... .jo.:,V. • 
to be amenable to the jurisdicLion of the Tongan Courts· The 
proceedings at all such trlals shall be public and the r~cords thcr~of 
accessible. ,-------------=-J 
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ARTICLE VI 
It is agreed that the Treaty of th t . 
1879 between Her Hajesty and His M· . e wenty-n'nth day of November 
considered to be abrogated in so f aJe~ty the Klng of Tonga shall be 
ar as ~t may be incons;st t · h 
the provision~ of this Treaty. · ~ en w~t 
ARTICLE VII 
The present Treaty shall come into force and effp~t from the date 
of signature thereof but shall again become null and void if not 
ratified within the prescribed period. 
ARTICLE VIII 
The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications 
exchanged at Nukualofa within twelve months from the date thereof. 
Done at Nukualofa this eighteenth day of May, 1900. 
This Treaty was ratified at Nukualofa on 16 February 1901. 
NOTE OF PQINTS ACCEPTEn BY THE KING 
1905 
1. The King to rull' ivith and through the Chiefs. 
2. ... , L1k..:n. The British Agt=nt and Consul to be .::onsult~J cJ.nJ his ,1 '\'l···t· 
3. Services of an English officer to be 
re-organisation of the Police. 
uti list~d 
4. Laws to be published in English as well as in Tongan. 
for th~ 
5. Distribution of Lands as contemplated and pr0mised by the late 
King to be car~ied out. 
6. Rents of Government lands to be paid intv Public Account, and no 
longer to be regarded as part of the Kiag's emvl~~nts. 
7. Renewal of Leases to Foreigners on terms tv be;: arr;mged. 
8. Laws regarding spirituous liquors to be enfvrced. 
9. New appointments to the Public Servi~c t~ ~c =~~~ in c0nsultation 
with His Britannic Majesty's Agent ~u1.i \.',':1~·-tl· 
10. C'ha ~g, s among leading officials t1.' t'-t.' ~.,_: .. • ,-:~ ::-· 
with His Britannic Majesty's N:ent ,;:~-: ,\•::~·-~: • 
11. Revised Estimates for 1905 t0 b~ Ji~r=c~. 
12. Rights of succession and inht'ri t.l:~s 
~ ., 
.... twultation 
Nukualofa. 18th January, 1905. 
Henry Douglas Wilkin, 
Commander R.N. H.H.s. "Clio" 
Witness, Jiaoji Fatafehi. 
Witness, J.F. Mateialona. 
\. 
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TONGA 
1928 
Whereas a Treaty of FriPndsh' 
Britain and Ireland Empress ~i ~e~~een Her Majesty the Queen of 
was made on the eightee~th day onf ~~ and His Majesty the King of 
'ldY, 1900, 
Great 
Tonga 
to remove doubts as to the 
Queen of Tonga in respect of offence 
Regulatins of Tonga committed b; 
. . ~d ~7hereas i.t is desirable 
JUr~sd1ction of Her MdJ.sty the 
against certain of the Laws and 
British subjects and Foreigners. 
Therefore the undersigned bein d 1 . , have agreed that Article V of ~h fg u rda~thor1zea to that effect, 
follows h . e a oresa freaty shall be amended as 
. ' t at 1s to say that the proviso occurring therein 
W1th the words "Provided that B~itish subjects and beginning 
down to the end of the Article shall be deleted Foreigners charged" 
substituted therefor:- dnd the follm.;ring 
Provided that British subjects and Fvceigners charged with 
any offence against any of the Laws and Regulations of Tonga 
for the enforcing of which the Hinister of Police is 
~esp~nsible not including crimes punishable by death or by 
1mpr1sonmPnt exceeding two years shall be amenable to the 
jurisdicLion of the Tongan Courts. The proceedings at all 
SIJCh trials shall be public and the records thereof 
accessible. 
In testimon; whereof I, EYRE HUTSON, Knight Com.nander of the Most 
Distinguished Order of Saint Hichael and Saint George, Governor of 
Fiji and High Commissioner and Consul-General for the Western Pacific, 
in virtue of my Full Power under the Royal Sign Hanuul and Great Seal 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland dated the 12th d.ay 
of August, 1926, have hereunto signed my uame, an~ I, SALOTE TUBOU, 
Queen uf Tonga, it. virtue of the powers Vt"!Stcd in me by section 42 c: 
the Act of Constitution or Tonga of the year 1888 and section 5 of 
Chapter I of the Law of Tonga of 1903 have hereunto signed my name. 
Done in duplicate at Suva in tha Colony of Fiji th.:.o seventh day 
of N9vcmbcr, 1928. 
Done in duplicate at: Nukualofa this twelfth day of August, lC\27 • 
High 
}.<u:t. His Britannic Hajcsty, 
EiRE HUTSON, 
Commmiosioner for the Western Pacific, 
SALOTE TUBOU. 
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APPENDIX I(vii) 
. EXCHANGE OF NOTES 
amendl.ng the Treaty of Friendship of 18th Ha 
between the United K~ngdom and T y 1900, S I 1 ~ onga. 
uva Nuku a1ofa, 2nd/20th Hay, 1952 
~~oJ·~ 1.)--The United Kingdom Officer Administering the Government 
to Her Majesty the Queen of Tonga 
;overnment House, Suva, 2nd May, 1952 
Your Majesty, 
of 
I HAVE the honour to refer to the discussions which took place in 
Dec;mber, 1951 and subsequently between the British Agent and Consul 
in fonga and the Government of Tonga for thE: purpose of agreeing upon 
an amendment to the Treaty of Friendship be~ween Tonga and the United 
Kingdom signed at Nuku 1 alofa on !'8th May, 1900 insofar as it provides 
for the manner in which Her Britannic Hajesty 1 s jl·.risdiction over 
cert· .in civil and cr;'mhal cases involving British subjects 
foreigners is to be exercised. 
2. I have now the honour upon instructions from Her Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
to propose that Article V of the said Treaty of Friendship shall have 
ef·o:-~ct as if the words "in accordance with provisions of the To':lga 
Order in Council, 1952, and of any Order in Council amending (or 
replacing) the same, and in accorda~ce with any Regulations made 
thereunder" were substituted for the words "in accordance with the 
provisions of the Pacific Order in Council, 1893, and of any order 
amending the same as far as applicable". 
3. If the proposal set out in the preceding paragraph is 
acceptable to the Government of Tonga, I suggest that the present Note 
and Your Mujety' s reply thereto in that sense be regarded . as 
constituting an Ag cement between th~ two Governments modify1.ng 
Article v of the said Treaty of Friendship with effect from the date 
on which the Tonga Order in Council, 1952 came into operation. 
I have the ho.nour to be Your Hajesty' s true friend, 
A.F.R· STODDAP.T, 
Officr't" Administering 
tlw Government of Fiji. 
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(No. 2 ·)--Her Hajesty the Queen of Tonga 
Adm~n~ster~ng th G to the United Kingdom Officer ~ ~ ~ e overrunent of Fiji 
The Palace, Nuku'alofa, 20th May, 1952 
Sir, 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Note of the 2nd · 
May, 1952, the terms of which are as follows:--
[As in No. 1.] 
2. In reply I have the honour to inform you that my Government 
accepts the proposals concerning the modification of Article V of the 
Treaty of Friendship of 18th May, 1900, as set forth in your Note and 
that your Note and this reply will lie regarded as constituting an 
Agree111ent betwee' t' two Governments modifying Article V of the said 
Treaty of Frieu .• lip with effect from the date on which the Tonga 
Order in Council, 1952 came into opera~ion. 
I have the honour to be your true friend, 
SALOTE TUPOU. 
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APPENDIX I(vlii) 
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP 
in respect of the 
between Her Majesty the Queen 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
and Her Majesty the Queen of Tonga Northern Ireland 
Nuku'alofa, August 26, 1958 
[Ratifications were exchanged on May 25, 1959] 
Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the 
Commonwealth (hereinafter referred to as He~ Britannic Majesty), and 
He~ Majesty The Queen of Tonga: 
Desiring to confirm and strengthen the friendly relations which 
exist between them, and with this aim to conclude a new Treaty to 
replace the Treaty of Friendship of 29th November, 1879, in so far as 
that Treaty is still in force, the Treaty of Friendship of 18th May, 
1900, and the Agreements of 18th January, 1905, the 7th November, 
1928, and the 20th May, 1952; 
Have appointed for that purpose as their plenipotentiaries:-
Her Britannic Majesty: 
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelund 
Herbert Garvey Knight Commander of the 
St. Michael and St. George, Knight 
Order, Hember of the Most Excellent 
His Excellency Sir Ronald 
Most Distinguished Order of 
Commander of the Royal Victorian 
Order of the British Empire. 
Her ~mjesty The Queen of Tonga: 
His Ro al Highness the crown Prince Tupouto'a T~ngi Honorary 
Knight Comm;nder of the Host Excellent Order of the Brit1sh Empire. 
exhibited ~aeir respective ~ull Powers found in good and Who, having 
due form, 
Have agreed as follows:-
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ARTICLE I 
For the purposes of the present Treaty:-
(1) Th~ term "territory" in 
the UnHed Kingdom f G relation to Her B . . terr't ( o reat Brit . n.tanm.c Majesty means 
1 ory other than the Kingd a1n and Northern Ireland and any 
relations Her Gov . om of Tonga) for h ernment 1n the u · w ose international 
to as the Government of h . n1ted Kingdom (here' f t e Un1ted Kingdom) 1na ter referred 
are responsible. 
(2) The term "subject" . . 
. t . 1n rela t1on to H B . 
c1 1Zen of the United K' d er r1tannic Majesty means any 
Federation of Rhorlesia d N1ng om and Colonies and any citizen of the 
an an yasaland and h 11 b 
.Y person who is a British rotec~ sa e deemed to include 
W1th any territory (other th~n th ed ~erson by reason of connection 
international relations the G e K1ngdom of Tonga) for whose 
responsible. overnment of the United Kingdom are 
(3) The term "Tongan subjE!ct" means 
subject as defined by the national~ty !any person 
... aw of Tonga. 
who is a Tongan 
ARTICLE II 
There shall be perpetual peace and Brita . Ma' friendship between Her 
nn1c Jesty, Her Heirs and Successors and Her Majesty The Queen 
of Tonga, Her Heirs and Successors and 'b , etween Their respective 
Territories and Subjects. 
ARTICLE III 
(1) The external relations of the Kingdom of Tonga shall be conducted 
by and be the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom, 
except in so far as the conduct of such relations may be entrusted by 
the Government of the United .angdom to the Government of Her Majesty 
The Queen of Tonga (hereinafter refe~red to as the Government of 
Tonga.) 
(2) The Government of the United Kingdom shall consult with the 
Government of Tonga regarding the conduct of the external relations of 
the Kingdom of Tonga and in particular shall consult with the 
Government of Tonga before entering into any international agreement 
for or in relation to the Kingdom of Tonga. 
(3) ller Majesty The Queen of Tonga shall take such steps as may 
appear to the Government of the United Kingdom to be necessary to 
secure compliance with any international agreement entered into by the 
Government of the United Kingdom for or in relation to the Kingdom of 
Tonga and any other obligation imposed by international law in 
relation to the Kingdom of Tonga. 
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ARTICLE IV 
(1) Her Britannic Majesty h·ll 
k s d at all tim t power ta e whatever steps . es o the utmost of Her 
Kingdom to be necessary for ~~y :piear to the Government of the United 
~onga; and to that end rna; !i~~c~hand security of the Kingdom of 
Queen of Tonga, seek the as . t' e agreement of Her Majesty The 
State. S1S ance of the Government of any other 
(2) Her Majesty The Queen of Tonga shall-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
allow Her Britannic Majesty's United Kingdom 
and the armed forces of an h armed forces 
secured in accordance 'th y ot er State whose assistance is 
w1 paragraph (1) of th~s A t' 1 
be stationed in her Kingdom for th ... r 1C e to 
and security; e purpose of its defence 
allow such forces free access to the waters and harbours 
Her Kingdom; 
of 
lease to Her Britannic Majesty such land and harbours 
Kingdom as may appear to the Government of the 
Kingdom to be necessary for naval, military or air 
purposes in connection with the defence and security 
Kingdom; 
in Her 
United 
force 
of Her 
(d) to the utmost of Her power co-operate with and aid such 
forces as may be stationed in Her Kingdom in pursuance of 
this Article; 
(e) take such other steps as may appear to the Government of the 
United Kingdom to be necessary for the purposes of the 
defence and security of Her Kingdom. 
(3) The law of the United Kingdom for the time being in force, 
whether enacted before or after the entry into force of this Treaty, 
relating to the administration and discipline of Her Britannic 
Majesty's United Kingdom armed forces, to the exemption of such forces 
from payment of duties or tolls, to deserters and absentees without 
leave, and to offences relating to naval, military and air force 
matters and the trial thereof, shall, in so far as its terms may so 
require, have the force of law in the Kingdom of Tonga. 
ARTICLE V 
The Government of Tonga shall consult with and obtain the consent 
of the Government of the United Kingdom before any legislation is 
enacted in the Kingdom of Tonga-
(a) 
(b) 
relating to defence, banking, curroncy and exchange; or 
whereb arsons who are not Tongan subjects may be.su~jected 
y p d 1' bl to any disabilities or restrlct1ons to 
to or ma e 1a e · d 1i b1 
which Tongan subjects are not also subjected or rna e a e. 
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ARTICLE VI 
(1). _Her Britannic MaJ"esty h 1 a s a 1 appoint 
Br1t1sh Commissioner and C . 
communication between th G onsul 1n Tonga, 
Government of Tonga. e overnment of the 
suitable person to the 
who shall be the medium of 
United Kingdom and the 
(2) The British Commissioner 
H and Consul may make er Majesty The Queen of T representations to 
matter affecting the intere t ofnga or the Government of Tonga on any 
f . . . s s o persons who or o any 1nd1V1dual person who is not are not ToDgan subjects 
such a subject. 
(3~ The British Commissioner and Consul shall 
MaJesty The Qu~en of Tonga or the Government of 
respect of which Her Majesty The Queen or the 
seeks such advice. 
give advice to Her 
Tonga on any matter in 
Government of Tonga 
(4) Her M . Th aJesty e Queen of Tonga may appoint a Commissioner for the 
Government of Tonga in the United Kingdom who may be a complementary 
medium of com~unication between the Government of Tonga and th 
Government of the United Kingdom in commercial matters. e 
ARTICLE VII 
(1) Her Britannic Majesty's Courts shall have jurisdiction to the 
exclusion of the Tongan courts in all criminal proceedings against 
persons who are not Tongan subjects except proceedings in respect of 
any act or omission which is an offence against the laws of Tonga and 
which is not punishable under those laws by death or by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding two years. 
(2) Her Britannic Majesty's jurisdiction in Tonga shall extend to the 
making of laws providing for the exercise of the jurisdiction 
conferred upon Her Britannic Majesty's Courts by paragraphs (1) of 
this Article; and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing provisions of this paragraph, Her Britannic Majesty may, in 
connection with the exercise of the jurisdiction so conferred, make 
laws-
(a) establishing courts in Tonga; 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
conferring jurisdiction either original or appellate, 
thOSe! courts or courts in any of Her territories; 
prescribing the law to be applied by any such court 
regulating the practice and procedure of any &•tch court; 
on 
and 
is providing for the removal from Tonga of any perso~ who 
T bJ·ect for trial in any of Her terr1tories or not a ongan su · f rder or for the caryring out in any such terr1tory o any o 
sentence. 
. shall have jurisdiction to make laws 
MaJe~~~ration in Tonga by the British Commi~sioner 
::~ deaths of subjects of Her Britannic HaJesty. 
(3) Her Britannic 
providing for the 
and Consul of births 
appear as a witness before a court of 
Every summons or warrant to (4) 
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Her Britannic Hajesty directed to a Tongan subject shall if possible 
be endorsed by a judge of the Supreme Court of Tonga, 'and when s~ 
endorsed shall have the same authority, and may be enforced in like 
manner as if issued by the Supreme Court of Tonga; but where it shall 
be made to appear to Her Britannic Hajesty' s court that the delay 
required to procure such endorsement may lead to the escape ot· removal 
of a material witness, such summons or warrant may be issued by the 
court without such endorsement, and shall have the same authority and 
may be enforced in like manner as if such summons or warrant had been 
directed to a person who is not a Tongan subject. 
(5) The authorities of Tonga shall at all times to the utmost of 
their power, when called upon by the British Commissioner and Consul, 
render aid in making arrests and in carrying out · order or sentence 
in pursuance of the jurisdiction conferred 111 Her Britannic 
Majesty's courts by this Article. 
(6) Without prejudice to the jurisdiction conferred on Her Britdnnic 
Majesty by paragraph (2) and (3) of this Article, Her Britannic 
Majesty may, with the prior agreement of the Government of Tonga, 
apply to Tonga as part of the law thereof any statute of the United 
Kingdom with such modifications, if any, as may be agreed upon. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Who are found in the territory of one The surrender of persons an ff 
d accused or convicted of o ence High Contracting Party an h shall be governed by the 
committed in the territory of the ot er M . t ' 
ing such surrender between Her Britannic aJes y s 
principles govern . lication of these principles shall form 
territories; the deta~led app h High Contracting Parties. 
the subject of consultations between t e 
ARTICLE IX 
d 11 subsidiary legislation 
All Acts of the Tongan Le~isl~t~ret~: E:glish language as well as 
made thereunder shall be publ~she ~n 
in the Tongan language. 
(i) The present 
ir::struments of 
t~elve months of 
ARTICLE X 
· and the b' t to ratificatlon 
Treaty shall be subJe~xchanged at Nuku'alofa within 
ratification shall e 
the date of signature. 
n the exchange of 
enter into force upo Treaty shall (7) The present ~ f ratification. the instruments 0 · · • the Preamble to 
recwents referred to.~n far as any provision 
(3) Thte ~~=:~~e:r:n:e~~by abrogba:te~e:~c~~~ ~~n:~om of Tonga and any 
presen d d as in force e 
thereof is regar e 
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of Her Britannic Majesty's territories other than the territories 
referred to in Article I (l) of this Treaty. 
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed 
the present Treaty and have affixed their Seals. 
Done in duplicate at Nuku'alofa this twenty-sixth day of August, 
nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, in the English and Tongan languages, 
the English text to prevail in case of doubt. 
For Her Britannic Majesty 
[L.S.] RONALD H. GARVEY 
For Her Majesty the Queen of Tonga 
[L.S.] TUPOUTO'A TUNGI 
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DESPATCH ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS TO ACCOHPANY THE REVISED TREATY 
Your Majesty, 
Government House 
Suva, Fiji, ' 
28th August, 1958, 
I have the hnnour to refer 
Treaty of Friendship signed to Article III (1) of the 
which it is stated that th at Nuku'alofa on 26th August ~;~~s~nd 
shall be conducted b e external relations of th K , 
the United Kindgom y and.be the responsibility ofethinGgdom of Tonga 
, except ~n so far e overnment of 
may be entrusted by Her B it as the conduct of such relat~ons 
Kingdo t h r annie Hajesty' G ... m o t e Government of Her H . s overnment in the United 
despatch sets out the intentio~;esty The Queen of Tonga. This K~ngdom regarding the extent to which of ~he Government of the United K~ngdom of Tonga should be d the _xternal relations of the 
con ucted by the Government of Tonga. 
2. Her Majesty's Government in Government of Tonga:- the United Kingdom authocis~s the 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
~~t~:;ot!~te and conclude agreements of purely local concern 
an agreements relating to matters of defence and 
security and civil aviation) with the administrations of 
neighbouring Pacific Islands and the Governments of 
Australia and New Zealand, including arrangements with them 
for the exchange of representatives; 
to negotiate and conclud t d e ra e agreements, whether 
bilateral or multilateral, relating solely to the treatment 
of goods; 
to become a member of any international technical 
organisation for membership of which the Kingdom of Tor~ga is 
eligible under the terms of the tnstrument constituting the 
organisation; and to conduct any external relations (not 
being relations excluded ftom the coopetencc of that 
Government by international luw) arising out of any such 
agreement concluded by the Government of Tonga or out of 
membership of any international organisations. 
3. Agreements of purely local concern with Administrations of 
neighbouring Pacific Islands and the Governments of Australia and New 
Zealand would include arrangements made with these Administrations and 
Governments for the recruitment and secondment of staff, obtaining of 
expert assistance and advice, and agreements to enact reciprocal 
legislation on such matters as double ta:mtion relief and the 
enforcement of Court judgments. In general, any agreemtmt affecting 
only the Kingdom of Tonga and thE' other Administrations or Govertwlents 
above mentioned shall bt• deemed to be of purelY local concern. 
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~ • Trade ag;eements relating solely to the treatment of goods would 
J.nclude tarl.ff agreements and cus,·oms · b 1 
~ . un1ons, ut wou d exclude ag~e~ments relating to shipping questions (other than those relating 
s(? e Y hto trafnfsport within the Kingdom) and establishment mattP~s 
J..e. t .ose a ect1)"ng the rights of persons and companies of ~e 
contract1ng parties • 
5. In addition, the Government of Tongct is authorised to enter into 
direct correspondence on matters of purely mutual interest with 
count::-ies o~ the British Commonwealth not covered in paragra?h 2 (a) 
above • Th1s shall be on the understanding that agreements with these 
countries, or arrangements to exchange representatives with them, 
shall not be concluded without the consent of the Government of the 
United Kingdom. 
6. The Government of Tonga will, in view of the general 
responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom for the 
external relat:lons of the Kingdom of Tonga, bE: expected to keep Her 
Majesty's Government in the Unit 1 Kingdom informed, through the 
British Commission~r and Consul, of the position and progress of any 
negotiations for the typ~ of agreements mentioned in paragraph 2 of 
this despatch, so that the Guver~~ent of the United Kingdom may:-
(a) 
(b) 
keep other Commonwealth Governments informed on metters 
which may be of interest or concern to them (in so far as 
this has not already b•,~e~ done by the Government of Tonga in 
the ordinary course o'' the nPgotiations); and 
advise, where nect:ssary, on the htternational aspects of 
agreement. 
an 
7. It will be open to the Goverr~ent of Tonlga lt~i sug~yes~he 
time, ways in which the conduct of externa re a ons 
of Tonga might be extended or otherwise modified. 
at any 
Kingdom 
I have the honour to be, 
Your Hajesty's true triend, 
RON~.;LD H. GARVEY, 
Consul Gennral for tves ;,;t'rn Pacific. Governor and 
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APPENDIX I(ix) 
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP 
BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDQ}l OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE KINGDOH OF TONGA 
Nuku'alofa, 30 May 1968 
Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Head of the 
Commonwealth (hereinafter r~ferred to as "Her Britannic M~jesty") and 
His Majesty The King of Tonga; 
D<· iring to confirm and strengthen the friendly relations that 
exist bl'tween them, and with this aim to conclude a new Treaty of 
Friendship to replace the Treaty of Friendship of 26th August 1958; 
Have appointed for this purpose as their Plenipotentiaries: 
Her Britannic Majesty: 
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(hereinafter referred to as "the United Kingdom") 
Archibald Cameron Reid Esquire Companion of the Most 
Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Her Majesty's 
Commissioner and Consul in the Kingdom of Tonga. 
His Majesty The King of Tonga: 
His Royal Highness Prince Tu'ipelehake Honorary Commander of 
Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. 
Who, having exhibited their respective Full Powers found in 
and due form, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
the 
good 
and friendship between Her 
There shall be pe:petu~l ~e~~e K·ng of Tonga, and between the 
Britannic Majesty an~ Uts MaJe:t~t~':ep~ndencies and the subjects of 
peoples of the United ldngdom an l o 
His Majesty The King of Tonga. 
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ARTICLF II 
(1) The Government of th 
sole responsibility f e United Kingdom shall have full 
1 
. or, and for th and 
re atl.ons of the Kincrdom f T e conduct of, the e:xternal 
( ) 
• c-. o onga--
a Wl.th the United Nat· . 
(b) with all internatio;o~s, 
United Kingdom nora t~rga~~sa~ions of which neither the 
b7ing a member; le 1ng o:n of Tonga is for the time 
(c) Wl.th respect to the accession or 
Tonga to any alliance or 1i . adherence by the Kingdom of 
(d) with respect to defence· po tJ.cal grouping of States; 
(e) with respect to establi~hment matters 
civil aviation , merchant shipping and 
, 
except in &o far as the Government of th 
that responsibility f·,r or r . ~ ~nited Kingdom may declare 
relations shall be vested,in thee~ponsl.bl.ll.ty for the conduct of, such 
Tonga (hereinafter referred to as ~~~rnmGent of His Majesty The King of 
e overnment of Tonga"). 
th ~2) The Government of Tonga shall take such steps as appear to 
e overnment of the United Kingdom to be necessary to securo 
compliance with any obligations for the time being resting on th~ 
~nited Kingdom in respect of the Kingdom of Tonga by virtue of any 
J.nternational agreement or otherwise under international law. To the 
extent, if any, that such obligations relate to matters which do not 
fall within the scope of sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) of paragraph (1) of 
this Article, the Government of the United Kingdom shall, unless it is 
otherwise agreed bc'tween the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
GOVQrnment of Tonga, have reaponsibility for the conduct of the 
external relations of the Kingdom of Tonga in respect of matters 
relating to those obligations. 
(3) ~fhere, in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this 
Article, the Government of the United Kingdom has full and sole 
responsibility for, or for the conduct of, the e~ternal relations of 
the Kingdom of Tonga, they shall consult with the Government of Tonga 
regarding the conduct of such ext<>rnal relations and in particular 
shall consult with tht.' Government of Tonga before entet'ing into any 
international al}reement in res pee t of the Kingdom of Tonga. 
(4) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Article and to 
tho provisions of paragraphs (2 ~· a11d (3) of Article IV the external 
relations of the Kingdom of Tonga :.hall be the rc.'sponsibility of, and 
shall bt' conducted by, the Gover11;:ent of Tonga, c~;eept in so far as 
the Governmt.mt of the United Kingdom may, at the request . of the 
Government of Tonga. undurtalte responsibility for, or reGponsibility 
for the conduct of, such relations. 
(S) The Government of Tonca shall inform tho. Govcrn1ncn7 o: the 
United Kingdom of their intention to take any pJrtlcul.-tr JC't:on 1n. t!~e 
field of cxterLMl affairo and keep tlw Goverm:lt.mt . of tne Unltcd 
Kinndom fullv informed of the prol_jrerJG of any ncr:otiat1ons bL't~~:;n th~ 
o ~ d <'l'.l.'• t'li rd par tv with rL•spcc t to e ..... L rna 
Government of Tonga an • ~ • 
affairs. 
/ 
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ARTICLE III 
(1) Her Britannic Ma ·est 
Her pm>7er take whatever J . ty shall at all times to the utmost of 
United Kingdom to be n~ce s ~ps may appear to the C!overnment of the 
Kingdom of Tonga agai~stssary for protecting and defendin~ the 
b i 
external aggressio . d "' 
o ta n the assistance of tl G n, an to that end may 
' le overnment of a th ~ 
tnat the Government of the Unite . . ny o er ::>tate: provided 
agreement of the Government of T d I,lngdom shall not, ~•i thout the 
armed forces of any such oth osnga make arrangements under which the 
. · er tate would be th i d K~ngdom of Tonga for th . au or se to enter the 
Kingdom against externa~ a~~~~~:~on~f protecting and defending the 
(2) For the purposes of p~ragraph (1) of this 
Majesty The King of Tonga shall-- · Article, His 
(a) allow Her Britannic HaJ'esty' s armed f f orces, and the armed 
orces of any other State in respect of •which an such 
arrangements as are referred to in the proviso to par~graph 
(1) of this Article are made, to be stationed in His 
Kingdom; 
(b) allow such forces free access fo the waters, harbours and 
airports of His Kingdom; 
(c) allow such forces, fre~ ~f chatJe, to use land and harbours 
in His Kingdom as may appear tv the Government of the United 
Kingdom to be necessary f?r naval, military and air force 
purposes; 
(d) to the utmost of His power co-operate with and aid such 
forces, 
a~.d shall take, or permit the taking of, such other measures as may 
appear to the Government of the United Kingdom to be necessary, 
including the enactment of legislation: provided !:hat, without 
prejudice to the generality of such other measures, His Hajesty The 
King of Tonga shall c~use effect to be given ~o the provisions of the 
Annex to the present Treaty in relation to Her Britannic Majesty's 
armed forces • · 'n in the Kingdom of Tonga in p11rrw ''lce of this 
Article. 
(3) .".1e ojovernment of Tonga shall consult with and obtain the 
con&ent of the Government of the United Kingdom before any legislation 
is enacted in the Kingdom <::.. Tonga with respect fo defc.,.:e. 
AitTICLE IV 
(1) Her Britannic Hajcoty and Uis HajcBtY The King of Tonca 
<>hall each appoint a representative in the other's country, to be 
:tyled Comminoioncr and Consul. Communications bc~~c:n the ~0~~~~~~~~ 
of tr e United. Kin~dom and t:hc Govcrm:wnt of Tonl,a ohall be e l 
1 1 • 1 11 1 vc c•qu:tl r.wtun as channe s through such rcprescutatlves, who. a 1a w ·· ' u · 
of conmunicati<'tJ between the two Govcrtl.!!l.cnts. 
(2) His Hajesty The King of Tonga r.l:J.Y' with thr.: ar,recment of the 
Govcrnoent of the United Kingdom--. ' Staten whose Gti-<'c•r:.tJcnts 
(a) appoint reprcnentativcs lR other 
"r'' wU Hm~ to reed vc them; S 
"' ~ ~ T iJPnt ointcd by oUter tG.tl'f'• (b) ruc0 ive representatives in on~a 
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(3) ~he status and functions 
received ~n pursuance of paragra ?f(~n)y representative appointed or 
as may be agreed betweP.n the Gov pn of this Article shall be such 
Government of Tonga prior t h' ernme~t of the United Kingdom and the 
o ~s appo~ntment or reception. 
ARTICLE V 
The surrender of fugitive offenders between 
(including its d.:>pendencies) and the the United Kingdom 
g d b Kingdom of T h 1 
overne y the principles governing the onga s a 1 be 
criminals within the Commonwealth• the detail s~rrenldier of fugitive 
principles shall form the b. • _e app cation of these 
Gover:unent of the Unite-d K~~g~~~t a~~ consulations bet\~een the occas~on may require. the Governm~ • of Tonga as 
ARTICLE VI 
In ' ·le present Treaty--
(a) r~ferences to Her Britannic Hajesty and to His Majesty The 
K~ng of Tonge. include references to their respee.tive Heirs 
and Successors; 
(b) references to Her Britannic Majesty's armed forces are 
references to the armed forces of the United Kingdom and to 
any other armed forces under the command of the Unitec 
Kingdom and include references to civilians (not being 
citizeng of, nor ordinarily resident in, the Kin~dom of 
To~ga) authorised by the· service authorities of the United 
Kingdom to accoffipany Her Britannic Majesty's armed forces in 
Tonga; · 
(c) references to defence include (without prejudice to their 
generality) references to all naval, military and air force 
matters; (d) references to merch"nt shipping do not include r0ferences to 
ships when engaged on a voyage bett-reen ports within the 
Kingdom of Tonga which does not include ~ call at any other 
country and which . is not part of a voya~e b0ginning or 
ending outside the Kingdom of Tongo. 
ARTICLE VII 
(1) The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification ,md the 
instruments of rat ificati• sh.lll be m•changcd at Nul~ti' alofa within 
twelve months of the date u• ~ature. 
(2) The present Treaty 
of instruments d ratificatior,. 
f t •l' £'XC:lhU1'',C .1. entc1· into orce upon t ,' ' 
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(3) If at any time the Government of the United Kingdom shall c~ase to t1ve any responsibility for the external relations of the K~ngdom of ~onga, the provisions of Artic~es II, III, IV and V of the 
present Treaty shall cease to have effect. 
( 4) Th•:! Treaty of Fri~ndship of 26th August 1958 is hereby 
abrogated except in so far as any provision thereof is regarded as in 
force betweeh the Kingdom of Tonga and any country for whose 
international relations the Government of the United Kingdom is no 
longer responsible. 
(5) Any cases pending in Her Britannic Majesty's Courts in 
pursuance of Article VII of the Treaty of Friendship of 26th Aug•1st 
1958 immediately before this Tr~aty comes into force may thereafter be 
continued and concluded as if that Article were still in force. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed 
the present Treaty and have afiixed thereto their seals. 
DONE in duplicate at Nuku'alofa this thirtieth· day of May, 
nineteen hundred and sixty-eight, in the Fnglish and Tongan langua~,t!; 
the English text to prevail in case of doubt. 
For Her Britannic Majesty: For His Majesty The King of Tonga: 
(L.S.) A.C. REID (L.S.) TU'IPELEHAKE. 
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ANNEX 
whetr~~) e~~~t!:w ~!f~~= Unit~d Kingdom for the time being in force, 
rel~ting to the admini~~r=L~~~ thanedentry into force of this Treaty, 
Ma'est 1 u · discipline of Her B · p Y s n1ted Kingdom armed f r1tannic fr~m the payment of dut. orces, to the exemption of such forces 
without leave and to~esffor tolls, to deserters and absentees 
r , 0 ences r.:::.1ating to 1 '1' fa~ce matters and the trial thereof . . nava , ~1 ~tary and air 
so require, have the force of law i~ ~~:lii.n~~o:o o~a~o~:a ~ts terms may 
(2) At times when Her Britannic 
stationed in the Kingd f Majesty's armed forces are 
. om o Tonga by reason of hostilities or for 
other operat1ons of a warlike nature, the courts of the .. Kin dom of ~onga shall not have any criminal jurisdiction over members ~f those 
orce~, and at other times those courts shall have such jurisdiction 
only 1n the case of offences other than--
(a) an offence against the property or security of the United 
Kingdom or against the property or person of a member of Her 
Britannic Majesty's armed forces; 
(b) an offence arising out of an act or omission done or made in 
the course of official duty, provided that the courts of 
Tonga may exercise jurisdiction over a member of Her 
Britannic Majesty's armed forces in any particular case or 
class of cases with the prior consent of the officer 
commanding these forces. 
(3) If the courts of the Kingdom of Tonga are to exercise 
jurisidiction over a member of Her Britannic Majesty's armed forces, 
the service authorities of the armed forces of the United Kingdom in 
the Kingdom of Tonga shall have the right to take custody of such 
member until he is brought to trial by the courts of the Kingdom of 
Tonga and in any such case the service authorities of the armed forces 
of the United Kingdom shall present such member to those r.ourts for 
investigatory process and trial when required. 
(4) The Government of the United Kingdom shall pay just and 
equitable compensation where, in accordance with the law of the 
Kingd~..m. of Tonga, there is liability for damage caused by an act or 
omission in the Kingdom of Tonga of a member of Her Britannic 
Majesty's armed forces arisin5 out of or in the course of his duties 
as a member of those forces and a member of those forces shall not be 
subject to the civil jurisdiction of the . courts of the Kingdom of 
Tonga in respect of any such act of omiss10n. 
APPENDIX I(x) 
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS 
TERMINATION OF UNIT ED KINGDOH RESPONSIBILITY 
THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF TONGA 
Nuku'alofa, 19 May 1970 
No. 1 
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FOR 
The Premier of the Kingdom of Tonga to Her Hajesty's Commissioner 
and Consul, Tonga 
Sir, 
Premier's Office, 
Nuku'alofa, 
Tonga, 
19 Hay, 1970. 
I have the honour to refer to the Treaty of Friendship between 
Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty which was signed at Nuku'alofa 
on the 30th of May, 1968, and to paragraph (3) of Article VII of the 
Treaty which provides that if at ar.y time the Government of the United 
Kingdom shall cease to have any responsibility for the external 
relations of the Kingdom of Tonga, the provisions of Articles II, III, 
IV and V of the Treaty shall cease to have effect. 
In order that Tonga may become a fully sovereign and independent 
State on the 4th of June 1970 it is necessary that those Articles of 
the Treaty should cease to have effect. 
Accordingly I have the hono•1r to propose that as from the 4th of 
June 1970 the Government of the United Kingdom should cease to have 
any responsibility for the external relations of the Kingdom of Tonga. 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
TU' IPELEHAKE, 
Premier of the Kingdom of Tonga. 
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No. 2 
Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul, Tonga, to the Premier of 
the Kingdom of Tonga 
Your Royal Highness, 
Nuku'alofa 
19th May, 1970. 
I have the honour to refer to Your Royal Highness's letter of the 
19th May, 1970 concerning the Treaty of Friendship which was signed at 
Nuku'alofa on the 30th of May, 1968. 
I am instructed by the Government of the United Kingdom to 
signify their agreement that as from the 4th of June 1970 they shall 
cease to have any responsibility for the external relations of the 
Kingdom of Tonga. 
I have the hor..our to be, 
Your Royal Highness's obedient Servant, 
A.C. REID 
Her Britannic Majesty's Commissioner and Consul. 
Page 33-A 
APPENDIX II 
PREMIERS OF .... "clGA 
1900-1970 
Siosateki Tonga Veikune 
(A)Siaosi Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake 
Sione T. Mateialona 
Tu'ivakano (Polutele) 
Tungi Mailefihi 
Solomone Ata 
Prince Tupouto'a Tungi 
Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehak.e 
(A) Act-' .~ 
November 1893-December 1904 
December 1904-January 1905 
January 1905-September 1912 
October 1912-June 1923 
June 1923-July 1941 
July 1941-November 1949 
December 1949-December 1965 
December 1965-
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APPENDIX I II 
BRITISH AGENT AND CONSULS TO TONGA AND 
COHMISSIONER AND CONSULS 
' 
Vice-Consul 
R. Beckwith Leefe 
Agent and Consul 
Hamilton Hunter 
w. Telfer Campbell 
(A) Is lay ~IcOwan 
H.E. W. Grant 
(A)G.B. Smith-Rewse 
Islay McOwan 
(A)J.M. Masterton 
J .s. Neill 
(A)W.E. Russell 
(A)A.E.S. Howard 
A.L. Armstrong 
(A)H.E. Maude 
c.w.T. Johnson 
J. E. Hind rum 
C.R.H. Nott 
A.C. Reid 
Commissioner ~ Consul 
Q.V.L. Weston 
E.J. Coode 
(A)J.B. Claydon 
1900-1970 
February 1887-February 1901 
February 1901-SeptP.mber 1909 
September 1909-April 1912 
April 1912-March 1913 
March 1913-July 1916 
September 1916-August 1917 
August 1917-~une 1926 
Dece.'llber 1923-May 1924 
January 1927-August 1937 
AprH 1928-July 1929 
December 1933-0ctober 1934 
December 1937-July 1943 
June 1941-0ctober 1941 
June 1943-March 1949 
March 1949-July 1954 
August 1954-Harch 1957 
~arch 1957-April 1959 
April 1959-0ctober 1959 
October 1959-June 1965 
August 1962-December 1962 
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A.C. Reid 
June 1965-June 1970 
(A)Acting -- Only the more lengthy or significant periods of acting 
are listed. 
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APPENDIX IV 
HIGH COMMISSIONERS FOR THE WESTERN PACIFIC 
' 
GOVERNORS OF FIJI WITH RESPONSIBI~ITY FOR TONGA 
AND CHIEF COHHISSIONERS FOR TONGA 
1900-1970 
High Commissioner for the Western Pacific 
---- ----
Sir George O'Brien 
(A)W.L. Allardyce 
Sir Henry M. Jackson 
(A)Charles Major 
Sir Everard im Thurn 
(A)Sir Charles Major 
Sir Francis H. May 
Sir Bickham Sweet-Escott 
(A)E. Hutson 
Sir Cecil Rodwell 
(A)T.E. Fell 
(A)T.E. Fell 
(A)T.E. Fell 
Sir Eyre Hutson 
(A)A.W. Seymour 
(A)A.W. Seymour 
Sir Murchison Fletcher 
(A)A.W. Seymour 
(A)A.W. Seymour 
(A)C.J.J.T. Barton 
Sir Arthur Richards 
(A)C.J.J.T. Barton 
March 1897-July 1901 
July 1901-September 1902 
September 1902-March 1904 
March 1904-0ctober 1904 
October 1904-August 1910 
August 1910-February 1911 
February 1911-June 1912 
July 1912-June 1918 
August 1915-May 1916 
October 1918-January 1924 
May 1920-June 1920 
Hay 1921-Harch 1922 
January 1924-April 1925 
April 1925-April 1929 
November 1927-April 1928 
April 1929-November 1929 
November 1929-Hay 1936 
November 1932-August 1933 
Januarv 1934-}tarch 1935 
Hay 1936-November 1936 
November 1936-Ju1y 1938 
July 1938-September 1938 
Sir Harry Luke 
Sir Philip Hitchell 
(A)J.F. Nicoll 
A.H .G. H. Grantham 
Sir Brian Freeston 
(A)G.D. Chamberlain 
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September 1938-July 1942 
July 1942-0ctober 1944 
October 1944-January 1945 
January 1945-March 1947 
January 1948-September 1951 
September 1951-July 1952 
Governor of Fiji and Consul-General for the Western Pacific 
Sir Ronald Garvey July 1952-August 1958 
United Kingdom Chief _Commissioner in Tonga 
Sir Kenneth Haddocks August 1958-July 1963 
Sir Deryck Jakeway January 1964-June 1965 
(The post was discontinued from June 1965) 
(A)Acting -- only the more lengthy or significant periods of acting 
are listed. 
